Millworks Technologies
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- 4 forensic flags
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
A precision engineering company manufacturing machined components, sheet metal parts, and integrated assemblies for mission-critical applications across the railways, aerospace, defence, and semiconductor sectors.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Millworks Technologies Limited is a precision engineering company that manufactures machined components, sheet metal parts, and integrated assemblies for mission-critical applications. The company caters to Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) in the railways, aerospace, defence, and semiconductor sectors. Operations are executed through Build-to-Print (BTP) and Build-to-Spec (BTS) engagement models, accommodating both full-scope manufacturing and job-work arrangements. The company operates four manufacturing facilities in Bengaluru, Karnataka, equipped with CNC machining centres, turning and turn-mill centres, wire EDM machines, and fibre laser cutting systems. The installed capacity across these units for Fiscal 2026 was 3,83,019 hours, achieving capacity utilization rates ranging from 72.90% to 77.16%. Delivery reaches customers either directly or, in the case of certain defence drones, via a 'bill-to-ship-to' model utilizing business partners for integration and final delivery.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding capital expenditure of our company to purchase Plant and Machinery — ₹61.03 cr
- Funding the working capital requirements of the company — ₹81.50 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 148.767 | 22.1001 | 9.386 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 37.0639 | 5.249 | 1.9541 |
| PAT Margin | 24.91% | 23.75% | 20.82% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 148.77 | 22.10 | 9.39 |
| Other Income | 4.63 | 0.32 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 153.40 | 22.42 | 9.40 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 75.96 | 10.62 | 2.53 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 8.88 | 3.85 | 2.05 |
| Other Expenses | 2.27 | 0.55 | 0.25 |
| Total Expenses | 103.10 | 15.34 | 7.02 |
| EBITDA | 56.30 | 7.89 | 2.78 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 2.95 | 0.31 | 0.10 |
| Finance Cost | 3.40 | 0.68 | 0.31 |
| Profit Before Tax | 50.23 | 7.08 | 2.38 |
| Tax Expense | 13.17 | 1.83 | 0.42 |
| Profit After Tax | 37.06 | 5.25 | 1.95 |
| EPS - Basic | 30.67 | 5.04 | 1.94 |
| EPS - Diluted | 30.67 | 5.04 | 1.94 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 12.77 | 0.06 | 0.05 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 69.90 | 23.25 | 2.28 |
| Net Worth | 82.67 | 23.31 | 2.33 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 7.87 | 6.26 | 0.73 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 9.15 | 3.37 | 3.84 |
| Trade Payables | 72.23 | 4.37 | 1.99 |
| Current Liabilities | 107.38 | 10.07 | 7.40 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 19.92 | 12.84 | 2.01 |
| Capital Work in Progress | — | 2.00 | 1.03 |
| Intangible Assets | 5.17 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Investments | 5.75 | — | — |
| Inventories | 11.47 | 7.51 | 3.61 |
| Trade Receivables | 138.69 | 6.81 | 1.88 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1.35 | 1.95 | 0.04 |
| Current Assets | 153.97 | 20.00 | 7.07 |
| Total Assets | 198.37 | 39.82 | 10.54 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -10.76 | -2.92 | 0.65 |
| Capital Expenditure | 7.79 | 9.31 | 2.69 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -16.27 | -9.77 | -2.69 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 27.17 | 13.27 | 2.00 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.14 | 0.58 | -0.04 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 36.7 | 35.2 | 29.6 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 35 | 34.6 | 28.7 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 24.9 | 23.8 | 20.8 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 44.8 | 22.5 | 83.9 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 53.8 | 23.6 | 39.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 18.7 | 13.2 | 18.5 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.21 | 0.41 | 1.96 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.28 | 0.97 | 1.63 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 15.77 | 11.4 | 8.56 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.43 | 1.99 | 0.96 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.33 | 1.24 | 0.47 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.75 | 0.55 | 0.89 |
| Receivable Days | 340 | 112 | 73 |
| Inventory Days | 28 | 124 | 140 |
| Payable Days | 177 | 72 | 77 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 191 | 164 | 136 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.29 | -0.56 | 0.33 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 24.1 | 20.5 | 12.3 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.64 | 29.85 | 25.67 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 24.9% | 23.8% | 20.8% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.75x | 0.55x | 0.89x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.4x | 1.71x | 4.52x |
