Altman Z″
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
HORIZONIND · Not specified · INE685T01010
Analyst mean 0.00 · 0 analysts · 0% bullishThis company listed within the last twelve months, so its prospectus is still the primary source. The figures below were extracted from the DRHP and RHP before listing and scored then, and they are shown here as they stand in the IPO record rather than restated.
Each flag is a fact read in the filing, shown with the context that makes it meaningful.
Stated objects, as worded in the offer document. Deployment against them is tracked separately.
Claims made in the offer document, to be read against what the company has reported since.
Incorporated in 2009 and backed by the global expertise of the Blackstone Group, Horizon Industrial Parks Limited operates a premier, fully integrated, scaled pure-play logistics platform in India. As of May 31, 2026, the company's pan-India network consists of 45 strategically located assets spread across 10 major industrial and consumption cities (including Delhi-NCR, Mumbai, Bengaluru, Chennai, Pune, and Hyderabad), representing a Total Network area of 58.58 million square feet (msf). This comprises an Operational Network of 28.55 msf with an aggregate Committed Occupancy of 93.56%, and a Development Network of 30.03 msf. Horizon leverages freehold and long-term leasehold land parcels spanning 2,193.07 acres to deliver high-specification built-to-suit and plug-and-play logistics and light manufacturing facilities. Sourcing and executing projects completely in-house, the company serves a well-diversified marquee client pool of 118 customers across high-growth sectors like e-commerce, retail, FMCG, renewables, and auto-ancillaries. Furthermore, 54.05% of its Operational Network is contracted to Fortune 500 companies or their end-tenants. By bundling premium infrastructure with turnkey fits, green energy solutions, cold chain capacities, and staff accommodations, Horizon reduces customer time-to-market to six to nine months, creating strong client stickiness and substantial competitive barriers.
Horizon Industrial Parks' moat is established through its unrivaled scale as India's largest logistics developer (58.58 msf network), first-mover dominance in high-barrier in-city logistics (owning the country's largest urban portfolio of 17 centers totaling 6.91 msf), and deep global sponsorship from the Blackstone Group. This is reinforced by a highly sticky Fortune 500 customer base (making up 54.05% of Operational Network) and integrated turnkey/infrastructure bundling that accelerates merchant operations significantly faster than independent setups.
Horizon Industrial Parks Limited is India's largest industrial and logistics infrastructure developer, owner, and operator in terms of Total Network area. The company develops and manages Grade A quality fulfillment centers, industrial facilities, and in-city logistics hubs across prime domestic markets, generating revenue primarily through long-term facility lease rentals and maintenance services.
Source: RHP p. 222, 223, 227, 230
Where the revenue came from, as the document splits it.
| Name | Pct | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Facility rental income | 84.16 | RHP p. 684 |
| Revenue from maintenance services | 3.2 | RHP p. 684 |
| Other operating income | 2.68 | RHP p. 684 |
According to JLL, India's industrial and Grade A/B warehousing sector is expanding rapidly, driven by e-commerce expansion, quick commerce proliferation, and domestic manufacturing pushes. The Grade A completed stock has witnessed robust growth, scaling to 305.1 msf in CY2025 (up from 112.5 msf in CY2020) and projected to expand at a 25.30% CAGR to 943.6 msf by CY2030. Grade A occupancy has consistently improved from 89.60% to 92.40% and is expected to expand by +440 bps to 96.80% by CY2030, reflecting sustained demand. The segment is increasingly consolidating toward institutional developers offering Grade A, ESG-compliant facilities, while unorganized players face escalating barriers. However, the sector faces headwinds from land constraints, construction inflation, and supply-demand imbalances.
