Raksan Transformers
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Heavy related-party purchases of Rs. 44.70 Crore in FY26 from promoter-owned SHR Powers Private Limited for transformer tank fabrication.
- Contractual liquidated damages and delivery penalties totaling Rs. 2.62 Crore in FY25 and Rs. 2.64 Crore in FY26 paid to state discoms.
- High revenue dependence on government discoms (50.73% B2G) with long inspection and payment cycles (receivables at Rs. 73.21 Crore).
- Inclusion of two mainboard-listed peers (Marsons and Shilchar) in the peer comparison set.
- Strong financial scale (FY26 revenue of Rs. 363.11 Crore, PAT of Rs. 33.60 Crore, and positive CFO of Rs. 14.89 Crore).
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Raksan Transformers Limited is an ISO 9001:2015 certified manufacturer of distribution, power, solar application, and special purpose transformers across various voltage ratings.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Incorporated in 1995 initially for transformer repair and servicing, Raksan Transformers Limited established transformer manufacturing operations in Fiscal 2005-06. The company operates two manufacturing facilities in Sonipat, Haryana (Plot No. 1413 and Plot No. 1675-1676-1677, HSIIDC Industrial Estate, Rai), spread across 1,012.5 sq. mtrs and 2,025 sq. mtrs respectively. As of March 31, 2026, the combined installed production capacity stands at 1,500,000 KVA per annum for distribution transformers and 1,350 MVA per annum for power transformers, with FY26 capacity utilization rates at 91.68% and 95.18% respectively. Products manufactured include single- and three-phase CRGO oil-filled distribution transformers up to 3,150 KVA, power transformers, solar application transformers, and special purpose transformers. The company supplies primarily to state power utilities/government entities (B2G accounting for 50.73% of FY26 revenue) and corporate/infrastructure clients (B2B accounting for 49.22% of FY26 revenue). Sourcing of key raw materials such as CRGO electrical steel, copper, and aluminum conductors is conducted through purchase orders with domestic and international suppliers, with group company SHR Powers Private Limited providing backward integration for transformer tank fabrication.
Established manufacturing facilities in Sonipat with in-house core cutting and winding capabilities, backward integration for transformer tanks through group company SHR Powers Private Limited, order book of Rs. 329.68 crore as of June 30, 2026, long-standing relationships with government power utilities, and over 31 years of promoter industry experience.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding capital expenditure towards setting up of manufacturing facility at Liwaspur, Sub-Tehsil Rai, Distt. Sonepat, Haryana — ₹62.14 cr
- To meet working capital requirements — ₹35.00 cr
- Repayment of certain borrowing availed by our Company, in part or full — ₹7.28 cr
- General Corporate Purpose
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 363.1082 | 324.2098 | 160.9461 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 33.6048 | 20.3767 | 7.5906 |
| PAT Margin | 9.25% | 6.29% | 4.72% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 12.0% | Revenue increased due to higher sales volume of transformers, revenue from traded goods (commenced trading in FY26), and higher job work charges. | Structural |
| Revenue from Operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 101.4% | Revenue increased significantly on account of higher sales volumes of transformers and new orders received by the company during FY 2025. | Structural |
| Cost of Materials Consumed (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 88.3% | Material costs increased directly in line with the substantial growth in transformer production and sales volumes. | Structural |
| Purchase of Stock-in-Trade (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 100.0% | Expenditure of Rs. 2,527.32 lakhs was incurred towards procurement of traded goods to meet customer requirements and reflects the commencement of trading operations. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 70.7% | Employee expenses increased primarily due to higher director remuneration (Rs. 93.00 lakhs in FY25 vs Rs. 46.20 lakhs in FY24) and higher staff welfare expenses. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 35.8% | Finance costs reduced due to lower utilization of working capital borrowings and a reduction in total outstanding borrowings from Rs. 2,350.87 lakhs to Rs. 2,073.64 lakhs. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortisation Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 43.9% | Depreciation increased due to fixed asset additions of approximately Rs. 820.57 lakhs (excluding land) made during the year. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortisation Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 151.3% | Depreciation increased sharply due to significant additions to property, plant, and equipment, particularly plant & machinery (Rs. 38.30 lakhs) and vehicles (Rs. 45.00 lakhs). | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 129.9% | Other expenses doubled due to operational growth, higher freight outward dispatches (Rs. 421.27 lakhs vs Rs. 247.28 lakhs), delayed delivery penalties (Rs. 320.17 lakhs vs Rs. 16.49 lakhs), and sales commission. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 64.9% | Net profit expanded due to higher revenue from operations, stable raw material costs, and lower finance costs resulting in improved operating margins. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 168.5% | Net profit expanded significantly driven by top-line revenue growth of 101.44% which outpaced expense growth. | Structural |