| = Return on Equity | 44.8% | 22.5% | 83.9% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.74x | 0.82x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.94x | 0.91x | 0.88x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 36% | 35.1% | 28.7% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 37.06 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -10.76 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 73 in FY24 to 340 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 15.77x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = 5.42An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 3.027 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.061 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.704 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 6.732 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.184 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.376 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.417 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.2411 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = 5.42, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 573% in FY26, against 135% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.1%
Contingent liabilities of 0.08 cr against a net worth of 82.67 cr — 0.1% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.15x
Short-term borrowings of 9.15 cr against cash of 1.35 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 1.23 cr against a profit of 37.06 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth37.06 ÷ 82.67What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)53.63 ÷ (82.67 + 17.02) = 53.63 ÷ 99.69Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue56.30 ÷ 148.77Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth17.02 ÷ 82.67How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost53.63 ÷ 3.40How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(138.69 ÷ 148.77) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days28 + 340 − 177How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-10.76 ÷ 37.06Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(37.06 − -10.76) ÷ 198.37 = 47.83 ÷ 198.37The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹331.00 × 17,614,755 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash583.05 + 17.02 − 1.35What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA598.71 ÷ 56.30The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT583.05 ÷ 37.06The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)15.73 ÷ 606.1%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Paper Profits Trapped in Receivables
FY26 revenue rose 573% to Rs 148.77 Cr, but the growth did not convert to cash. With receivables at Rs 138.69 Cr against that revenue — about 340 days of sales — reported PAT of Rs 37.06 Cr translated into operating cash flow of Rs -10.76 Cr. The gap points to collection timing or revenue-recognition quality, and it is the central fact of the filing.
Source: p. 495-516, 636, 647A Business Interwoven with a Promoter Entity
The Company's premises, part of its labour, its lending relationships and part of its shareholding all run through V3 Technologies, a promoter-group entity. The public company is operationally dependent on a private entity its promoters control.
Source: p.647Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Litigation: Direct and indirect tax proceedings against Company: 0.0845 Crore. Direct and indirect tax proceedings against Promoters: 0.2486 Crore.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Unimech Aerospace and Manufacturing Ltd | 87.87 | — | 8.58 | — |
| Azad Engineering Ltd | 96.45 | — | 8.74 | — |
| Our Company | — | — | 44.83 | — |
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
Revenue rose from Rs 22.10 Cr in FY25 to Rs 148.77 Cr in FY26 (+573%), but operating cash flow was Rs -10.76 Cr against PAT of Rs 37.06 Cr. Trade receivables reached Rs 138.69 Cr — roughly 340 days of sales, nearly a full year's revenue uncollected at year end.
p. 495-516, 636, 647V3 Technologies, a promoter-group entity that is also a shareholder via the bonus issue, leases both the registered office and the manufacturing unit to the Company (rent Rs 3.47 Cr), supplies labour and job-work (purchases Rs 7.08 Cr + Rs 1.01 Cr), buys from the Company (Rs 2.04 Cr), and runs two-way unsecured loans (given Rs 4.92 Cr + Rs 10.60 Cr; taken Rs 4.30 Cr + Rs 5.70 Cr) within the same year.
p.647Promoters subscribed at Rs 10 per share in November 2021. Outside investors were then allotted preferentially at Rs 19,010 (Oct 2024), Rs 20,535 (Jun 2025) and Rs 47,968 (Oct-Nov 2025). A bonus issue in the ratio of 200:1 on 15 December 2025 repriced all holders, after which a further preferential allotment was made to outside investors at Rs 470 per share on 23 January 2026 — roughly five weeks before the offer opened.
p.70-72Aparna Samir Thakker holds 16.98% post-issue (21,69,089 shares), among the largest single holdings in the Company, acquired via a 22,57,800-share bonus in the 200:1 issue. That bonus implies a pre-bonus holding of 11,289 shares, which does not appear as a preferential allotment to her in the share-issue history; the most likely route is acquisition by transfer within the Thakker group (Samir and Dhawal Thakker both appear in the allotment table).