Growth rate: 25.30% CAGR (CY2025 - CY2030) for Grade A completed warehousing stock
Market size: 531.60 msf (Combined Grade A and B completed warehousing stock in India as of CY2025)
Sector slug: warehousing-and-logistics
Source: RHP p. 222, 236, 682
As presented in the offer document. Post-listing figures are in the statements above.
| Basis | Period | Related party revenue cr | Pat cr | Ebitda cr | Pat margin | Revenue cr | Pat margin derived |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| consolidated | FY26 | -203.649 | 607.8 | -29.46% | 691.381 | yes | |
| consolidated | FY25 | -178.781 | 339.117 | -45.81% | 390.286 | yes | |
| consolidated | FY24 | -162.21 | 151.51 | -70.88% | 228.861 | yes |
The measures this sector is actually judged on, as disclosed in the document. No feed supplies these.
Written before listing, answered from the document itself.
Where is the money going?
Out of the ₹2,600.00 crore Fresh Issue, ₹2,250.00 crore is allocated for the full or partial repayment and/or prepayment of outstanding borrowings availed by the Company and 16 of its Identified Subsidiaries (such as Bagur Logistics Park and Embassy Industrial Park Hosur), with the remaining balance allocated to general corporate purposes.
p. 33, 136
How concentrated is the customer base?
The customer base is moderately concentrated, with the top 10 customers contributing 42.60% of proforma revenues in FY26 (down from 43.12% in FY25 and 54.04% in FY24). The largest single customer contributes 11.12% of proforma revenues in FY26.
p. 35, 130
Is it profitable and growing?
The company's revenues are growing rapidly, with proforma revenues from operations increasing by 52.67% from ₹452.85 crore in FY24 to ₹691.38 crore in FY26, alongside an expanding consolidated proforma EBITDA margin of 79.07% in FY26. However, high interest costs and depreciation charges result in net losses at the bottom line, with the company reporting restated consolidated net losses of ₹203.65 crore in FY26, ₹178.78 crore in FY25, and ₹162.21 crore in FY24.
p. 40, 90, 180
What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
Contingent liabilities as of March 31, 2026 total ₹50.38 crore, dominated by ₹50.22 crore in goods and services tax (GST) disputes. Footnote risks also reveal: (i) an unquantified pending writ petition by the Federation of CWC Employees Union challenging the validity of warehouse concessions allotted to the company; (ii) several title and boundary suits across key assets; (iii) the fact that freehold/leasehold lands worth over ₹151.37 crore are not held in the respective company's name but remain registered under prior or predecessor entities; and (iv) a statutory auditor's CARO disclosure that short-term loans of ₹78.80 crore were diverted for long-term property acquisitions in a subsidiary.
p. 97, 133, 190, 196, 423-424, 727
What the issue priced at, on the figures in the document.
| Date | Name | Shares | Price per share | Category | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2025-06-04 | BREP Asia II Indian Holding Co VI (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 369529929 | promoter | p. 182, 183 | |
| 2025-07-15 | BREP Asia II Indian Holding Co VI (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 25147040 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-07-15 | BREP Asia II EIP Holding (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 36452960 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-07-30 | BREP Asia II Indian Holding Co VI (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 83638401 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-07-30 | BREP Asia II EIP Holding (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 121241599 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-08-07 | BREP Asia III India Holding Co III Pte. Ltd. | 746864563 | promoter | p. 183 | |
| 2025-10-15 | BREP Asia II Indian Holding Co VI (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 29967287 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-10-15 | BREP Asia II EIP Holding (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 43440354 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-10-15 | BREP Asia III India Holding Co III Pte. Ltd. | 46792359 | 50 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-12-05 | BREP Asia II EIP Holding (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 50125397 | promoter | p. 183 | |
| 2025-12-11 | BREP Asia II Indian Holding Co VI (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 20630710 | 59.81 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-12-11 | BREP Asia II EIP Holding (NQ) Pte. Ltd. | 31940664 | 59.81 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-12-11 | BREP Asia III India Holding Co III Pte. Ltd. | 32213779 | 59.81 | promoter | p. 183 |
| 2025-12-26 | 360 ONE Real Assets Advantage Fund and other financial investors | 275873599 | 59.81 | financial investor | p. 183 |
Ceo: Urvish Jayantilal Rambhia
Outstanding direct tax litigations against Subsidiaries consist of 13 cases involving an aggregate quantified amount of ₹47.997 crore. Indirect tax litigations consist of 2 cases against the Company involving ₹4.636 crore and 4 cases against Subsidiaries involving ₹31.135 crore. Outstanding material civil litigations include a writ petition (C.W.P. No. 16416 of 2025) before the Delhi High Court filed by the Federation of Central Warehousing Corporation Employees Unions challenging the asset monetization of CWC warehouses allotted to the company and its subsidiaries.
