Maharaja & Speedex India Limited
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Operating cash flow conversion degraded to 23.87% of PAT in FY26 as inventory expanded by 77.68% to Rs. 36.17 crore.
- Suo motu GNL-1 application filed under Section 454 for adjudication of private placement money received before special resolution, plus unsigned AOC-4 filings for FY21-FY24.
- Peer comparison set consists exclusively of mainboard-listed giants Borosil Limited and Cello World Limited.
- High supplier concentration with top 10 suppliers providing 87.38% of procurements in FY26.
- Direct tax appeal of Rs. 2.3079 crore pending against promoter Rohit Garg.
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Maharaja & Speedex India Limited is a drinkware manufacturing and distribution company focused on stainless-steel bottles and allied drinkware products, catering to retail consumers and institutional customers across India.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Maharaja & Speedex India Limited is engaged in the manufacturing, branding, marketing, and distribution of stainless-steel bottles and value-added drinkware products. The company offers standard products (stainless steel bottles) and novelty products (tumblers, feeding bottles, gym shakers) across mass, premium, and lifestyle categories. It operates two leased manufacturing units in Sonipat, Haryana, through its wholly-owned subsidiary Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited, with a combined installed capacity of 62,82,000 units per annum as of FY26 and capacity utilization of 88.41%. In addition to branded consumer products under 'Speedex' and 'Dewdrop', the company undertakes original equipment manufacturing (OEM) and private-label manufacturing for corporate gifting, institutional buyers, and brand partners. Products are distributed across India via a network of approximately 101 active distributors spanning 17 states and 2 union territories, alongside presence in modern trade and e-commerce platforms. In FY26, in-house manufactured products accounted for 88.85% of revenue, while outsourced trading accounted for 11.15%.
Integrated manufacturing setup through wholly-owned subsidiary Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited, pan-India distribution network of 101 distributors across 17 states and 2 UTs, in-house brands Speedex and Dewdrop, and OEM/private-label capabilities for corporate clients.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment and/or pre-payment, in full or part, of certain borrowings availed by our Company and its subsidiary from banks — ₹24.10 cr
- Funding of capital expenditure towards purchase of plant and machineries at the existing manufacturing facility of our wholly-owned subsidiary — ₹21.42 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 122.6538 | 93.5081 | 61.3233 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 15.3419 | 5.5655 | 1.0785 |
| PAT Margin | 12.51% | 5.95% | 1.76% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 31.2% | Revenue grew due to expansion in business operations supported by an increase in installed capacity in February 2026 by 17,58,000 bottles per annum. | Structural |
| Revenue from Operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 52.5% | Revenue increased due to the acquisition of Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited enabling backward integration into manufacturing and Speedex Online expanding online distribution. | Structural |
| Cost of Raw Material Consumed (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 24.5% | Raw material costs increased due to higher raw material purchases to support expanded in-house manufacturing operations. | Structural |
| Cost of Raw Material Consumed (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 100.0% | Cost of raw materials consumed arose due to the acquisition of subsidiary Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited, which established in-house manufacturing operations in FY25 where none existed in FY24. | Structural |
| Purchase of Stock-in-Trade (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 30.3% | Stock-in-trade purchases decreased due to lower reliance on outsourced traded inventory as in-house manufacturing capacity expanded. | Structural |
