Gulf Lloyds (India) Ltd
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Change in accounting basis destroying comparability
- Massive 83% supplier concentration
- Related party value extraction via property advances
- Chronic statutory filing delays
- Negative cash conversion
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Gulf Lloyds (India) Limited carries on the business of third-party quality inspection, audit and certification services to all type and size of industries and industrial sectors.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Gulf Lloyds (India) Limited provides third-party quality inspection, verification, audit, and certification services across various industries including oil and gas, retail, manufacturing, infrastructure, food, pharmaceutical, consumer products, energy, textile, construction, refinery, power plants, aerospace, and electrical & electronics. The company operates in the service industry and does not require conventional raw materials. Its operations depend on the technical expertise of its personnel, which includes 584 regular inspection engineers and 68 freelance inspection engineers out of a total 715 employees. The company operates from multiple leased premises situated at Gala Empire, Thaltej, Ahmedabad. To offer testing and training services in-house, the company incorporated a subsidiary and has entered into MOUs with NABL-accredited laboratories for testing activities. It acquires business from top domestic and export clients, with the top 10 customers contributing 73.93% of revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Capital Expenditure for Office premises — ₹3.71 cr
- Repayment of unsecured loan — ₹3.00 cr
- Working Capital requirement — ₹7.15 cr
- General corporate purposes — ₹2.33 cr
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 35.6794 | 35.6082 | 23.2599 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 4.3029 | 4.668 | 1.6775 |
| PAT Margin | 12.06% | 13.11% | 7.21% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 35.68 | 35.61 | 23.26 |
| Other Income | 0.29 | 0.27 | 0.25 |
| Total Income | 35.97 | 35.88 | 23.51 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 22.02 | 23.47 | 16.67 |
| Other Expenses | 6.04 | 4.74 | 3.87 |
| Total Expenses | 30.33 | 29.61 | 21.19 |
| EBITDA | 7.90 | 7.66 | 2.97 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.66 | 0.41 | 0.19 |
| Finance Cost | 1.60 | 0.98 | 0.45 |
| Profit Before Tax | 5.64 | 6.27 | 2.32 |
| Tax Expense | 1.34 | 1.60 | 0.64 |
| Profit After Tax | 4.30 | 4.67 | 1.68 |
| EPS - Basic | 8.76 | 9.51 | 3.42 |
| EPS - Diluted | 8.76 | 9.51 | 3.42 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 4.91 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 8.71 | 9.32 | 4.65 |
| Net Worth | 13.48 | 9.33 | 4.66 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 5.40 | 4.30 | 2.69 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 10.28 | 4.64 | 4.25 |
| Total Borrowings | 15.68 | 8.94 | 6.94 |
| Trade Payables | 0.88 | 0.20 | 1.26 |
| Current Liabilities | 15.88 | 9.62 | 8.39 |
| Total Liabilities | 35.29 | 23.51 | 15.88 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 2.06 | 1.73 | 0.94 |
| Trade Receivables | 15.56 | 10.70 | 5.25 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.31 | 0.89 | 0.67 |
| Current Assets | 24.87 | 14.85 | 8.64 |
| Total Assets | 35.29 | 23.51 | 15.88 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -1.37 | 0.94 | -5.02 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.00 | 1.54 | 0.44 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -1.34 | -1.74 | -0.38 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 5.14 | 1.02 | 5.86 |
| Net Change in Cash | 2.42 | 0.22 | 0.46 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 22 | 21.4 | 12.6 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 20.1 | 20.2 | 11.8 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 12.1 | 13.1 | 7.2 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 31.9 | 50.1 | 36 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 24.8 | 39.7 | 23.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 12.2 | 19.9 | 10.6 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 1.16 | 0.96 | 1.49 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.56 | 1.05 | 2.11 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 4.53 | 7.38 | 6.14 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.57 | 1.54 | 1.03 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.01 | 1.51 | 1.46 |
| Receivable Days | 159 | 110 | 82 |
| Payable Days | 9 | 2 | 20 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.32 | 0.2 | -2.99 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 16.1 | 15.8 | 42.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.51 | 3.74 | 2.26 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 12.1% | 13.1% | 7.2% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.01x | 1.51x | 1.46x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.62x | 2.52x | 3.41x |
| = Return on Equity | 31.9% | 50.1% | 36% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.76x | 0.74x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.78x | 0.86x | 0.84x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 20.3% | 20.4% | 11.9% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 4.30 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -1.37 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 82 in FY24 to 159 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 53% while profit grew 157%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.452 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.804 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.002 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.788 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.993 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.019 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1609 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.51 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.255 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.247 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.205 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.382 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.51 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.32x profit in FY26, against 0.2x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.32x
Short-term borrowings of 10.28 cr against cash of 3.31 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 21.2%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.91 cr against a profit of 4.30 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth4.30 ÷ 13.48What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)7.24 ÷ (13.48 + 15.68) = 7.24 ÷ 29.16Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue7.90 ÷ 35.68Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth15.68 ÷ 13.48How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost7.24 ÷ 1.60How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(15.56 ÷ 35.68) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-1.37 ÷ 4.30Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(4.30 − -1.37) ÷ 35.29 = 5.68 ÷ 35.29The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹100.00 × 6,729,200 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash67.29 + 15.68 − 3.31What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA79.65 ÷ 7.90The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT67.29 ÷ 4.30The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Shifting Accounting Basis Masks Comparability
The company presents its latest FY26 financials on a consolidated basis while keeping FY25 and FY24 on a standalone basis. This inconsistent presentation silently breaks direct year-over-year comparisons for crucial metrics like revenue, margins, and cash flows.
