Pramodini Medicare
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Severe internal control weaknesses, including missing loan agreements and failure to submit stock statements to banks
- Recurring and extensive secretarial defaults, highlighted by a 1,647-day ROC delay in filing auditor appointments
- Historical 6-year promoter/director disqualification u/s 164(2) for regulatory filing defaults in another entity
- Material related-party dependencies: core diagnostics and manpower services are outsourced to promoter-controlled entities
- Rs 7.34 Cr in outstanding loans advanced to associate company Vista Pramodini Medicare Pvt Ltd
- Outstanding Rs 4.95 Cr corporate guarantee extended on behalf of promoter group entity Sri Ram Medicare
- Up to 25% of IPO proceeds allocated to completely unidentified and unappraised inorganic acquisitions
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Pramodini Medicare Limited is an Indian diagnostic service provider offering technology-enabled diagnostic and imaging services.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Pramodini Medicare Limited provides a comprehensive range of technology-enabled diagnostic services, including MRI, CT scans, ultrasound, and PET-CT oncology imaging. Originally incorporated on September 12, 2000, as 'Pramodini Medicare Private Limited' in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh, the company operates its diagnostic centers primarily from leased premises. Its expansion plans involve setting up proposed diagnostic centers and upgrading existing facilities in locations such as Vijayawada, Bangalore, Hubli, and Manjari. The company has placed medical equipment orders with suppliers like Truevis Technologies Private Limited, but has not yet finalized orders for all proposed diagnostic devices. Its customer base consists of individual patients and healthcare providers utilizing diagnostic services. The company delivers its diagnostic and imaging services directly to patients through its diagnostic centers.
Strategic presence across various states of India, a strong network with diversified models, technical capability with robust IT infrastructure, and a diverse customer and patient base.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding of capital expenditure for purchase of Medical Equipments towards Existing and Proposed Diagnostic Centres — ₹45.15 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
- Unidentified inorganic acquisition
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured18%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 62.2875 | 38.2377 | 35.2295 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 17.3773 | 11.0276 | 6.9301 |
| PAT Margin | 27.9% | 28.84% | 19.67% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 62.29 | 38.24 | 35.23 |
| Other Income | 1.09 | 0.31 | 0.56 |
| Total Income | 63.38 | 38.55 | 35.79 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 11.34 | 4.69 | 5.55 |
| Other Expenses | 7.98 | 5.67 | 7.53 |
| Total Expenses | 40.08 | 22.80 | 25.72 |
| EBITDA | 30.90 | 20.97 | 15.53 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 7.39 | 4.28 | 4.39 |
| EBIT | 24.60 | 16.99 | 11.71 |
| Finance Cost | 1.30 | 1.24 | 1.63 |
| Profit Before Tax | 23.30 | 15.75 | 10.08 |
| Tax Expense | 5.92 | 4.61 | 2.94 |
| Profit After Tax | 17.38 | 11.03 | 6.93 |
| EPS - Basic | 10.41 | 6.67 | 4.30 |
| EPS - Diluted | 10.41 | 6.67 | 4.30 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 16.69 | 1.28 | 1.28 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 36.46 | 34.49 | 23.46 |
| Net Worth | 53.15 | 35.77 | 24.75 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 13.76 | 8.03 | 6.22 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 4.08 | 2.78 | 5.74 |
| Total Borrowings | 17.85 | 10.81 | 11.96 |
| Trade Payables | 0.82 | 0.56 | 4.02 |
| Current Liabilities | 26.30 | 12.27 | 17.47 |
| Total Liabilities | 40.46 | 20.67 | 24.03 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 44.19 | 21.79 | 16.03 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.01 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.03 | 0.00 | 0.06 |
| Inventories | 0.99 | 0.20 | 0.03 |
| Trade Receivables | 17.40 | 11.17 | 17.94 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 6.44 | 7.12 | 3.42 |
| Current Assets | 33.07 | 19.34 | 22.39 |
| Total Assets | 93.62 | 56.45 | 48.78 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 25.39 | 22.12 | 9.85 |
| Capital Expenditure | 29.81 | 10.04 | 0.36 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -30.63 | -14.66 | -1.38 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 5.73 | -2.39 | -10.81 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.50 | 5.07 | -2.34 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 48.8 | 54.4 | 43.4 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 38.8 | 44.1 | 32.7 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 27.9 | 28.8 | 19.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 32.7 | 30.8 | 28 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 34.7 | 36.5 | 31.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 18.6 | 19.5 | 14.2 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.34 | 0.3 | 0.48 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.37 | 0.18 | 0.55 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 18.89 | 13.67 | 7.17 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.26 | 1.58 | 1.28 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.22 | 1.56 | 1.28 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.67 | 0.68 | 0.72 |
| Receivable Days | 102 | 107 | 186 |
| Inventory Days | 6 | 2 | 0 |
| Payable Days | 5 | 5 | 42 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 103 | 104 | 144 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.46 | 2.01 | 1.42 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -8.6 | -19.7 | -6 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 4.03 | 2.34 | 0.08 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 27.9% | 28.8% | 19.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.67x | 0.68x | 0.72x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.76x | 1.58x | 1.97x |
| = Return on Equity | 32.7% | 30.8% | 28% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.7x | 0.69x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.93x | 0.86x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 39.5% | 44.4% | 33.2% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.46x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Receivable days fell from 186 to 102. Collections improved over the disclosed period.
