Sumax Engineering
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Significant raw material and trade dependency on group entity Autokrom India Private Limited (representing ₹1.70 Cr in trade volume in FY26)
- Ongoing unsecured financing from promoter group relative Sumer Chand Mehta with an outstanding pre-IPO loan taken of ₹3.13 Cr
- Unresolved TRACES TDS defaults of ₹4.91 Lakhs dating back to FY 2007-08 alongside chronic ROC secretarial filing delays
- Selection of the SME EMERGE platform despite having Mainboard-scale revenues (₹147.69 Cr) and profits (₹12.76 Cr)
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Sumax Engineering Limited (formerly known as Sumax Engineering Private Limited) is a Secunderabad-based company engaged in both the manufacturing and trading of a diverse range of products tailored for the Automotive OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) Market and Auto Refinish Market.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Sumax Engineering Limited was originally incorporated in December 1994 and converted to a public limited company in September 2024. The Company operates two manufacturing and storage facilities: Unit I in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu (26,000 sq. ft.) and Unit II in Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana (31,559 sq. ft.). Because the company operates a customized system of make-to-order manufacturing for its OEM clients, conventional fixed capacity and capacity utilization metrics are based on line-by-line product categories (such as Buffing Pads, Masking Tapes, and Car Covers), with Unit I and Unit II utilizing up to 94% and 96% of capacity respectively in key lines like Buffing Pads for Fiscal 2026. The company primarily sells its products B2B directly to major automotive OEMs and also to the aftermarket auto refinish segment. To reaches these customers, the company leverages long-term partnerships, direct OEM sales teams, and active participation in prominent global expos (such as Automechanika Frankfurt). The company's products are marketed and sold under the 'SUMAX' brand, and its processing facilities are accredited with ISO 9001:2015 and IATF 16949:2016 certifications.
The Company's primary operational moat is its established, three-decade-long supplier relationships and strategic certifications (IATF 16949:2016) with major automotive OEMs, allowing them to integrate directly into OEM production lines. This is supported by its well-known 'SUMAX' brand recall and a dual-segment marketing strategy targeting both high-end OEMs and the fragmented refinish aftermarket.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding of Capital Expenditure towards Construction of proposed manufacturing Unit I at Plot No-E-185, RIICO IND Area Karoli Teh Tapukara, Rajasthan — ₹4.89 cr
- Funding of Capital Expenditure towards Construction of proposed manufacturing Unit II at Plot No. P 32 Street No. B, Sector 11, Model Economic Township, Village - Nimana, Tehsil Badli, District - Jhajjar, State Haryana — ₹16.62 cr
- Funding working capital requirements of our company — ₹12.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 147.6906 | 146.126 | 130.7945 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 12.7586 | 9.9816 | 7.4314 |
| PAT Margin | 8.64% | 6.83% | 5.68% |
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 147.69 | 146.13 | 130.79 |
| Other Income | 0.65 | 1.06 | 0.75 |
| Total Income | 148.34 | 147.18 | 131.54 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 54.02 | 63.21 | 57.93 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 11.48 | 9.19 | 8.77 |
| Other Expenses | 6.94 | 6.66 | 5.61 |
| Total Expenses | 132.10 | 133.75 | 121.52 |
| EBITDA | 19.08 | 15.03 | 11.63 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.34 | 1.09 | 1.07 |
| EBIT | 17.74 | 13.94 | 10.56 |
| Finance Cost | 0.57 | 0.57 | 0.61 |
| Profit Before Tax | 17.24 | 13.44 | 10.02 |
| Tax Expense | 4.48 | 3.46 | 2.59 |
| Profit After Tax | 12.76 | 9.98 | 7.43 |
| EPS - Basic | 8.66 | 6.78 | 5.04 |
| EPS - Diluted | 8.66 | 6.78 | 5.04 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 14.73 | 2.10 | 2.10 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 46.88 | 46.75 | 36.77 |
| Net Worth | 61.62 | 48.86 | 38.87 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 6.85 | 0.00 | 0.33 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 6.21 | 7.75 | 6.10 |
| Total Borrowings | 13.06 | 7.75 | 6.43 |
| Trade Payables | 5.93 | 6.18 | 4.90 |
| Current Liabilities | 14.81 | 15.78 | 14.01 |
| Total Liabilities | 23.20 | 17.28 | 15.13 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 31.57 | 6.88 | 6.78 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.44 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.32 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Investments | 1.00 | 0.00 | 1.50 |
| Inventories | 26.32 | 28.72 | 22.82 |
| Trade Receivables | 17.63 | 18.41 | 14.24 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1.92 | 5.72 | 3.71 |
| Current Assets | 50.71 | 57.87 | 45.87 |
| Total Assets | 84.81 | 66.14 | 54.00 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 18.80 | 0.70 | 3.79 |
| Capital Expenditure | 26.35 | 1.20 | 0.74 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -27.43 | 0.41 | -2.13 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 4.85 | 0.90 | 1.15 |
| Net Change in Cash | -3.79 | 2.01 | 2.81 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 12.9 | 10.2 | 8.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 12 | 9.5 | 8 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 8.6 | 6.8 | 5.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 20.7 | 20.4 | 19.1 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 23.8 | 24.6 | 23.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 15 | 15.1 | 13.8 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.21 | 0.16 | 0.17 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.58 | 0.14 | 0.23 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 31.02 | 24.56 | 17.36 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 3.42 | 3.67 | 3.28 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.65 | 1.85 | 1.65 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.74 | 2.21 | 2.42 |
| Receivable Days | 44 | 46 | 40 |
| Inventory Days | 65 | 72 | 64 |
