Technocrats Plasma Systems
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride financials: stand-alone revenue and profits surged in FY26 but operating cash flow collapsed to negative ₹-11.66 Cr due to ballooning receivables and inventories
- Severe previous auditor qualifications on balance confirmations and untracked, unverified inventory records
- Treasury and corporate law violations regarding premature preferential escrow account transfers in FY25
- Significant outstanding tax and commercial litigations under appeal (₹1.73 Cr sales tax and ₹0.59 Cr commercial lawsuit)
- Insiders and promoters adjusted acquisition costs to single digits via splits and bonus issues just prior to the public offering
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Technocrats Plasma Systems Limited is an India-based engineering-led manufacturer of plasma cutting machines, welding equipment, and customized automation systems.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Technocrats Plasma Systems Limited is an engineering-led manufacturer of plasma cutting machines, welding equipment, and customized automation systems. The company operates two manufacturing facilities located in Vasai, Maharashtra, with an aggregate built-up area of 20,000 square feet. Its manufacturing plant has a pro-rata average installed capacity of 70.88 units per year across the last three financial years. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, the company had average production of 35.50 units, representing a capacity utilization rate of 50.08%. The company sells its products B2B to fabrication shops, OEMs, and industrial customers across engineering, automotive, infrastructure, heavy machinery, and shipbuilding sectors. These products are distributed directly and through a network of authorized dealers and channel partners centrally coordinated from its corporate office.
Key operational moats include indigenous design and development capabilities, in-house fabrication with integrated testing capabilities, strong repeat business and recognition from institutional customers, and experienced promoters with deep domain knowledge.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Purchase and installation of plant and machinery for manufacturing of plasma cutting machines, welding equipment and customised automation systems at the Existing Premises — ₹8.79 cr
- Funding towards long term working capital requirements — ₹40.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured18%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 131.309 | 49.3568 | 6.0623 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 14.936 | 8.1096 | 2.2051 |
| PAT Margin | 11.37% | 16.43% | 36.37% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 131.31 | 49.36 | 6.06 |
| Other Income | 0.10 | 0.08 | 0.29 |
| Total Income | 131.41 | 49.44 | 6.35 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 112.69 | 44.41 | 2.32 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 2.73 | 1.73 | 1.28 |
| Other Expenses | 3.83 | 3.62 | 1.61 |
| Total Expenses | 106.47 | 41.68 | 5.55 |
| EBITDA | 26.29 | 8.59 | 1.30 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.20 | 0.12 | 0.12 |
| EBIT | 26.09 | 8.47 | 1.18 |
| Finance Cost | 1.24 | 0.80 | 0.66 |
| Profit Before Tax | 24.94 | 7.76 | 0.81 |
| Tax Expense | 10.00 | -0.35 | -1.40 |
| Profit After Tax | 14.94 | 8.11 | 2.21 |
| EPS - Basic | 11.63 | 7.46 | 2.05 |
| EPS - Diluted | 11.63 | 7.46 | 2.05 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 12.88 | 1.64 | 1.54 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 26.13 | 12.61 | 2.20 |
| Net Worth | 39.01 | 14.24 | 3.74 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 7.97 | 8.01 | 2.77 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 6.76 | 2.23 | 3.89 |
| Total Borrowings | 14.73 | 10.24 | 6.66 |
| Trade Payables | 11.24 | 8.88 | 1.02 |
| Current Liabilities | 24.70 | 14.30 | 6.92 |
| Total Liabilities | 33.05 | 22.47 | 9.82 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 2.29 | 1.42 | 1.48 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.13 | 0.02 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 33.18 | 14.81 | 5.08 |
| Trade Receivables | 20.98 | 14.94 | 3.27 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.44 | 0.24 | 0.28 |
| Current Assets | 69.15 | 30.94 | 9.17 |
| Total Assets | 72.06 | 36.72 | 13.55 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -11.66 | -5.05 | 0.79 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.05 | 0.05 | 0.00 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -1.21 | -0.18 | 0.02 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 13.07 | 5.18 | -0.62 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.20 | -0.04 | 0.18 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 20 | 17.4 | 20.4 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 19.9 | 17.1 | 18.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 11.4 | 16.4 | 36.4 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 38.3 | 56.9 | 59 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 48.5 | 34.6 | 11.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 20.7 | 22.1 | 16.3 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.38 | 0.72 | 1.78 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.54 | 1.16 | 4.91 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 20.98 | 10.62 | 1.78 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.8 | 2.16 | 1.33 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.46 | 1.13 | 0.59 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.82 | 1.34 | 0.45 |
| Receivable Days | 58 | 110 | 197 |
| Inventory Days | 92 | 110 | 306 |
| Payable Days | 31 | 66 | 62 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 119 | 154 | 441 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.78 | -0.62 | 0.36 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 36.9 | 35.8 | 10.5 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 5.29 | 0.45 | 0.02 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 11.4% | 16.4% | 36.4% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.82x | 1.34x | 0.45x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.85x | 2.58x | 3.63x |
| = Return on Equity | 38.3% | 56.9% | 59% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.6x | 1.05x | 2.74x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.96x | 0.92x | 0.68x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 19.9% | 17.2% | 19.4% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 14.94 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -11.66 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days fell from 197 to 58. Collections improved over the disclosed period.