Auditor name: M S K C & Associates LLP and S G C O & Co. LLP
Promoters are affiliated with the Blackstone Group and collectively hold 88.74% of the pre-Offer paid-up Equity Share capital. None of the shares held by the Promoters are pledged or otherwise encumbered.
Statutory auditors issued unmodified opinions on the Restated Consolidated Financial Information. However, CARO reports of several subsidiaries contain multiple disclosures regarding: (i) database-level audit trail (edit log) features not being enabled or preserved in prior years; (ii) title deeds of freehold land (gross carrying value of ₹151.37 crore) held in previous names rather than the company's name; (iii) short-term inter-corporate deposits of ₹78.797 crore used for long-term investments in Everstrat Zenith Private Limited; and (iv) recurring cash losses at multiple early-stage asset SPVs.
Yes. Statutory auditors changed within the last three years: Walker Chandiok & Co LLP was joint statutory auditor for FY24; Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP resigned as statutory auditor on March 5, 2025, to avoid independence conflicts arising from non-audit services; M S K C & Associates LLP was appointed to fill the casual vacancy on March 5, 2025; and S G C O & Co. LLP was appointed as Joint Statutory Auditor on November 13, 2025.
Source: p. 1, 37, 49, 104, 129, 133, 187, 190, 196, 328-329, 423-424, 727, 736
A change between the two filings is a disclosure in itself.
| Field | Rhp value | Drhp value | Note | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period and Financial Statements | Restated consolidated financial statements covering Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 | Restated consolidated financial statements covering Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023, along with an interim 3-month stub period ended June 30, 2025 | The reporting timeline was rolled forward to cover full Fiscal 2026 financial statements, dropping the oldest reporting year (Fiscal 2023) and the interim 3-month stub period. | DRHP p. 523, 681; RHP p. 40, 90, 320 |
| Operational Network and Total Network Area | Operational Network of 28.55 msf and Total Network of 58.58 msf as of May 31, 2026 | Operational Network of 26.74 msf and Total Network of 58.01 msf as of November 30, 2025 | The company's Operational Network area increased by 1.81 msf, and the Total Network potential leasable area expanded by 0.57 msf over the updated reporting period. | DRHP p. 232, 335; RHP p. 12, 176, 228 |
| Committed Occupancy Rate | 93.56% as of May 31, 2026 | 94.55% as of November 30, 2025 | The committed occupancy of the Operational Network decreased slightly by 99 basis points between the two reporting periods. | DRHP p. 232; RHP p. 12, 228 |
| Capital Commitments | ₹1,264.05 crore as of March 31, 2026 | ₹847.93 crore as of June 30, 2025 | Estimated capital commitments for contracts remaining to be executed on capital account (net of advances) increased by ₹416.12 crore (approximately 49%). | DRHP p. 77, 334; RHP p. 34, 251, 313 |
| Contingent Liabilities - Other Claims | Nil as of March 31, 2026 | ₹17.68 crore as of June 30, 2025 | The unquantified other claims against the company not acknowledged as debt were resolved or dropped in the final prospectus. | DRHP p. 23, 77, 334; RHP p. 251, 313 |
| Contingent Liabilities - Income Tax | ₹0.16 crore as of March 31, 2026 | Nil as of June 30, 2025 | A new contingent liability for direct income tax disputes was added in the final filing. | DRHP p. 23, 77, 334; RHP p. 251, 313 |
Numbered markers are corporate actions and, once the filings are read, capital and governance events. Prices are split-adjusted so the series is continuous.
