Metalic Technoforge Ltd
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Negative CFO diverging from PAT
- Ballooning receivables and inventory
- Auditor flag on inventory discrepancies with banks
- Recent auditor change
- Statutory dues defaults and filing delays
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Metalic Technoforge Limited is engaged in the business of manufacturing of closed die forged and precision-machined components.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Metalic Technoforge Limited is engaged in the manufacturing of closed die forged and precision-machined components. The product portfolio includes complex and safety-critical parts such as big rings, small rings, ball studs, gear blanks with broaching, gears, and coupling assemblies. The company caters to customers operating in industries such as automotive, farming equipment, construction machinery, hydraulic applications, commercial vehicles, and general engineering. Operations are conducted through a manufacturing facility located in Rajkot, Gujarat, which comprises four units. Three of these units are currently operational and equipped for forging, heat treatment, machining, and tooling. The fourth unit is currently vacant and proposed for setting up the new Manufacturing Unit IV.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding of capital expenditure requirements of the Company towards setting up of the proposed Manufacturing Unit IV and upgradation of existing units at manufacturing facility in Rajkot, Gujarat. — ₹30.81 cr
- Full or part repayment and/or prepayment of certain outstanding secured borrowings availed by our Company. — ₹6.72 cr
- General Corporate Purpose
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 95.5475 | 74.3722 | 50.8509 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 12.3644 | 9.0281 | 4.2641 |
| PAT Margin | 12.94% | 12.14% | 8.39% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 95.55 | 74.37 | 50.85 |
| Other Income | 2.44 | 1.27 | 0.65 |
| Total Income | 97.98 | 75.64 | 51.50 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 56.80 | 42.68 | 33.81 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 6.45 | 4.55 | 1.42 |
| Other Expenses | 22.88 | 17.67 | 13.41 |
| Total Expenses | 80.35 | 63.05 | 45.58 |
| EBITDA | 21.95 | 16.08 | 7.29 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 4.42 | 2.60 | 1.10 |
| Finance Cost | 2.34 | 2.15 | 0.92 |
| Profit Before Tax | 17.63 | 12.59 | 5.92 |
| Tax Expense | 5.27 | 3.56 | 1.66 |
| Profit After Tax | 12.36 | 9.03 | 4.26 |
| EPS - Basic | 7.12 | 6.93 | 7.17 |
| EPS - Diluted | 7.12 | 6.93 | 7.17 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 17.50 | 1.00 | 0.35 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 15.92 | 16.40 | 7.37 |
| Net Worth | 33.42 | 17.40 | 7.72 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 8.56 | 12.17 | 2.79 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 23.22 | 15.81 | 8.02 |
| Total Borrowings | 31.78 | 27.97 | 10.81 |
| Trade Payables | 21.92 | 18.03 | 13.64 |
| Current Liabilities | 48.98 | 34.40 | 23.05 |
| Total Liabilities | 92.09 | 65.10 | 33.67 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 22.09 | 22.88 | 8.14 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.02 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.08 | 0.09 | 0.08 |
| Inventories | 32.30 | 18.41 | 10.11 |
| Trade Receivables | 26.28 | 14.68 | 10.65 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.36 | 0.32 | 0.33 |
| Current Assets | 66.10 | 39.08 | 22.99 |
| Total Assets | 92.09 | 65.10 | 33.67 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -0.96 | 1.87 | 2.05 |
| Capital Expenditure | 3.72 | 15.70 | 5.77 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -4.12 | -17.58 | -5.74 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 5.13 | 15.69 | 3.79 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.05 | -0.01 | 0.10 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 22.4 | 21.3 | 14.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 20.4 | 19.5 | 13.3 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 12.9 | 12.1 | 8.4 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 37 | 51.9 | 55.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 30.6 | 32.5 | 36.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 13.4 | 13.9 | 12.7 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.95 | 1.61 | 1.4 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.43 | 1.72 | 1.44 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 8.54 | 6.87 | 7.41 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.35 | 1.14 | 1 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.69 | 0.6 | 0.56 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.04 | 1.14 | 1.51 |
| Receivable Days | 100 | 72 | 76 |
| Inventory Days | 123 | 90 | 73 |
| Payable Days | 84 | 88 | 98 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 139 | 74 | 51 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.08 | 0.21 | 0.48 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 14.5 | 11 | 6.6 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.84 | 6.03 | 5.27 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 12.9% | 12.1% | 8.4% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.04x | 1.14x | 1.51x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.76x | 3.74x | 4.36x |