| Payable Days | 15 | 15 | 14 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 94 | 103 | 90 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.47 | 0.07 | 0.51 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -7.1 | 14 | 6.7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 19.71 | 1.1 | 0.7 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 8.6% | 6.8% | 5.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.74x | 2.21x | 2.42x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.38x | 1.35x | 1.39x |
| = Return on Equity | 20.7% | 20.4% | 19.1% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.74x | 0.74x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.97x | 0.96x | 0.95x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12% | 9.5% | 8.1% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.47x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 13% while profit grew 72%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 31.02x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -2.51An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.947 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.895 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 1.427 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.011 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 3.362 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.15 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.071 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0712 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = -2.51, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 12.02 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.423 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.553 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.209 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 2.656 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 12.02 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.3%
Contingent liabilities of 0.18 cr against a net worth of 61.62 cr — 0.3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.6%
0.6% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.31x
Short-term borrowings of 6.21 cr against cash of 1.92 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 16.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 2.09 cr against a profit of 12.76 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth12.76 ÷ 61.62What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)17.74 ÷ (61.62 + 13.06) = 17.74 ÷ 74.67Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue19.08 ÷ 147.69Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth13.06 ÷ 61.62How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost17.74 ÷ 0.57How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(17.63 ÷ 147.69) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days65 + 44 − 15How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT18.80 ÷ 12.76Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(12.76 − 18.80) ÷ 84.81 = -6.04 ÷ 84.81The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹101.00 × 19,022,700 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash192.13 + 13.06 − 1.92What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA203.26 ÷ 19.08The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT192.13 ÷ 12.76The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)15.06 ÷ 27.8%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Healthy Operating Cash flow Overcomes Pre-IPO Profit Spikes
In contrast to many SME issues where profits expand without cash backing, Sumax Engineering's FY26 standalone net profit of ₹12.76 Cr is fully backed by ₹18.80 Cr in Cash Flow from Operations. This cash conversion recovery was driven by stable inventory management (₹26.32 Cr in FY26 vs ₹28.72 Cr in FY25) and timely receivables billing collection.
Source: p. 44, 46, 58Growth-Driven Use of Proceeds Over Refinancing
The company has structured its specified fresh issue objects entirely around tangible capital expenditure and working capital. Out of the specified raise, ₹21.51 Cr (64.19%) is dedicated to constructing new manufacturing units in Rajasthan and Haryana to expand capacity, with ₹12.00 Cr (35.81%) allocated to working capital, leaving zero allocation for balance sheet debt prepayment.
Source: p. 71, 72Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Sudeep Mehta (Chairman and Managing Director)
Litigation: Outstanding direct and indirect tax demand proceedings against the Company totaling ₹0.1766 Cr (comprising 7 direct tax cases of ₹0.0700 Cr and 3 indirect tax GST cases of ₹0.1066 Cr). Commercial suit COS/63/2025 filed BY the Company against Santhosh V. Panse & others for recovery of ₹1.6000 Cr based on a breached settlement agreement. FIR No. 123/2025 filed BY the Company against employee Santhosh V. Panse for fraud and customer data theft. Litigations against Promoters, Directors, and Key Managerial Personnel are Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company has significant financial and operational dependencies on its promoters and group entities. In FY26, relative Sumer Chand Mehta was paid ₹0.34 Cr in interest and provided an unsecured loan of ₹3.13 Cr to the company, with only ₹0.09 Cr repaid, leaving a large outstanding loan. Additionally, the company engaged in material B2B transaction flows with group company Autokrom India Private Limited, recording purchases of ₹0.76 Cr and sales of ₹0.94 Cr.
p. 46Sumax Engineering Limited reported Standalone revenues of ₹146.13 Cr in FY25 and ₹147.69 Cr in FY26, with net profits (PAT) of ₹9.98 Cr and ₹12.76 Cr respectively. Its net worth stands at ₹61.62 Cr. These parameters comfortably exceed the minimum criteria required for a Mainboard listing in India.
p. 1, 3, 44The company has outstanding processed TDS defaults on the TRACES portal totaling ₹4.91 Lakhs (₹0.0491 Cr) spanning a prolonged period from FY 2007-08 to FY 2025-26. This is coupled with chronic delays in filing mandatory ROC corporate forms (DIR-12, MGT-14, SH-7) and a change in statutory auditors within the last three years.
p. 28, 30, 31, 45, 47The company executed a massive 6:1 bonus issue on 2026-03-11, allotting 12,627,000 shares to promoters/promoter group. Less than four months later, on 2026-07-10, promoters Sudeep Mehta and Vimla Mehta executed secondary share transfers of 506,400 shares to various third-party individuals and entities (including Superb Real Estate LLP) at a raw price of ₹101.00 per share, providing pre-IPO liquidity and onboarding outside investors just before the public filing.