- Interest coverage was 18.89x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.956 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.643 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.629 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.146 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.144 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.189 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0856 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.14 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.072 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.389 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.263 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.314 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.14 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 63% in FY26, against 9% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 10.6%
Contingent liabilities of 5.62 cr against a net worth of 53.15 cr — 10.6% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 1.5%
1.5% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 1.58x
Short-term borrowings of 4.08 cr against cash of 6.44 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.6%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.62 cr against a profit of 17.38 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth17.38 ÷ 53.15What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)24.60 ÷ (53.15 + 17.85) = 24.60 ÷ 71.00Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue30.90 ÷ 62.29Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth17.85 ÷ 53.15How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost24.60 ÷ 1.30How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(17.40 ÷ 62.29) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days6 + 102 − 5How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT25.39 ÷ 17.38Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(17.38 − 25.39) ÷ 93.62 = -8.01 ÷ 93.62The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹118.00 × 22,045,595 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash260.14 + 17.85 − 6.44What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA271.55 ÷ 30.90The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT260.14 ÷ 17.38The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)14.97 ÷ 57.6%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Consistently Robust Operating Cash Flow Outpaces Profitability
Pramodini Medicare exhibits a high-quality financial profile where actual Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) consistently exceeded net profits in each of the past three fiscal years, culminating in Rs 25.39 Cr CFO against Rs 17.38 Cr PAT in FY26. This indicates efficient collection and strong underlying cash generation from its diagnostic network.
Source: p. 26, 65, 66, 67, 161, 162Severe Internal Control and Compliance Deficits Mask Operational Quality
Despite strong financials, the company presents profound regulatory and control risks: statutory auditors flagged missing loan sanction agreements and the failure to submit required stock statements to banks. Furthermore, the company incurred a 1,647-day delay in filing auditor ROC appointments, and key promoters were historically disqualified for 6 years due to regulatory defaults in another entity.
Source: p. 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 199, F-2Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar
Litigation: TDS demands against the Company: 7 cases u/s Rs 0.0039 Cr. Direct Tax demands against Promoters: 12 cases u/s Rs 0.0151 Cr. Direct Tax demands against Group Companies: 10 cases u/s Rs 0.1008 Cr. Pending Civil Suit u/s Independent Director (Ajay Kumar Attaluri): 1 case (amount unascertainable). Ongoing civil/writ petition against Group Company (Infer Radiological): 1 case (amount unascertainable).
Auditor / RPT Flags: Auditor report (Note A u/s secured loans) discloses that underlying sanction letters/loan agreements for certain borrowings were not readily available at the reporting date. Further, Note 17 u/s additional notes indicates that the Company availed borrowings u/s security of current assets but did not submit monthly returns/statements of current assets to banks, preventing reconciliation of material discrepancies.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pramodini Medicare Limited | — | — | 32.69 | — |
| Invicta Diagnostic Limited | 13.62 | — | 9.76 | — |
| Krsnaa Diagnostics Limited | 16.74 | — | 10.35 | — |
| Star Imaging & Path Labs Limited | 7.87 | — | 16.58 | — |
At the ₹118 upper band, the issue is priced at 11.3x earnings — a 17% discount to the peer median of 13.6x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The statutory auditor disclosed that underlying sanction letters/loan agreements for certain borrowings were not readily available at the reporting date. Further, the company availed bank borrowings u/s security of current assets but failed to submit monthly returns/statements of current assets to banks, preventing reconciliation of material discrepancies. In addition, there were chronic secretarial filing delays, including a 1,647-day delay in filing Form ADT-1 for auditor appointment and AOC-4 filing delays of up to 275 days.