What the numbers mean when read together — computed from the filings, not a score.
Operating cash is -227% of trailing profit. On its own this can be working-capital timing in a growth year — worth watching whether it persists.
Why this reading: Kept at caution, not flagged: it is a single-year gap and the multi-year cash record does not (yet) show a repeated shortfall. One soft year is not a verdict.
Operating cash ₹464 cr vs trailing profit ₹-204 cr. A one-year gap below 0.5 is often growth working capital; it becomes a real concern only if it recurs.
Borrowings rose 110% over two years while the company also carries ₹737 cr in investments. Why borrow at interest while parking money elsewhere is a fair question.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Borrowings moved to ₹6,904 cr from ₹3,294 cr. Simultaneous large investments can be legitimate treasury management, or a sign that reported cash is not freely available.
Debt rose over 3 years, and most of it (167%) has turned into fixed assets and projects under construction — the borrowing is building the business.
Why this reading: A positive signal: leverage taken on is visibly becoming productive capacity, not disappearing.
New borrowing ₹4,569 cr largely matched by an asset build of ₹7,612 cr. Debt that funds capacity is a different thing from debt that funds nothing.
Net margin improved from -45.9% to -6% year-on-year — the business is keeping more of each rupee.
Why this reading: A positive signal in the numbers, shown for balance alongside the concerns.
Quarter net margin -6% vs -45.9% four quarters earlier. Expansion from operating leverage is healthy; verify it is not a one-off gain.
Free cash flow is positive and consistent — the business funds itself after capex.
Why this reading: A positive signal in the numbers, shown for balance alongside the concerns.
Latest free cash flow ₹472 cr. Negative in only 0 of 4 years. A self-funding business needs less external capital and dilutes less.
Every score below is calculated here from the reported numbers — none of it is asserted. Open the notebook at the foot of the section to see each formula with this company's figures in it.
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
Piotroski F-Score — fundamental momentum — Joseph Piotroski, University of Chicago, 2000, in a study of whether accounting signals could improve returns among cheap stocks.
Nine yes-or-no tests across profitability, leverage and operating efficiency. Each pass scores one. It asks a narrow question: is this business getting better or worse on its own terms, year over year?
How to read it7 or more suggests improving fundamentals; 3 or fewer suggests deterioration. It measures direction, not quality — a weak company improving can score higher than a strong one holding steady.
Where it failsA single year of comparison, so one unusual year distorts it. Says nothing about valuation, competitive position or management. Piotroski designed it to rank already-cheap stocks, not to judge a company in isolation.
Needs trade receivables, current assets, other expenses.
Accruals are -5.7% of assets. Free cash flow negative in 0 of 4 years.
DuPont decomposition — Devised inside the DuPont Corporation in the 1920s and still the standard way to read a return on equity.
Splits return on equity into its three sources, so the same headline number can be traced to very different businesses.
How to read itA 20% ROE built on margin and turnover is a different proposition from a 20% ROE built on 3× leverage. The first survives a downturn; the second amplifies it.
Where it failsA single year. Negative equity makes it meaningless. Leverage is structural for lenders, so the third term carries no signal there.
Revenue grew faster than the capital behind it, which is what operating leverage looks like: the existing asset base is working harder.
