Vectras Enprocon
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Persistent negative operating cash flows across all reported financial years (-INR 5.10 Cr in FY26)
- Substantial related party transactions with promoter-owned partnership firm M/s Vectras
- Significant working capital lockup in work-in-progress inventory and trade receivables
- High customer concentration with top customer/partner firm contributing significantly to sales
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Engineering, Procurement, and Construction (EPC) company delivering infrastructure solutions across the Oil & Gas, Power, and Infrastructure sectors.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Incorporated in May 2021, Vectras Enprocon Limited provides integrated EPC services in the Midstream and Downstream segments of the Oil & Gas industry, including cross-country pipelines, combined station works, city gas stations, civil infrastructure, and electrical/instrumentation works across India.
Established execution track record in Oil & Gas EPC projects with strong order book (INR 183.28 Crore as of September 30, 2026) and approvals from PSUs like IOCL, HPCL, and BPCL.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Pre-payment/ re-payment, in part or full, of certain outstanding borrowings availed by our Company
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 119.802 | 80.4803 | 54.3189 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 15.4327 | 10.1677 | 5.8119 |
| PAT Margin | 12.88% | 12.63% | 10.7% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations (FY25 to FY26) | ↑ 48.9% | Primary reason was higher utilisation of order book and increased project execution. | Structural |
| EBITDA (FY25 to FY26) | ↑ 59.6% | Expansion in order book and better absorption of fixed costs. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Working capital intensity and long project cycles company persistent
Oil & Gas EPC projects span 6 to 36 months, requiring significant working capital for procurement and bank guarantee margins.
Tailwinds
- Expansion in national pipeline networks and government focus on infrastructure capex macro
India's oil consumption is projected to rise 50% by 2030, driving demand for midstream and downstream oil & gas pipelines.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-11-05
- Pre Application Start2026-10-29
- Bidding Start2026-10-30
- Bidding End2026-11-03
- Allotment Process Start2026-11-04
- Allotment Finalization2026-11-05
- Listing Day2026-11-06
- Mandate End2026-12-15
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 119.80 | 80.48 | 54.32 |
| Other Income | 0.10 | 0.05 | 0.05 |
| Total Income | 119.90 | 80.53 | 54.37 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 29.66 | 25.15 | 21.20 |
| Changes in Inventories | -14.69 | -12.56 | -2.22 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 13.23 | 5.70 | 3.67 |
| Finance Cost | 1.90 | 0.77 | 0.22 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.38 | 0.77 | 0.38 |
| Other Expenses | 4.09 | 2.58 | 1.96 |
| Total Expenses | 99.06 | 66.97 | 46.25 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 20.84 | 13.56 | 8.12 |
| Exceptional Items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 20.84 | 13.56 | 8.12 |
| Tax Expense | 5.41 | 3.39 | 2.30 |
| Profit After Tax | 15.43 | 10.17 | 5.81 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 15.43 | 10.17 | 5.81 |
| EPS - Basic | 10.29 | 6.78 | 4.17 |
| EPS - Diluted | 10.29 | 6.78 | 4.17 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 15.00 | 2.50 | 2.50 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 22.75 | 19.82 | 9.65 |
| Net Worth | 37.75 | 22.32 | 12.15 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 1.53 | 1.78 | 0.12 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 20.68 | 10.09 | 4.03 |
| Total Borrowings | 22.21 | 11.87 | 4.16 |
| Trade Payables | 6.06 | 9.59 | 1.99 |
| Current Liabilities | 28.72 | 22.29 | 8.45 |
| Total Liabilities | 74.94 | 46.50 | 21.47 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 5.95 | 3.69 | 1.78 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 34.79 | 15.75 | 4.91 |
| Trade Receivables | 21.16 | 19.05 | 8.86 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 2.21 | 2.81 | 2.93 |
| Current Assets | 66.21 | 38.03 | 17.78 |
| Total Assets | 74.94 | 46.50 | 21.47 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -5.10 | -4.44 | -1.29 |
| Capital Expenditure | 3.99 | 2.68 | 2.12 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -4.33 | -3.31 | -2.67 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 8.43 | 6.98 | 6.15 |
| Net Change in Cash | -1.00 | -0.77 | 2.18 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 20.1 | 18.8 | 16 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 19 | 17.8 | 15.3 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 12.9 | 12.6 | 10.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 40.9 | 45.6 | 47.8 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 37.9 | 41.9 | 51.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 20.6 | 21.9 | 27.1 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.59 | 0.53 | 0.34 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.83 | 0.6 | 0.14 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 11.97 | 18.57 | 37.79 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.3 | 1.71 | 2.1 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.09 | 1 | 1.52 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.6 | 1.73 | 2.53 |
| Receivable Days | 64 | 86 | 60 |
| Inventory Days | 848 | 457 | 94 |
| Payable Days | 148 | 278 | 38 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 764 | 265 | 116 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.33 | -0.44 | -0.22 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 27.4 | 31.4 | 33.1 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.9 | 3.48 | 5.52 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 12.9% | 12.6% | 10.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.6x | 1.73x | 2.53x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.99x | 2.08x | 1.77x |
| = Return on Equity | 40.9% | 45.6% | 47.8% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.75x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.92x | 0.95x | 0.97x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 19% | 17.8% | 15.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 15.43 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -5.10 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Interest coverage was 11.97x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.31An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.746 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.914 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.36 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.489 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.922 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.405 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.78 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.274 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.31, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 10.09 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.5 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.304 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.303 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.504 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 10.09 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