| Purchase of Stock-in-Trade (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 66.0% | Stock-in-trade purchases decreased significantly due to a strategic shift from pure trading to in-house manufacturing following the acquisition of Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 62.0% | Employee benefit expenses increased due to higher wages, staff salaries, and director remuneration. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 229.0% | Employee costs surged due to consolidating the workforce of newly acquired subsidiaries Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited and Speedex Online Private Limited. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 23.4% | Finance costs declined due to reductions in bank interest and interest paid on unsecured loans. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 91.2% | Finance costs almost doubled due to taking over the borrowings and bank facilities of acquired subsidiaries Dewdrop Bottles and Speedex Online. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortization Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 61.0% | Depreciation increased due to property, plant, and machinery additions during the year. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortization Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 181.5% | Depreciation expanded due to the addition of manufacturing property, plant, and equipment from acquiring Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 38.7% | Other expenses grew primarily due to higher job work charges and increased electricity and water expenses for manufacturing operations. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 396.3% | Other expenses increased almost fivefold due to incorporating operational overheads (rent, advertisement, job work, power/water, portal fees) of newly acquired subsidiaries. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 175.7% | Net profit expanded due to strong top-line revenue growth, higher gross margins from in-house manufacturing, and lower interest costs. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 416.0% | Net profit expanded over 5x due to revenue growth and backward integration into manufacturing via subsidiary acquisitions. | Structural |
| Inventories (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 77.7% | Inventories increased as raw material stock was built up to support expanded in-house manufacturing capacity and higher order volumes. | Structural |
| Inventories (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 63.6% | Inventories grew due to stocking raw materials for newly commenced in-house manufacturing and expanding finished goods stock. | Structural |
| Trade Receivables (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 54.4% | Trade receivables expanded in line with overall revenue growth across general trade and distributor channels. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 78.9% | Operating cash flow improved due to higher operating profit before working capital changes, partially offset by inventory and receivables lockup. | Structural |
| Borrowings (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 47.8% | Borrowings increased to fund capital expenditure additions and meet working capital requirements for expanding manufacturing scale. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Raw material price volatility in stainless steel and aluminium sector
Fluctuations in global stainless steel and metal prices directly impact production costs and gross profit margins. - Dependence on key suppliers for stainless steel procurement company
High supplier concentration (top 10 suppliers account for 87.38% of purchases in FY26) exposes operations to supply chain disruptions or pricing pressures. - Revenue concentration in select North Indian states company
High revenue contribution from key states exposes business to regional market shocks or localized distribution disruptions.
Tailwinds
- Consumer shift from plastic to sustainable, reusable stainless steel drinkware macro
Growing environmental awareness, health consciousness, and government policies against single-use plastics drive expanding consumer demand for stainless steel bottles and flasks. - Backward integration into in-house manufacturing via Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited company
In-house production provides complete control over quality, design, production scheduling, and higher operating margins compared to pure trading.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Unit I & Unit II (Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited), Sonipat, Haryana | FY26 | 88.4% |
| Unit I & Unit II (Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited), Sonipat, Haryana | FY25 | 77.6% |
Movements the filing does not explain
- Inventory Turnover Days Expansion in FY26 FY26 vs FY25 — Inventory turnover days lengthened from 98 days in FY25 to 150 days in FY26 (inventories jumped from Rs. 20.36 crore to Rs. 36.17 crore), but MD&A does not detail specific product-wise overstocking or slow-moving SKU breakdown.