- Interest coverage was 20.98x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -0.06An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.528 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.707 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.072 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 2.66 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.983 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.461 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.747 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.3692 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -0.06, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 12.15 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.617 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.363 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.362 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.18 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 12.15 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.78x profit in FY26, against -0.62x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 14.1%
Contingent liabilities of 5.52 cr against a net worth of 39.01 cr — 14.1% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.06x
Short-term borrowings of 6.76 cr against cash of 0.44 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.45 cr against a profit of 14.94 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth14.94 ÷ 39.01What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)26.09 ÷ (39.01 + 14.73) = 26.09 ÷ 53.74Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue26.29 ÷ 131.31Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth14.73 ÷ 39.01How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost26.09 ÷ 1.24How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(20.98 ÷ 131.31) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days92 + 58 − 31How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-11.66 ÷ 14.94Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(14.94 − -11.66) ÷ 72.06 = 26.60 ÷ 72.06The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹132.00 × 17,500,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash231.00 + 14.73 − 0.44What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA245.29 ÷ 26.29The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT231.00 ÷ 14.94The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)15.47 ÷ 84.2%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Aggressive pre-IPO Profit dressing Decoupled from Real Cash Flows
Technocrats Plasma Systems shows a classic 'dressed bride' financial profile immediately prior to listing. Standalone revenue and PAT grew exponentially in FY26, but operating cash flow collapsed to a negative ₹-11.66 Cr, driven by trade receivables ballooning to ₹20.98 Cr and inventories swelling to ₹33.18 Cr.
Source: p. 49-52, 57, 58Systemic Compliance Deficits and Auditor Qualifications on Balance Reconciliations
The prospectus reveals profound internal control and compliance defaults. The statutory auditor qualified prior books due to a complete lack of balance confirmations and inventory quantitative records. Furthermore, the company violated Companies Act Section 42(4) by prematurely transferring preferential share subscription funds from escrow to current accounts before ROC allotment filings.
Source: p. 2, 4, 31, 33-38, 742, 859-868, 1054-1058Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Amrisha Arun Kumar Sharma
Litigation: Pending civil suit (Bhopal Commercial Court) against the Company filed by Maurer-Sanfield India Ltd: ₹0.5891 Cr. Direct Tax disputed demands against the Company u/s AY 2018-19 and AY 2009-10: 2 cases totaling ₹0.1416 Cr (including disputed demand of ₹0.0106 Cr for AY 2018-19). Outstanding TDS defaults on TRACES portal against the Company u/s FY26 and prior years: 5 cases of ₹0.3910 Cr. Disputed Maharashtra Sales Tax/VAT/CST demands for FY 2010-11 and FY 2012-13: 1 case of ₹1.7347 Cr (including VAT/CST demands of ₹48.81 Lakhs and ₹124.66 Lakhs pending appeal). Outstanding Income Tax demand against Promoter Arun Kumar: 1 case of ₹0.0008 Cr.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Statutory auditor qualified the historical FY 2022-23 books regarding: (i) non-confirmation and non-reconciliation of material balances for trade receivables, payables, advances, and loans; and (ii) failure to maintain proper quantitative records and periodic reconciliation of raw materials, semi-finished goods, and stock-in-process, preventing independent valuation verification.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ador Welding Limited | 31.55 | — | 14.79 | — |
| ESAB India Limited | 41.88 | — | 48.14 | — |
| Patil Automation Ltd | 23.21 | — | 13.77 | — |
| Jyoti CNC Automation Ltd | 58.51 | — | 16.79 | — |
At the ₹132 upper band, the issue is priced at 11.3x earnings — a 72% discount to the peer median of 40.9x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company's standalone revenues grew over 20-fold from ₹6.06 Cr in FY24 to ₹131.31 Cr in FY26, with reported PAT climbing to ₹14.94 Cr. However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) was deeply negative and deteriorated from ₹0.79 Cr in FY24 to ₹-5.05 Cr in FY25 and ₹-11.66 Cr in FY26, driven by trade receivables ballooning to ₹20.98 Cr and inventories swelling to ₹33.18 Cr in FY26.
