Peshwa Wheat
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Pre-IPO 1:1 bonus issue in July 2024 expanded promoter equity at nil cost.
- Over 61% of borrowings (Rs. 14.58 crore out of Rs. 23.74 crore) consist of demand-repayable unsecured loans from promoter family and group entities.
- Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited supplies 38.48% of total raw materials in FY26.
- Pending Income Tax demand of Rs. 4.75 crore under Section 143(1)(a) for AY 2025-26.
- Operating cash flow turned strongly positive in FY26 at Rs. 15.64 crore (up from -Rs. 13.10 crore in FY25).
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Peshwa Wheat Limited is engaged in the business of processing wheat-based products such as Atta (wheat flour), Sortex Wheat, Broken Wheat, and other flour products including Gram Flour (Besan) and Maize Flour.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Incorporated in December 2023 upon conversion from a partnership firm formed in 2017, Peshwa Wheat Limited operates an integrated flour processing unit at Industrial Growth Centre Apparel Cluster, Bijepur, Indore, Madhya Pradesh. The company processes wheat-based products including Atta (wheat flour), Sortex Wheat, Broken Wheat, Wheat Bran (used for cattle feed), and other flour products such as Gram Flour (Besan) and Maize Flour, sold primarily in 50 kg and 30 kg packaging segments. Products are sold through super stockists (accounting for 55.39% of FY25 revenue) and directly to customers/stockists. In FY26, wheat products contributed 85.79% (Atta 38.25%, Sortex Wheat 42.43%, Broken Wheat 3.55%, Wheat Bran 1.56%), maize flour contributed 10.62%, and trading of vegetables contributed 3.59% to total revenue from operations. Operations are heavily concentrated in Madhya Pradesh, which generated 97.21% of domestic revenue in FY26. Raw materials (wheat, chana dal, maize) are sourced entirely from suppliers within Madhya Pradesh, with related party Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited supplying 38.48% of raw materials in FY26 (54.54% in FY25).
Integrated zero-waste/zero-discharge processing facility, strategic raw material procurement relationship with group company Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited under MSME sub-lease guidelines, established distribution network via super stockists, and strong presence in Madhya Pradesh.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding Capital Expenditure towards Purchase of Plant and Machineries — ₹6.69 cr
- Funding Capital Expenditure towards Civil Construction — ₹5.01 cr
- Funding Working Capital Requirements — ₹26.50 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 3 live components.
80% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 215.9352 | 171.535 | 43.793 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 15.8082 | 11.8361 | 5.2106 |
| PAT Margin | 7.32% | 6.9% | 11.9% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 25.9% | Revenue increased due to expanded market reach by increasing sales to super stockists alongside direct customer sales. | Structural |
| Cost of Materials Consumed (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 43.6% | Cost of materials consumed rose due to higher raw material procurement and processing volumes required to support top-line revenue growth. | Structural |
| Purchase of Stock in Trade (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 66.9% | Purchases of stock in trade declined as the company reduced vegetable and third-party trading activities to focus on in-house flour manufacturing. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 23.3% | Employee benefit expenses decreased primarily due to lower salary and wage expenses during the year. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortisation Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 52.5% | Depreciation expense reduced following initial accelerated depreciation charges on plant and machinery additions made in preceding periods. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 33.6% | Net profit expanded due to strong top-line growth and improved cost management, pushing the PAT margin to 7.32%. | Structural |
| Trade Receivables (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 46.4% | Trade receivables increased in line with overall top-line revenue expansion. | Structural |
