Qualiance International
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Trade receivables ballooning 673% to ₹15.99 crore in the pre-IPO year (FY26)
- PAT margin expanding from 9.23% in FY25 to 15.44% in FY26
- Significant transactional volumes (₹4.28 crore combined) with promoter group company Silvertraq
- Bidirectional loan cycling of ₹3.84 crore with promoter Vipul Badani
- Disclosed history of statutory filing, secretarial, and charge registration delays
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Qualiance International Limited is engaged in the design, engineering, manufacture, and export of technically complex, high-specification performance garments for institutional, government, and brand clients in international markets.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Qualiance International Limited specializes in technically complex garments, including military and police uniforms, tactical outerwear, high-visibility workwear, weather-resistant clothing, and sun-protective apparel. The company operates an in-house manufacturing facility in Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu, with a built-up area of over 45,000 square feet and an installed production capacity of 4,50,000 pieces per annum. Specialized garment construction techniques such as seam sealing, bonded construction, ultrasonic welding, laser cutting, and lamination are performed in-house. Fabrics and functional trims are sourced from suppliers in Europe, the Far East, and other global markets. The company primarily serves European government departments (such as the Swiss military) and premium international lifestyle and performance outdoor brands. Outbound finished garments are shipped from proximity ports like Tuticorin, Chennai Sea Port, and Chennai Airport. The company plans to expand by setting up a new multi-storey RCC manufacturing facility of 1,43,370 sq. ft. in Tiruppur with an annual base production capacity of 10,80,000 pieces (600 sewing machines).
Possesses deep institutional process expertise in manufacturing technically complex, high-specification garments (e.g., seam-sealed outerwear and military-grade uniforms) that meet strict compliance and quality standards of European government departments, which creates a high barrier to entry compared to commodity garment manufacturers.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding the capital expenditure requirements of our company towards setting up a new manufacturing facility at Tiruppur- Tamil Nadu — ₹38.00 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured18%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 76.8911 | 53.0724 | 37.2294 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 11.869 | 4.8985 | 2.8393 |
| PAT Margin | 15.44% | 9.23% | 7.63% |
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 76.89 | 53.07 | 37.23 |
| Other Income | 4.06 | 1.98 | 0.91 |
| Total Income | 80.95 | 55.06 | 38.14 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 32.09 | 31.42 | 14.61 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 17.29 | 13.80 | 10.41 |
| Other Expenses | 9.45 | 9.68 | 6.13 |
| Total Expenses | 64.90 | 48.77 | 34.74 |
| EBITDA | 16.72 | 7.97 | 4.86 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.12 | 1.02 | 0.87 |
| EBIT | 15.59 | 6.96 | 3.99 |
| Finance Cost | 3.75 | 2.82 | 1.56 |
| Profit Before Tax | 16.06 | 6.29 | 3.40 |
| Tax Expense | 4.19 | 1.39 | 0.56 |
| Profit After Tax | 11.87 | 4.90 | 2.84 |
| EPS - Basic | 11.99 | 4.95 | 11.21 |
| EPS - Diluted | 11.99 | 4.95 | 11.21 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 9.90 | 9.90 | 9.90 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 24.75 | 14.54 | 10.41 |
| Net Worth | 34.65 | 24.44 | 20.31 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 4.91 | 10.29 | 4.63 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 23.59 | 19.42 | 14.54 |
| Total Borrowings | 28.50 | 29.71 | 19.17 |
| Trade Payables | 0.84 | 0.47 | 1.58 |
| Current Liabilities | 28.35 | 22.00 | 17.54 |
| Total Liabilities | 34.34 | 33.10 | 22.83 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 18.03 | 18.37 | 17.95 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 24.14 | 29.54 | 14.87 |
| Trade Receivables | 15.99 | 2.07 | 3.63 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.78 | 0.65 | 1.66 |
| Current Assets | 46.56 | 35.53 | 22.82 |