| Trade Receivables (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 40.7% | Trade receivables grew due to revenue expansion from government utilities where multi-level inspection and approval procedures lengthen payment cycles (~74 days). | Structural |
| Trade Receivables (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 158.5% | Trade receivables increased significantly due to a 101.44% expansion in revenue from operations and higher project execution. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 177.6% | Operating cash flow improved significantly to Rs. 14.89 crore due to higher profit before tax (Rs. 45.19 crore) offset by working capital investments in trade receivables and inventory. | Structural |
| Borrowings (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 139.6% | Total borrowings increased as the holding company took new bank loans to finance capital expenditures and working capital requirements. | Structural |
Headwinds
- High revenue concentration from government utilities company persistent
Government utilities account for 50.73% of FY26 revenue, exposing the company to long inspection and payment cycles, procedural delays, and tender dependency. - Price volatility in key raw materials (CRGO steel, copper, aluminium) sector
Raw material price fluctuations and supply disruptions directly impact cost structure and operating margins under fixed-price contracts. - Delayed delivery charges and liquidated damages company temporary
Delayed transformer dispatches result in contractual liquidated damages (Rs. 263.84 lakhs paid in FY26 and Rs. 320.17 lakhs in FY25).
Tailwinds
- National Electricity Plan and grid transmission/distribution expansion macro
Government investments in power generation, transmission, and rural/urban grid expansion drive sustained multi-year demand for transformers. - In-house manufacturing and backward integration for transformer tanks company
Group company SHR Powers Private Limited provides captive fabrication of transformer bodies, enhancing supply chain control and cost efficiency.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Unit-I & II Sonipat Facilities (Distribution Transformers) | FY26 | 91.7% |
| Unit-I & II Sonipat Facilities (Power Transformers) | FY26 | 95.2% |
| Unit-I & II Sonipat Facilities (Distribution Transformers) | FY25 | 87.1% |
| Unit-I & II Sonipat Facilities (Power Transformers) | FY25 | 85.7% |
Movements the filing does not explain
- Delayed Delivery Charges Surge in FY25 FY25 vs FY24 — Delayed delivery penalties surged from Rs. 16.49 lakhs in FY24 to Rs. 320.17 lakhs in FY25 (a 19.4x jump), but MD&A attributes this broadly to growth in business operations without explaining specific operational causes for delivery delays.
- Sales Commission Expenses Expansion in FY25 FY25 vs FY24 — Commission expenses increased 15.3x from Rs. 15.07 lakhs in FY24 to Rs. 230.29 lakhs in FY25 while revenue doubled, with MD&A offering no explanation of changed commission structures or third-party agent arrangements.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-17
- Pre Application Start2026-09-09
- Bidding Start2026-09-10
- Bidding End2026-09-15
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-16
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-17
- Listing Day2026-09-18
- Mandate End2026-10-27
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 363.11 | 324.21 | 160.95 |
| Other Income | 0.52 | 0.57 | 1.58 |
| Total Income | 363.63 | 324.78 | 162.52 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 267.77 | 268.54 | 142.59 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 25.27 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Changes in Inventories | -1.89 | 2.35 | -3.96 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 8.18 | 7.65 | 4.48 |
| Finance Cost | 1.06 | 1.64 | 1.72 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.38 | 0.96 | 0.38 |
| Other Expenses | 16.68 | 15.89 | 6.91 |
| Total Expenses | 318.44 | 297.03 | 152.12 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 45.19 | 27.75 | 10.40 |
| Profit Before Tax | 45.19 | 27.75 | 10.40 |
| Tax Expense | 11.58 | 7.37 | 2.81 |
| Profit After Tax | 33.60 | 20.38 | 7.59 |
| EPS - Basic | 20.39 | 12.36 | 4.61 |
| EPS - Diluted | 20.39 | 12.36 | 4.61 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 16.48 | 0.87 | 0.87 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 60.94 | 43.20 | 22.83 |
| Net Worth | 77.42 | 44.07 | 23.70 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 8.25 | 10.14 | 2.13 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 12.49 | 13.37 | 7.68 |
| Total Borrowings | 20.74 | 23.51 | 9.81 |
| Trade Payables | 43.52 | 42.42 | 26.69 |
| Current Liabilities | 69.13 | 62.48 | 39.33 |
| Total Liabilities | 155.59 | 117.90 | 67.02 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 40.57 | 32.57 | 8.69 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 3.66 | 2.71 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.94 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.10 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 25.91 | 21.24 | 19.45 |
