Sotefin Bharat
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride financials with negative cash flow
- Ballooning receivables
- Lack of accounting software audit trails flagged by auditor
- Statutory dues filing delays
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Sotefin Bharat Limited provides mechanised and automated parking solutions, delivering comprehensive turnkey services including system design, manufacturing, installation, and operations and maintenance.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Sotefin Bharat Limited provides mechanised and automated parking solutions, delivering comprehensive turnkey services. The company designs, manufactures, installs, and maintains fully and semi-automatic storage and retrieval systems for cars, heavy vehicles, and other applications. Structural and electro-mechanical components are manufactured in-house at its facility in Bagnan, Howrah, West Bengal, which spans approximately 40,000 sq. ft. For Fiscal 2026, the installed manufacturing capacity was 4,000 car spaces per annum against an optimum capacity of 10,000 car spaces. The company's patented robotic solution, the SILOMAT Dolly, is currently sourced from Sotefin SA, Switzerland, while other components are sourced from European and Indian vendors. Customers include public sector entities such as municipal authorities and public sector undertakings, as well as private sector real estate developers. In the public sector, business is acquired through government tenders, whereas private sector projects are generated through existing relationships and referrals.
Sourcing of critical patented parking robot, the SILOMAT Dolly, from Sotefin SA, Switzerland, combined with in-house structural and electro-mechanical manufacturing.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding capital expenditure requirements for setting up a manufacturing facility in Kolkata, West Bengal — ₹20.13 cr
- Funding capital expenditure requirements for the proposed new office premises — ₹8.17 cr
- Funding working capital requirements of the Company — ₹40.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 116.7465 | 93.7766 | 56.2833 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 17.3686 | 11.3079 | 6.2463 |
| PAT Margin | 14.88% | 12.06% | 11.1% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 116.75 | 93.78 | 56.28 |
| Other Income | 1.48 | 0.38 | 0.59 |
| Total Income | 118.23 | 94.15 | 56.87 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 45.73 | 27.57 | 28.26 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 7.70 | 5.69 | 5.30 |
| Finance Cost | 2.52 | 1.94 | 1.49 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 2.26 | 0.34 | 0.45 |
| Other Expenses | 34.96 | 42.43 | 12.76 |
| Total Expenses | 93.17 | 77.97 | 48.27 |
| Profit Before Tax | 25.06 | 16.18 | 8.60 |
| Tax Expense | 7.69 | 4.87 | 2.35 |
| Profit After Tax | 17.37 | 11.31 | 6.25 |
| EPS - Basic | 13.39 | 9.27 | 5.68 |
| EPS - Diluted | 13.39 | 9.27 | 5.68 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 29.83 | 18.46 | 10.54 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 13.36 | 1.16 | 1.00 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 70.57 | 55.35 | 26.88 |
| Net Worth | 83.93 | 56.51 | 27.88 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 3.99 | 3.12 | 0.91 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 20.02 | 9.04 | 17.87 |
| Total Borrowings | 24.01 | 12.16 | 18.78 |
| Trade Payables | 9.74 | 21.17 | 9.51 |
| Current Liabilities | 40.63 | 37.84 | 30.35 |
| Total Liabilities | 45.14 | 42.17 | 32.76 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 31.86 | 12.95 | 9.93 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 2.36 | 11.54 | 2.72 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.55 | 0.13 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 9.12 | 8.55 | 5.15 |
| Trade Receivables | 75.13 | 56.13 | 36.80 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.76 | 1.10 | 2.03 |
| Current Assets | 92.06 | 72.56 | 47.91 |
| Total Assets | 129.06 | 98.68 | 60.64 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -6.86 | 4.02 | 1.33 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -12.54 | -12.80 | -1.95 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 19.41 | 8.84 | 0.15 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.00 | 0.06 | -0.48 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 25.2 | 19.6 | 18.5 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 23.3 | 19.2 | 17.7 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 14.9 | 12.1 | 11.1 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 20.7 | 20 | 22.4 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 25.5 | 26.4 | 21.6 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 13.5 | 11.5 | 10.3 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.29 | 0.22 | 0.67 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.78 | 0.6 | 1.59 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 10.95 | 9.34 | 6.75 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.27 | 1.92 | 1.58 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 2.04 | 1.69 | 1.41 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.9 | 0.95 | 0.93 |
| Receivable Days | 235 | 218 | 239 |
| Inventory Days | 29 | 33 | 33 |
