Vinod Texworld
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Ongoing block assessment under Section 158BC following an Income Tax search and seizure raid on December 9, 2025.
- Deeply negative cumulative Cash Flow from Operations of -10.84 Crore over FY24-FY26 despite 25.13 Crore in reported net profits.
- Extreme related-party concentration, with 54.30% of core raw materials (greige fabric) purchased from promoter-owned Vinod Cotfab Private Limited.
- Outstanding tax demands of 0.5339 Crore and unquantifiable contingent liabilities from the ongoing block assessment.
- Promoters personal guarantees securing 74.44% of total outstanding borrowings.
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Vinod Texworld Limited is engaged in the manufacturing, processing, supplying, and trading of textile products, catering to both domestic and international markets.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Vinod Texworld Limited operates in the textile industry with core operations in the dyeing and printing of greige fabric. Its processing facility is located in Ahmedabad, Gujarat. Over the last three fiscal years, the company has undertaken a strategic shift in its business model, transitioning from a job-work service provider to a fully integrated in-house manufacturing and direct sales model, which offers better margins and pricing control. It also engages in trading of textile products to supplement its offerings, though trading yields lower margins. In Fiscal 2026, the company exported products to Nepal, but remains heavily focused on the domestic market, which accounted for 99.02% of its Fiscal 2026 revenue. To support its growth, the company is undertaking an expansion of its existing fabric processing and dyeing plant during FY 2026-27.
The company's competitive strengths include its established manufacturing and processing facility, its transition to a high-margin direct sales model, and its experienced promoter and management team.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Expansion of Existing Plant — ₹6.39 cr
- Repayment of Loan — ₹7.15 cr
- To meet working capital requirements — ₹20.35 cr
- General Corporate Purpose — ₹5.97 cr
Valuation at the Offer Price
These are the multiples the issuer is required to disclose under “Basis for the Offer Price”. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 342.6362 | 335.3693 | 271.488 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 10.4074 | 9.2336 | 5.4864 |
| PAT Margin | 3.04% | 2.75% | 2.02% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 342.64 | 335.37 | 271.49 |
| Other Income | 0.32 | 0.37 | 0.17 |
| Total Income | 342.96 | 335.74 | 271.65 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 240.61 | 237.71 | 203.09 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 52.32 | 53.17 | 42.90 |
| Changes in Inventories | -5.86 | -7.64 | -15.81 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 4.17 | 3.95 | 3.19 |
| Finance Cost | 5.82 | 5.15 | 2.56 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 3.48 | 3.88 | 2.94 |
| Other Expenses | 28.29 | 26.89 | 25.63 |
| Total Expenses | 328.83 | 323.10 | 264.50 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 14.13 | 12.64 | 7.16 |
| Profit Before Tax | 14.13 | 12.64 | 7.16 |
| Tax Expense | 3.72 | 3.40 | 1.67 |
| Profit After Tax | 10.41 | 9.23 | 5.49 |
| EPS - Basic | 8.97 | 7.96 | 4.78 |
| EPS - Diluted | 8.97 | 7.96 | 4.78 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 11.60 | 11.60 | 11.60 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 31.20 | 20.80 | 11.56 |
| Net Worth | 42.81 | 32.40 | 23.16 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 19.05 | 17.48 | 19.47 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 51.43 | 48.80 | 27.54 |
| Total Borrowings | 70.48 | 66.28 | 47.01 |
| Trade Payables | 58.26 | 70.48 | 72.60 |
| Current Liabilities | 118.44 | 126.90 | 111.05 |
| Total Liabilities | 138.69 | 145.28 | 131.11 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 26.61 | 24.02 | 25.84 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.06 | 0.62 |
| Investments | 0.04 | 0.04 | 0.03 |
| Inventories | 65.83 | 60.33 | 45.56 |
| Trade Receivables | 82.90 | 87.54 | 76.49 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.42 | 0.21 | 0.14 |
| Current Assets | 154.71 | 153.47 | 128.23 |
| Total Assets | 181.50 | 177.68 | 154.28 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 7.87 | -11.97 | -6.75 |
| Capital Expenditure | -6.15 | -2.37 | -5.91 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -6.05 | -2.08 | -5.86 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -1.61 | 14.12 | 10.57 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.21 | 0.07 | -2.03 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 6.8 | 6.5 | 4.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 5.8 | 5.3 | 3.6 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 3 | 2.8 | 2 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 24.3 | 28.5 | 23.7 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 17.6 | 18 | 13.8 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 5.7 | 5.2 | 3.6 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 1.65 | 2.05 | 2.03 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 2.99 | 3.05 | 3.7 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 3.43 | 3.46 | 3.8 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.31 | 1.21 | 1.15 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.75 | 0.73 | 0.74 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.89 | 1.89 | 1.76 |
| Receivable Days | 88 | 95 | 103 |
