Optimystix Entertainment India
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride profile: PAT grew 39.45% in FY26 while operating cash flow collapsed to negative Rs -8.05 Cr due to receivables ballooning to Rs 48.69 Cr
- Substantial related-party transactions: Rs 12.16 Cr of content rights purchased from associate Wakaoo Films LLP alongside Rs 14.64 Cr outstanding receivables
- Rs 1.82 Cr unsecured interest-bearing loan advanced to Whole-Time Director Rajesh Darshan Bahl
- 13 direct tax/TDS demand cases against promoters and directors totaling Rs 3.33 Cr alongside a Rs 22.73 Lakh CGST penalty dispute u/s 122
- Inconsistent reporting basis (Consolidated in FY26/FY25 vs Standalone in FY24)
- Rising top 5 customer revenue concentration (85.05% of sales in FY26)
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Optimystix Entertainment India Limited is engaged in creating, producing, and distributing content for television, films, and digital platforms.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Optimystix Entertainment India Limited conceptualizes, develops, produces, and distributes television serials, digital content, and feature films. Founded in 2000, the company operates from leased registered office premises in Andheri West, Mumbai, and does not own any product manufacturing facilities. Since it is engaged in media and entertainment services, capacity and capacity utilization metrics are not applicable to its business. The company sells its content to television broadcasters, film studios, and OTT/streaming platforms. It exhibits significant customer concentration, with its top five customers contributing 85.05% of revenue in FY26, and its largest client, Jiostar India Private Limited, accounting for 36.21%. Television and web series content are typically delivered on a cost-plus margin basis with milestone-linked cash flows. Feature films are also produced on a cost-plus-margin structure, with additional revenue sharing from downstream rights with studios.
Proven legacy of culturally iconic television franchises, a multi-genre and multi-platform content engine with diversified revenue streams, and strong strategic partnerships including a long-term collaboration with T-Series.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Working Capital Requirements — ₹64.38 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 134.9875 | 124.3935 | 54.7624 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 24.0377 | 17.2376 | 6.6879 |
| PAT Margin | 17.81% | 13.86% | 12.21% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 134.99 | 124.39 | 54.76 |
| Other Income | 0.91 | 0.68 | 0.23 |
| Total Income | 135.89 | 125.07 | 54.99 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 5.03 | 1.85 | 2.20 |
| Finance Cost | 0.01 | 0.08 | 0.12 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.80 | 0.18 | 0.47 |
| Other Expenses | 3.93 | 3.16 | 3.28 |
| Total Expenses | 104.70 | 100.72 | 50.86 |
| Profit Before Tax | 31.20 | 24.34 | 4.12 |
| Tax Expense | 7.16 | 7.11 | -2.57 |
| Profit After Tax | 24.04 | 17.24 | 6.69 |
| EPS - Basic | 13.36 | 12.92 | 5.02 |
| EPS - Diluted | 13.36 | 12.92 | 5.02 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 31.10 | 23.93 | 4.48 |
| EBIT | 30.31 | 23.75 | 4.01 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 18.27 | 0.66 | 0.51 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 113.20 | 96.53 | 59.15 |
| Net Worth | 131.47 | 97.19 | 59.66 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.09 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.35 |
| Total Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.09 | 0.44 |
| Trade Payables | 28.32 | 21.86 | 13.71 |
| Current Liabilities | 35.16 | 41.56 | 45.84 |
| Total Liabilities | 35.22 | 41.62 | 46.01 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 1.68 | 0.81 | 0.55 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.03 | 0.03 | 0.04 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Inventories | 70.41 | 51.68 | 41.01 |
| Trade Receivables | 48.69 | 20.59 | 16.91 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 9.52 | 20.86 | 0.12 |
| Current Assets | 152.46 | 137.61 | 102.34 |
| Total Assets | 166.80 | 138.83 | 105.70 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -8.05 | 0.87 | -2.81 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.76 | 0.44 | 0.07 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -13.51 | 0.01 | 0.08 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 10.22 | 19.86 | -0.58 |
| Net Change in Cash | -11.35 | 20.74 | -3.30 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 22.9 | 19.1 | 8.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 22.3 | 19 | 7.3 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 17.8 | 13.9 | 12.2 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 18.3 | 17.7 | 11.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 23.1 | 24.4 | 6.7 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 14.4 | 12.4 | 6.3 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0 | 0 | 0.01 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | -0.31 | -0.87 | 0.07 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 2180.25 | 311.21 | 34.06 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 4.34 | 3.31 | 2.23 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 2.33 | 2.07 | 1.34 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.81 | 0.9 | 0.52 |
