Infrax Renewable Limited
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Pre-IPO year shows classic 'Dressed Bride' pattern with 205.9% revenue growth alongside negative operating cash flow (-Rs. 2.70 crore).
- Trade receivables expanded by 4,854% in FY26 from Rs. 0.23 crore to Rs. 11.39 crore.
- Inclusion of mainboard-listed Acme Solar Holdings Limited in the peer comparison set.
- Recent corporate conversion from a partnership firm (Infrax International) in September 2024, giving the issuer less than 2 years of corporate track record.
- Recurring statutory tax interest penalties embedded inside finance costs (Rs. 24.34 Lakhs in FY26).
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Infrax Renewable Limited is an ISO 9001:2015 certified company engaged in providing solar Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) services, including solar power solutions for Rooftop and Ground Mount solar projects.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Infrax Renewable Limited provides solar Engineering, Procurement and Construction (EPC) services, including Rooftop and Ground Mount solar projects. Its EPC services encompass project design, engineering, procurement, installation, testing, commissioning, and operation & maintenance services. The company was originally formed as a partnership firm under the name Infrax International in April 2019 and was converted into a public limited company in September 2024. The company operates branch offices and warehouses across Gujarat, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh. It caters to B2B and B2C clients, serving over 5,000 customers with a dealer network of 2,830 dealers in 2026. In 2026, the company also entered the Independent Power Producer (IPP) business segment. The company intends to set up a manufacturing facility to produce solar structures, module frames, and solar panel recycling using IPO proceeds.
Established track record for execution of solar EPC solutions, strong customer relationships, wide range of solar products, financial stability through PPA model, and established dealer and supplier network across multiple states.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding of capital expenditure of our Company towards purchase of machineries and equipments for proposed manufacturing facility — ₹12.29 cr
- Funding working capital requirements of our Company — ₹17.00 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 93.2149 | 30.4686 | 9.6524 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 10.2014 | 2.8518 | 0.9576 |
| PAT Margin | 10.94% | 9.36% | 9.92% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 93.21 | 30.47 | 9.65 |
| Other Income | 0.12 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 93.33 | 30.48 | 9.66 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 39.62 | 18.60 | 7.04 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 38.06 | 7.07 | 1.30 |
| Changes in Inventories | -2.48 | -0.76 | -0.95 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 1.41 | 0.36 | 0.17 |
| Finance Cost | 0.78 | 0.21 | 0.25 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.11 | 0.02 | 0.01 |
| Other Expenses | 2.04 | 0.70 | 0.34 |
| Total Expenses | 79.55 | 26.20 | 8.15 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 13.79 | 4.27 | 1.51 |
| Profit Before Tax | 13.79 | 4.27 | 1.51 |
| Tax Expense | 3.58 | 1.42 | 0.56 |
| Profit After Tax | 10.20 | 2.85 | 0.96 |
| EPS - Basic | 10.86 | 3.56 | 1.20 |
| EPS - Diluted | 10.86 | 3.56 | 1.20 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 1.25 | 1.00 | 1.40 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 14.52 | 0.89 | 0.00 |
| Net Worth | 15.77 | 1.89 | 1.40 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 2.82 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 4.17 | 3.02 | 0.00 |
| Total Borrowings | 6.99 | 3.02 | 0.00 |
| Trade Payables | 2.12 | 0.74 | 1.33 |
| Current Liabilities | 12.85 | 6.32 | 2.99 |
| Total Liabilities | 31.53 | 8.24 | 4.40 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 4.79 | 0.12 | 0.01 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.03 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 12.72 | 5.75 | 3.00 |
| Trade Receivables | 11.39 | 0.23 | 0.25 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.85 | 1.21 | 0.66 |
| Current Assets | 26.22 | 7.67 | 3.98 |
| Total Assets | 31.53 | 8.24 | 4.40 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -2.70 | 0.24 | 1.67 |
| Capital Expenditure | -4.76 | -0.16 | -0.01 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -4.74 | -0.34 | -0.24 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 7.11 | 0.46 | -1.01 |
| Net Change in Cash | -0.33 | 0.37 | 0.42 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 15.7 | 14.8 | 18.3 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 15.6 | 14.7 | 18.2 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 10.9 | 9.4 | 9.9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 64.7 | 151.2 | 68.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 64 | 91.4 | 125.6 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 32.4 | 34.6 | 21.8 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.44 | 1.6 | 0 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.42 | 0.4 | -0.37 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 18.64 | 20.98 | 7.12 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.04 | 1.21 | 1.33 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.05 | 0.3 | 0.33 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2.96 | 3.7 | 2.19 |
| Receivable Days | 45 | 3 | 9 |
| Inventory Days | 50 | 69 | 114 |
| Payable Days | 8 | 9 | 50 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 87 | 63 | 73 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.26 | 0.08 | 1.75 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 40.9 | 31.7 | -16.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 42.57 | 6.98 | 0.77 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 10.9% | 9.4% | 9.9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2.96x | 3.7x | 2.19x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2x | 4.37x | 3.14x |
