Skytech Infinite Platform
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride financials: stand-alone revenue and profits surged in FY26 but operating cash flow collapsed to negative ₹-1.66 Cr due to uncollected trade receivables ballooning to ₹27.71 Cr
- Severe compliance defaults: extreme delays of up to 3,578 days in filing ROC revised accounts (Form AOC-4) and up to 735 days in filing deposit returns (Form DPT-3)
- Promoter loans: active lending and capital transfers to promoters Suma Deiveekan (₹0.51 Cr) and Paramashivam Deiveekan (₹0.30 Cr) in the pre-IPO fiscal year
- All specified fresh issue proceeds (₹16.81 Cr) are dedicated to working capital, making the capital raise entirely soft and discretionary
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Skytech Infinite Platform Limited is engaged in providing comprehensive turnkey industrial automation and control solutions, including the design, engineering, assembly, integration, and maintenance of various types of Automation Control Panels.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Skytech Infinite Platform Limited (formerly Skytech Infinite Platform Private Limited) was incorporated on May 28, 2009, and acts as a turnkey industrial automation and control systems integrator. The company operates from a leased registered office and factory premises admeasuring approximately 10,000 square feet in Saitpalya, Bangalore, Karnataka, which serves as its primary assembly, integration, and testing center. Because the business is structured around custom engineering and system integration rather than high-volume manufacturing, conventional metrics like plant capacity and capacity utilization are not measured or applicable. Instead, its operations are driven by a skilled workforce of 85 employees, including a dedicated design and project engineering department. The company serves a diverse set of industrial sectors, including power, water, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, and general infrastructure. It reaches clients in domestic markets and international geographies, including footprints in Bhutan, Thailand, China, Singapore, and the USA, through authorized channel partnerships with global OEMs like Mitsubishi Electric and Endress+Hauser.
The company's primary moat lies in its strategic channel partnerships and authorizations with global OEMs like Mitsubishi Electric, Endress+Hauser, Exor, and Euroteck. This allows them to integrate multi-vendor OEM systems and provide turnkey, vendor-agnostic solutions with robust after-sales lifecycle support.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Working Capital Requirements — ₹16.81 cr
- General Corporate Expenses
- Issue Related Expenses
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 51.645 | 45.1401 | 44.1285 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 4.2048 | 3.7141 | 1.3509 |
| PAT Margin | 8.14% | 8.23% | 3.06% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 51.65 | 45.14 | 44.13 |
| Other Income | 0.50 | 0.07 | 0.02 |
| Total Income | 52.14 | 45.21 | 44.15 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 34.83 | 30.45 | 32.42 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 7.55 | 6.38 | 5.98 |
| Finance Cost | 0.68 | 0.68 | 0.59 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.60 | 0.43 | 0.48 |
| Other Expenses | 2.62 | 2.18 | 2.65 |
| Total Expenses | 46.28 | 40.12 | 42.11 |
| Profit Before Tax | 5.86 | 5.08 | 2.04 |
| Tax Expense | 1.66 | 1.37 | 0.68 |
| Profit After Tax | 4.20 | 3.71 | 1.35 |
| EPS - Basic | 6.12 | 5.40 | 21.61 |
| EPS - Diluted | 6.12 | 5.40 | 21.61 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 7.14 | 6.19 | 3.11 |
| EBIT | 6.55 | 5.76 | 2.62 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 6.88 | 6.88 | 0.63 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 12.14 | 7.94 | 10.48 |
| Net Worth | 19.02 | 14.81 | 11.10 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 2.75 | 2.23 | 3.20 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 6.50 | 3.16 | 0.70 |
| Total Borrowings | 9.25 | 5.39 | 3.90 |
| Trade Payables | 14.75 | 7.44 | 8.73 |
| Current Liabilities | 24.34 | 12.01 | 10.80 |
| Total Liabilities | 28.55 | 15.23 | 14.90 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 6.29 | 5.79 | 6.20 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.10 | 0.63 | 0.17 |
| Inventories | 8.66 | 4.64 | 6.58 |
| Trade Receivables | 27.71 | 15.93 | 10.78 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.29 | 1.83 | 0.64 |
| Current Assets | 40.08 | 22.65 | 18.29 |
| Total Assets | 47.57 | 30.05 | 26.00 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -1.66 | 0.81 | 3.02 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.20 | 0.04 | 0.00 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -0.07 | -0.43 | 0.07 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 3.18 | 0.82 | -2.48 |
| Net Change in Cash | 1.46 | 1.19 | 0.62 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 13.7 | 13.7 | 7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 12.6 | 12.7 | 5.9 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 8.1 | 8.2 | 3.1 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 22.1 | 25.1 | 12.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 23.2 | 28.5 | 17.5 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 8.8 | 12.4 | 5.2 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.49 | 0.36 | 0.35 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.83 | 0.57 | 1.05 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 9.6 | 8.5 | 4.47 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.65 | 1.89 | 1.69 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.29 | 1.5 | 1.08 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.09 | 1.5 | 1.7 |
| Receivable Days | 196 | 129 | 89 |
| Inventory Days | 91 | 56 | 74 |
| Payable Days | 155 | 89 | 98 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 132 | 96 | 65 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.39 | 0.22 | 2.24 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 12.3 | 9.7 | -6.4 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.02 | 0.08 | 0 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 8.1% | 8.2% | 3.1% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.09x | 1.5x | 1.7x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.5x | 2.03x | 2.34x |