| Receivable Days | 132 | 60 | 113 |
| Inventory Days | 190 | 152 | 273 |
| Payable Days | 77 | 64 | 91 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 245 | 148 | 295 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.33 | 0.05 | -0.42 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 19.2 | 11.8 | 9 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.21 | 2.4 | 0.14 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against revenue. Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 17.8% | 13.9% | 12.2% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.81x | 0.9x | 0.52x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.27x | 1.43x | 1.77x |
| = Return on Equity | 18.3% | 17.7% | 11.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.77x | 0.71x | 1.62x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 1.03x | 1.03x | 1.03x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 22.5% | 19.1% | 7.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 24.04 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -8.05 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Interest coverage was 2180.25x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
6 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 2.179 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.085 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.57 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.646 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.704 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1924 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 15.22 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.703 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.679 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.182 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 3.733 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 15.22 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
4 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹16.4 cr in FY25, ₹32.1 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 60 days in FY25, 132 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 152 days in FY25, 190 days in FY26 (on revenue)
- ○Other current assets rising against revenue · 35.8% of revenue in FY25, 17.7% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 22.5% of net block in FY25, 47.4% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 20.1% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.33x profit in FY26, against 0.05x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.2%
Contingent liabilities of 0.23 cr against a net worth of 131.47 cr — 0.2% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 12.5%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 3.00 cr against a profit of 24.04 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹175.00, the market value is ₹407 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹40.7 cr | 1.7x | 3.8 | 2.4 |
| 12% a year | ₹48.9 cr | 2.0x | 5.1 | 3.2 |
| 14% a year | ₹57.0 cr | 2.4x | 6.2 | 3.9 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 5.90% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -2.41% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹9.8 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth24.04 ÷ 131.47What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)30.31 ÷ (131.47 + 0.00) = 30.31 ÷ 131.47Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue31.10 ÷ 134.99Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth0.00 ÷ 131.47How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost30.31 ÷ 0.01How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(48.69 ÷ 134.99) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days190 + 132 − 77How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-8.05 ÷ 24.04Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(24.04 − -8.05) ÷ 166.80 = 32.09 ÷ 166.80The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹175.00 × 23,268,900 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash407.21 + 0.00 − 9.52What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA397.69 ÷ 31.10The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT407.21 ÷ 24.04The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹24.04 cr ÷ ₹407.21 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-9.81 cr ÷ ₹407.21 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)16.94 ÷ 39.4%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Profit Growth Diverges from Cash Realization on Aggressive Pre-IPO Revenue Recognition
Optimystix reported a sharp increase in reported net profit margin to 17.81% in FY26. However, operating cash conversion collapsed to negative Rs -8.05 Cr, with Rs 48.69 Cr locked up in outstanding receivables. This mismatch indicates that the company is recognizing revenue aggressively prior to actual cash collection.
Source: p. 158, 242, 244, 478, 479, 715, 716Governance Red Flags: Personal Director Loans, LLP Balances, and Heavy Board Tax Demands
The filing highlights several internal control and compliance gaps: promoters and directors face 13 outstanding direct tax and TDS cases of Rs 3.33 Cr, the company faces a CGST penalty of Rs 22.73 Lakhs for ineligible input tax credit, and a personal loan of Rs 1.82 Cr remains advanced to whole-time director Rajesh Darshan Bahl.