| = Return on Equity | 64.7% | 151.2% | 68.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.67x | 0.63x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.95x | 0.86x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 15.6% | 14.7% | 18.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 10.20 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -2.70 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 9 in FY24 to 45 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 18.64x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
8 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 16.194 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.677 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.299 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 3.059 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 7.182 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.067 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.648 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.4093 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 11.16 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.424 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.461 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.462 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.5 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 11.16 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.26x profit in FY26, against 0.08x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 15.77 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 4.3%
4.3% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.2x
Short-term borrowings of 4.17 cr against cash of 0.85 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.24 cr against a profit of 10.20 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth10.20 ÷ 15.77What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)14.57 ÷ (15.77 + 6.99) = 14.57 ÷ 22.76Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue14.68 ÷ 93.21Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth6.99 ÷ 15.77How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost14.57 ÷ 0.78How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(11.39 ÷ 93.21) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days50 + 45 − 8How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-2.70 ÷ 10.20Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(10.20 − -2.70) ÷ 31.53 = 12.90 ÷ 31.53The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹104.00 × 9,393,554 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash97.69 + 6.99 − 0.85What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA103.83 ÷ 14.68The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT97.69 ÷ 10.20The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)9.58 ÷ 257.7%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Pre-IPO Working Capital Trap: Negative OCF Behind the 200%+ Growth
A deep dive into the restated cash flows reveals that Infrax Renewable's tripling of revenues in FY26 (from Rs. 30.47 crore to Rs. 93.21 crore) came at the cost of severe working capital lockup. Operating cash flow collapsed from +Rs. 0.24 crore to -Rs. 2.70 crore as trade receivables ballooned 48-fold from Rs. 0.23 crore to Rs. 11.39 crore. The company is effectively extending credit to B2B solar buyers to drive top-line numbers, forcing it to seek Rs. 17.00 crore in public IPO funds to plug its operating cash deficit.
Source: p.57, 98, 255Peer Set Category Error: Benchmarking an SME Contractor Against Mainboard Acme Solar
In its Basis for Issue Price section, Infrax Renewable includes Acme Solar Holdings Limited—a mainboard utility producer trading at a 43.05x P/E—in its peer comparison table. However, in the Risk Factors on p.45, the issuer explicitly admits that there are no comparable listed Indian companies operating in its exact business segment. Benchmarking an SME solar EPC contractor with two years of corporate history against a mainboard utility giant is a clear category error that skews public valuation expectations.
Source: p.45, 103, 104Unseasoned Corporate Entity with Pending Manufacturing Approvals
Infrax Renewable operated as a partnership firm until September 23, 2024, meaning its corporate entity history spans less than 24 months. Despite this short corporate record, the company is raising Rs. 12.29 crore to establish an in-house manufacturing plant for solar mounting structures and recycling. This diversification carries execution risks, as pollution control approvals (Consent to Establish/Operate) from the Gujarat Pollution Control Board remain pending.
Source: p.2, 44, 72, 128Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Bhargv Ashvinbhai Vachhani
Litigation: Criminal cases against company: NIL. Civil cases against company: NIL. Tax demands/notices: NIL. Trademark objections: Trademark INFRAX under Class 35 objected by Trademark Registry, Gujarat.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acme Solar Holdings Limited | 43.05 | — | 9.84 | — |
| Alpex Solar Limited | 11.47 | — | 35.87 | — |
| Solarium Green Energy Limited | 18.45 | — | 12.58 | — |
At the ₹104 upper band, the issue is priced at 9.6x earnings — a 48% discount to the peer median of 18.5x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In FY26 (the pre-IPO year), revenue from operations jumped 205.94% (from Rs. 30.47 crore to Rs. 93.21 crore) and restated PAT surged 257.72% (from Rs. 2.85 crore to Rs. 10.20 crore). However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) turned negative at -Rs. 2.70 crore in FY26 (down from +Rs. 0.24 crore in FY25) because trade receivables ballooned by 4,854% from Rs. 0.23 crore to Rs. 11.39 crore.
p.57, 58, 249, 255The company compares itself to Acme Solar Holdings Limited, a mainboard-listed utility-scale solar producer with a P/E multiple of 43.05x, despite acknowledging on p.45 that there are no exact comparable listed peers for its business model.
p.45, 103, 104On June 5, 2026 (just three weeks prior to the DRHP filing date of June 26, 2026), the company allotted 9,85,111 equity shares at Rs. 72.00 per share to non-promoter preferential allottees, following a 7:1 bonus issue on May 5, 2026.