Source: p. 116-126, 212-213, 329-331, 335-337, 340-345, 411, 466-468, 474-475Value Extraction Through Director Advances
Alongside heavy to-and-fro unsecured loan transactions, the company has directly advanced funds to its directors (Jaykumar, Bhagirath, and Shivaniben Bhavsar) under the guise of capital advances given for property purchase, raising significant concerns about the diversion of company resources to promoters.
Source: p. 130, 436, 131, 437, 132Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Litigation: None disclosed
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company presented FY26 financials on a consolidated basis, but provided FY25 and FY24 on a standalone basis, silently breaking direct year-over-year comparability.
p. 116-126, 212-213, 329-331, 335-337, 340-345, 411, 466-468, 474-475The company faces massive concentration risks, with its Top 10 customers contributing 73.93% of revenue and its Top 1 supplier accounting for a staggering 83.61% of total purchases in FY26.
p.280, p.281, p.282, p.283, p.290, p.296, p.387The company engages in heavy to-and-fro unsecured loans with its directors and notably advanced company funds to directors (Jaykumar Bhavsar, Bhagirath Bhavsar, Shivaniben Bhavsar) specifically labeled as capital advances for property purchase.
p. 130, 436, 131, 437, 132The company has a history of non-compliance, including 34 instances of delays in filing GST returns (ranging from 1 to 35 days) and delays relating to employee EPF/EPFO filings.
p. 78-80Operating cash flow turned negative to Rs -1.37 Cr in FY26 against a reported PAT of Rs 4.30 Cr, alongside a surge in trade receivables from Rs 10.70 Cr to Rs 15.56 Cr.
p. 116-126, 212-213, 329-331, 335-337, 340-345, 411, 466-468, 474-475The company intends to use Rs 7.15 Cr for working capital and Rs 2.33 Cr for general corporate purposes, combining for 52.1% of the total fresh issue size.
p.216Shares were transferred among promoters and others in December 2024 at Rs 5,000 per share, followed by a massive bonus issue in May 2025 that heavily diluted the capital base prior to the Rs 100 IPO.
p.174, p.177, p.190, p.192, p.193None disclosed
p. 142, 184, 534, 535None disclosed
p. 142, 184, 534, 535Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While the company provides these services, it operates with severe concentration, relying on a single supplier for 83.61% of purchases and its top 10 customers for 73.93% of revenue, contradicting the image of a broad, resilient service platform.
p.280, p.281, p.282, p.283, p.290, p.296, p.387Live Subscription Status
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the IPO funds being deployed?
The Rs 18.19 Cr fresh issue will primarily fund working capital (Rs 7.15 Cr), capital expenditure for office premises (Rs 3.71 Cr), and repayment of unsecured loans (Rs 3.00 Cr).
p.216Who are the promoters and what is their holding?
The promoters are Jaykumar Bhagirathkumar Bhavsar, Bhagirath Punjalal Bhavsar, Anitaben Bhagirathkumar Bhavsar, and Shivaniben Jaykumar Bhavsar. They will hold 72.88% post-issue, and their average cost of acquisition is highly diluted and near zero due to a massive bonus issue in May 2025.
p.174, p.177, p.184, p.194Are there material related party transactions extracting value?
Yes. The company engages in heavy unsecured borrowing and lending with its directors and has notably given capital advances to multiple directors specifically for property purchases. It also pays rent to its directors.
p. 130, p. 131, p. 132, p. 436, p. 437Does the company's cash flow match its reported profits?
No. In FY26, the company reported a PAT of Rs 4.30 Cr but generated negative operating cash flows of Rs -1.37 Cr. This decay was exacerbated by trade receivables climbing to Rs 15.56 Cr.
p. 116-126, 212-213, 329-331, 335-337, 340-345, 411, 466-468, 474-475What structural market risks apply to this issue?
As an SME IPO, it carries a standing context of a strict minimum investment lot size (1200 shares), mandatory 5% circuit filters, high dependence on the designated market maker (Prabhat Financial Services Limited) for liquidity, and an inherently thin free float.
p.2, p.8, p.11, p.43, p.124, p.148, p.154What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jaykumar Bhagirathkumar Bhavsar | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-26 | 10.0x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 10.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Bhagirath Punjalal Bhavsar | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-26 | 10.0x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 10.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anitaben Bhagirathkumar Bhavsar | ₹10.00 | 2014-09-26 | 10.0x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 10.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Jaykumar Bhavsar | ₹10.00 | 2016-03-04 | 10.0x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 10.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Anitaben Bhavsar | ₹10.00 | 2016-03-04 | 10.0x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 10.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Jaykumar Bhagirathkumar Bhavsar | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Bhagirath Punjalal Bhavsar | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Anitaben Bhagirathkumar Bhavsar | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Shivaniben Jaykumar Bhavsar | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Ashokkumar Bhavsar | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Nimishaben Bhavsar | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Akash Dhobi | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| Shivam Shah | — | 2025-05-12 | — |
| The 5 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Shivaniben Bhavsar | ₹5,000.00 | 2024-12-03 | as disclosed |
| Ashokkumar Bhavsar | ₹5,000.00 | 2024-12-03 | as disclosed |
| Nimisha Bhavsar | ₹5,000.00 | 2024-12-03 | as disclosed |
| Akash Dhobi | ₹5,000.00 | 2024-12-03 | as disclosed |
| Shivam Shah | ₹5,000.00 | 2024-12-03 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.