| Trade Receivables | 73.21 | 52.02 | 20.12 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.23 | 0.21 | 4.64 |
| Current Assets | 101.55 | 74.04 | 45.27 |
| Total Assets | 155.59 | 117.90 | 67.02 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 14.89 | 5.36 | 7.43 |
| Capital Expenditure | -11.19 | -22.55 | -7.42 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -11.19 | -22.55 | -7.42 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -3.68 | 12.76 | 3.58 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.02 | -4.43 | 3.58 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 13.1 | 9.3 | 7.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 12.7 | 9 | 7.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 9.3 | 6.3 | 4.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 43.4 | 46.2 | 32 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 47.1 | 43.5 | 36.2 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 21.6 | 17.3 | 11.3 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.27 | 0.53 | 0.41 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.43 | 0.77 | 0.41 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 43.82 | 17.87 | 7.04 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.47 | 1.18 | 1.15 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.09 | 0.84 | 0.66 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2.33 | 2.75 | 2.4 |
| Receivable Days | 74 | 59 | 46 |
| Inventory Days | 26 | 24 | 44 |
| Payable Days | 44 | 48 | 61 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 56 | 35 | 29 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.44 | 0.26 | 0.98 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 12 | 12.7 | 0.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 8.12 | 23.55 | 19.48 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 9.3% | 6.3% | 4.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2.33x | 2.75x | 2.4x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.01x | 2.68x | 2.83x |
| = Return on Equity | 43.4% | 46.2% | 32% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.73x | 0.73x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.98x | 0.94x | 0.86x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12.7% | 9.1% | 7.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was only 0.44x reported profit in FY26. Less than half of the profit on the income statement arrived as cash.
- Receivable days rose from 46 in FY24 to 74 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 126% while profit grew 343%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 43.82x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.74An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.257 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.654 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.905 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.12 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.87 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.943 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.807 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1203 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.74, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.41 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.208 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.392 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.297 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.498 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.41 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 3.8 percentage points in FY26, having moved 1.6 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 77.42 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.6%
0.6% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.02x
Short-term borrowings of 12.49 cr against cash of 0.23 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 4.5%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 1.51 cr against a profit of 33.60 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth33.60 ÷ 77.42What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)46.24 ÷ (77.42 + 20.74) = 46.24 ÷ 98.15Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue47.62 ÷ 363.11Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth20.74 ÷ 77.42How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost46.24 ÷ 1.06How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(73.21 ÷ 363.11) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days26 + 74 − 44How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT14.89 ÷ 33.60Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(33.60 − 14.89) ÷ 155.59 = 18.72 ÷ 155.59The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹273.00 × 20,893,400 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash570.39 + 20.74 − 0.23What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA590.90 ÷ 47.62The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT570.39 ÷ 33.60The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)16.97 ÷ 64.9%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Heavy Related-Party Sourcing from Promoter Entity SHR Powers
In FY26, Raksan Transformers purchased Rs. 44.7038 Crore of transformer tanks and bodies from promoter-owned SHR Powers Private Limited, accounting for 16.70% of total material costs. While this provides captive tank fabrication capabilities, sourcing nearly one-sixth of raw materials from a promoter entity creates supply chain captivity and potential margin transfer risks between group entities.