| Inventories (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 28.2% | Inventories increased due to higher raw material purchases to support expanded production volumes. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 219.4% | Operating cash flow turned positive reaching Rs. 15.6445 crore due to higher operating profits and working capital stabilization. | Structural |
| Revenue from Operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 94.6% | Revenue nearly doubled due to adopting a super stockist distribution strategy, higher working capital availability, and introducing vegetable trading. | Structural |
| Cost of Materials Consumed (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 125.3% | Raw material costs rose sharply due to higher procurement and processing of wheat to meet increased customer demand. | Structural |
| Purchase of Stock in Trade (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 26.1% | Traded goods purchases declined as the company focused on higher-margin manufactured products. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 121.9% | Employee benefit expenses increased due to higher wage payouts and an increase in director remuneration from Rs. 0.0900 crore to Rs. 0.3600 crore. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 157.1% | Finance costs increased due to higher interest on bank cash credit facilities availed to fund working capital requirements. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortisation Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 270.0% | Depreciation expanded significantly following additions to property, plant, and equipment during the year. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 57.8% | Other expenses increased due to higher power and fuel costs, legal and professional fees, and general operational overheads. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 106.1% | Net profit expanded significantly due to top-line volume growth and operating leverage. | Structural |
| Trade Receivables (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 263.6% | Trade receivables surged due to rapid top-line growth and increased sales through super stockists. | Structural |
| Inventories (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 27.5% | Inventories increased due to higher raw material procurement to support rising demand. | Structural |
| Total Borrowings (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 187.4% | Borrowings increased due to higher short-term working capital loans from banks and financial institutions. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Raw material price volatility in wheat, chana dal, and maize kernel sector
Agricultural commodity price fluctuations driven by weather, government MSP policies, and market supply dynamics can impact operating margins if cost increases cannot be passed on immediately. - Complete geographical concentration of raw material procurement in Madhya Pradesh company
Sourcing 100% of raw materials from Madhya Pradesh exposes operations to regional crop failures, climatic events, or local logistical disruptions. - High reliance on related party Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited for raw materials company
Procuring 38.48% of raw materials in FY26 (54.54% in FY25) from group company Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited creates operational dependency on a single related supplier.
Tailwinds
- Shift toward super stockist distribution model company
Expanding sales through super stockists (53.40% of revenue in FY26 vs 8.70% in FY24) enables wider market reach, bulk order fulfillment, and faster stock turnover. - Capacity expansion from 56,100 MTPA to 1,02,600 MTPA company
Increasing processing capacity at the Bijepur, Indore facility will allow the company to capture additional market share across wheat flour, Sortex wheat, and maize flour segments.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Plot No. 5, Industrial Area, Apparel Cluster, Bijepur, Indore, MP (56,100 MTPA) | FY26 | 90.1% |
| Plot No. 5, Industrial Area, Apparel Cluster, Bijepur, Indore, MP (56,100 MTPA) | FY25 | 74.6% |
| Plot No. 5, Industrial Area, Apparel Cluster, Bijepur, Indore, MP (49,500 MTPA) | FY24 | 58.7% |
Movements the filing does not explain
- Short-Term Loans and Advances Surge in FY25 FY25 vs FY24 — Short-term loans and advances jumped from Rs. 0.4140 crore in FY24 to Rs. 8.4415 crore in FY25 due to supplier advances, before dropping back to Rs. 0.3158 crore in FY26, without detailing the specific counterparty vendor allocations in MD&A narrative.