| Total Assets | 68.99 | 57.53 | 43.14 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 7.84 | -4.45 | 2.85 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.49 | 2.31 | 0.55 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -2.61 | -4.38 | -0.44 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -4.99 | 7.71 | -1.60 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.24 | -1.12 | 0.81 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 20.6 | 14.5 | 12.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 19.3 | 12.6 | 10.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 15.4 | 9.2 | 7.6 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 34.3 | 20 | 14 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 24.7 | 12.8 | 10.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 17.2 | 8.5 | 6.6 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.82 | 1.22 | 0.94 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.66 | 3.65 | 3.6 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 4.16 | 2.46 | 2.55 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.64 | 1.61 | 1.3 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.79 | 0.27 | 0.45 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.11 | 0.92 | 0.86 |
| Receivable Days | 76 | 14 | 36 |
| Inventory Days | 115 | 203 | 146 |
| Payable Days | 4 | 3 | 16 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 187 | 214 | 166 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.66 | -0.91 | 1 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 5.8 | 16.3 | -0 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.33 | 2.28 | 0.63 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 15.4% | 9.2% | 7.6% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.11x | 0.92x | 0.86x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.99x | 2.35x | 2.12x |
| = Return on Equity | 34.3% | 20% | 14% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.78x | 0.84x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 1.03x | 0.9x | 0.85x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 20.3% | 13.1% | 10.7% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Receivable days rose from 36 in FY24 to 76 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 107% while profit grew 318%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = 2.1An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 5.338 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.7 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 1.012 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.449 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.893 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.786 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.859 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0584 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = 2.1, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.73 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.264 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.359 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.226 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.009 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.73 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
7 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 6.7 percentage points in FY26, having moved 2 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 3.4%
Contingent liabilities of 1.17 cr against a net worth of 34.65 cr — 3.4% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.03x
Short-term borrowings of 23.59 cr against cash of 0.78 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 10.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 1.23 cr against a profit of 11.87 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth11.87 ÷ 34.65What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)15.59 ÷ (34.65 + 28.50) = 15.59 ÷ 63.15Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue16.72 ÷ 76.89Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth28.50 ÷ 34.65How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost15.59 ÷ 3.75How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(15.99 ÷ 76.89) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days115 + 76 − 4How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT7.84 ÷ 11.87Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(11.87 − 7.84) ÷ 68.99 = 4.03 ÷ 68.99The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹127.00 × 13,452,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash170.84 + 28.50 − 0.78What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA198.56 ÷ 16.72The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT170.84 ÷ 11.87The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)14.39 ÷ 142.3%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Classic Pre-IPO 'Dressed Bride' Financial Profile
The company's restated financials show notable margin expansion immediately preceding the public offer, with PAT margins rising from 9.23% to 15.44% in FY26. However, the simultaneous 673% increase in trade receivables to ₹15.99 crore raises concerns that sales may have been pulled forward or stuffed into credit channels prior to the IPO.
Source: p.151, p.153Promoter Group Filing Backlog and Secretarial Risks
The company has disclosed multiple filing delays. More critically, three promoter group companies—Knox Agro, Silvertraq, and Winsel Aqua—have failed to file annual returns and financial statements with the ROC since 2018, pointing to systemic secretarial and administrative compliance deficits within the promoter group.