cumulative operating cash flow ÷ cumulative net profit
₹917 cr ÷ ₹-673 cr, over 4 years
-1.36×
Below 1.0 and persistent means profit is being recognised before the cash arrives.(net profit − operating cash flow) ÷ average total assets
(₹-204 − ₹464) cr ÷ average assets
-5.7%
Negative means cash exceeded profit — the healthier reading. Positive above ~10% is where accruals start to dominate earnings.net margin × asset turnover × leverage
-29.5% × 0.05 × 2.38
-3.6%
Splits ROE into whether returns come from operations or from borrowing.EBIT ÷ finance cost
₹342 cr ÷ ₹539 cr
0.63×
How many times operating profit covers the interest bill.borrowings ÷ net worth
₹6,904 cr ÷ ₹5,665 cr
1.22×
Read against the sector — infrastructure carries more than software.growth in fixed assets + CWIP, against growth in revenue
capital +307% vs revenue +358%, FY2023 to FY2026
-51pp gap
Money going in far faster than revenue coming out. For an incubator this is expected — the test is whether it eventually converts.Needs more balance-sheet detail (only 3 of 6 flags testable).
NOPAT over equity plus debt less cash, at a notional 25% tax. Incremental ROIC is the return on money put in since then — the number that decides whether growth creates value or consumes it.
Return on invested capital, and incremental ROIC — Standard in corporate finance; the incremental form was popularised by Michael Mauboussin as the test of whether growth creates value.
ROIC measures what the business earns on all the capital it employs — equity plus debt, less cash. Incremental ROIC asks a sharper question: what has it earned on the money put in since a chosen year?
How to read itROIC comfortably above the cost of capital — call it 11–13% in India — means growth compounds. Below it, growth consumes. Incremental below headline means recent investment is earning less than the legacy business.
Where it failsDistorted in the year of a large acquisition. Understated for companies mid-build, where capital is deployed but capacity has not yet been commissioned — an incubator will look poor until it does not.
Read downward. Cash can cover EBITDA and still not survive capex — the third rung is where a capital-hungry business shows itself.
The earnings quality ladder — Not a named model — the standard sequence an analyst walks when testing whether reported profit is real.
Three ratios read in order, each stricter than the last.
How to read itRead downward. Each rung failing where the one above passed tells you exactly where the cash is going.
Where it failsA single year of heavy capex depresses the third rung legitimately. Judge it across a cycle.
The growth rate that makes today's market value equal the discounted cash flows, at a 11.5% discount rate and 4.0% terminal growth. Not a forecast — the arithmetic of what is already in the price. Compare it with what the business has actually delivered.
Reverse DCF — the growth already in the price — A standard inversion of discounted cash flow, used to avoid the forecasting problem entirely.
Instead of forecasting cash flows and deriving a value, it takes today's market value as given and solves for the growth rate that would justify it. The output is not a view — it is the arithmetic of what the market is currently assuming.
How to read itCompare it with what the business has actually delivered. A price implying 30% a year against a decade of 15% is a demanding assumption; the reverse is a modest one.
Where it failsUseless when free cash flow is negative or unusually depressed, which is common mid-capex. Highly sensitive to the discount rate — a point either way moves the answer materially.
Against a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%.
Cost of debt — Interest expense over average borrowings — the effective rate the company actually pays.
What the lenders charge, which is a market verdict on credit quality that no rating agency delay affects.
How to read itAgainst a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%. Read the direction over years as much as the level.
Where it failsUnderstated where a large share of interest is capitalised into projects under construction. Not meaningful for lenders, where interest is cost of goods.
Some figures appear twice on this page with different values. That is not an error — they sit on different bases. The live feed reports a rolling twelve months; everything computed here comes from the last audited statements. Both are shown so you can see which is which.
Where the two disagree, every model, screen and ratio computed on this page uses the filed figure, because the rest of the page is on that basis.
Models that need these lines are withheld rather than estimated: net worth, current assets, current liabilities, trade receivables, inventory, net block. Nothing on this page is back-solved from a figure the company did not publish.
Each framework below is a set of stated, mechanical criteria from published work, run against this company's own filed numbers. Passing or failing a screen is not a verdict — different frameworks disagree by design, and that disagreement is itself informative.
Benjamin Graham's stated criteria for a defensive stock, applied to the filed numbers. A company failing several is not disqualified — Graham designed these to be deliberately strict.
