Shree Balaji (Mala) Textiles
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Auditor flagged massive Rs 25.18 Cr discrepancy between bank submissions and book records
- Deeply negative CFO (-Rs 13.26 Cr) despite reported profits
- Ballooning trade receivables tying up nearly 50% of revenue
- History of statutory defaults and ROC filing delays
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Shree Balaji (Mala) Textiles Limited is a contract manufacturer and wholesaler of cotton sarees in India's B2B cotton sarees wholesale segment.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Shree Balaji (Mala) Textiles Limited is a contract manufacturer and wholesaler of cotton sarees in India's B2B cotton sarees wholesale segment. The company shifted from trading to pure play manufacturing of cotton sarees on a job work basis, getting manufacturing done at designated job work units. It also started a manufacturing facility in Jetpur under the name Shree Brindavan Chandra Prints. Approximately 95% of its products are manufactured through job workers, allowing the company to strategically leverage the advantages of job work arrangements without incurring substantial capital expenditure. Its product catalogue consists of multiple design options catering to all genres under the brand name 'Mala Saree'. The company operates a B2B business model, selling products through a network of approximately 105 brokers, 13 dealers, 69 wholesalers, and 3000 retailers spread across the Central, East, North, Northeast, South, and West parts of India.
Approximately 95% of products are manufactured through job workers, allowing the company to optimize operational efficiency and manage costs effectively without substantial capital expenditure. It relies on a strong distribution network of brokers, dealers, wholesalers, and retailers.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding the working capital requirements of our Company — ₹16.50 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 211.9718 | 193.0437 | 195.5407 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 5.8542 | 4.9461 | 2.4564 |
| PAT Margin | 2.76% | 2.56% | 1.26% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 211.97 | 193.04 | 195.54 |
| Other Income | 0.43 | 0.39 | 0.35 |
| Total Income | 212.40 | 193.44 | 195.89 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 103.43 | 103.17 | 106.76 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 2.21 | 2.19 | 2.74 |
| Other Expenses | 79.67 | 81.28 | 76.98 |
| Total Expenses | 204.47 | 186.84 | 192.60 |
| EBITDA | 15.50 | 13.20 | 10.23 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.36 | 0.37 | 0.39 |
| Finance Cost | 7.42 | 6.32 | 6.61 |
| Profit Before Tax | 7.93 | 6.59 | 3.29 |
| Tax Expense | 2.08 | 1.65 | 0.84 |
| Profit After Tax | 5.85 | 4.95 | 2.46 |
| EPS - Basic | 8.13 | 6.86 | 3.41 |
| EPS - Diluted | 8.13 | 6.86 | 3.41 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 7.21 | 0.72 | 0.72 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 20.30 | 20.93 | 15.98 |
| Net Worth | 27.51 | 21.65 | 16.70 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.03 | 1.28 | 2.41 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 69.06 | 47.47 | 48.96 |
| Total Borrowings | 69.08 | 48.75 | 51.37 |
| Trade Payables | 34.21 | 45.13 | 41.79 |
| Current Liabilities | 120.55 | 115.39 | 107.89 |
| Total Liabilities | 121.14 | 117.23 | 110.80 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 3.89 | 4.14 | 4.16 |
| Inventories | 28.82 | 36.65 | 26.21 |
| Trade Receivables | 104.27 | 93.91 | 92.03 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 5.84 | 2.56 | 4.22 |
| Current Assets | 139.56 | 134.68 | 123.30 |
| Total Assets | 148.64 | 138.88 | 127.51 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -13.27 | 8.80 | 4.00 |
| Capital Expenditure | 0.11 | 0.38 | 0.14 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 0.10 | -0.22 | 0.00 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 13.09 | -8.85 | -3.46 |
| Net Change in Cash | -0.07 | -0.27 | 0.54 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 7.3 | 6.8 | 5.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 7.2 | 6.7 | 5.1 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 2.8 | 2.6 | 1.3 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 21.3 | 22.8 | 14.7 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 15.9 | 18.3 | 14.6 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 3.9 | 3.6 | 1.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 2.51 | 2.25 | 3.08 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 4.08 | 3.5 | 4.61 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 2.07 | 2.04 | 1.5 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.16 | 1.17 | 1.14 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.92 | 0.85 | 0.9 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.43 | 1.39 | 1.53 |
| Receivable Days | 180 | 178 | 172 |
| Inventory Days | 50 | 69 | 49 |
| Payable Days | 59 | 85 | 78 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 171 | 162 | 143 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -2.27 | 1.78 | 1.63 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 12.9 | -2.8 | -1.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.29 | 1 | 0.36 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 2.8% | 2.6% | 1.3% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.43x | 1.39x | 1.53x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 5.4x | 6.41x | 7.63x |