| Payable Days | 30 | 82 | 62 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 234 | 169 | 210 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.39 | 0.36 | 0.21 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 18.8 | 7.4 | 8.1 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 14.9% | 12.1% | 11.1% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.9x | 0.95x | 0.93x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.54x | 1.75x | 2.18x |
| = Return on Equity | 20.7% | 20% | 22.4% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.69x | 0.7x | 0.73x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.91x | 0.89x | 0.85x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 23.6% | 19.3% | 17.9% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 17.37 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -6.86 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Interest coverage was 10.95x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.48An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.075 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.161 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.299 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.245 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.389 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.712 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.833 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1877 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.48, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 11.03 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.398 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.547 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.214 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.859 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 11.03 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 5.9 percentage points in FY26, having moved 1 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.39x profit in FY26, against 0.36x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 24.3%
Contingent liabilities of 20.35 cr against a net worth of 83.93 cr — 24.3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 3.2%
3.2% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.04x
Short-term borrowings of 20.02 cr against cash of 0.76 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 5.5%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.96 cr against a profit of 17.37 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth17.37 ÷ 83.93What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)27.58 ÷ (83.93 + 24.01) = 27.58 ÷ 107.93Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue29.83 ÷ 116.75Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth24.01 ÷ 83.93How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost27.58 ÷ 2.52How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(75.13 ÷ 116.75) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days29 + 235 − 30How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-6.86 ÷ 17.37Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(17.37 − -6.86) ÷ 129.06 = 24.23 ÷ 129.06The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹187.00 × 18,160,307 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash339.60 + 24.01 − 0.76What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA362.85 ÷ 29.83The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT339.60 ÷ 17.37The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)19.55 ÷ 53.6%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Paper Profits and Ballooning Receivables
The company's impressive FY26 revenue of Rs 116.74 Cr is overshadowed by its inability to collect cash. Trade receivables have surged to Rs 75.12 Cr, representing roughly 64% of total annual sales. Consequently, the reported PAT of Rs 17.36 Cr has not translated into cash, leaving the company with a negative operating cash flow of Rs -6.85 Cr in the year immediately preceding the IPO.
Source: p. 860-868, 1015, 1073Auditor Flags Missing Audit Trails
In a significant governance finding, the statutory auditor noted in the CARO annexure that the company utilized an accounting software that lacked an active audit trail (edit log) facility for its transactions throughout the financial year. This absence of a basic digital control severely limits the independent verifiability of the reported financial figures.
Source: p. 218-219, 390-392, 470, 1058Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Litigation: Direct tax proceedings against Company: 0.1020 Crore. Indirect tax proceedings against Company: 0.3501 Crore. Direct tax proceedings against Promoters: 0.3493 Crore.
Auditor / RPT Flags: The company has used an accounting software for maintaining its books of accounts which doesn’t have a feature of recording audit trail (edit log) facility and the same has not operated throughout the year, for all transactions during the year.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Revenue from operations grew substantially to Rs 116.74 Cr in FY26, but operating cash flow turned negative to Rs -6.85 Cr against a reported PAT of Rs 17.36 Cr. This decay is accompanied by trade receivables ballooning to Rs 75.12 Cr.
p. 860-868, 1015, 1073The statutory auditor flagged that the company used accounting software lacking an audit trail (edit log) facility throughout the year. Additionally, the company changed its auditor in the last 3 years and had 9 instances of delayed GST filings and 3 instances of delayed TDS filings in FY26.