Source: p.57, 121, 122Execution Bottlenecks: Multi-Crore Liquidated Damage Penalties Paid to Discoms
In FY25, Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (PVVNL) issued four penalty orders against Raksan Transformers totaling Rs. 2.6193 Crore for delayed transformer dispatches. Overall, the company paid Rs. 3.2017 Crore in FY25 and Rs. 2.6384 Crore in FY26 as delayed delivery charges. While top-line growth is strong, these contractual penalties highlight ongoing operational bottlenecks in meeting utility delivery deadlines.
Source: p.25, 221Mainboard Financial Scale Listed on BSE SME Platform
With FY26 revenue of Rs. 363.11 Crore, PAT of Rs. 33.60 Crore, and a post-issue equity capital of Rs. 20.89 Crore, Raksan Transformers operates at a financial scale significantly larger than typical SME issuers. However, the company opted for BSE SME listing, and its peer set includes mainboard power transformer giants Marsons Limited (P/E 49.63x) and Shilchar Technologies Limited (P/E 29.47x).
Source: p.1, 50, 98Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Sanjeev Kanda
Litigation: Civil cases / Liquidated Damages: Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (PVVNL) issued penalty orders against the company for delayed transformer dispatches totaling Rs. 2.6193 Crore (Rs. 261.93 lakhs) across four orders in FY25. Criminal cases against company/promoters: NIL. Statutory/tax demands: GST demand of Rs. 0.0038 Crore (Rs. 0.38 lakhs) and TDS demand of Rs. 0.0597 Crore (Rs. 5.97 lakhs) paid/disclosed in FY25.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Marsons Limited | 49.63 | — | 21.28 | — |
| Shilchar Technologies Limited | 29.47 | — | 32.22 | — |
| Supreme Power Equipment Limited | 27.75 | — | 17.49 | — |
At the ₹273 upper band, the issue is priced at 13.4x earnings — a 55% discount to the peer median of 29.5x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company purchased Rs. 44.7038 Crore of raw materials (transformer tanks/bodies) from group company SHR Powers Private Limited in FY26, representing 16.70% of total raw materials consumed (Rs. 267.77 Crore). SHR Powers is a promoter-owned entity.
p.57, 121, 122Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (PVVNL) levied liquidated damages / penalties totaling Rs. 2.6193 Crore across four separate orders in FY25 due to delayed transformer dispatches. Additionally, total delayed delivery charges paid were Rs. 3.2017 Crore in FY25 and Rs. 2.6384 Crore in FY26.
p.25, 221The company compares its valuation against two mainboard-listed peers—Marsons Limited (P/E 49.63x) and Shilchar Technologies Limited (P/E 29.47x)—alongside SME peer Supreme Power Equipment Limited (P/E 27.75x).
p.98In FY25, restated PAT surged by 168.45% (from Rs. 7.59 Crore to Rs. 20.38 Crore), but Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) decayed from Rs. 7.43 Crore to Rs. 5.36 Crore as trade receivables expanded by 158.54% (from Rs. 20.12 Crore to Rs. 52.02 Crore). CFO subsequently recovered to Rs. 14.89 Crore in FY26.
p.50, 52, 53On September 6, 2025 (12 months prior to the IPO), the company allotted 1,56,13,200 bonus shares at Rs. 0.00 to existing shareholders, expanding the share capital from Rs. 0.8674 Crore to Rs. 16.4806 Crore.
p.72, 73Civil cases / Liquidated Damages: Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited (PVVNL) issued penalty orders against the company for delayed transformer dispatches totaling Rs. 2.6193 Crore (Rs. 261.93 lakhs) across four orders in FY25. Criminal cases against company/promoters: NIL. Statutory/tax demands: GST demand of Rs. 0.0038 Crore (Rs. 0.38 lakhs) and TDS demand of Rs. 0.0597 Crore (Rs. 5.97 lakhs) paid/disclosed in FY25.
p. 25, 26, 50, 70 and 2 moreShort-term borrowings of ₹12.49 cr against cash of ₹0.23 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While installed capacity utilization reached 91.68% for distribution transformers and 95.18% for power transformers in FY26, the company paid Rs. 2.64 Crore in FY26 and Rs. 3.20 Crore in FY25 as delayed delivery penalties to discoms, showing operational bottlenecks in meeting delivery schedules.
p.23, 25, 221The company is allocating Rs. 62.14 Crore of IPO proceeds to set up the Liwaspur plant. Given current utilization at >91% and a solid order book of Rs. 329.68 Crore as of June 30, 2026, capacity addition is fully supported by order visibility.
p.23, 84, 122Trade receivables expanded to Rs. 73.21 Crore in FY26 (74 debtor days) due to multi-level discom inspection procedures, validating the requirement for incremental working capital to support revenue growth.
p.50, 90, 91Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (27 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue IPO proceeds allocated across capital expenditure, working capital, and debt repayment?