p.72, 74, 107Finance costs for FY26 include Rs. 24.34 Lakhs (0.2434 Crore) paid as interest on taxes (up from Rs. 12.38 Lakhs in FY25), indicating repeated delays in statutory tax deposits and compliance.
p.251Promoters have extended unsecured loans of Rs. 1.5861 crore (representing 22.70% of total borrowings of Rs. 6.9867 crore) and personal guarantees of Rs. 5.4007 crore securing 77.30% of total bank borrowings.
p.239, 240Criminal cases against company: NIL. Civil cases against company: NIL. Tax demands/notices: NIL. Trademark objections: Trademark INFRAX under Class 35 objected by Trademark Registry, Gujarat.
p.151, 181, 188, 268Operating cash flow was negative ₹2.70 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹10.20 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Trade receivables grew 4854.4% against revenue growth of 205.9% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthShort-term borrowings of ₹4.17 cr against cash of ₹0.85 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While revenue grew to Rs. 93.21 crore in FY26, cash generation deteriorated severely. Cash flow from operations turned negative at -Rs. 2.70 crore as receivables expanded to Rs. 11.39 crore, demonstrating that geographical expansion has come at the cost of extended credit terms and working capital lockup.
p.102, 128, 255The company is allocating Rs. 12.29 crore of IPO proceeds towards this capital expenditure. However, the company currently has no prior manufacturing operating history (having operated as an EPC contractor and trader), and pollution control approvals (Consent to Establish/Operate) remain pending.
p.44, 128Trade receivables expanded from Rs. 0.23 crore in FY25 to Rs. 11.39 crore in FY26, and inventory grew to Rs. 12.72 crore. The working capital cycle is heavily back-ended into Q3 and Q4, making the business reliant on public equity proceeds to support customer credit.
p.98, 247, 255Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (23 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What is the breakdown of IPO proceeds between capital expenditure, working capital, and general corporate purposes?
The proceeds are allocated as: Rs. 12.2933 crore for purchasing machinery and equipment for the proposed manufacturing facility, Rs. 17.0000 crore for funding working capital requirements, and the balance for General Corporate Purposes (GCP). Working capital represents the largest single allocation.
p.85, 98, 128What is the promoters' shareholding pre-issue and what pre-IPO allotments were made to insiders?
Promoters Bhargv Vachhani, Bhavik Gandhi, and Khushboo Vachhani hold 67.73% of the pre-issue share capital. On May 5, 2026, existing shareholders received 8,750,000 bonus shares (7:1 bonus ratio), followed by a preferential allotment of 985,111 shares at Rs. 72.00 per share to non-promoter investors on June 5, 2026.
p.72, 74, 77What is the volume of related-party transactions with group entity Infrax Solar LLP?
The company engaged in substantial two-way transactions with group company Infrax Solar LLP in FY26, comprising sales of Rs. 7.6568 crore (8.21% of total revenue) and purchases of Rs. 3.7392 crore. Additionally, the company paid Rs. 22.52 Lakhs in interest on loans from related parties in FY26.
p.188, 202, 251Why did operating cash flow turn negative in FY26 despite reported PAT exceeding Rs. 10 crore?
In FY26, restated PAT reached Rs. 10.2014 crore, but operating cash flow dropped to -Rs. 2.7021 crore. This negative cash conversion was caused by Rs. 11.1554 crore getting locked up in trade receivables (which surged from Rs. 0.23 crore to Rs. 11.39 crore) and Rs. 6.9783 crore absorbed by inventory expansion.
p.57, 255, 256When was the issuer incorporated and what is its corporate compliance background?
The issuer operated as a partnership firm (Infrax International) from April 2019 until its conversion into a public limited company on September 23, 2024. As a result, its operating history as a corporate entity is under two years. Trademark registration for 'INFRAX' under Class 35 remains objected to by the Trademark Registry.
p.2, 72, 151What are the trading lot size, minimum retail commitment, market maker terms, and exit constraints for public investors?
The issue is listed on BSE SME with a minimum retail application requirement of 2 lots. Because trading occurs strictly in standardized market lots and lots are indivisible, partial exit or trading of fractional lots is impossible. The market maker obligation runs for a mandatory period of 3 years, and standard 5% price bands apply.
p.2, 6, 54, 292What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers to MOA / Partnership Firm Partners | ₹10.00 | 2024-09-23 | 10.4x |
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2026-05-05 | — |
| Ami Niraj Shah, Aparna Misra, Avnish Chhabria & Others | ₹72.00 | 2026-06-05 | 1.4x |
| Allotted below the band — 1 entries | |||
| Aditya Joshi, Chittorgarh Infotech Ltd, Yash Hitesh Patel & Others | ₹160.00 | 2025-07-21 | as disclosed |
The 1 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 17 Sep 2029promoter3 years
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.