Q &T Foods
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Promoter and company face active criminal cheque bouncing (Section 138 NI Act) lawsuits
- Insiders and pre-IPO investors received a 1:1 bonus issue right after preferential allotments, halving their cost to Rs 47.00 per share
- Extreme compliance defaults, including up to 316-day delays in depositing employee EPF/ESIC welfare funds and a 2,435-day ROC filing delay
- Over 25% of the fresh issue proceeds are allocated to debt repayment rather than operational growth
- Extreme geographical concentration with 99.25% of revenue originating from Uttar Pradesh
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Q&T Foods Limited manufactures, distributes, and sells savoury bakery products, primarily bread, under its brand 'American Bakers'.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Q&T Foods Limited (formerly Q&T Foods Private Limited) was incorporated in 2018 and operates in the bakery segment. Its registered office is in Ghaziabad, Uttar Pradesh, and it operates from a single leased manufacturing facility of 10,750 square feet located at Village Dinanath Pur Puthi, Dasna, Ghaziabad. The facility has an installed production capacity of 9,472 TPA, with actual production increasing from 7,446 tons in FY24 to 8,651 tons in FY26, representing a capacity utilization of 91.33% in the latest fiscal year. Principal raw materials include flour, sugar, salt, oil, and yeast, sourced from local vendors. The company's products are sold under its brand name 'American Bakers' directly to a network of retail dealers, distributors, and bulk B2B clients. Geographically, its sales are heavily concentrated in Uttar Pradesh, which contributed 99.25% of operational revenue in FY26, while the top 10 customers contributed 25.01% of revenue.
Established regional brand recall of 'American Bakers', dedicated in-house manufacturing process, long-standing dealer relationships, and an extensive local distribution network in Uttar Pradesh.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- To finance the Capital expenditure requirements for the purchase of Equipment/Machineries for existing manufacturing facility — ₹4.42 cr
- To part finance working capital requirements of the company — ₹7.50 cr
- Repayment/pre-payment, in full or in part, of certain borrowings availed by our Company — ₹6.75 cr
- To meet General corporate purposes — ₹3.92 cr
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 54.7763 | 46.8307 | 40.2153 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 5.2003 | 2.7355 | 1.96 |
| PAT Margin | 9.49% | 5.84% | 4.87% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 54.78 | 46.83 | 40.22 |
| Other Income | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total Income | 54.78 | 46.83 | 40.22 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 40.43 | 35.80 | 30.84 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 2.91 | 2.97 | 2.53 |
| Other Expenses | 2.97 | 3.10 | 3.10 |
| Total Expenses | 47.83 | 43.14 | 37.57 |
| EBITDA | 8.37 | 4.82 | 3.77 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.61 | 0.37 | 0.39 |
| Finance Cost | 0.91 | 0.91 | 0.74 |
| Profit Before Tax | 6.95 | 3.69 | 2.65 |
| Tax Expense | 1.75 | 0.96 | 0.69 |
| Profit After Tax | 5.20 | 2.74 | 1.96 |
| EPS - Basic | 10.84 | 5.83 | 4.26 |
| EPS - Diluted | 10.84 | 5.83 | 4.26 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 4.80 | 4.80 | 0.10 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 7.44 | 2.24 | 2.34 |
| Net Worth | 12.24 | 7.04 | 2.44 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.15 | 2.45 | 2.75 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 10.90 | 7.67 | 7.09 |
| Total Borrowings | 11.05 | 10.11 | 9.84 |
| Trade Payables | 0.95 | 0.87 | 0.86 |
| Current Liabilities | 13.90 | 9.96 | 8.98 |
| Total Liabilities | 14.34 | 12.64 | 11.90 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 9.75 | 6.61 | 3.91 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 5.37 | 4.51 | 2.50 |
| Trade Receivables | 9.38 | 7.90 | 7.25 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.58 | 0.32 | 0.27 |
| Current Assets | 16.83 | 13.08 | 10.40 |
| Total Assets | 26.57 | 19.68 | 14.34 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 3.99 | 1.89 | -0.17 |
| Capital Expenditure | 3.75 | 3.07 | 1.48 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -3.75 | -3.07 | -1.48 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 0.02 | 1.22 | 1.76 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.26 | 0.05 | 0.11 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 15.3 | 10.3 | 9.4 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 14.4 | 9.8 | 8.4 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 9.5 | 5.8 | 4.9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 42.5 | 38.9 | 80.3 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 33.8 | 26.8 | 27.6 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 19.6 | 13.9 | 13.7 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.9 | 1.44 | 4.03 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.25 | 2.03 | 2.54 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 8.61 | 5.06 | 4.59 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.21 | 1.31 | 1.16 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.82 | 0.86 | 0.88 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2.06 | 2.38 | 2.8 |
| Receivable Days | 62 | 62 | 66 |
| Inventory Days | 36 | 35 | 23 |
| Payable Days | 6 | 7 | 8 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 92 | 90 | 81 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.77 | 0.69 | -0.09 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 4.5 | 4.3 | 14.9 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 6.12 | 8.39 | 3.8 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 9.5% | 5.8% | 4.9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2.06x | 2.38x | 2.8x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.17x | 2.8x | 5.87x |