- Short-Term Loans & Advances Volatility FY25 vs FY24 — Short-term loans and advances dropped from Rs. 1.10 crore in FY24 to Rs. 0.10 crore in FY25 before rebounding to Rs. 0.44 crore in FY26 without specific MD&A explanation.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-17
- Pre Application Start2026-09-09
- Bidding Start2026-09-10
- Bidding End2026-09-15
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-16
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-17
- Listing Day2026-09-18
- Mandate End2026-10-27
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 122.65 | 93.51 | 61.32 |
| Other Income | 0.09 | 0.10 | 0.09 |
| Total Income | 122.74 | 93.60 | 61.41 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 53.41 | 42.92 | 0.00 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 14.30 | 20.52 | 60.35 |
| Changes in Inventories | 1.00 | -2.28 | -6.80 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 8.61 | 5.31 | 1.62 |
| Finance Cost | 1.56 | 2.04 | 1.07 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.93 | 1.20 | 0.43 |
| Other Expenses | 22.75 | 16.40 | 3.30 |
| Total Expenses | 103.55 | 86.11 | 59.96 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 19.19 | 7.49 | 1.45 |
| Profit Before Tax | 19.19 | 7.49 | 1.45 |
| Tax Expense | 3.85 | 1.92 | 0.37 |
| Profit After Tax | 15.34 | 5.57 | 1.08 |
| EPS - Basic | 11.89 | 4.49 | 0.89 |
| EPS - Diluted | 11.89 | 4.49 | 0.89 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 12.90 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 15.96 | 13.51 | 4.96 |
| Net Worth | 28.86 | 13.52 | 4.97 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 3.97 | 7.12 | 4.69 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 22.70 | 10.91 | 11.42 |
| Total Borrowings | 26.66 | 18.04 | 16.11 |
| Trade Payables | 20.39 | 11.07 | 4.69 |
| Current Liabilities | 48.82 | 26.96 | 15.53 |
| Total Liabilities | 81.98 | 47.67 | 26.94 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 15.15 | 6.13 | 1.57 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 2.49 |
| Inventories | 36.17 | 20.36 | 12.44 |
| Trade Receivables | 19.35 | 12.54 | 6.91 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.46 | 1.18 | 0.38 |
| Current Assets | 65.46 | 40.71 | 21.84 |
| Total Assets | 81.98 | 47.67 | 26.94 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 3.66 | 2.05 | 2.13 |
| Capital Expenditure | -11.17 | -2.12 | -0.23 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -11.61 | -1.65 | -2.68 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 7.23 | 0.04 | 0.81 |
| Net Change in Cash | -0.72 | 0.44 | 0.26 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 18.5 | 11.5 | 4.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 16.9 | 10.2 | 4.1 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 12.5 | 6 | 1.8 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 53.2 | 41.2 | 21.7 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 37.4 | 30.2 | 11.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 18.7 | 11.7 | 4 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.92 | 1.33 | 3.24 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.16 | 1.57 | 5.35 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 13.3 | 4.68 | 2.36 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.34 | 1.51 | 1.41 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.6 | 0.75 | 0.61 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.5 | 1.96 | 2.28 |
| Receivable Days | 58 | 49 | 41 |
| Inventory Days | 108 | 79 | 74 |
| Payable Days | 61 | 43 | 28 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 105 | 85 | 87 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.24 | 0.37 | 1.98 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 14.2 | 7.4 | -3.9 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 5.79 | 1.77 | 0.54 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 12.5% | 6% | 1.8% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.5x | 1.96x | 2.28x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.84x | 3.53x | 5.42x |
| = Return on Equity | 53.2% | 41.2% | 21.7% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.8x | 0.74x | 0.75x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.92x | 0.79x | 0.58x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 16.9% | 10.2% | 4.1% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was only 0.24x reported profit in FY26. Less than half of the profit on the income statement arrived as cash.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 100% while profit grew 1323%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 13.3x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.177 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.958 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.312 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.447 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.101 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.901 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1425 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.29 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.203 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.195 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.253 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.352 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.29 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 28.86 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.02x
Short-term borrowings of 22.70 cr against cash of 0.46 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 7.9%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 1.21 cr against a profit of 15.34 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth15.34 ÷ 28.86What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)20.75 ÷ (28.86 + 26.66) = 20.75 ÷ 55.53Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue22.68 ÷ 122.65Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth26.66 ÷ 28.86How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost20.75 ÷ 1.56How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(19.35 ÷ 122.65) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days108 + 58 − 61How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT3.66 ÷ 15.34Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(15.34 − 3.66) ÷ 81.98 = 11.68 ÷ 81.98The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹186.00 × 12,903,196 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash240.00 + 26.66 − 0.46What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA266.20 ÷ 22.68The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT240.00 ÷ 15.34The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)15.64 ÷ 175.7%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Dressed Bride: CFO Conversion Drops to 23.8% as Inventory Reaches Rs. 36.17 Crore
While restated PAT expanded 175.66% in FY26 to Rs. 15.3419 crore, operating cash flow lagged significantly at Rs. 3.6630 crore. Inventory ballooned by 77.68% to Rs. 36.1749 crore (150 inventory days), absorbing cash and reflecting aggressive top-line and profit expansion ahead of the public issue.