| Inventory Days | 70 | 66 | 61 |
| Payable Days | 62 | 77 | 98 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 96 | 84 | 66 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.76 | -1.3 | -1.23 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 1.4 | 11.9 | 7.9 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.77 | 0.61 | 2.01 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 3% | 2.8% | 2% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.89x | 1.89x | 1.76x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 4.24x | 5.48x | 6.66x |
| = Return on Equity | 24.3% | 28.5% | 23.7% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.73x | 0.77x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.71x | 0.71x | 0.74x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 5.8% | 5.3% | 3.6% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 26% while profit grew 90%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Debt to equity stood at 1.65x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.927 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.978 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.022 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.202 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.03 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.932 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.014 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.18 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.2 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.172 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.11 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.309 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.18 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 43.3%
Contingent liabilities of 18.55 cr against a net worth of 42.81 cr — 43.3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 15.1%
15.1% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.01x
Short-term borrowings of 51.43 cr against cash of 0.42 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.6%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.37 cr against a profit of 10.41 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth10.41 ÷ 42.81What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)19.95 ÷ (42.81 + 70.48) = 19.95 ÷ 113.29Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue23.42 ÷ 342.64Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth70.48 ÷ 42.81How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost19.95 ÷ 5.82How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(82.90 ÷ 342.64) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days70 + 88 − 62How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT7.87 ÷ 10.41Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(10.41 − 7.87) ÷ 181.50 = 2.53 ÷ 181.50The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹94.00 × 16,157,600 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash151.88 + 70.48 − 0.42What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA221.94 ÷ 23.42The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT151.88 ÷ 10.41The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)14.59 ÷ 12.7%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Income Tax Search and Seizure: An Unquantified Shadow over the IPO
On December 9, 2025, the Income Tax Department conducted a search and seizure raid at the office premises of Vinod Texworld Limited, covering the block period from FY 2019-20 up to the search date. Although a formal block assessment notice under Section 158BC was issued on July 2, 2026, and materials were supplied in August 2026, the company has not yet filed its return or received any assessment order. No provision has been made in the restated financial statements for potential tax liabilities, interest, or penalties arising from this raid. Consequently, public investors are entering a company with an active, unquantified tax liability risk that could severely impact post-IPO net worth.
Source: p.368, 369Sourcing Captivity: Sourcing Over 54% of Raw Materials from Promoters
Vinod Texworld Limited's operational model is deeply intertwined with its promoter group. In FY26, the company purchased 130.6519 Crore of greige fabric from promoter-owned Vinod Cotfab Private Limited, which represents 54.30% of its total cost of raw materials consumed (240.6125 Crore). This captive supply chain gives the promoter entity immense leverage over the company's cost structure and margin profile. If Vinod Cotfab alters its credit terms or pricing, the issuer's profitability could be wiped out. Furthermore, because these transactions are carried out on a non-competitive, related-party basis, public shareholders have no independent assurance of arm's-length pricing.
Source: p.F-18Paper Profits vs. Empty Coffers: The Working Capital Liquidity Trap
A detailed analysis of the company's cash flow statements reveals that its impressive restated profit growth is purely on paper. Between FY24 and FY26, reported PAT nearly doubled from 5.4864 Crore to 10.4074 Crore, generating a total of 25.1274 Crore in cumulative profits. However, over the same period, cumulative cash flow from operations was deeply negative at -10.8436 Crore. This cash drain was caused by cash getting locked up in receivables (which stood at 82.8951 Crore in FY26) and inventory (65.8339 Crore in FY26). The company's business expansion is acting as a liquidity trap, forcing it to raise 20.35 Crore of IPO proceeds just to fund working capital requirements that its core business operations cannot cash-convert.