p. 213, 267, 1056, p. 218-219, 390-392, 470, 1058The company made a preferential allotment to promoter group entities (Sheetal Jignesh Sandhavi) and other investors at Rs 160 per share in November 2025, exactly eight months before the offer opening date.
p.472The company intends to use Rs 40.00 Cr of the fresh issue proceeds for working capital requirements.
p.526The company's scale, with FY26 revenue of Rs 116.74 Cr, total assets of Rs 129.06 Cr, and PAT of Rs 17.36 Cr, would have easily supported a mainboard listing, but the SME route was chosen instead.
p. 860-868, 1015, 1073Direct tax proceedings against Company: 0.1020 Crore. Indirect tax proceedings against Company: 0.3501 Crore. Direct tax proceedings against Promoters: 0.3493 Crore.
p. 218-219, 390-392, 470, 1058The company has used an accounting software for maintaining its books of accounts which doesn’t have a feature of recording audit trail (edit log) facility and the same has not operated throughout the year, for all transactions during the year.
p. 218-219, 390-392, 470, 1058Operating cash flow was negative ₹6.86 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹17.37 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Revenue grew, the related-party share of it grew, and operating cash flow fell, all in FY26. No one of these is evidence on its own. Together they are the pattern worth understanding before the other numbers on this page.
rule: sales↑ + RPT share↑ + CFO↓Short-term borrowings of ₹20.02 cr against cash of ₹0.76 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The core technological moat, the patented robotic SILOMAT Dolly, is entirely outsourced from Sotefin SA, Switzerland, leaving the company's in-house manufacturing limited strictly to structural and electro-mechanical components.
p.182, p.199, p.690-691, p.702, p.708, p.956Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (31 Aug 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the IPO funds being deployed?
The fresh issue proceeds will be used primarily for working capital (Rs 40.00 Cr), setting up a manufacturing facility in Kolkata (Rs 20.12 Cr), and new office premises (Rs 8.17 Cr).
p.526Who are the promoters and what is their holding?
The promoters are Arup Choudhuri, Jignesh Pravinchandra Sanghavi, and Pisa International Private Limited, who collectively hold 62.11% of the pre-issue capital.
p.483, p.517Are there material related party transactions extracting value?
The company has transacted with group companies, including Rs 1.85 Cr in sales and Rs 1.18 Cr in loans taken from Relcon Infra Private Limited, and Rs 0.34 Cr in loans given to Paciano Hospitality Private Limited. A relative, Sheetal Jignesh Sanghavi, was also allotted shares in a recent preferential issue.
p. 1004, p. 1005, p. 1007, p.472Does the company's cash flow match its reported profits?
No. Despite reporting a PAT of Rs 17.36 Cr in FY26, the company generated negative operating cash flows of Rs -6.85 Cr. This cash drain was caused by a massive buildup in trade receivables, which stood at Rs 75.12 Cr.
p. 860-868, 1015, 1073What structural market risks apply to this issue?
As an SME IPO, this issue carries standing risks including a large minimum investment lot size, mandatory 5% circuit filters, total dependence on the designated market maker (Choice Equity Broking Private Limited) for liquidity, and a thin free float.