- Previous Year Income Tax Adjustment in FY26 FY26 — In FY26, current tax was Rs. 5.4197 crore offset by an excess tax provision pushback of -Rs. 8.3864 crore from prior years and a deferred tax charge of Rs. 8.4020 crore, which is not detailed in the MD&A narrative.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-30
- Pre Application Start2026-09-23
- Bidding Start2026-09-24
- Bidding End2026-09-28
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-29
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-30
- Listing Day2026-10-01
- Mandate End2026-11-09
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 215.94 | 171.54 | 43.79 |
| Other Income | 0.02 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 215.96 | 171.55 | 43.81 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 184.86 | 128.74 | 29.45 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 7.08 | 21.39 | 13.48 |
| Changes in Inventories | -1.65 | 0.13 | -7.27 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 0.84 | 1.09 | 0.27 |
| Finance Cost | 1.09 | 1.13 | 0.14 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.42 | 0.89 | 0.09 |
| Other Expenses | 2.06 | 2.14 | 0.96 |
| Total Expenses | 194.72 | 155.51 | 37.12 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 21.24 | 16.04 | 6.69 |
| Profit Before Tax | 21.24 | 16.04 | 6.69 |
| Tax Expense | 5.44 | 4.21 | 1.47 |
| Profit After Tax | 15.81 | 11.84 | 5.21 |
| EPS - Basic | 11.51 | 8.62 | 7.82 |
| EPS - Diluted | 11.51 | 8.62 | 7.82 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 13.73 | 13.73 | 6.86 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 29.34 | 13.53 | 8.56 |
| Net Worth | 43.06 | 27.26 | 15.42 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.55 | 0.47 | 0.23 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 23.19 | 22.13 | 7.70 |
| Total Borrowings | 23.74 | 22.60 | 7.93 |
| Trade Payables | 3.58 | 2.73 | 4.39 |
| Current Liabilities | 36.75 | 38.20 | 15.36 |
| Total Liabilities | 80.60 | 65.95 | 31.17 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 4.10 | 4.62 | 5.20 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 29.92 | 23.34 | 18.30 |
| Trade Receivables | 28.07 | 19.18 | 5.27 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 17.65 | 1.85 | 1.70 |
| Current Assets | 76.23 | 52.82 | 25.71 |
| Total Assets | 80.60 | 65.95 | 31.17 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 15.64 | -13.10 | -2.02 |
| Capital Expenditure | -0.17 | -0.55 | -1.70 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 0.12 | -0.29 | -1.69 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 0.04 | 13.55 | 5.03 |
| Net Change in Cash | 15.81 | 0.15 | 1.33 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 10.5 | 10.5 | 15.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 10.3 | 10 | 15.6 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 7.3 | 6.9 | 11.9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 36.7 | 43.4 | 33.8 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 33.4 | 34.4 | 29.2 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 19.6 | 17.9 | 16.7 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.55 | 0.83 | 0.51 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.27 | 1.15 | 0.9 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 20.46 | 15.21 | 48.18 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.07 | 1.38 | 1.67 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.26 | 0.77 | 0.48 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2.68 | 2.6 | 1.4 |
| Receivable Days | 47 | 41 | 44 |
| Inventory Days | 51 | 50 | 153 |
| Payable Days | 6 | 6 | 37 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 92 | 85 | 160 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.99 | -1.11 | -0.39 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 0.2 | 37.8 | 23.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.4 | 0.62 | 18.36 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 7.3% | 6.9% | 11.9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2.68x | 2.6x | 1.4x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.87x | 2.42x | 2.02x |
| = Return on Equity | 36.7% | 43.4% | 33.8% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.74x | 0.78x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.93x | 0.98x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 10.3% | 10% | 15.6% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 0.99x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Interest coverage was 20.46x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.89An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.163 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.734 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.025 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.259 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.729 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.713 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.789 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.002 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = -1.89, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 10.07 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.49 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.364 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.277 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.534 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 10.07 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 11%
Contingent liabilities of 4.76 cr against a net worth of 43.06 cr — 11% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 4.4%
4.4% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.76x
Short-term borrowings of 23.19 cr against cash of 17.65 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.36 cr against a profit of 15.81 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth15.81 ÷ 43.06What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)22.34 ÷ (43.06 + 23.74) = 22.34 ÷ 66.80Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue22.76 ÷ 215.94Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth23.74 ÷ 43.06How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost22.34 ÷ 1.09How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(28.07 ÷ 215.94) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days51 + 47 − 6How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT15.64 ÷ 15.81Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(15.81 − 15.64) ÷ 80.60 = 0.16 ÷ 80.60The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹101.00 × 19,028,196 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash192.18 + 23.74 − 17.65What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA198.27 ÷ 22.76The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT192.18 ÷ 15.81The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ EPS, on pre- and post-issue share counts₹11.51 EPS pre → ₹8.31 EPS postThe fresh issue expands the share count by 27.85%, so the same profit is spread across more shares. The multiple quoted in the filing is struck on pre-issue earnings; the one on the right is what a buyer actually holds on listing day. The gap closes only if the new capital earns a return, which has not happened yet.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹101.00 ÷ ₹75.00Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)12.16 ÷ 33.6%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Operating Cash Flow Recovery: CFO Reaches Rs. 15.64 Crore in FY26
Operating cash flow turned positive in FY26, reaching Rs. 15.6445 crore compared to negative cash flows of -Rs. 13.1047 crore in FY25 and -Rs. 2.0241 crore in FY24. This cash conversion recovery was supported by operating profit expansion to Rs. 22.7334 crore and working capital stabilization.