Source: p.F-5, F-7, F-11Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Yash Vinod Mittal
Litigation: Civil cases against company: 2 labour disputes before Labour Court for Rs. 0.0266 Crore (Vimlesh Pal Yadav claiming unpaid salary of Rs. 2.66 lakhs). Criminal cases against company/promoters/directors: NIL. Tax demands/notices: Rs. 0.5339 Crore across 5 cases against the company, including a GST demand of Rs. 23.49 lakhs for FY24 and an ongoing Income Tax block assessment proceeding following a search carried out on December 9, 2025.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jakharia Fabric Limited | 22.08 | — | 13.1 | — |
| Borana Weaves Ltd | 12.61 | — | 22.95 | — |
At the ₹94 upper band, the issue is priced at 10.5x earnings — a 40% discount to the peer median of 17.3x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
On December 9, 2025, the Income Tax Department conducted a search and seizure proceeding (raid) at the office premises of Vinod Texworld Limited, covering the block period from FY 2019-20 up to December 2025. Subsequently, a block assessment notice under Section 158BC was received on July 2, 2026. The proceedings are currently ongoing, no block assessment order has been passed, and no provisions have been made in the restated financial statements for potential liabilities.
p.368, 369The company's restated PAT rose from 5.4864 Crore in FY24 to 9.2336 Crore in FY25 and to 10.4074 Crore in FY26, generating a cumulative net profit of 25.1274 Crore. However, over the same three-year period, cumulative cash flow from operations was deeply negative at -10.8436 Crore (-6.7469 Crore in FY24, -11.9693 Crore in FY25, and 7.8726 Crore in FY26) because cash was continuously locked up in working capital.
p.F-5, F-7The company relies heavily on promoter-owned entity Vinod Cotfab Private Limited for its raw material supply. In FY26, purchases of greige fabric from Vinod Cotfab amounted to 130.6519 Crore, which represents 54.30% of the company's total cost of raw materials consumed (240.6125 Crore) and 39.73% of total expenses.
p.F-18Promoters Harsh Mittal and Yash Mittal have provided personal guarantees totaling 52.4707 Crore to secure the company's credit and banking facilities, which covers 74.44% of the company's total outstanding debt of 70.4847 Crore.
p.33, 361On March 31, 2024, the company allotted 1,25,000 equity shares via a rights issue at a price of 80.00 per share, which is 1.18x lower than the IPO fixed price of 94.00.
p.110, 146Civil cases against company: 2 labour disputes before Labour Court for Rs. 0.0266 Crore (Vimlesh Pal Yadav claiming unpaid salary of Rs. 2.66 lakhs). Criminal cases against company/promoters/directors: NIL. Tax demands/notices: Rs. 0.5339 Crore across 5 cases against the company, including a GST demand of Rs. 23.49 lakhs for FY24 and an ongoing Income Tax block assessment proceeding following a search carried out on December 9, 2025.
p.2, p.247, p.36515.1% of FY26 revenue (₹51.80 cr) came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue sold to yourself is not revenue won in the market.
rule: RPT revenue > 15%Short-term borrowings of ₹51.43 cr against cash of ₹0.42 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While reported PAT margins did expand from 2.02% in FY24 to 2.75% in FY25 and 3.04% in FY26, this paper profitability did not translate into liquidity. Cumulative cash flow from operations was deeply negative at -10.84 Crore over the three-year period, proving that the model transition has severely locked up cash in working capital.
p.201, F-5, F-7Although the statutory edit log features have been maintained within Tally throughout the audit period, the company was subjected to a major Income Tax Department search and seizure (raid) on December 9, 2025, and carries 22 instances of delayed ROC filings, indicating historical compliance gaps.
p.24, 46, 51, 368, F-25The company's estimated working capital cycle of 94 days for FY27 is consistent with actual receivable days (88 days) and inventory days (84 days) in FY26. However, because cumulative operating cash flows are deeply negative, the company is entirely dependent on the IPO proceeds of 20.35 Crore to fund its incremental working capital gap.
p.129, 272, F-6Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (23 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What is the detailed breakdown of the IPO proceeds, and what percentage is allocated to working capital and general corporate purposes?