| = Return on Equity | 22.1% | 25.1% | 12.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.72x | 0.73x | 0.66x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.9x | 0.88x | 0.78x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12.7% | 12.8% | 5.9% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 4.20 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -1.66 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 89 in FY24 to 196 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 17% while profit grew 211%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 9.6x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.6An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.521 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.999 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.473 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.144 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.804 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.038 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.201 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1232 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.6, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.88 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.331 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.255 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.138 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.666 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.88 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
5 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹2.9 cr in FY25, ₹5.9 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 129 days in FY25, 196 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 56 days in FY25, 91 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 0.6% of revenue in FY25, 0.8% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 7.5% of net block in FY25, 9.5% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 58.3% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.39x profit in FY26, against 0.22x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 4.8%
Contingent liabilities of 0.91 cr against a net worth of 19.02 cr — 4.8% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.51x
Short-term borrowings of 6.50 cr against cash of 3.29 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 13%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.55 cr against a profit of 4.20 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹77.00, the market value is ₹75.6 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹7.6 cr | 1.8x | 4.2 | 2.6 |
| 12% a year | ₹9.1 cr | 2.2x | 5.5 | 3.4 |
| 14% a year | ₹10.6 cr | 2.5x | 6.6 | 4.1 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 5.56% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -3.78% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹2.9 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth4.20 ÷ 19.02What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)6.55 ÷ (19.02 + 9.25) = 6.55 ÷ 28.27Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue7.14 ÷ 51.65Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth9.25 ÷ 19.02How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost6.55 ÷ 0.68How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(27.71 ÷ 51.65) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days91 + 196 − 155How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-1.66 ÷ 4.20Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(4.20 − -1.66) ÷ 47.57 = 5.86 ÷ 47.57The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹77.00 × 9,820,600 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash75.62 + 9.25 − 3.29What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA81.58 ÷ 7.14The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT75.62 ÷ 4.20The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹4.20 cr ÷ ₹75.62 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-2.86 cr ÷ ₹75.62 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)17.98 ÷ 13.2%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Profit Growth Completely Decoupled from Real Cash Flows
The company's pre-IPO financial trajectory presents a classic 'dressed bride' risk profile. Profits expanded rapidly to ₹4.20 Cr in FY26, but operating cash flow turned deeply negative at ₹-1.66 Cr because trade receivables ballooned to ₹27.71 Cr, indicating that the top-line scale has not yet been translated into actual cash collections.
Source: p. 21, 55, 56, 191, 192Critical Regulatory Filings Backlog raises Internal Control Concerns
The prospectus highlights major historical compliance lapses, including a 3,578-day delay in filing Form AOC-4 for revised accounts of FY15, and consecutive delays of 735 and 370 days in deposit filings (Form DPT-3). These long-duration omissions indicate potential vulnerabilities in internal administrative and accounting controls.
Source: p. 25, 26, 30, 31, 38, 245Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Paramashivam Deiveekan (Managing Director)
Litigation: Pending tax demand proceedings against the Company: GST assessment order demand under Section 73 of the GST Act of ₹0.0293 Cr (aggrieved by the demand, the Company has filed an appeal after depositing 10% of the disputed demand); Outstanding direct tax TDS demand from assessment years FY 2024-25 and FY 2025-26 of ₹0.0002 Cr. Criminal proceedings filed by the Company (cheque bouncing): 1 pending case under Section 138 of the NI Act against RKP Drives India Private Limited & Theetharamada Nanjappa Uthaiah involving a cheque of ₹0.1364 Cr. Other pending commercial litigation filed by the Company: 1 recovery suit against RKP Drives India Private Limited for recovery of ₹0.7664 Cr arising from unpaid invoices. No litigation against Promoters or Directors.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company's restated financial profile shows moderate revenue growth from ₹44.13 Cr in FY24 to ₹51.65 Cr in FY26, alongside a steep expansion in profitability, with PAT more than tripling from ₹1.35 Cr in FY24 to ₹4.20 Cr in FY26. However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) completely collapsed from a positive ₹3.02 Cr in FY24 to ₹0.81 Cr in FY25, and turned deeply negative at ₹-1.66 Cr in FY26. This severe cash decay is driven by trade receivables ballooning from ₹10.78 Cr in FY24 to ₹27.71 Cr in FY26 (now representing 53.66% of total revenue).
p. 21, 55, 56, 191 and 1 moreThe company has disclosed extreme delays in secretarial and regulatory filings. Most notably, the filing of Form AOC-4 for revised financial statements of FY 2014-15 was delayed by 3,578 days (nearly 10 years). Additionally, Form DPT-3 (return of deposits) was delayed by 735 days for FY 2021-22 and 370 days for FY 2022-23, Form PAS-6 (reconciliation of share capital audit report) was delayed by 166 days, and Form INC-22 (change of registered office) was delayed by 122 days.