p. 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 58, 202-210The statutory auditor qualified the historical FY 2022-23 accounts due to: (i) complete non-confirmation and non-reconciliation of major balances for trade receivables, payables, advances, and loans; and (ii) failure to maintain proper quantitative records and periodic reconciliation of raw materials, semi-finished goods, and stock-in-process, preventing independent valuation verification.
p. 2, 4, 1054-1058The company executed pre-IPO preferential allotments in early 2025 at ₹2,400.00 per share (face value of ₹100). It then executed a 10:1 stock split on May 23, 2025, and an immediate 6:1 bonus issue on August 12, 2025. This rapid capitalization of reserves diluted the promoters' nominal acquisition cost to single digits (₹5.09 for Arun Kumar and ₹6.04 for Vandana Sharma) and reduced the July 2025 pre-IPO preferential allotment price to ₹85.00 per share.
p. 95, 96, 98, 103, 104The company violated Section 42(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 by transferring preferential allotment share subscription monies from the escrow account directly to its current account prior to filing the Form PAS-3 return of allotment in FY25, necessitating a voluntary adjudication petition under Section 454. Additionally, the company has outstanding processed TDS defaults of ₹39.10 Lakhs on the TRACES portal.
p. 31, 33-38, 742, 859-868, 1224-1228The company faces outstanding litigation under appeal, including a disputed Maharashtra Sales Tax/VAT/CST appeal of ₹1.73 Cr for FY11 and FY13, direct tax portal demands of ₹0.1416 Cr, and an active civil recovery lawsuit of ₹0.5891 Cr filed against it by Maurer-Sanfield India Ltd in the Bhopal Commercial Court.
p. 29, 34, 37, 739, 741-744, 1928-1933The company reported Standalone FY26 revenue of ₹131.31 Cr and PAT of ₹14.94 Cr, which easily exceeds the minimum financial eligibility criteria for a Mainboard listing. However, they chose to list on the BSE SME platform by capping post-issue capital at ₹17.50 Cr.
p. 1, 3, 6, 7, 49, 91-93, 128Pending civil suit (Bhopal Commercial Court) against the Company filed by Maurer-Sanfield India Ltd: ₹0.5891 Cr. Direct Tax disputed demands against the Company u/s AY 2018-19 and AY 2009-10: 2 cases totaling ₹0.1416 Cr (including disputed demand of ₹0.0106 Cr for AY 2018-19). Outstanding TDS defaults on TRACES portal against the Company u/s FY26 and prior years: 5 cases of ₹0.3910 Cr. Disputed Maharashtra Sales Tax/VAT/CST demands for FY 2010-11 and FY 2012-13: 1 case of ₹1.7347 Cr (including VAT/CST demands of ₹48.81 Lakhs and ₹124.66 Lakhs pending appeal). Outstanding Income Tax demand against Promoter Arun Kumar: 1 case of ₹0.0008 Cr.
p. 2, 4, 29, 34, 37, 404, 405, 427, 739, 741, 742, 743, 744, 842, 843, 848, 850, 858, 903, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1090, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1126, 1167, 1172, 1191, 1196, 1219, 1220, 1267, 1270, 1613, 1618, 1629, 1650, 1651, 1652, 1680, 1684, 1716, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1954, 1958, 1970, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2015Statutory auditor qualified the historical FY 2022-23 books regarding: (i) non-confirmation and non-reconciliation of material balances for trade receivables, payables, advances, and loans; and (ii) failure to maintain proper quantitative records and periodic reconciliation of raw materials, semi-finished goods, and stock-in-process, preventing independent valuation verification.
p. 2, 4, 29, 34, 37, 404, 405, 427, 739, 741, 742, 743, 744, 842, 843, 848, 850, 858, 903, 1054, 1055, 1056, 1057, 1058, 1090, 1096, 1097, 1098, 1126, 1167, 1172, 1191, 1196, 1219, 1220, 1267, 1270, 1613, 1618, 1629, 1650, 1651, 1652, 1680, 1684, 1716, 1893, 1894, 1895, 1896, 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, 1932, 1933, 1954, 1958, 1970, 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1986, 2015Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company's historical compliance records are weak, highlighted by prior statutory audit qualifications regarding a complete failure to maintain proper quantitative inventory records and third-party balance reconciliations. This severely compromises the historical cost transparency and operational verification of its engineering assets.
p. 2, 4, 49, 143, 1054-1058Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Maashitla Securities
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (29 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh IPO proceeds distributed between growth and working capital?