The fresh issue size is 42.8302 Crore. Proceeds are allocated as: 20.3500 Crore (47.51%) for working capital, 7.1500 Crore (16.70%) for term loan repayments, 6.3877 Crore (14.92%) for existing plant expansion, and 5.9727 Crore (13.94%) for General Corporate Purposes (GCP). The combined unfalsifiable raise (Working Capital + GCP) is 26.3227 Crore, representing 61.46% of the issue.
p.120, 129What is the promoters' skin in the game, and has there been any cheap allotment within 24 months of the IPO?
Promoters hold 76.72% pre-issue, diluting to 55.08% post-issue. There was a rights allotment of 1,25,000 shares to promoters on March 31, 2024 (17-18 months prior to the offering) at a WACA of 80.00 per share, which is a 15% discount to the public fixed offering price of 94.00.
p.106, 110, 146What is the level of related-party transaction dependency and does it present conflict of interest risks?
Related-party dependency is extremely high. The company purchased 130.6519 Crore of greige fabric from promoter-owned Vinod Cotfab Private Limited in FY26, representing 54.30% of total raw materials consumed. It also sold 51.7915 Crore of processed fabric to promoter-owned Vinod Denim Limited, accounting for 15.11% of total revenue.
p.F-18Why is there such a massive gap between cumulative reported profits and cash flows from operations?
The gap is driven by a working capital liquidity trap. Over FY24-FY26, cumulative PAT was 25.1274 Crore, but cumulative CFO was negative at -10.8436 Crore. This occurred because cash was continuously locked up in trade receivables, which stood at 82.8951 Crore in FY26 (24.19% of revenue), and inventories, which stood at 65.8339 Crore in FY26 (19.21% of revenue).
p.F-5, F-7, F-11What are the key internal control and accounting software disclosures certified by the statutory auditors?
The statutory auditors certified that the company used integrated billing and accounting software (Tally) that maintained a continuous, un-tampered audit trail (edit log) for all transactions recorded throughout the year. However, historical secretarial records show 22 statutory ROC forms were filed with delays, and clerical errors were present in ADT-1, MGT-7, and AOC-4 forms from FY15 to FY22.
p.24, 46, 51, 68What are the lot size, trading ticket size, and market maker terms for public investors?
The IPO has a fixed price of 94.00 and a lot size of 1,200 shares. Minimum retail applications require 1 lot (1,200 shares) costing 1,12,800. Trading occurs strictly in lot sizes of 1,200 and lots are indivisible, making partial exit or trading of odd lots impossible. Giriraj Stock Broking Private Limited is the Market Maker with a mandatory 3-year obligation period, and a daily circuit limit of 5% applies.
p.2, 52, 79, 87, 98What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to MOA | ₹10.00 | 2012-07-19 | 9.4x |
| An early round from roughly 14 years ago, at roughly 9.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Right Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2013-12-24 | 9.4x |
| An early round from roughly 13 years ago, at roughly 9.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Right Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2015-03-30 | 9.4x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 9.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Right Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2018-03-27 | 9.4x |
| An early round from roughly 9 years ago, at roughly 9.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Right Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2020-02-10 | 9.4x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 9.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Yash Vinod Mittal & Others | ₹10.00 | 2022-03-30 | 9.4x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 9.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Harsh Vinod Mittal & Others | ₹42.00 | 2023-03-28 | 2.2x |
| Harsh Vinod Mittal & Others | ₹80.00 | 2024-03-31 | 1.2x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 17 Sep 2029promoter3 years3,231,552 shares (20% of total)
- 17 Sep 2028promoter2 years2,834,194 shares (17.54% of total)
- 17 Sep 2027promoter1 year2,834,194 shares (17.54% of total)
- 17 Sep 2027person other than promoter1 year2,701,260 shares (16.72% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.