Source: p. 162, 183, 187, 194, 249, 251, 678, 691, 739, 743Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Vipul D. Shah
Litigation: GST Penalty demand u/s 122(1)(vii) against Company: 1 case of Rs 0.2273 Cr. Direct Tax / TDS outstanding demands against Promoters and Directors: 13 cases of Rs 3.3263 Cr. Regular Civil Suits filed by Promoters and Directors: 2 cases u/s perpetual injunctions of Rs 0.0006 Cr. Criminal or SEBI proceedings: Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Panorama Studios international Ltd | 83.2 | — | 4.52 | 7.93 |
| Cinevista Ltd | 14.19 | — | 11 | 45 |
| Balaji Telefilms Ltd | -21.95 | — | 7.99 | — |
At the ₹175 upper band, the issue is priced at 13.1x earnings — a 73% discount to the peer median of 48.7x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Optimystix reported revenue growth to Rs 134.99 Cr in FY26 (up from Rs 54.76 Cr in FY24) alongside PAT margin expansion to 17.81% (up from 12.13% in FY24). However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) collapsed to negative Rs -8.05 Cr in FY26 (against positive Rs 0.87 Cr in FY25 and negative Rs -2.81 Cr in FY24), driven by trade receivables more than doubling to Rs 48.69 Cr (up from Rs 20.59 Cr in FY25).
p. 158, 242, 244, 478 and 3 moreThe company acquired content rights worth Rs 12.16 Cr in FY26 from its associate entity Wakaoo Films LLP, which is partner-owned. Furthermore, the company advanced unsecured loans to Whole-Time Director Mr. Rajesh Darshan Bahl with Rs 1.82 Cr outstanding as of March 31, 2026 (including Rs 0.46 Cr interest receivable), and carries a massive Rs 14.64 Cr receivable from Wakaoo Films LLP on its balance sheet.
p. 182, 183, 184, 251 and 4 morePromoters and Directors are involved in 13 outstanding direct tax and TDS demand cases involving a total disputed amount of Rs 3.3263 Cr (mainly against director Vipul D. Shah and independent directors Rajesh Desai and Monica Gupta). Additionally, the company is contesting a CGST penalty demand u/s 122(1)(vii) of Rs 22.73 Lakhs (Rs 0.2273 Cr) for ineligible input tax credit.
p. 162, 187, 194, 249 and 3 moreThe company presented its FY26 and FY25 financials on a Consolidated basis (comprising subsidiaries Optimystix Digital and Optimystix Films), whereas FY24 is presented on a Standalone basis.
p. 40, 41, 125, 126 and 1 moreThe company exhibits extreme revenue concentration, with its top 5 customers contributing 85.05% of operational revenue in FY26 (up from 78.91% in FY25) and the top 10 customers accounting for 95.81% of total sales. Its largest customer (Jiostar India Private Limited) accounts for 36.21% of revenue.
p. 144, 155, 489On September 4, 2025, the company executed a 1:10 stock split, followed by a massive 25:1 bonus share allotment on September 9, 2025 (allotting 1,75,66,250 equity shares shortly before filing). This capitalization of reserves reduced Managing Director Vipul D. Shah's average cost of acquisition to Rs 7.32 per share.
p. 208, 339, 340, 364 and 1 moreThe company reported FY26 revenue of Rs 134.99 Cr, PAT of Rs 24.04 Cr, and Net Worth of Rs 131.47 Cr, while structuring post-issue capital at Rs 23.27 Cr (2,32,68,900 shares of face value Rs 10 each) to qualify for SME platform listing under Regulation 229(2).
p. 231, 798, 805GST Penalty demand u/s 122(1)(vii) against Company: 1 case of Rs 0.2273 Cr. Direct Tax / TDS outstanding demands against Promoters and Directors: 13 cases of Rs 3.3263 Cr. Regular Civil Suits filed by Promoters and Directors: 2 cases u/s perpetual injunctions of Rs 0.0006 Cr. Criminal or SEBI proceedings: Nil.
p. 35, 37, 194, 215 and 12 moreOperating cash flow was negative ₹8.05 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹24.04 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Trade receivables grew 136.5% against revenue growth of 8.5% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While the company has delivered long-term successful franchises, its financial structure is highly dependent on milestone-linked platform disbursements, customer concentration is rising (top 5 = 85.05%), and its working capital remains heavily tied up in unreleased WIP inventories (Rs 70.41 Cr) and uncollected trade receivables (Rs 48.69 Cr).
p. 144, 244, 426, 427, 489, 496, 497Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Maashitla Securities
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (22 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue IPO proceeds allocated?
The net proceeds of the fresh issue are allocated entirely towards meeting working capital requirements (estimated at Rs 64.38 Cr), with the balance deployed for general corporate purposes (capped at the lower of 15% of gross proceeds or Rs 10.00 Cr).
p. 42, 394, 395, 415Who are the promoters and what is their cost of acquisition?