Two ratios only: what the business earns on its capital, and what you pay for those earnings. Designed to be ranked across a universe rather than read in isolation.
The fundamental half of William O'Neil's framework. The market and leadership components are judgement calls and are not scored here.
The characteristics long-term holders commonly look for: cash-backed earnings, high returns on capital, and debt that never forces a decision.
Median of the companies we hold in the same sector (Not specified). Every figure on both sides is the live feed's trailing twelve months, so the two are measured the same way whatever depth of extraction this company has had. A number only means something next to something else — expensive against the market and cheap against peers are different facts.
Bars are revenue; the line is net margin. Revenue rising while the line falls is the shape worth noticing.
Operating cash first, then what the business spent and raised.
One year is a snapshot. These are the two lines that matter across a cycle.
Rising debtor or inventory days against flat sales is the earliest visible sign of stress.
Set your own assumptions and watch the numbers move. A scenario calculator — the outputs are the arithmetic of your inputs.
One canonical set of figures — the same numbers used everywhere else on this page and on the screener.
How the register has moved over recent quarters — the direction matters more than the level.
Promoter held steady from 75.40% to 75.40% across these quarters.
FII held steady from 5.92% to 5.92% across these quarters.
MF held steady from 2.11% to 2.11% across these quarters.
Other held steady from 16.57% to 16.57% across these quarters.
Where cash gets stuck. A rising inventory or debtor line against flat sales is the earliest sign of trouble in the numbers.
| Measure | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor days
How long customers take to pay | 20 | 31 | 28 | 18 |
| Cash conversion cycle
Debtor + inventory − payable days | 20 | 31 | 28 | 18 |
| Working capital days | -321 | -234 | -1,547 | -208 |
| ROCE %
Return on capital employed | — | 2.0% | 3.0% | 3.0% |
The shape of the business over time (annual) — read the direction, not the single print.
| Line | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 151 | 234 | 390 | 691 |
| Other income | 20 | 16 | 25 | 76 |
| Depreciation | 67 | 98 | 143 | 266 |
| Finance cost | 131 | 194 | 353 | 539 |
| Profit before tax | -160 | -139 | -181 | -197 |
| Net profit (owners) | -151 | -139 | -179 | -204 |
| EPS (₹) | -2.70 | -2.53 | -3.11 | -0.81 |
Exceptional items, total income and EBITDA are read from the filed statements.
| Metric | Jun 2025 | Mar 2026 | Jun 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue | 129 | 188 | 201 |
| Other Income | 7 | 45 | 40 |
| Expenses | 36 | 44 | 40 |
| Depreciation | 52 | 72 | 77 |
| Finance cost | 105 | 117 | 131 |
| Profit before tax | -58 | 0 | -7 |
| Net Profit | -58 | 1 | -12 |
| EPS | -0.62 | 0.00 | -0.04 |
| Item | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Capital | 536 | 536 | 536 | 2,450 |
| Reserves | 78 | 136 | 472 | 3,215 |
| Borrowings | 2,335 | 3,294 | 7,017 | 6,904 |
| Net block | 2,480 | 3,611 | 8,534 | 9,981 |
| CWIP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 111 |
| Investments | 51 | 80 | 131 | 737 |
| Total Assets | 3,174 | 4,290 | 9,835 | 13,495 |
| Line | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | 89 | 129 | 235 | 464 |
| Cash from investing | -409 | -791 | -1,583 | -4,740 |
| Cash from financing | 376 | 716 | 1,458 | 4,638 |
| Free cash flow | 94 | 130 | 235 | 472 |
| Net change in cash | 56 | 54 | 110 | 362 |
Cash from operations is the number profit has to answer to. Free cash flow is what remains after the business pays for its own growth.
These are coverage counts, not ratings. Each one asks a fixed set of questions of the filings and reports how many the company answered. A company that discloses nothing counts nothing here — that is a statement about the disclosure, not about the business.
The same read, applied to the companies this one competes with.