Source: p.45, 47, 272Demand-Repayable Promoter Loans Represent 61.45% of Total Debt
Unsecured loans provided by promoter family members and group entities (Peshwa Nutrition Rs. 6.9000 crore, Peshwa Bakers Rs. 4.1090 crore, Rahat Ali Saiyed Rs. 2.9756 crore, Shehnaj Rs. 0.6000 crore) total Rs. 14.5846 crore, accounting for 61.45% of total company borrowings (Rs. 23.7360 crore). All promoter loans are repayable on demand.
Source: p.51, 135Raw Material Sourcing Reliance on Group Entity Peshwa Nutrition
Peshwa Wheat procured Rs. 75.7546 crore of raw material wheat from group company Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited in FY26, representing 38.48% of total raw material purchases (down from 54.54% in FY25). Sourcing is governed by MP Industrial Development Corporation MSME sub-lease provisions.
Source: p.28, 50, 135Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Rahat Ali Saiyed
Litigation: Income Tax Demand of Rs. 4.7476 crore and Indirect Tax Demand of Rs. 0.0082 crore against the Company.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Baba Foods Processing India Limited | 13.1 | — | 4.63 | — |
| Megastar Foods Limited | 40.93 | — | 8.97 | — |
At the ₹101 upper band, the issue is priced at 8.8x earnings — a 67% discount to the peer median of 27.0x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
On July 23, 2024 (14 months prior to the IPO), the company issued 6,864,498 bonus shares in a 1:1 ratio at Rs. 0.00 per share to existing shareholders following a preferential allotment on January 25, 2024 at Rs. 44.00 per share. This bonus issue doubled the promoter share count at zero cost.
p.65, 66The company procured Rs. 75.7546 crore of raw materials in FY26 (38.48% of total raw material purchases, down from 54.54% in FY25) from group entity Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited. Additionally, unsecured loans from promoter family and group entities (Peshwa Nutrition Rs. 6.9000 crore, Peshwa Bakers Rs. 4.1090 crore, Rahat Ali Saiyad Rs. 2.9756 crore, Shehnaj Rs. 0.6000 crore) total Rs. 14.5846 crore, accounting for 61.45% of total borrowings (Rs. 23.7360 crore), all repayable on demand.
p.28, 50, 51, 135An Income Tax demand of Rs. 4.7476 crore under Section 143(1)(a) for Assessment Year 2025-26 was issued to the company on January 30, 2026, and remains outstanding.
p.30, 277In FY26, 97.21% of domestic sales were concentrated in Madhya Pradesh, and 100.00% of raw materials (Rs. 196.8751 crore) were procured from suppliers within Madhya Pradesh.
p.19, 70, 77In FY26, Peshwa Wheat generated Rs. 215.9352 crore in revenue from operations and Rs. 15.8082 crore in net profit with a net worth of Rs. 43.0644 crore. Despite meeting scale parameters for a mainboard listing, the company selected the BSE SME platform.
p.1, 5, 45The peer comparison set includes mainboard-listed Megastar Foods Limited (P/E 40.93x) alongside SME-listed Baba Foods Processing India Limited (P/E 13.10x), yielding an elevated peer median P/E of 27.02x.
p.119Out of the fresh issue proceeds, Rs. 26.5000 crore is allocated for working capital requirements alongside Rs. 6.6909 crore for plant and machinery and Rs. 5.0120 crore for civil construction.
p.81, 82, 110Income Tax Demand of Rs. 4.7476 crore and Indirect Tax Demand of Rs. 0.0082 crore against the Company.