| = Return on Equity | 21.3% | 22.8% | 14.7% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.75x | 0.75x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.52x | 0.51x | 0.33x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 7.2% | 6.7% | 5.1% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 5.85 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -13.27 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 8% while profit grew 138%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Debt to equity stood at 2.51x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = 30.03An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.011 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.909 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 79.791 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.098 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.976 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.893 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.966 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1286 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = 30.03, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 5.47 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.128 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.137 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.103 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.227 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 5.47 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -2.27x profit in FY26, against 1.78x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.2%
0.2% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.08x
Short-term borrowings of 69.06 cr against cash of 5.84 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 10.1%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.59 cr against a profit of 5.85 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth5.85 ÷ 27.51What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)15.35 ÷ (27.51 + 69.08) = 15.35 ÷ 96.59Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue15.50 ÷ 211.97Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth69.08 ÷ 27.51How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost15.35 ÷ 7.42How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(104.27 ÷ 211.97) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days50 + 180 − 59How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-13.27 ÷ 5.85Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(5.85 − -13.27) ÷ 148.64 = 19.12 ÷ 148.64The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹70.00 × 9,905,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash69.34 + 69.08 − 5.84What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA132.57 ÷ 15.50The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT69.34 ÷ 5.85The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)11.84 ÷ 18.4%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Critical Auditor Flag on Bank Discrepancies
The statutory auditor has highlighted a severe governance and control failure: massive discrepancies reaching up to Rs 25.18 Crore were found between the quarterly stock and book debt statements submitted to the lending banks and the company's actual books of accounts. This finding severely compromises the integrity of the reported working capital numbers.
Source: p. 210-213, 222, 515-524Profits Do Not Translate to Cash
Despite recording robust revenue of Rs 211.97 Cr and a profit of Rs 5.85 Cr in FY26, the company suffered a severe cash drain, generating negative Rs -13.26 Cr in operating cash flow. This disconnect is driven entirely by Rs 104.26 Cr locked in trade receivables, meaning nearly 50% of the company's annual sales remain uncollected on paper.
Source: p. 183-186, 195-207Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Litigation: Criminal proceedings by Company: 2.6310 Crore. Direct and indirect tax proceedings against Company: 0.0041 Crore.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Massive discrepancies noted between quarterly stock and book debt statements submitted to banks and the books of accounts (differences up to Rs 25.18 Crore in Q3 FY26) due to non-completion of bank and book entries.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| N R Vandana Tex Industries Limited | 15.03 | — | 14.43 | — |
| Saraswati Saree Depot Ltd | 9.32 | — | 12.02 | — |
| Shree Balaji (Mala) Textiles Limited (Our company) | — | — | 21.28 | — |
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The statutory auditor flagged massive discrepancies between the quarterly stock and book debt statements submitted to banks and the actual books of accounts, reaching up to Rs 25.18 Crore in Q3 FY26.
p. 210-213, 222, 515-524While the company reported revenue of Rs 211.97 Cr and PAT of Rs 5.85 Cr in FY26, operating cash flow turned deeply negative to Rs -13.26 Cr. This is accompanied by massive trade receivables of Rs 104.26 Cr.
p. 183-186, 195-207The company has a history of delays in employee-related filings (PF and ESIC), delayed ROC form filings with additional fees, interest payable on MSME dues (Rs 5.20 Lakhs), and a GST ASMT-10 scrutiny notice alleging discrepancies of Rs 5.23 Lakhs.
p. 35-41, 126-127, 511-512, 627The company executed a massive 9:1 bonus issue on September 11, 2025, allotting 64,84,500 shares to existing shareholders.
p. 80The company plans to deploy Rs 16.50 Cr of the fresh issue proceeds towards working capital requirements.