| = Return on Equity | 42.5% | 38.9% | 80.3% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.74x | 0.74x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.88x | 0.8x | 0.78x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 14.4% | 9.8% | 8.4% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 36% while profit grew 165%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 8.61x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.015 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.899 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.17 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.886 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.83 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.839 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0455 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.77 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.11 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.28 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.296 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.854 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.77 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 5 percentage points in FY26, having moved 0.9 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 1.7%
Contingent liabilities of 0.21 cr against a net worth of 12.24 cr — 1.7% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.05x
Short-term borrowings of 10.90 cr against cash of 0.58 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.5%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.18 cr against a profit of 5.20 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth5.20 ÷ 12.24What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)7.86 ÷ (12.24 + 11.05) = 7.86 ÷ 23.29Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue8.37 ÷ 54.78Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth11.05 ÷ 12.24How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost7.86 ÷ 0.91How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(9.38 ÷ 54.78) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days36 + 62 − 6How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT3.99 ÷ 5.20Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(5.20 − 3.99) ÷ 26.57 = 1.21 ÷ 26.57The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹115.00 × 7,078,400 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash81.40 + 11.05 − 0.58What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA91.87 ÷ 8.37The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT81.40 ÷ 5.20The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)15.65 ÷ 90.1%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Promoter Criminal Lawsuits and Serious Compliance Lapses overshadow Top-line Scale
While Q&T Foods has successfully scaled its revenues to Rs 54.78 Cr with positive operating cash flows, severe governance and integrity deficits are documented. These include outstanding criminal Section 138 cheque-bouncing cases against the company and the promoter director, along with delays of up to 316 days in depositing basic employee welfare funds and a 2,435-day delay in secretarial ROC filings.
Source: p. 22, 23, 24, 35, 52, 113Insider Capital Advantage and Pre-IPO Margin Surge
Select pre-IPO investors received preferential allotments at Rs 94.00 per share in late 2024, only to immediately benefit from a 1:1 bonus issue, effectively halving their acquisition cost to Rs 47.00 per share. This cost advantage is paired with a sharp expansion of EBITDA margins to 15.28% in FY26 (up from 9.37% in FY24), raising flags of pre-IPO profit dressing.
Source: p. 50, 52, 69Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Mr. Nishant Raj Gupta (Managing Director)
Litigation: Direct Tax disputed outstanding demand against Promoter Director (Nishant Raj Gupta): 5 cases of Rs. 0.1675 Cr. Criminal cases against the Company and Promoter Director Mr. Nishant Raj Gupta under Section 138 of NI Act (Cheque bouncing): 1 case of Rs. 0.1438 Cr filed by Gupta Plastic Products, and 1 case filed by Dreamz Overseas Private Limited (unspecified amount). Claims not acknowledged as debt (contingent litigation) against Company: Rs 0.2061 Cr.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mrs. Bectors Food Specialties Limited | 54.37 | — | 10.11 | — |
At the ₹115 upper band, the issue is priced at 10.6x earnings — a 80% discount to the peer median of 54.4x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
S N Capital Management and other pre-IPO investors were allotted 1,74,000 equity shares on 2024-10-09 and 24,000 shares on 2024-11-05 at a preferential price of Rs 94.00 per share. On 2024-12-11, just one month later, the company issued a 1:1 bonus to all existing shareholders. This immediate capitalization of reserves effectively halved the pre-IPO investors' acquisition cost to Rs 47.00 per share, which is a significant discount of 59.1% against the fixed IPO price of Rs 115.00.
p. 69The company and promoter director Nishant Raj Gupta are facing active criminal cheque bouncing lawsuits under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, including a case of Rs 0.1438 Cr filed by Gupta Plastic Products. Widespread statutory delays exist: employee statutory contributions (EPF/ESIC) were chronically delayed by up to 316 days. Additionally, there was a 2,435-day delay in filing Form DPT-3 (return of deposits) and a 124-day delay in registering statutory auditor appointments (Form ADT-1) with the ROC.
p. 22, 23, 24, 35, 113The company's EBITDA margins expanded sharply from 9.37% in FY24 to 15.28% in FY26, allowing reported PAT to expand more than 165% to Rs 5.20 Cr in FY26 (up from Rs 1.96 Cr in FY24) right before the public offering. However, this profitability surge is not backed by equivalent cash generation, as CFO was Rs 3.99 Cr in FY26 (76.7% cash conversion) and was negative at Rs -0.17 Cr in FY24.
p. 50, 52, 120The company’s operations are heavily concentrated in a single market. In FY26, the state of Uttar Pradesh contributed 99.25% of the company's total revenue from operations.