p.72, p.77The Company changed its statutory auditor within the last three years and has a record of repeated late filing of statutory returns: GST up to 19 days, EPF up to 73 days, ESIC up to 74 days, alongside an income-tax demand and undisputed TDS shortfalls.
p. 134-145, 222, 684Rs 81.50 Cr of the fresh issue — the largest single use of proceeds — is allocated to working capital, in a year the Company generated Rs -10.76 Cr of operating cash flow.
p.82With FY26 revenue of Rs 148.77 Cr and PAT of Rs 37.06 Cr, the Company's scale would plausibly have supported a mainboard listing; the SME route was chosen.
p. 495-516, 636, 647Direct and indirect tax proceedings against Company: 0.0845 Crore. Direct and indirect tax proceedings against Promoters: 0.2486 Crore.
p. 158-159, 238, 263, 476, 819-822None disclosed
p. 158-159, 238, 263, 476, 819-822Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Core inputs — the manufacturing premises and part of the labour — are leased from and supplied by V3 Technologies, a promoter entity, which qualifies the 'fully in-house' framing. The demand narrative rests on the defence/aerospace/semiconductor positioning; the filing's own receivables data (nearly a full year of sales uncollected) bears directly on the quality of that revenue and should be read alongside the claim.
p.120, p.636, p.647Live Subscription Status
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the IPO funds being deployed?
Rs 81.50 Cr to working capital (the largest single use), Rs 61.03 Cr to plant and machinery, and the balance to general corporate purposes. It is a 100% fresh issue; promoters are not selling.
p.82What did insiders pay, and when?
Promoters subscribed at Rs 10 per share in November 2021. A bonus issue in the ratio of 200:1 on 15 December 2025 substantially reduced their effective per-share cost. Outside investors were allotted at Rs 470 per share on 23 January 2026, about five weeks before the offer opened.
p.70-72What flows to promoter-owned entities?
Materially. V3 Technologies — a promoter-group entity and a shareholder — leases the office and manufacturing unit to the Company, supplies labour and job-work, buys from the Company, and runs two-way unsecured loans with it. Directors also have unsecured loans to and from the Company in both directions.
p.647Did the profit become cash?
No. Against FY26 PAT of Rs 37.06 Cr, operating cash flow was Rs -10.76 Cr, because trade receivables rose to Rs 138.69 Cr — roughly 340 days of sales, nearly a full year's revenue uncollected.
p. 495-516, 636, 647What does listing on the SME platform mean for me as an investor?
Standing context for every SME issue: a lot size of roughly Rs 1-1.5 lakh means retail cannot diversify across issues; post-listing price moves are bounded by circuit filters; liquidity depends substantially on the designated market maker (Pace Stock Broking Services Private Limited); and the free float is thin.
p.2, p.11, p.30, p.68, p.80What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sridhar Acharya | ₹10.00 | 2021-11-01 | 33.1x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 33.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| H K Madhu | ₹10.00 | 2021-11-01 | 33.1x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 33.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sowmya Madhu | ₹10.00 | 2021-11-01 | 33.1x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 33.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Rashmi Sridhar Acharya | ₹10.00 | 2021-11-01 | 33.1x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 33.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Aparna Samir Thakker | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Rashmi Sridhar Acharya | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Sowmya Madhu | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Sridhar Acharya | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| H K Madhu | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Mrs. Rashmi Sridhar Acharya, Mrs. Soumya Madhu, Mr. Sridhar Acharya and Mr. Madhu (Representing M/S. V3 Technologies) | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Mayur Bhandari | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Samir Arvind Thakker | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Dhawal Arvind Thakker | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Purvesh Mukeshkumar Shah | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Aditya Dharia | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Raghav Karol | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Arwa Umesh | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Niraj Dhanraj Chhajer, Deepti Chhajer (Pransh Capital Partners) | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Kranti Prabhakar | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Premal Aarikh M (Premal Aarikh HUF) | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Sunil Abar | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Mona Jayesh Sheth | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Nandan Pravinbhai Ganatra | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Sagar Narendhabhai Gokani | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Nilang Kishore Jain | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Prince D Surana | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Salma Sahav | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Rahul Kumar | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Anupam Narayan Iyer | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Vishal Sanjay Mehta | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Kanchan Kalra | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Mukesh Kumar Agarwal | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Rajesh Swaminathan | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Amandeep Singh Dhanjal | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Ramaiy Kapoor | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Rajkumar Chotelal Kapoor | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Jitendra Mohan Katramal | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Nirmala Jitendra Katramal | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Jhanvi Jitendra Katramal | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Nidhi Sagar Bhanushali | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Mahesh Purushottam Bhanushali | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Jyotsna Mahesh Bhanushali | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Sagar Purushottam Bhanushali | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| Vipula Shailesh Bhansali | — | 2025-12-15 | — |