p. 25, 26, 30, 31 and 2 moreOn 2024-01-29, five pre-IPO investors (including employees and associates) acquired 5 shares via transfer at ₹160.00 per share. Less than six months later, on 2024-07-19, the company declared and allotted a massive 10:1 bonus issue (6,250,000 bonus shares). This immediate capitalization of reserves mathematically diluted the acquisition cost of these select pre-IPO shares from ₹160.00 to ₹14.55 per share, providing an immediate pricing cushion shortly before the IPO.
p. 72, 74In FY26, the company engaged in direct financing transactions with its promoters and directors. Director Suma Deiveekan took an unsecured loan of ₹0.51 Cr from the company and repaid only ₹0.016 Cr. Managing Director Paramashivam Deiveekan was granted a loan of ₹0.30 Cr and repaid ₹0.36 Cr during the same year.
p. 21, 58, 215Pending tax demand proceedings against the Company: GST assessment order demand under Section 73 of the GST Act of ₹0.0293 Cr (aggrieved by the demand, the Company has filed an appeal after depositing 10% of the disputed demand); Outstanding direct tax TDS demand from assessment years FY 2024-25 and FY 2025-26 of ₹0.0002 Cr. Criminal proceedings filed by the Company (cheque bouncing): 1 pending case under Section 138 of the NI Act against RKP Drives India Private Limited & Theetharamada Nanjappa Uthaiah involving a cheque of ₹0.1364 Cr. Other pending commercial litigation filed by the Company: 1 recovery suit against RKP Drives India Private Limited for recovery of ₹0.7664 Cr arising from unpaid invoices. No litigation against Promoters or Directors.
p. 17, 23, 25, 26 and 4 moreOperating cash flow was negative ₹1.66 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹4.20 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Trade receivables grew 74% against revenue growth of 14.4% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company's underlying administrative and secretarial controls are extremely weak, as evidenced by a 3,578-day delay in submitting revised accounts for FY15 and consecutive multi-hundred-day backlogs in filing returns of deposits (Form DPT-3) and share capital audits.
p. 25, 26, 30, 31, 38, 245Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Integrated Registry
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (29 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh IPO proceeds being allocated?
All specified fresh issue proceeds are allocated to working capital requirements (₹16.8130 Cr). General Corporate Expenses and Issue Related Expenses are also part of the raise but their exact allocations are not printed.
p. 20, 82Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Mr. Paramashivam Deiveekan and Mrs. Suma Deiveekan, who hold 100% pre-issue capital. Their average cost of share acquisition is ₹0.91 and ₹0.98 per share, respectively, heavily lowered by early allotments at face value (₹10.00) and a massive 10:1 bonus issue in July 2024.
p. 71, 72, 73Are there material loans or advances given to directors in the pre-IPO period?
Yes. In FY26, Director Suma Deiveekan took a loan of ₹0.5075 Cr from the company and repaid only ₹0.0160 Cr, while Managing Director Paramashivam Deiveekan took a loan of ₹0.3000 Cr and repaid ₹0.3583 Cr.
p. 21, 58, 215Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
No. While standalone PAT more than tripled from ₹1.35 Cr in FY24 to ₹4.20 Cr in FY26, Cash Flow from Operations collapsed from positive ₹3.02 Cr in FY24 to negative ₹-1.66 Cr in FY26. This decay was driven by trade receivables ballooning to ₹27.71 Cr.
p. 21, 55, 56, 191What market structure and allotment parameters apply to this SME offer?
The offer is a 100% book-built fresh issue of up to 2,945,600 equity shares listing on the NSE EMERGE platform, with up to 1,48,800 shares reserved for the market maker, Prabhat Financial Services Ltd. Post-issue capital is structured at ₹9.82 Cr (9,820,600 shares).
p. 3, 8, 20, 52, 59, 67What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mr. Paramashivam Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2009-05-28 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 18 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mrs. Suma Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2009-05-28 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 18 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Paramashivam Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-27 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mrs. Suma Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-27 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Paramashivam Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2015-03-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mrs. Suma Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2015-03-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mrs. Suma Deiveekan | ₹10.00 | 2021-05-07 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Paramashivam Deiveekan | — | 2024-07-19 | — |
| Mrs. Suma Deiveekan | — | 2024-07-19 | — |
| Anki Reddy Anjaneyulu, Binil Kurikilamkattu Scaria, Jinith Nediya Parambath, Naveen Ravikumar, Vinoth Kumar Raghupati (10 shares each) | — | 2024-07-19 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 1 entries | |||
| Anki Reddy Anjaneyulu, Binil Kurikilamkattu Scaria, Jinith Nediya Parambath, Naveen Ravikumar, Vinoth Kumar Raghupati (1 share each) | ₹160.00 | 2024-01-29 | as disclosed |
The 1 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 21 Aug 2029promoterlocked-in for a period of three years from the date of Allotment1,964,120 shares (20% of total)
- 21 Aug 2028promoterlocked in for a period of two years from the date of Allotment2,455,413 shares
- 21 Aug 2027promoterlocked in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment2,455,412 shares
- 21 Aug 2027otherlocked in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment55 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