p. 29, 30, 31, 32, F-2, 237Two of the company's Promoters and Directors, Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar and Dr. Chalasani Kavitha, were disqualified under Section 164(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 from November 1, 2015 to October 31, 2021, for being directors of another company (M/s. Lark Avenues Private Limited) that failed to file its financial statements and annual returns. The disqualification was removed on January 10, 2026.
p. 34, 199The company operates with significant related party dependencies. It paid Rs 0.61 Cr in contract manpower charges in FY26 to group company Infer Radiological & Imaging Services Pvt Ltd (which performs core contract manpower and collection services) and paid a Rs 1.30 Cr advance to it. Additionally, it has given loans of Rs 1.05 Cr in FY26 (Rs 1.15 Cr in FY25) to associate Vista Pramodini Medicare Pvt Ltd (which performs core clinical associateship), with an outstanding unsecured loan receivable of Rs 7.34 Cr as of FY26.
p. F-2, 333, 334, 336The company extended a material corporate guarantee of Rs 4.95 Cr (Rs 495.00 Lakhs) in favor of Sri Ram Medicare Private Limited, a promoter group entity, in relation to its bank borrowings across FY24, FY25, and FY26.
p. 27, 40, 333One of the primary objects of the issue is to utilize a portion of the Net Proceeds for general corporate purposes and unidentified inorganic acquisitions, which are subject to a combined cap of 35% of Gross Proceeds, with unidentified acquisitions specifically capped at 25% of Gross Proceeds.
p. 31, 98On March 21, 2026, less than 5 months prior to the offer, the company issued 15,410,580 bonus equity shares in a 12:1 ratio to existing shareholders by capitalizing free reserves and share premium, which reduced the promoters' nominal weighted average cost of acquisition to Rs 34.95 per share.
p. 83, 84, 92, 111, 263Unlike typical pre-IPO candidates with decaying cash conversion, the company demonstrated a very strong cash flow profile. In FY26, CFO was Rs 25.39 Cr against reported PAT of Rs 17.38 Cr. In FY25, CFO was Rs 22.12 Cr against PAT of Rs 11.03 Cr, and in FY24, CFO was Rs 9.85 Cr against PAT of Rs 6.93 Cr.
p. 26, 65, 66, 67, 161, 162TDS demands against the Company: 7 cases u/s Rs 0.0039 Cr. Direct Tax demands against Promoters: 12 cases u/s Rs 0.0151 Cr. Direct Tax demands against Group Companies: 10 cases u/s Rs 0.1008 Cr. Pending Civil Suit u/s Independent Director (Ajay Kumar Attaluri): 1 case (amount unascertainable). Ongoing civil/writ petition against Group Company (Infer Radiological): 1 case (amount unascertainable).
p. 3, 5, 29, 82, 92, 95, 121, 124, 147, 186, 235, 291, 329, 393Auditor report (Note A u/s secured loans) discloses that underlying sanction letters/loan agreements for certain borrowings were not readily available at the reporting date. Further, Note 17 u/s additional notes indicates that the Company availed borrowings u/s security of current assets but did not submit monthly returns/statements of current assets to banks, preventing reconciliation of material discrepancies.
p. 3, 5, 29, 82, 92, 95, 121, 124, 147, 186, 235, 291, 329, 393Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The diagnostic operations are heavily dependent on related-party entities. Core clinical and diagnostics associateship is performed by associate Vista Pramodini Medicare Private Limited (which received Rs 1.05 Cr loan and paid Rs 0.93 Cr rent in FY26), and contract manpower and diagnostic collection are outsourced to group company Infer Radiological & Imaging Services Private Limited.
p. 68, 106, 188, 333, 334Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Purva Sharegistry
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (25 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue proceeds being deployed?
Proceeds are earmarked for funding capital expenditure for the purchase of medical equipment for existing and proposed diagnostic centers (Rs 45.15 Cr). The balance is allocated to general corporate purposes and unidentified inorganic acquisitions, subject to a combined cap of 35% of Gross Proceeds (with unidentified acquisitions limited to <=25%).
p. 31, 97, 98Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar, Dr. Chalasani Kavitha, Ms. Chalasani Durga Aashritha, and M/s. Sri Ram Medicare Private Limited, holding 85.71% pre-issue. Due to a 12:1 bonus issue in March 2026, the weighted average cost of acquisition for secondary transactions stands at Rs 34.95 per equity share.
p. 82, 84, 92, 111, 112, 180Are there material related-party transactions or balance-sheet exposures?