Fresh issue proceeds are allocated as: Rs. 62.1366 Crore for setting up the new Liwaspur manufacturing facility, Rs. 35.0000 Crore for working capital requirements, Rs. 7.2834 Crore for debt repayment, and the balance for general corporate purposes.
p.84, 85What is the promoter shareholding pre and post-issue, and what pre-IPO allotments were made to promoters?
Promoters Sanjeev Kanda, Dievam Singh Kanda, and Renu Kanda hold 94.22% pre-issue, diluting to 69.06% post-issue. Existing shareholders received an 18:1 bonus allotment (15,613,200 shares) on September 6, 2025. Promoter Sanjeev Kanda is selling 1,100,000 shares via Offer for Sale.
p.1, 70, 72, 77What is the nature and extent of related-party transactions with group entity SHR Powers Private Limited?
The company purchased Rs. 44.7038 Crore worth of materials (transformer tanks and fabricated bodies) from promoter-owned SHR Powers Private Limited in FY26 (16.70% of material costs) and sold Rs. 2.2731 Crore. Promoter Sanjeev Kanda received Rs. 1.5125 Crore in remuneration.
p.56, 57, 145How did operating cash flow perform relative to restated profits across the three fiscal years?
In FY24, PAT was Rs. 7.59 Crore and CFO was Rs. 7.43 Crore. In FY25, PAT surged to Rs. 20.38 Crore but CFO fell to Rs. 5.36 Crore due to receivables leaping to Rs. 52.02 Crore. In FY26, PAT reached Rs. 33.60 Crore and CFO recovered strongly to Rs. 14.89 Crore.
p.50, 52, 53What are the key statutory, CARO, and audit disclosures for the issuer?
Statutory disclosures note minor filing delays in GSTR-9C (6 days for FY25) and historic PF/ESI deposit delays. Paschimanchal Vidyut Vitran Nigam Limited levied Rs. 2.6193 Crore in liquidated damages in FY25 for delayed dispatches. Auditor M/s T U & Co. has audited the restated financials with no change in 3 years.
p.25, 31, 40, 50What are the lot size, application ticket cost, market maker terms, and liquidity constraints for public investors?
The issue is listed on BSE SME with a minimum retail application requirement of 2 lots. Because trading occurs strictly in standardized market lots and lots are indivisible, partial exit or trading of fractional lots is impossible. Hem Finlease Private Limited is the Market Maker with 276,000 reserved shares (5.01%) and a mandatory 3-year obligation period. Standard SME 5% price bands apply.
p.1, 5, 47, 68What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers to MOA | ₹10.00 | 1995-07-21 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 32 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Rakesh Kanda, Sanjeev Kanda & Prem Wati Kanda | ₹10.00 | 1997-02-24 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 30 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Prem Wati Kanda | ₹10.00 | 1998-08-28 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 28 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2005-03-30 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 22 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2005-07-27 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sanjeev Kanda, Prem Wati Kanda & Others | ₹10.00 | 2007-11-01 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 19 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sanjeev Kanda HUF, Aashish Retail Sales & Others | ₹10.00 | 2008-11-01 | 27.3x |
| An early round from roughly 18 years ago, at roughly 27.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Allottees | ₹100.00 | 2009-07-01 | 2.7x |
| An early round from roughly 17 years ago, at roughly 2.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Rights Allottees (including forfeited shares) | ₹150.00 | 2017-01-16 | 1.8x |
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2025-09-06 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 18 Sep 2029promoter3 years4,300,000 shares (20.58% of total)
- 18 Sep 2027promoter1 year10,128,662 shares (48.48% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.