p. 50The company is utilizing Rs 6.75 Cr of the fresh issue proceeds for the repayment/pre-payment of its borrowings. This represents 25.72% of the gross fresh issue size of Rs 26.25 Cr.
p. 83Direct Tax disputed outstanding demand against Promoter Director (Nishant Raj Gupta): 5 cases of Rs. 0.1675 Cr. Criminal cases against the Company and Promoter Director Mr. Nishant Raj Gupta under Section 138 of NI Act (Cheque bouncing): 1 case of Rs. 0.1438 Cr filed by Gupta Plastic Products, and 1 case filed by Dreamz Overseas Private Limited (unspecified amount). Claims not acknowledged as debt (contingent litigation) against Company: Rs 0.2061 Cr.
p. 5, 22, 50, 52, 55, 63, 71, 112, 113, 116None disclosed
p. 5, 22, 50, 52, 55, 63, 71, 112, 113, 116Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The manufacturing and brand presence is almost entirely single-state. 99.25% of sales come from Uttar Pradesh, making the company highly vulnerable to localized market conditions, and its compliance infrastructure is weak as highlighted by extreme statutory defaults.
p. 23, 24, 35, 50, 113, 120Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What are the primary objects of the fresh IPO issue?
The gross fresh issue proceeds of Rs 26.25 Cr are allocated towards working capital requirements (Rs 7.50 Cr), repayment of borrowings (Rs 6.75 Cr), purchase of equipment and machinery for the existing facility (Rs 4.42 Cr), and general corporate purposes (Rs 3.92 Cr).
p. 83Who are the promoters and what is their share acquisition cost?
The promoters are Mr. Nishant Raj Gupta, Ms. Khushbu Varshney, and Ms. Usha Gupta, holding 89.45% pre-issue. Due to early subscription at face value and sequential bonus issues (21:1 in September 2024 and 1:1 in December 2024), their average cost of acquisition is at nominal single digits.
p. 68, 69, 70Are there material related party transactions or director balances?
Related party transactions are primarily restricted to promoter director remuneration (Rs 0.18 Cr to Nishant Raj Gupta in FY26) and unsecured loan transactions with Nishant Raj Gupta (Rs 0.66 Cr loan taken and Rs 2.98 Cr repaid in FY26). No core functions are outsourced to related parties.
p. 53Does operating cash flow back the company's profitability expansion?
The company has demonstrated positive cash flows, generating CFO of Rs 3.99 Cr in FY26 against a reported standalone PAT of Rs 5.20 Cr (76.7% conversion rate), compared to a negative CFO of Rs -0.17 Cr in FY24.
p. 50, 52What market structure parameters apply to this offer?
The offer is a 100% Fresh Issue of up to Rs 26.25 Cr at a fixed price of Rs 115.00 per share, listing on the BSE SME platform. Prabhat Financial Services Limited acts as the market maker (up to 1,15,200 shares reserved). Minimum trading lot size is 1,200 shares with standard 5% price bands post-listing.
p. 1, 3, 6, 50, 68What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Nishant Raj Gupta & Pradeep Kumar Sharma (MOA Subscribers) | ₹10.00 | 2018-08-29 | 11.5x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 11.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Nishant Raj Gupta, Usha Gupta, Khushbu Varshney, Rakesh Gupta, Roopali Gupta, Ajay Kumar Singh, Rahul Anand (Bonus 21:1) | — | 2024-09-05 | — |
| S N Capital Management, Ritesh Gupta, Adheesh Kabra, Capgate Consultants, Pankaj Kumar, Rohit Narang, Vivek Singh (Private Placement) | ₹94.00 | 2024-10-09 | 1.2x |
| Heena Singhal, Mohit Agarwal HUF, Mukesh Bhati, Himanshu Agarwal, Shilvee Gupta (Private Placement) | ₹94.00 | 2024-11-05 | 1.2x |
| Nishant Raj Gupta, Usha Gupta, Khushbu Varshney, Rakesh Gupta, Roopali Gupta, Rahul Anand, Ajay Kumar Singh, SN Capital, Ritesh Gupta, Adheesh Kabra, Capgate Consultants, Pankaj Kumar, Rohit Narang, Vivek Singh, Heena Singhal, Mohit Agarwal HUF, Mukesh Bhati, Himanshu Agarwal, Shilvee Gupta (Bonus 1:1) | — | 2024-12-11 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 19 Aug 2029promoterlocked-in for a period of three years from the date of allotment1,415,700 shares (20% of total)
- 19 Aug 2028promoterlocked in for a period of two years from the date of allotment (fifty percent of excess promoters holding)1,437,150 shares (20.3% of total)
- 19 Aug 2027promoterlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment (remaining fifty percent of excess promoters holding)1,437,150 shares (20.3% of total)
- 19 Aug 2027otherlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment in this Issue (non-promoter pre-issue capital)506,000 shares (7.15% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.