p.4, p.10, p.13, p.437, p.459What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sotefin Patents SA | ₹10.00 | 2012-03-16 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 15 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Pisa International Private Limited | ₹10.00 | 2012-03-16 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 15 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sotefin Patents SA | ₹10.00 | 2014-03-31 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 13 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Pisa International Private Limited | ₹10.00 | 2014-03-31 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 13 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sotefin Patents SA | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-20 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Pisa International Private Limited | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-20 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Proviron Technology SA | ₹10.00 | 2017-09-21 | 18.7x |
| An early round from roughly 9 years ago, at roughly 18.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Rakesh P shah | ₹60.06 | 2017-11-15 | 3.1x |
| An early round from roughly 9 years ago, at roughly 3.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Jignesh Pravinchandra Sanghavi | ₹60.06 | 2017-11-15 | 3.1x |
| An early round from roughly 9 years ago, at roughly 3.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Pisa International Private limited | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Proviron Technology SA | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Jignesh Pravinchandra Sanghavi | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Nipa Jainendra Shah | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Heena Rakesh Shah | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Sejal Dipan Shah | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Ami Tejas Shah | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Sudhanshu Srivastav | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Vinodhi Somnath Poojary | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Ankita G Gangawat | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Abhidhi Communications Private Limited | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Shalinl Bohra | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| India Credit Risk Management LLP | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Anita Mukesh Mittal | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Latha Unnikrishnan Pillai | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Kunal Mahendra Bhakta | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Atul Ramniklal Parikh | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Archerchem Healthcare Limited | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Vikash Motichand Golechha | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Himanshu Jawahar Vora | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Manoj J Kamdar | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Mukund Shivram Biwalkar | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Shraddha Tejas Sheth | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Sriram Venkata Sai Sonti | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Pharma Synth Formulations Limited | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Golden Bird India Fund PE LP | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Green Portfolio Private Limited | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Ajay T Jaisinghani | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Monisha Vijay Khanchandani | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Ritika Nikhil Jaisinghani | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Amit Haresh Duhlani | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Futuregrow Spectrum Radiation Private limited | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Dipal Sukesh Marla | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Rajeev Agarwal | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Divam Sharma | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Kapil Ramji Keniya HUF | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Rakesh Mittal | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Manoj Tayal | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Harshit Singhal | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Rashmi Agarwal | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Nabs Vriddhii LLP | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Blue Angel StockBrokers Private Ltd | — | 2025-06-25 | — |
| Wealthwave Capital Fund | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| India Infinite | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Amit Haresh Dhulani | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Ritika Nikhil Jaisinghani | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Ajay Jaisinghani | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Sheetal Jignesh Sandhavi | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Monisha Vijay Khanchandani | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Binita Jesal Khakharia | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Tejas Sanat Sheth | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Sumesh Ashok Mishra | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Bhavin Hasmukh | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Shakeel Jairam Shetty | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Shrikrishna Sonti | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Pusha Devi Bhansali | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Divyansh Sahai | ₹160.00 | 2025-11-11 | 1.2x |
| Allotted below the band — 34 entries | |||
| Sudhanshu Srivastav | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Vinodini Somnath Poojary | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Ankita G Gangawat | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Abhidhi Communications Pvt Ltd | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Shalini Bohra | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Indiacredit Risk Management LLP | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Anita Mukesh Mittal | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Latha Unnikrishnan Pillai | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Kunal Mahandra Bhakta | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Atul Ramniklal Parikh | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Archerchem Healthcare Limited | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Vikash Motichand Golechha | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Himanshu Jawahar Vora | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Manoj J Kamdar | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Mukund Shivram Biwalkar | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Shraddha Tejas Sheth | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Sriram Venkata Sai Sonti | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Pharma Synth Formulations Ltd | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Kalpana Jain | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Green Portfolio Pvt Ltd | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Monisha Vijay Khanchandani | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Ajay T Jaisinghani | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Ritika Nikhil Jaisinghani | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Amit Haresh Duhlani | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Futuregrow Spectrum Radiation Pvt Ltd | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Dipal Sukesh Marla | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Rajeev Agarwal | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Divam Sharma | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Kapil Ramji keniya Huf | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Rakesh Mittal | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Manoj Tayal | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Harshit Singhal | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-07-20 | as disclosed |
| Nabs Vriddhi LLP | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-08-24 | as disclosed |
| Blue Angel Stock Brokers Private Limited | ₹1,100.00 | 2024-08-24 | as disclosed |
The 34 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 23 Jul 2029promoter3 (three) years from the date of allotment3,632,100 shares (20% of total)
- 23 Jul 2028promotertwo years from the date of allotment in the initial public offer931,034 shares
- 23 Jul 2027promoterone year from the date of allotment in the initial public offer931,034 shares
- 23 Jul 2027other1 (one) year from the date of allotment in the Issue
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.