Source: p.31, 59, 61, 250Secretarial Adjudication for Pre-Resolution Private Placement Money
The company filed a suo motu application in Form GNL-1 under Section 454 of the Companies Act 2013 for adjudication of penalties regarding private placement application money received prior to passing special resolutions. Additionally, financial statements (AOC-4) for FY21 through FY24 lacked required CEO/CFO signatures and had to be resubmitted via Form GNL-2.
Source: p.33, 39, 40Mainboard Peer Comparison Used to Price SME Offering
Despite listing on the BSE SME platform, Maharaja & Speedex benchmarks its valuation against mainboard consumerware majors Borosil Limited (P/E 38.23x) and Cello World Limited (P/E 25.69x), establishing an elevated industry peer median P/E of 31.96x.
Source: p.3, 114, 115Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Akash Aggarwal
Litigation: Direct Tax appeal pending against Promoter Rohit Garg before National Faceless Appeal Centre for AY 2009-10 involving Rs. 2.3079 crore (Rs. 230.79 lakhs). Criminal, civil or statutory actions against Company/Promoters/Subsidiary: NIL.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Borosil Limited | 38.23 | — | 9.3 | 6.24 |
| Cello World Limited | 25.69 | — | 14.35 | 14.27 |
At the ₹186 upper band, the issue is priced at 15.6x earnings — a 51% discount to the peer median of 32.0x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In FY26 (pre-IPO year), restated PAT surged by 175.66% to Rs. 15.3419 crore (from Rs. 5.5655 crore in FY25), but Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) was only Rs. 3.6630 crore (a cash conversion rate of 23.87% of PAT). This divergence was caused by inventory ballooning 77.68% to Rs. 36.1749 crore (150 inventory turnover days), locking up working capital.
p.31, 59, 61, 250The company benchmarks its valuation against two mainboard-listed consumerware majors—Borosil Limited (P/E 38.23x) and Cello World Limited (P/E 25.69x)—setting an elevated industry average peer P/E of 31.96x for an SME issue.
p.114, 115The company disclosed delays in filing ROC forms (PAS-3, MGT-14, SH-7) and filed a suo motu application in Form GNL-1 under Section 454 for adjudication regarding private placement application money received prior to passing a special resolution. Additionally, financial statements (AOC-4) for FY21-FY24 were not duly signed by CEO/CFO and were resubmitted via GNL-2, along with disclosed delays in depositing EPF and ESI dues.
p.33, 39, 40In FY26, the company generated Rs. 122.6538 crore in revenue from operations and Rs. 15.3419 crore in net profit, meeting financial size requirements for a mainboard listing, but selected the BSE SME platform with lighter regulatory review.
p.3, 59, 114In FY26, the company's top 10 suppliers accounted for 87.38% of total raw material and procurement purchases, creating high supply chain dependency.
p.22, 23Direct Tax appeal pending against Promoter Rohit Garg before National Faceless Appeal Centre for AY 2009-10 involving Rs. 2.3079 crore (Rs. 230.79 lakhs). Criminal, civil or statutory actions against Company/Promoters/Subsidiary: NIL.
p.29, 30, 212, 264Short-term borrowings of ₹22.70 cr against cash of ₹0.46 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
In-house production increased manufacturing revenue to 88.85% of total sales in FY26, expanding net profit margins. However, cash flow generation degraded severely as inventory days stretched to 150 days, locking up Rs. 36.17 crore in working capital.
p.31, 114, 167, 254Current capacity utilization at the Sonipat plant reached 88.41% in FY26 on an installed capacity of 62.82 lakh units per annum, demonstrating high utilization that justifies further machinery addition.
p.26, 77, 94, 167Total outstanding borrowings as of FY26 stood at Rs. 26.6633 crore (including Rs. 22.70 crore short-term borrowings). Repaying Rs. 24.10 crore will eliminate over 90% of debt and significantly lower finance costs (Rs. 1.56 crore in FY26).
p.60, 94, 245Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Maashitla Securities
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (27 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the IPO proceeds allocated across debt repayment, capital expenditure, and general corporate purposes?