p. 61, 62, 86-88Outstanding direct and indirect tax demand proceedings against the Company totaling ₹0.1766 Cr (comprising 7 direct tax cases of ₹0.0700 Cr and 3 indirect tax GST cases of ₹0.1066 Cr). Commercial suit COS/63/2025 filed BY the Company against Santhosh V. Panse & others for recovery of ₹1.6000 Cr based on a breached settlement agreement. FIR No. 123/2025 filed BY the Company against employee Santhosh V. Panse for fraud and customer data theft. Litigations against Promoters, Directors, and Key Managerial Personnel are Nil.
p. 47, 148, 150, 191, 192, 193, 208None disclosed
p. 47, 148, 150, 191, 192, 193, 208Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company's administrative and secretarial controls exhibit persistent vulnerabilities, as evidenced by unresolved processed TRACES TDS defaults of ₹4.91 Lakhs stretching back to FY 2007-08, delayed deposits of employee PF contributions, and chronic multi-month backlogs in filing critical ROC corporate forms (DIR-12, MGT-14, SH-7).
p. 28, 30, 31, 45Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (09 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh IPO proceeds being utilized, and is there any debt repayment component?
The fresh issue proceeds are entirely growth-oriented: ₹4.89 Cr is allocated to construct a new Unit I in Karoli, Rajasthan; ₹16.62 Cr is for constructing Unit II in Jhajjar, Haryana; and ₹12.00 Cr is for funding working capital. No portion of the specified proceeds is allocated to the repayment of borrowings.
p. 71, 72Who are the promoters, and what is their pre-IPO acquisition history and cost?
The promoters are Sudeep Mehta and Smriti Mehta. Their entry cost is extremely low due to early allotments at face value (₹100.00 prior to split) and subsequent sequential dilution cushions, including a 14:1 bonus in August 2018, a 1:10 stock split in March 2024 (reducing face value to ₹10.00), and a massive 6:1 bonus issue in March 2026.
p. 61, 62, 63Are there material financing or operational RPT dependencies?
Yes. The company is operationally and financially linked to its promoter group. In FY26, it purchased ₹0.76 Cr and sold ₹0.94 Cr of goods to group entity Autokrom India Private Limited. Financially, relative Sumer Chand Mehta provided unsecured loans of ₹3.13 Cr (repaid ₹0.09 Cr) and was paid ₹0.34 Cr in interest.
p. 46Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
Yes. In FY26, the company's operating cash flow (CFO) was highly robust at ₹18.80 Cr, comfortably exceeding its reported PAT of ₹12.76 Cr. This is a strong positive divergence indicating excellent invoice realizations and working capital stabilization compared to FY25 (where CFO was only ₹0.70 Cr vs PAT of ₹9.98 Cr).
p. 44, 46, 58What is the capital structure of this offer, and why was the SME route chosen?
The offer is structured as a 100% book-built issue to be listed on the NSE EMERGE platform, with GYR Capital Advisors as the lead manager. Despite having revenues of ₹147.69 Cr and net profits of ₹12.76 Cr which easily qualify for a Mainboard listing, the company chose the SME platform to benefit from lighter disclosure and regulatory review loads.
p. 1, 3, 5, 8, 44What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to MOA (Sumer Chand Mehta, Sudeep Mehta, Vimla Mehta) | ₹100.00 | 1994-12-21 | 1.0x |
| Sudeep Mehta and Veena Mangal | ₹100.00 | 1996-06-30 | 1.0x |
| Hemant Jain | ₹100.00 | 1997-01-03 | 1.0x |
| Sudeep Mehta | ₹100.00 | 2001-02-02 | 1.0x |
| Hemant Jain | ₹100.00 | 2001-03-01 | 1.0x |
| Vimla Mehta | ₹100.00 | 2002-06-01 | 1.0x |
| Allottees of Bonus Issue (ratio 14:1) | — | 2018-08-10 | — |
| Share split / sub-division (1:10 split) | — | 2024-03-27 | — |
| Allottees of Bonus Issue (ratio 6:1) | — | 2026-03-11 | — |
| Pre-IPO Secondary Share Transfers (Sudeep Mehta & Vimla Mehta to Aditi, Superb Real Estate LLP, Chappidi Siva Kumar Reddy, etc.) | ₹101.00 | 2026-07-10 | 1.0x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 02 Sep 2029promoterlocked-in for a period of three years from the date of Allotment as Minimum Promoters' Contribution3,805,000 shares (20% of total)
- 02 Sep 2076promoterlocked-in for a period of two years from the date of Allotment (being 50% of the excess promoters' contribution)4,259,170 shares (22.39% of total)
- 02 Sep 2076promoterlocked-in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment (being the remaining 50% of the excess promoters' contribution)4,259,170 shares (22.39% of total)
- 02 Sep 2027otherlocked-in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment (being pre-issue public shareholding of locked-in shares)482,400 shares (2.54% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.