Source: p.18, p.21, p.22, p.217Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Bhoomin Rajesh Badani (Whole Time Director & CEO)
Litigation: Company: INR 1.1672 crore (INR 0.0015 crore Direct Tax demand + INR 1.1657 crore GST disputes across 5 cases, including an active INR 98.73 lakhs dispute for FY 2022-23); Promoters: INR 0.2169 crore (INR 21.69 lakhs Direct Tax demand against Vipul Badani for AY 2019-20 and an unquantifiable reassessment for AY 2014-15 on alleged escapement of INR 1.24 crores); Directors: None; Group Companies: None.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Gokaldas Exports Limited | 60.84 | — | 4.63 | — |
| S P Apparels Limited | 23.21 | — | 10.67 | — |
At the ₹127 upper band, the issue is priced at 10.6x earnings — a 75% discount to the peer median of 42.0x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
In the pre-IPO year (FY26), the company's restated PAT margin expanded significantly to 15.44% (up from 9.23% in FY25 and 7.63% in FY24). This sharp margin jump was accompanied by a 673% surge in trade receivables, which ballooned from ₹2.07 crore in FY25 to ₹15.99 crore in FY26, indicating potential revenue acceleration or uncollected pre-IPO sales.
p.151, p.153The company engages in significant business transactions with its promoter group entity, Silvertraq International Private Limited, recording sales of ₹2.25 crore and purchases of ₹2.03 crore in FY25. This indicates a high level of operational integration with a related party performing core functions.
p.190Promoters actively cycle funds through unsecured loans. In FY26, promoter Vipul Badani extended loans of ₹3.84 crore to the company and took repayments of ₹2.60 crore. Concurrently, Krupa Rajesh Badani took loans of ₹0.70 crore and repaid ₹0.82 crore.
p.189, p.190Disclosures reveal persistent secretarial and statutory filing delays, including GSTR-3B, EPF, and ESIC returns. Delays were also recorded in secretarial forms (MGT-14, DPT-3, PAS-3) and charge creations, alongside outstanding annual filings since 2018 for three promoter group companies (Knox Agro, Silvertraq, and Winsel Aqua).
p.18, p.21, p.22, p.217The company has changed its statutory auditor within the last three years, appointing M/s R K Jagetiya & Co. as the new statutory auditor.
p.134Company: INR 1.1672 crore (INR 0.0015 crore Direct Tax demand + INR 1.1657 crore GST disputes across 5 cases, including an active INR 98.73 lakhs dispute for FY 2022-23); Promoters: INR 0.2169 crore (INR 21.69 lakhs Direct Tax demand against Vipul Badani for AY 2019-20 and an unquantifiable reassessment for AY 2014-15 on alleged escapement of INR 1.24 crores); Directors: None; Group Companies: None.
p.134, p.146, p.151, p.214-218None disclosed
p.134, p.146, p.151, p.214-218Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company operates a specialized in-house unit with seam-sealing, bonding, and ultrasonic welding capabilities. It serves demanding clients like European government militaries and premium brands, which validates its technical capabilities. However, its current annual capacity of 4,50,000 pieces is highly utilized, necessitating a large ₹38.00 crore capex to build a new 1,43,370 sq. ft. facility.
p.102, p.201, p.227While revenues and PAT show strong growth, the cash flow conversion is volatile. The company reported a negative Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) of -₹4.45 crore in FY25 due to inventory accumulation (₹29.54 crore). In FY26, despite positive CFO, trade receivables surged by 673% to ₹15.99 crore, indicating that a large portion of pre-IPO sales are locked up in credit.
p.151, p.153Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (20 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What is the concrete execution plan and timeline for the proposed ₹38.00 crore capital expenditure in Tiruppur?
The company plans to deploy ₹38.00 crore for setting up a new multi-storey RCC manufacturing facility (1,43,370 sq. ft.) in Tiruppur, Tamil Nadu. The funds will be spent on civil construction, electrical works, and procurement of specialized machinery (including 600 sewing machines) to add 10,80,000 pieces of annual production capacity.
p.201, p.202What are the details of the outstanding direct tax litigations and assessments against promoter Vipul Badani?
Promoter Vipul Badani faces an outstanding direct tax demand of ₹21.69 lakhs for AY 2019-20 under section 147. Additionally, there is an active reassessment proceeding for AY 2014-15 on an alleged escapement of income of ₹1.24 crores, which exposes the promoter to potential personal tax liabilities.
p.214-218What is the operational nature of transactions with Silvertraq International Private Limited, and are there outstanding balances?