4 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹14.6 cr in FY25, ₹20.5 cr in FY26
- ○Receivable days rising · 86 days in FY25, 64 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 457 days in FY25, 848 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 0.5% of revenue in FY25, 6.7% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 20.9% of net block in FY25, 23.1% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 61.2% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.33x profit in FY26, against -0.44x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 37.75 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 14.2%
14.2% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.11x
Short-term borrowings of 20.68 cr against cash of 2.21 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.9%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.60 cr against a profit of 15.43 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹105.00, the market value is ₹200 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹20.0 cr | 1.3x | 1.9 | 1.2 |
| 12% a year | ₹24.0 cr | 1.6x | 3.2 | 2.0 |
| 14% a year | ₹28.0 cr | 1.8x | 4.3 | 2.7 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 7.71% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -4.55% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹9.1 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth15.43 ÷ 37.75What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)22.74 ÷ (37.75 + 22.21) = 22.74 ÷ 59.96Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue24.11 ÷ 119.80Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth22.21 ÷ 37.75How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost22.74 ÷ 1.90How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(21.16 ÷ 119.80) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days848 + 64 − 148How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-5.10 ÷ 15.43Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(15.43 − -5.10) ÷ 74.94 = 20.54 ÷ 74.94The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹105.00 × 19,056,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash200.09 + 22.21 − 2.21What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA220.09 ÷ 24.11The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT200.09 ÷ 15.43The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ EPS, on pre- and post-issue share counts₹10.29 EPS pre → ₹8.10 EPS postThe fresh issue expands the share count by 21.28%, so the same profit is spread across more shares. The multiple quoted in the filing is struck on pre-issue earnings; the one on the right is what a buyer actually holds on listing day. The gap closes only if the new capital earns a return, which has not happened yet.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹105.00 ÷ ₹13.33Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹15.43 cr ÷ ₹200.09 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-9.10 cr ÷ ₹200.09 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)12.97 ÷ 51.8%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Substantial Related Party Business Flows with Promoter Partnership Firm
The company generated INR 17.06 Crore in sales (14.24% of revenue) and INR 11.79 Crore in purchases (34.67% of raw materials) in FY26 with M/s Vectras, a 50:50 partnership firm of the promoters.
Source: p.22, 25, 36, 244Persistent Operating Cash Outflows
The company reported negative cash flows from operating activities across FY24 (-INR 1.29 Cr), FY25 (-INR 4.44 Cr), and FY26 (-INR 5.10 Cr) due to working capital lockup in inventory and receivables.
Source: p.30, 54, 165Dual Business Operations and Non-Compete Agreement
Promoters operate a competing partnership firm M/s Vectras; a non-compete agreement dated September 25, 2025 mandates subcontracting awarded public sector orders to the company.
Source: p.22, 37, 38Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Chandresh Manubhai Suthar
Litigation: No criminal, material civil, or tax litigation pending against Company or Promoters.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pratham EPC Projects Limited | 34.47 | — | 7.44 | — |
| Desco Infratech Limited | 8.35 | — | 25.21 | — |
| Likhitha Infrastructure Limited | 22.43 | — | 9.82 | — |
At the ₹105 upper band, the issue is priced at 10.2x earnings — a 55% discount to the peer median of 22.4x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Indian EPC Industry
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| India Overall EPC Industry Market Size 2024 | USD 175.30 Billion | CAGR of 7.7% from 2021 to 2024 based on Dun & Bradstreet Report |
Source: p.117, 118
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Company executed significant related party sales (INR 17.06 Crore in FY26) and purchases (INR 11.79 Crore in FY26) with M/s Vectras, a partnership firm in which both Promoters hold 50% interest.
p.37, 44, 56Company reported negative cash flow from operating activities across FY24 (-INR 1.29 Cr), FY25 (-INR 4.44 Cr), and FY26 (-INR 5.10 Cr) despite expanding restated PAT.
p.54, 102, 165Promoters Naynesh Kanubhai Patel and Maheshkumar Gopalbhai Patel are 50% partners each in M/s Vectras, a partnership firm engaged in the same EPC line of business.
p.37, 38No criminal, material civil, or tax litigation pending against Company or Promoters.
p. 2, 50, 56, 156 and 1 moreOperating cash flow was negative ₹5.10 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹15.43 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>014.2% of FY26 revenue came from connected entities.
rule: RPT revenue 5-15%Revenue grew, the related-party share of it grew, and operating cash flow fell, all in FY26. No one of these is evidence on its own. Together they are the pattern worth understanding before the other numbers on this page.
rule: sales↑ + RPT share↑ + CFO↓Short-term borrowings of ₹20.68 cr against cash of ₹2.21 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Evaluated against revenue CAGR of 48.51% and PAT CAGR of 62.95% from FY24 to FY26.
p.21, 35, 134Inventories increased from INR 4.91 Cr in FY24 to INR 34.79 Cr in FY26 while operating cash flow remained negative (-INR 5.10 Cr in FY26).
p.52, 54, 102Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Dec 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What is the extent of transaction flow with the promoters' partnership firm M/s Vectras?
In FY26, the company recorded sales of INR 17.06 Crore (14.24% of revenue) and purchases of INR 11.79 Crore (34.67% of raw material purchases) with M/s Vectras, a 50:50 partnership firm of the promoters.
p.44, 56, 244, 246Why is cash flow from operating activities negative despite strong reported PAT growth?
Operating cash flow was negative at -INR 5.10 Crore in FY26 (compared to PAT of INR 15.43 Crore) due to heavy working capital lockup, including an increase in inventory (work-in-progress) of INR 19.04 Crore and trade receivables.
p.54, 165, 238What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Naynesh Kanubhai Patel | — | 2025-09-20 | — |
| Maheshkumar Gopalbhai Patel | — | 2025-09-20 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 06 Nov 2029Promoter Minimum Contribution3 years
- 06 Nov 2028Promoter Excess Shareholding (50%)2 years
- 06 Nov 2027Promoter Excess Shareholding (50%)1 year
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