| The 55 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Amandeep Singh Dhanjal | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Vipula Shailesh Bhansali | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Jitendra Mohan Katramal | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Nirmala Jitendra Katramal | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Jhanvi Jitendra Katramal | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Nidhi Sagar Bhanushali | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Mahesh Purushottam Bhanushali | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Jyotsna Mahesh Bhanushali | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Sagar Purushottam Bhanushali | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Premal Aarikh M (Karta Representing Premal Aarikh HUF) | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Sunil Abar | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Salma Sahay | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Nandan Pravinbhai Ganatra | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Niraj Dhanraj Chhajer, Deepti Chhajer (1st and 2nd holder representing Pransh Capital Partners) | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Sagar Narendrabhai Gokani | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Nilang Kishore Jain | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Rahul Kumar | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Mukesh Kumar Agarwal | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Ramaiy Kapoor | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Rajkumar Chotelal Kapoor | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Aditya Dharia | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Raghav Karol | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Arwa Umesh | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Dhawal Arvind Thakker | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Mona Jayesh Sheth | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Vishal Sanjay Mehta | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Prince D Surana | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Kanchan Kalra | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-22 | as disclosed |
| Rajesh Swaminathan | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-26 | as disclosed |
| Anupam Narayan Iyer | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-26 | as disclosed |
| Kranti Prabhakar Shanbhag | ₹19,010.00 | 2024-10-26 | as disclosed |
| Mrs. Rashmi Sridhar Acharya, Mrs. Soumya Madhu, Mr. Sridhar Acharya and Mr. Madhu H K representing M/S. V3 Technologies | ₹19,010.00 | 2025-03-01 | as disclosed |
| Sheila Bhaskar Mudbidri | ₹19,010.00 | 2025-03-03 | as disclosed |
| Mayur Bhandari | ₹19,010.00 | 2025-03-03 | as disclosed |
| Samir Arvind Thakker | ₹20,535.00 | 2025-06-18 | as disclosed |
| Dhawal Arvind Thakker | ₹47,968.00 | 2025-10-19 | as disclosed |
| Purvesh Mukeshkumar Shah | ₹47,968.00 | 2025-10-19 | as disclosed |
| Dhawal Arvind Thakker | ₹47,968.00 | 2025-11-04 | as disclosed |
| Purvesh Mukeshkumar Shah | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Binita Aashish Mehta | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Dhiren Harilal Pipalia | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Chirag Nitin Sheth | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Chirag Nitin Sheth (Karta Representing Chirag Nitin Sheth HUF) | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Riddhi Chirag Sheth | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Nitya Shree Sharnya LLP | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Indoo Yadav | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Daksha Mukesh Shah | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Aruna Nitin Sheth | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Nitin Mahasukhlal Sheth | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Tanuj Vijay Mehta | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Heena Umesh Mehta | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Kishorekumar Mehta (1st Holder) & Roshni Mehta (2nd Holder) | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Anand Prakash Shah (1st Holder) & Surekha Prakash Shah (2nd Holder) | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Daiveek Raju Modi (1st Holder) & Raju Sureshchandra Modi (2nd Holder) | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Jignesh Harsukhbhai Desai (Karta Representing Jignesh H Desai HUF) | ₹470.00 | 2026-01-23 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 21 Jul 2029promoter3 years3,522,952 shares
- 21 Jul 2028promotertwo years from the date of allotment in the initial public Offer2,019,937 shares
- 21 Jul 2027promoterone year from the date of allotment in the initial public offer2,019,937 shares
- 21 Jul 2027otherone year from the date of allotment in the initial public offer5,207,929 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.