Silvertraq is a promoter-controlled group company. Qualiance conducts both sales (₹2.25 crore in FY25) and purchases (₹2.03 crore in FY25) of fabric and garments with Silvertraq, establishing an integrated supply chain relationship with this related party.
p.190Why did trade receivables rise to ₹15.99 crore in FY26, and how does this impact the company's liquidity?
Receivables surged from ₹2.07 crore in FY25 to ₹15.99 crore in FY26 (representing 21% of FY26 revenue), driven by extended credit terms given to international clients. While CFO remained positive at ₹7.84 crore in FY26 due to inventory reduction, the uncollected receivables represent a substantial working capital lockup that increases reliance on short-term bank borrowings.
p.151, p.153Why has the company pursued an SME platform listing on NSE Emerge instead of the Mainboard?
With a pre-issue paid-up capital of ₹9.90 crore and a post-issue capital of ₹13.45 crore, the company's post-issue capital falls below the ₹25.00 crore threshold, making it structurally eligible for the NSE Emerge SME platform rather than a Mainboard listing.
p.40, p.58What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to Memorandum of Association (Vipul Badani, Krupa Rajesh Badani, Rajesh Jagmohandas Badani, Pratiksha Vipul Badani, Bhoomin R Badani, Vipul J Badani HUF, Rajesh J Badani HUF) | ₹10.00 | 2006-08-24 | 12.7x |
| An early round from roughly 20 years ago, at roughly 12.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Vipul Badani and Krupa Rajesh Badani | ₹10.00 | 2006-09-25 | 12.7x |
| An early round from roughly 20 years ago, at roughly 12.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Vipul Badani and Krupa Rajesh Badani | ₹10.00 | 2007-02-06 | 12.7x |
| An early round from roughly 20 years ago, at roughly 12.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Vipul Badani and Krupa Rajesh Badani | ₹10.00 | 2011-09-19 | 12.7x |
| An early round from roughly 15 years ago, at roughly 12.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Vipul Badani and Krupa Rajesh Badani | ₹10.00 | 2011-11-17 | 12.7x |
| An early round from roughly 15 years ago, at roughly 12.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Vipul Badani and Krupa Rajesh Badani | ₹10.00 | 2024-02-16 | 12.7x |
| Transfer from Krupa Rajesh Badani to RJ HUF | ₹127.00 | 2025-08-29 | 1.0x |
| Transfer from Pratiksha Vipul Badani to Eterna Prima-Scheme II | ₹127.00 | 2025-08-29 | 1.0x |
| Transfer from Sneha Bhoomin Badani to Vinod Kumar Lodha | ₹127.00 | 2025-08-29 | 1.0x |
| Transfer from Sneha Bhoomin Badani to Naresh Kumar Bhargava | ₹127.00 | 2025-08-29 | 1.0x |
| Transfer from Sneha Bhoomin Badani to Sanjay Popatlal Jain | ₹127.00 | 2025-08-29 | 1.0x |
| Transfer of Gift from Vipul Badani to relatives (Pratiksha V Badani and Dhriti Drolia) | — | 2025-11-17 | — |
| Transfer of Gift from Krupa Rajesh Badani to relatives (Rajesh J Badani, Sneha B Badani, Bhoomin R Badani) | — | 2025-11-17 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 11 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years from the date of Allotment2,692,000 shares (20.01% of total)
- 11 Sep 2028Promoters' holding in excess of minimum contribution (50% of pre-issue shares)2 years from the date of Allotment2,509,000 shares (18.65% of total)
- 11 Sep 2027Promoters' holding in excess of minimum contribution (Remaining pre-issue shares)1 year from the date of Allotment2,508,741 shares (18.65% of total)
- 11 Sep 2027Pre-issue equity shares held by persons other than the promoters1 year from the date of Allotment950,000 shares (7.06% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.