| = Return on Equity | 37% | 51.9% | 55.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.7x | 0.72x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.88x | 0.85x | 0.87x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 20.9% | 19.8% | 13.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 12.36 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -0.96 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 76 in FY24 to 100 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 88% while profit grew 190%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 8.54x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.22An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.393 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.051 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.88 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.285 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.613 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.027 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.874 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1447 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.22, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.87 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.186 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.173 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.217 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.363 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.87 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.08x profit in FY26, against 0.21x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.2%
Contingent liabilities of 0.06 cr against a net worth of 33.42 cr — 0.2% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.4%
0.4% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.02x
Short-term borrowings of 23.22 cr against cash of 0.36 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 8%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.99 cr against a profit of 12.36 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth12.36 ÷ 33.42What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)19.97 ÷ (33.42 + 31.78) = 19.97 ÷ 65.20Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue21.95 ÷ 95.55Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth31.78 ÷ 33.42How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost19.97 ÷ 2.34How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(26.28 ÷ 95.55) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days123 + 100 − 84How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-0.96 ÷ 12.36Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(12.36 − -0.96) ÷ 92.09 = 13.33 ÷ 92.09The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹77.00 × 23,984,400 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash184.68 + 31.78 − 0.36What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA216.10 ÷ 21.95The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT184.68 ÷ 12.36The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)14.94 ÷ 37%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Paper Profits Trapped in Working Capital
While the company reported impressive revenue of Rs 95.55 Cr and PAT of Rs 12.36 Cr in FY26, it failed to convert this into cash. Negative operating cash flow of Rs -0.96 Cr was driven entirely by a massive surge in trade receivables (Rs 26.28 Cr) and inventories (Rs 32.30 Cr), indicating severe collection risks and capital blockage in the year preceding the IPO.
Source: p. 67-73, 134, 160-168Auditor Flags Inventory Discrepancies
In a critical governance finding, the statutory auditor noted that the company historically failed to maintain proper quarterly inventory records. Consequently, discrepancies existed between the inventory statements submitted to the lending banks and the company's actual books of accounts, casting significant doubt on internal controls and the accuracy of reported working capital.
Source: p. 82-86, 211, 234, 523Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal
Litigation: Direct tax proceedings against Company: 0.0577 Crore. Tax proceedings against Directors/Promoters: 0.0022 Crore. Criminal complaints by Promoters: 0.0300 Crore. Tax proceedings against Group Companies: 1.5742 Crore.
Auditor / RPT Flags: In preceding years, the company did not maintain proper records of quarterly records of inventory. Consequently, discrepancies existed during the year between the inventory statements submitted to the bank and the books of accounts, these were reconciled at year end.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amic Forging Limited | 66.91 | — | 13.31 | — |
| Tirupati Forge Limited | 135.43 | — | 4.72 | — |
| Paramount Speciality Forgings Limited | 14.93 | — | 7.57 | — |
| Metalic Technoforge Limited | — | — | 37 | — |
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company reported strong revenue growth to Rs 95.55 Cr and PAT of Rs 12.36 Cr in FY26, but operating cash flow turned negative to Rs -0.96 Cr, alongside ballooning trade receivables of Rs 26.28 Cr and inventories of Rs 32.30 Cr.
p. 67-73, 134, 160-168The statutory auditor flagged that the company did not maintain proper quarterly inventory records in preceding years, resulting in discrepancies between inventory statements submitted to the bank and the books of accounts. Additionally, the company changed its auditor in the last 3 years.
p. 82-86, 211, 234, 523The company has a history of short payment and short deduction of TDS (Rs 5.76 Lakhs) and multiple delays in filing GST (up to 3 days), EPF (up to 5 days), TDS (up to 19 days), and TCS (up to 12 days) returns.
p. 124-126, 168, 609The promoters were allotted significant shares via a Rights Issue at Rs 10 per share in August 2024, followed by a massive 16:1 bonus issue in March 2026, heavily diluting the capital base shortly before the offer.
p.262, p.266, p.267The company's scale, with FY26 revenue of Rs 95.55 Cr, total assets of Rs 92.08 Cr, and PAT of Rs 12.36 Cr, approaches mainboard-qualifying scale but the SME route was chosen.
p. 67-73, 134, 160-168Direct tax proceedings against Company: 0.0577 Crore. Tax proceedings against Directors/Promoters: 0.0022 Crore. Criminal complaints by Promoters: 0.0300 Crore. Tax proceedings against Group Companies: 1.5742 Crore.
p. 82-86, 211, 234, 523In preceding years, the company did not maintain proper records of quarterly records of inventory. Consequently, discrepancies existed during the year between the inventory statements submitted to the bank and the books of accounts, these were reconciled at year end.
p. 82-86, 211, 234, 523Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company relies on a promoter group entity, M/s. Siddheshwar Technoforge Private Limited, for job work, indicating not all manufacturing processes are entirely in-house.
p.171, p.176Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the IPO funds being deployed?