The promoters are Mr. Vipul D. Shah, Mr. Rajesh Darshan Bahl, Mr. Sanjay Dhirajlal Shah, and Optimystix Media Private Limited, who collectively hold 77.61% pre-issue. Due to a 25:1 bonus issue in September 2025, Mr. Vipul D. Shah's average cost of acquisition is Rs 7.32 per share, and Optimystix Media's average cost is Rs 5.81 per share.
p. 36, 49, 209, 367Are there material related party transactions or director loan balances?
Yes. The company acquired content rights worth Rs 12.16 Cr in FY26 from its associate entity Wakaoo Films LLP and carries a Rs 14.64 Cr receivable from it. Additionally, the company has advanced an outstanding unsecured loan of Rs 1.82 Cr (including accrued interest) to Whole-Time Director Mr. Rajesh Darshan Bahl.
p. 182, 183, 251, 253, 674, 677, 678Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
No. In FY26, despite reported PAT expanding to Rs 24.04 Cr, Cash Flow from Operations was negative at Rs -8.05 Cr. This deficit was driven by working capital expansion, as trade receivables expanded to Rs 48.69 Cr and inventories rose to Rs 70.41 Cr.
p. 158, 242, 244, 478, 479What structural market parameters apply to this offer?
The offer consists of a Fresh Issue of up to 50,00,000 shares and an Offer for Sale of up to 12,00,000 shares. Mansi Share and Stock Broking Private Limited acts as the sole market maker with up to 6,20,000 shares reserved. Trading lot size is 800 shares with 5% circuit filters applying post-listing.
p. 11, 68, 81, 227, 320, 327What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sanjiv B. Sharma & Vipul D. Shah (MOA Subscribers) | ₹100.00 | 2000-10-31 | 1.8x |
| Sanjiv Sharma, Vipul D. Shah, Sangeena Sharma, Pooja Shah (Further Allotment) | ₹100.00 | 2000-10-31 | 1.8x |
| Sanjiv Sharma, Vipul D. Shah, Sangeena Sharma, Pooja Shah (Bonus Issue) | — | 2004-05-03 | — |
| Optimystix Media Private Limited (Loan to Equity Allotment) | ₹100.00 | 2004-05-12 | 1.8x |
| Existing Shareholders (Stock Split 1:10 from face value Rs 100 to Rs 10) | — | 2025-09-04 | — |
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 25:1) | — | 2025-09-09 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 3 entries | |||
| Paresh Parekh, Super Cassettes Industries Pvt Ltd, Rahul Agarwal, Manisha Gupta, Rajesh Darshan Bahl, Priti Rajesh Bahl, Ankit Agarwal (Rights Issue) | ₹13,656.00 | 2025-03-31 | as disclosed |
| Sunil Shyam Mirpuri, Devesh Chandrabhan Gupta, Evermore Share Broking Pvt Ltd, Varun A Chohan, Dovetail Global Fund, Think Spark Advisors LLP, Ranganathan Madhavan, Ravie Dubey, Sargun Mehta, Anup Mehta (Preferential Offer) | ₹30,850.00 | 2025-07-17 | as disclosed |
| Inti Capital VCC, Sanjay Kumar Agarwal, SB Opportunities Fund 1, Atulkumar Kantilal Patel, Payal Tandan Shrivastava, Sunil Shyam Mirpuri, Ritesh Jain, Mahendrakumar Kankaria, Ajay Chamanlal Sareen, Ritaben Atulkumar Mathukiya, Divyesh Vijay Shah (Preferential Offer) | ₹30,850.00 | 2025-08-01 | as disclosed |
The 3 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 14 Aug 2029promoterthree years from the date of allotment of Equity shares issued pursuant to this Issue4,680,000 shares (20.11% of total)
- 14 Aug 2076promoterlocked in for 50% promoters’ holding in excess of MPC shall be released after 1 year and lock-in for remaining 50% promoters’ holding in excess of MPC shall be released after 2 years4,120,000 shares (17.71% of total)
- 14 Aug 2027otherlocked in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment in the Public Issue8,268,900 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