The company is allocating ₹40.00 Cr of the fresh issue proceeds towards long-term working capital requirements and ₹8.79 Cr for purchasing and installing plant and machinery at its existing Vasai premises. Working capital represents the absolute majority of the specified allocations.
p. 129Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Mr. Arun Kumar and Mrs. Vandana Sharma. Following a 10:1 stock split on May 23, 2025, and a 6:1 bonus allotment on August 12, 2025, their nominal cost of acquisition per share is ₹5.09 and ₹6.04, respectively.
p. 93, 96, 98, 104, 106, 122Are there material related party transactions or outstanding advances?
Yes. Related party transactions include a material adjustment of advances with promoter-group entity Techno Dyne amounting to ₹1.54 Cr in FY26, alongside loan repayments and other transactions executed with promoters Arun Kumar and Vandana Sharma.
p. 77, 469, 885, 1952Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
No. In FY26, despite a reported standalone net profit of ₹14.94 Cr, the company's operating cash flow was deeply negative at ₹-11.66 Cr. This is because cash was heavily absorbed by a surge in trade receivables (₹20.98 Cr) and inventories (₹33.18 Cr).
p. 49, 50, 51, 52, 57, 58What market structure and allotment parameters apply to this SME offer?
The offer is a 100% book-built fresh issue of up to 4,620,000 equity shares listing on the BSE SME platform, with up to 2,31,000 shares reserved for the market maker, Aftertrade Broking Private Limited. Post-issue capital is structured at ₹17.50 Cr.
p. 1, 3, 6, 7, 91, 92, 93, 128What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to MOA (Arun Kumar & Sudhir Kumar) | ₹100.00 | 1994-11-01 | 1.3x |
| Arun Kumar, Sudhir Kumar Haribansh Sharma, Vandana Sharma, Shilpa Vinod Shah | ₹100.00 | 1995-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Arun Kumar, Sudhir Kumar Haribansh Sharma | ₹100.00 | 1995-04-30 | 1.3x |
| Arun Kumar, Shilpa Vinod Shah | ₹100.00 | 1996-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Arun Kumar | ₹100.00 | 2002-03-31 | 1.3x |
| Share Sub-division / Split (face value ₹100 to ₹10) | — | 2025-05-23 | — |
| Bonus Issue (6:1 ratio) | — | 2025-08-12 | — |
| The 12 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Vanguard Jewels, Javda India Impex, Lexus Infotech, Viren Diamond Exports, Yash V Jewels | ₹500.00 | 2004-03-31 | as disclosed |
| Jaykaydee Industries, Real Gold Trading Co. Private Limited, Alka Diamond Inds Limited | ₹500.00 | 2005-03-31 | as disclosed |
| Alka Diamonds Inds Limited | ₹500.00 | 2006-01-09 | as disclosed |
| Alka Diamonds Industries, Kush Hindustan Entertainment, Volplast limited, Hema Trading Company Private Limited | ₹500.00 | 2006-03-30 | as disclosed |
| Alka Diamond Industries Limited, Real Gold Trading Co. P. Limited | ₹500.00 | 2006-04-10 | as disclosed |
| Real Gold Trading, Kush Hindustan Entertainment, Lexus Infotech, Vanguard Jewels, Yash V. Jewels, Javda India Impex, Hema Trading, Signora Finance | ₹500.00 | 2007-10-26 | as disclosed |
| JPK Trading, Jolly Multitrade, Irishman Steel, New Planet Trading, Hema Trading | ₹500.00 | 2009-03-31 | as disclosed |
| Rights Issue (Arun Kumar & Vandana Sharma) | ₹500.00 | 2014-12-05 | as disclosed |
| Preferential Allotment (Conversion of Unsecured Loan from Mr. Arun Kumar & Mrs. Vandana Sharma) | ₹500.00 | 2022-03-30 | as disclosed |
| Preferential Allotment (Deepak Todi, Alok Laxmikant Agarwal, Naresh Jaiprakash Shroff, and other investors) | ₹2,400.00 | 2025-02-06 | as disclosed |
| Preferential Allotment (Conversion of Unsecured Loan from Mr. Arun Kumar & Mrs. Vandana Sharma) | ₹2,400.00 | 2025-04-08 | as disclosed |
| Preferential Allotment (Naresh Jaiprakash Shroff and other pre-IPO investors) | ₹595.00 | 2025-07-07 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 21 Aug 2029promoterlocked-in for a period of three years from the date of Allotment3,510,500 shares (20.06% of total)
- 21 Aug 2027promoterlocked-in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment7,689,500 shares
- 21 Aug 2027otherlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment of Equity Shares in this Issue1,680,000 shares (13.04% of total)
- 19 Nov 2026financial investorFifty per cent of the Equity Shares allotted to Anchor Investors under the Anchor Investor Portion shall be locked-in for a period of 90 days from the date of Allotment and the remaining Equity Shares allotted to Anchor Investors under the Anchor Investor Portion shall be locked-in for a period of 30 days from the date of Allotment
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.