The primary allocations are Rs 30.81 Cr for capital expenditure to set up Manufacturing Unit IV and upgrade existing units, and Rs 6.72 Cr for repayment of secured borrowings.
p.327Who are the promoters and what is their holding?
The promoters hold 83.56% of the pre-issue capital. Their holdings were significantly expanded through a massive 16:1 bonus issue in March 2026.
p.266, p.267, p.283, p.293Are there material related party transactions extracting value?
Yes, the company utilizes a group entity (M/s. Siddheshwar Technoforge Private Limited) for job work, and relies on heavy unsecured loans taken from its promoters and directors.
p. 176, p. 182, p. 183, p. 184Does the company's cash flow match its reported profits?
No. Despite reporting a strong PAT of Rs 12.36 Cr in FY26, the company generated negative operating cash flows of Rs -0.96 Cr due to massive buildups in trade receivables (Rs 26.28 Cr) and inventories (Rs 32.30 Cr).
p. 67-73, 134, 160-168What structural market risks apply to this issue?
As an SME IPO, it carries standing risks including a strictly mandated minimum investment lot size, 5% circuit filters, high dependence on the designated market maker (Shreni Shares Limited) for liquidity, and a thin free float.
p.8, p.9, p.11, p.182, p.237, p.686What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | ₹10.00 | 2016-10-04 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Trambadiya Dhaval Vrajlal | ₹10.00 | 2016-10-04 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Vadodariya Satish Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2016-10-04 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Kapadiya Vipul K | ₹10.00 | 2016-10-04 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Pankil Chandubhai Padhariya | ₹10.00 | 2016-10-04 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Rupapara Jay Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2018-05-24 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | ₹10.00 | 2019-01-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Vadodariya Satish Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2019-01-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Trambadiya Dhaval Vrajlal | ₹10.00 | 2019-01-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Kapadiya Vipul K | ₹10.00 | 2019-01-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Pankil Chandubhai Padhariya | ₹10.00 | 2019-01-30 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 8 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | ₹10.00 | 2019-03-29 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Pankil Chandubhai Padhariya | ₹10.00 | 2019-03-29 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Vadodariya Satish Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2019-04-12 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Trambadiya Dhaval Vrajlal | ₹10.00 | 2019-04-12 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Kapadiya Vipul K | ₹10.00 | 2019-04-12 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | ₹10.00 | 2020-03-31 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | ₹10.00 | 2020-03-31 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Rupapara Jay Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2020-03-31 | 7.7x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 7.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Vadodariya Satish Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Trambadiya Dhaval Vrajlal | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Kapadiya Vipul K | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Pankil Chandubhai Padhariya | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Rupapara Jay Rameshbhai | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Malani Vishal A | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Ankit Rameshbhai Savaliya | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Gajipara Ronakkumar Mansukhbhai | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Vivekkumar Girishbhai Butani | ₹10.00 | 2024-08-10 | 7.7x |
| Mr. Gajipara Keyur Dhirajlal | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Vadodariya Satish Rameshbhai | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Trambadiya Dhaval Vrajlal | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Kapadiya Vipul K | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Pankil Chandubhai Padhariya | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Rupapara Jay Rameshbhai | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Malani Vishal A | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Ankit Rameshbhai Savaliya | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Gajipara Ronakkumar Mansukhbhai | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Vivekkumar Girishbhai Butani | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Ms. Malani Nehaben Anilbhai | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Anil Premjibhai Malani | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Ninad Vasantbhai Rajyaguru | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Ms. Rachnaben Shaileshbhai Thumar | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Ms. Ranjanben Rameshbhai Savalia | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Jatin Dwarkadas Dholakia | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Goswami Yashavantgiri Keshavgiri | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Hansrajbhai Ramjibhai Lunagariya | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr.Sojitra Anilbhai Laxmanbhai | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| Mr. Rameshbhai Ukabhai Rupapara | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| M/s. Schapenberg Industries Gmbh | — | 2026-03-17 | — |
| The 4 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Mr. Gajipara Ronakkumar Mansukhbhai | ₹1,015.00 | 2024-07-12 | as disclosed |
| Mr. Vivekkumar Girishbhai Butani | ₹1,015.00 | 2024-07-12 | as disclosed |
| Mr. Anil Premjibhai Malani | ₹1,250.00 | 2025-05-23 | as disclosed |
| Mr. Ninad Vasantbhai Rajyaguru | ₹1,250.00 | 2025-05-23 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.