Net issue proceeds are allocated as: Rs. 24.1043 crore for repayment/pre-payment of bank borrowings availed by the company and its subsidiary, Rs. 21.4158 crore for capex towards plant and machinery at the subsidiary's Sonipat facility, and the balance for General Corporate Purposes.
p.94, 95What is the promoters' shareholding pre and post-issue, and what is their acquisition history?
Promoters Rakesh Kumar Aggarwal and Akash Aggarwal hold 72.68% pre-issue. Promoters issued 12,888,000 bonus shares in January 2026. Promoter Rakesh Kumar Aggarwal and promoter group member Akash Aggarwal are selling 861,600 shares via Offer for Sale (OFS). Direct tax appeal of Rs. 2.3079 crore is pending against promoter Rohit Garg.
p.29, 30, 72, 77, 79What are the key related-party transactions with subsidiaries and promoter directors?
Transactions with wholly-owned manufacturing subsidiary Dewdrop Bottles Private Limited included Rs. 64.2046 crore in sales and Rs. 6.2689 crore in purchases in FY26. Total remuneration paid to promoter family directors and relatives was Rs. 1.2050 crore in FY26. Unsecured loans from promoter directors Rohit Garg (Rs. 3.5881 crore) and Kusum Aggarwal (Rs. 4.8700 crore taken) were also disclosed.
p.64, 246How did operating cash flow perform relative to restated net profits over FY24 to FY26?
In FY24, PAT was Rs. 1.0785 crore and CFO was Rs. 2.1308 crore. In FY25, PAT was Rs. 5.5655 crore and CFO was Rs. 2.0472 crore. In FY26, PAT surged to Rs. 15.3419 crore, but CFO was only Rs. 3.6630 crore (23.87% cash conversion) due to inventory expanding to Rs. 36.1749 crore.
p.59, 61, 250What secretarial, statutory, and audit compliance issues were disclosed in the filing?
The company disclosed delays in filing ROC forms (PAS-3, MGT-14, SH-7), filed a Form GNL-1 suo motu application under Section 454 for adjudication of private placement application money received prior to special resolutions, resubmitted unsigned AOC-4 financial statements for FY21-FY24 via GNL-2, and noted EPF/ESI statutory deposit delays. M/s APV & Associates serves as statutory auditor.
p.33, 39, 40, 264What are the lot size, application ticket cost, market maker terms, and liquidity constraints for public investors?
The offer is listed on BSE SME with a minimum retail application requirement of 2 lots. Trading occurs strictly in standardized market lots, and because lots are indivisible, partial exit or trading of fractional lots is impossible. Choice Equity Broking Private Limited is the Market Maker with 216,000 reserved shares (5.01%) and a mandatory 3-year obligation period. Standard SME 5% price circuit limits apply.
p.2, 3, 7, 55, 74What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rakesh Kumar Aggarwal and Kusum Aggarwal | ₹10.00 | 2006-02-15 | 18.6x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 18.6x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2026-01-28 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 3 entries | |||
| Abhishek Garg and Utkarsh Patel | ₹65,309.00 | 2024-01-23 | as disclosed |
| Atul Tulsian | ₹70,000.00 | 2025-02-28 | as disclosed |
| Atul Tulsian | ₹70,000.00 | 2025-03-28 | as disclosed |
The 3 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 18 Sep 2029promoter3 years
- 18 Sep 2028promoter2 years
- 18 Sep 2027promoter group and public1 year
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.