p.1, 5, 30, 67Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Wheat procurement is heavily seasonal during the Rabi harvest (late February to April), requiring inventory holding through September. Restated inventory stood at Rs. 29.92 crore in FY26, and operating cash flow turned positive (+Rs. 15.64 crore in FY26), supporting the need for seasonal inventory funding.
p.44, 47, 81, 110Existing plant capacity of 56,100 MTPA operated at 90.10% utilization in FY26 (74.58% in FY25), demonstrating high facility utilization that supports capacity expansion at Bijepur, Indore.
p.81, 82, 108Under MP Industrial Development Corporation sub-lease rules, Peshwa Nutrition is obligated to supply at least 75% of its output to mother unit Peshwa Wheat Limited, confirming a structural sub-lease requirement but maintaining single-supplier operational dependency.
p.28, 29Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Maashitla Securities
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (09 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue IPO proceeds allocated across plant expansion, civil works, working capital, and general corporate purposes?
Fresh issue proceeds are allocated as: Rs. 6.6909 crore for purchase of plant and machinery, Rs. 5.0120 crore for civil construction, Rs. 26.5000 crore for funding working capital requirements, and the balance for General Corporate Purposes (capped at 25%).
p.81, 82What is the promoters' shareholding pre and post-issue, and what is their acquisition cost history?
Promoters Rahat Ali Saiyed, Sadaf Saiyed, Shehnaj, Mo. Jed, and Riyazuddin Qureshi hold 72.61% pre-issue equity (9,968,000 shares), diluting to 52.39% post-issue. A 1:1 bonus issue of 6,864,498 shares in July 2024 expanded insider shareholding at Rs. 0.00, while preferential allottees paid Rs. 44.00 per share in January 2024.
p.65, 66, 67, 72What are the key related-party transactions, raw material supply dependencies, and promoter loans?
Raw material purchases from group entity Peshwa Nutrition Private Limited totaled Rs. 75.7546 crore in FY26 (38.48% of total raw material purchases). Sales of finished goods to promoter entity Peshwa Bakers totaled Rs. 9.5799 crore. Unsecured loans from promoter family and group entities total Rs. 14.5846 crore (61.45% of total debt of Rs. 23.7360 crore), all repayable on demand. Promoters provided personal guarantees covering bank facilities.
p.23, 28, 50, 51, 135How did operating cash flow perform relative to restated net profits over FY24 to FY26?
Restated PAT grew from Rs. 5.2106 crore in FY24 to Rs. 11.8361 crore in FY25 and Rs. 15.8082 crore in FY26. Operating cash flow (CFO) recovered strongly to +Rs. 15.6445 crore in FY26, rebounding from negative operating cash flows of -Rs. 13.1047 crore in FY25 and -Rs. 2.0241 crore in FY24 due to working capital stabilization.
p.45, 47, 272What secretarial, statutory compliance, litigation, and tax findings exist for the company?
The company operates an integrated processing plant with 24 employees. An Income Tax demand of Rs. 4.7476 crore u/s 143(1)(a) for AY 2025-26 is outstanding. Statutory auditor M/s. Bakliwal & Co., Chartered Accountants, has served continuously without modification or qualification.
p.28, 30, 277What are the application lot terms, retail ticket requirements, market maker details, and exit constraints for public investors?
The offer is listed on BSE SME with a minimum retail application requirement of 2 lots. Trading occurs strictly in standardized market lots, and because lots are indivisible, partial exit or fractional lot trading is impossible. Bhansali Value Creations Private Limited is the Market Maker with 295,200 reserved shares (5.57%) and a mandatory 3-year obligation period. Standard SME 5% price circuit limits apply.
p.1, 5, 6, 61, 64, 220What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers to MOA on Conversion | ₹10.00 | 2023-12-26 | 10.1x |
| Preferential Allottees | ₹44.00 | 2024-01-25 | 2.3x |
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2024-07-23 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 01 Oct 2029promoter3 years3,810,000 shares (20.02% of total)
- 01 Oct 2027promoter1 year3,079,000 shares (16.18% of total)
- 01 Oct 2027public1 year6,839,996 shares (35.95% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.