p. 93With FY26 revenue of Rs 211.97 Cr, total assets of Rs 148.64 Cr, and PAT of Rs 5.85 Cr, the company possesses the scale that approaches or supports a mainboard listing, but the SME route was chosen.
p. 183-186, 195-207Criminal proceedings by Company: 2.6310 Crore. Direct and indirect tax proceedings against Company: 0.0041 Crore.
p. 210-213, 222, 515-524Massive discrepancies noted between quarterly stock and book debt statements submitted to banks and the books of accounts (differences up to Rs 25.18 Crore in Q3 FY26) due to non-completion of bank and book entries.
p. 210-213, 222, 515-524Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company states that approximately 95% of its products are manufactured through job workers. This indicates the company is predominantly functioning as a trader, aggregator, and design house with an outsourced supply chain, rather than a conventional manufacturer with heavy capital assets.
p. 130Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the IPO funds being deployed?
The fresh issue proceeds will be utilized primarily for working capital requirements (Rs 16.50 Cr), with the remainder designated for general corporate purposes.
p. 93Who are the promoters and what is their holding?
The promoters are Binod Kumar Kedia, Anita Kedia, and Mrityunjay Commosales Private Limited, who collectively hold 96.46% pre-IPO. Their holding base was significantly expanded by a 9:1 bonus issue in September 2025.
p. 80, 86, 90Are there material related party transactions extracting value?
The company routinely takes and repays unsecured loans with its directors (Binod Kumar Kedia, Anita Kedia, Shresth Kedia, Hemlata Kedia, and Rishika Kedia) and engages in minor purchase/sale transactions with promoter-owned entities like M/s Shree Savya and M/s Shreejay Creations.
p. 471, 472, 476, 477Does the company's cash flow match its reported profits?
No. Despite reporting a PAT of Rs 5.85 Cr in FY26, operating cash flow collapsed to a negative Rs -13.26 Cr. This was primarily caused by trade receivables ballooning to Rs 104.26 Cr.
p. 183-186, 195-207What structural market risks apply to this issue?
As an SME IPO, this issue carries standing market risks including a strictly mandated minimum investment lot size, mandatory 5% circuit filters, high dependence on the designated market maker (Mansi Share and Stock Broking Private Limited) for liquidity, and an inherently thin free float.
p. 2, 7, 8, 10, 56, 228What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Binod Kumar Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2005-09-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2005-09-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Hemlata Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2005-09-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2006-03-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sulochana Devi Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2006-03-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Hanuman Prasad Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2006-03-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Hemlata Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2006-03-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Manoj Kumar Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2006-03-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Shresth Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2006-03-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Santosh Kumar Kedia | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-30 | 1.4x |
| R.B. Rungta | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-30 | 1.4x |
| Manoj Kumar Jajodia | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-30 | 1.4x |
| Sarika Bajaj | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-30 | 1.4x |
| Vireswar Export Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Priya Nivesh Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Dowell Fiscal Services Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Sunflag Viniyog Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Garima Suppliers Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Dharmaraj Fincon Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| P. D. Gainwell & Credit Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Pee Dee Finvest Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Triple Rank Consultants Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Vishaljoy Vinimay Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Kokila Exports Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Quantum Impex Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Motorex Finance Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Swati Stock & Securities Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Fastgrow Vyapaar Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Prism Commercial Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Singhania Commodeal Pvt. Ltd. | ₹50.00 | 2006-03-31 | 1.4x |
| Binod Kumar Kedia | — | 2007-03-31 | — |
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2009-09-26 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2009-09-27 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2009-09-28 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2009-09-28 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2009-09-28 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anita Kedia | ₹10.00 | 2009-09-30 | 7.0x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 7.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mrityunjay Commosales Private Limited | ₹5.00 | 2010-05-28 | 14.0x |
| An early round from roughly 16 years ago, at roughly 14.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mrityunjay Commosales Private Limited | ₹5.00 | 2010-05-28 | 14.0x |
| An early round from roughly 16 years ago, at roughly 14.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Binod Kumar Kedia | — | 2018-03-22 | — |
| Binod Kumar Kedia | — | 2018-03-22 | — |
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2025-09-11 | — |
| Binod Kumar Kedia | — | 2026-05-19 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.