Yes. The company has given loans to associate Vista Pramodini Medicare Pvt Ltd (outstanding receivable of Rs 7.34 Cr in FY26) and paid Rs 0.61 Cr in manpower charges to Infer Radiological & Imaging Services Pvt Ltd. It has also extended an outstanding corporate guarantee of Rs 4.95 Cr on behalf of promoter group entity Sri Ram Medicare Pvt Ltd.
p. F-2, 333, 334Does operating cash flow align with reported profits?
Yes, exceptionally well. Operating cash flow (CFO) has consistently exceeded reported PAT over the last three years: FY26 CFO was Rs 25.39 Cr vs PAT of Rs 17.38 Cr; FY25 CFO was Rs 22.12 Cr vs PAT of Rs 11.03 Cr; and FY24 CFO was Rs 9.85 Cr vs PAT of Rs 6.93 Cr. This indicates high earnings quality.
p. 26, 65, 66, 67, 161, 162What structural market parameters apply to this offer?
The offer consists of a Fresh Issue of up to 53,50,800 shares and an OFS of up to 5,00,400 shares. Shreni Shares Limited and Rainbow Securities Private Limited act as joint market makers (up to 3,36,000 shares reserved). Post-issue capital is structured at Rs 22.05 Cr (2,20,45,595 shares of face value Rs 10 each), allowing listing on the NSE Emerge platform.
p. 1, 8, 9, 61, 71, 79, 327What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers (Mr. Raja Rao Yalamanchili and Ms. Hymavathi Yalamanchali) | ₹10.00 | 2000-09-12 | 11.8x |
| An early round from roughly 26 years ago, at roughly 11.8x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Allotment | ₹10.00 | 2004-03-31 | 11.8x |
| An early round from roughly 23 years ago, at roughly 11.8x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Allotment | ₹10.00 | 2011-03-25 | 11.8x |
| An early round from roughly 16 years ago, at roughly 11.8x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Ms. Hymavathi Yalamanchali to Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar | ₹80.93 | 2018-03-21 | 1.5x |
| Mr. Raja Rao Yalamanchili to Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar | ₹80.93 | 2018-03-21 | 1.5x |
| Ms. Hymavathi Yalamanchali to Dr. Chalasani Kavitha | ₹80.93 | 2018-04-02 | 1.5x |
| Mr. Raja Rao Yalamanchili to Dr. Chalasani Kavitha | ₹80.93 | 2018-04-02 | 1.5x |
| Share Sub-division / Split (face value ₹10 to ₹1) | — | 2020-02-12 | — |
| Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar to Mr. Yash Hitesh Patel | ₹31.00 | 2025-03-10 | 3.8x |
| Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar to Ms. Sumita Mishra | ₹31.00 | 2025-03-17 | 3.8x |
| Share Consolidation (face value ₹1 to ₹10) | — | 2025-03-30 | — |
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 12:1) | — | 2026-03-21 | — |
| The 3 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar to Mr. Siva Rama Krishna Prasad Atluri | ₹310.00 | 2025-04-02 | as disclosed |
| Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar to Ms. Karri Mani Kumari | ₹310.00 | 2025-04-02 | as disclosed |
| Dr. Chalasani Kuldeep Kumar to Mr. Swapnil Sudhakarrao Topale | ₹310.00 | 2025-04-03 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 19 Aug 2029promoterlocked-in for a period of 3 years from the date of allotment4,409,119 shares (20% of total)
- 19 Aug 2028promoterlocked in for a period of two years from the date of allotment in the initial public offer4,699,979 shares
- 19 Aug 2027promoterlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment in the initial public offer4,699,979 shares
- 19 Aug 2027otherlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment of Equity Shares in this Offer2,385,318 shares
- 17 Nov 2026financial investorFifty percent of the Equity Shares allotted to Anchor Investors under the Anchor Investor Portion shall be locked-in for a period of 90 days from the date of Allotment and the remaining Equity Shares allotted to Anchor Investors under the Anchor Investor Portion shall be locked-in for a period of 30 days from the date of Allotment
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.