G.V.Electricals
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride earnings profile with negative operating cash flow (-Rs 3.31 Cr)
- Massive receivables buildup (Rs 51.16 Cr)
- Chronic statutory delays in PF (Rs 9.11 Cr) and ESIC (Rs 1.23 Cr) payments
- Untraceable historical secretarial records and recent auditor change
- Extreme geographic concentration (69% in Odisha)
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
G V Electricals Ltd is a power distribution infrastructure services provider engaged in providing operation and maintenance (O&M) services, electrical infrastructure and network development works, and metering and meter management services.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
G V Electricals Ltd is a power distribution infrastructure services provider operating across three primary service verticals: Network Operation and Maintenance (O&M) Services, Electrical Infrastructure and Network Development Works, and Metering and Meter Management Services. The company does not undertake any manufacturing activities and does not own or operate manufacturing facilities, executing projects through a contract-based logistics framework. Operations involve deploying skilled technical personnel, specialized tools, equipment, and materials across multiple project sites in states including Odisha, Maharashtra, Delhi, Rajasthan, and Gujarat. Key customers comprise state power distribution utilities, public sector undertakings, and private sector infrastructure entities, with contracts secured predominantly through competitive bidding processes. The company utilizes a fleet of operational vehicles and equipment to execute O&M contracts for distribution networks, substations, and LT/HT lines. Services are delivered directly at client locations or designated service service areas in accordance with utility specifications and contractual terms.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment of a portion of certain borrowings availed by our Company — ₹6.00 cr
- Funding of Working Capital Requirements — ₹22.00 cr
- General Corporate Purpose
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 156.4129 | 131.2356 | 111.7956 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 10.4657 | 4.6608 | 2.8032 |
| PAT Margin | 6.69% | 3.55% | 2.51% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 156.41 | 131.24 | 111.80 |
| Other Income | 0.25 | 0.12 | 0.24 |
| Total Income | 156.66 | 131.36 | 112.03 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 3.67 | 4.16 | 7.37 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 106.53 | 92.69 | 82.24 |
| Other Expenses | 30.09 | 27.97 | 16.05 |
| Total Expenses | 142.36 | 124.61 | 106.57 |
| EBITDA | 17.05 | 8.04 | 6.14 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.69 | 0.75 | 0.40 |
| EBIT | 15.36 | 7.29 | 5.73 |
| Finance Cost | 1.31 | 0.66 | 0.51 |
| Profit Before Tax | 14.30 | 6.75 | 5.47 |
| Tax Expense | 3.83 | 2.09 | 2.66 |
| Profit After Tax | 10.47 | 4.66 | 2.80 |
| EPS - Basic | 12.64 | 5.77 | 3.47 |
| EPS - Diluted | 12.64 | 5.77 | 3.47 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 8.28 | 0.04 | 0.04 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 25.39 | 23.16 | 17.01 |
| Net Worth | 33.67 | 23.20 | 17.05 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.99 | 0.21 | 0.41 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 15.48 | 7.63 | 4.54 |
| Total Borrowings | 16.47 | 7.84 | 4.95 |
| Trade Payables | 3.78 | 3.33 | 3.77 |
| Current Liabilities | 37.67 | 24.36 | 22.75 |
| Total Liabilities | 78.40 | 51.43 | 42.06 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 5.80 | 4.49 | 2.31 |
| Investments | 0.95 | 0.47 | — |
| Inventories | 4.73 | 2.53 | 0.47 |
| Trade Receivables | 51.16 | 30.88 | 26.21 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 6.01 | 5.29 | 3.77 |
| Current Assets | 65.49 | 40.71 | 35.85 |
| Total Assets | 78.40 | 51.43 | 42.06 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -3.31 | 1.08 | 0.39 |
| Capital Expenditure | 3.06 | 2.93 | 1.12 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -5.43 | -2.06 | -1.20 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 7.32 | 3.72 | -0.06 |
| Net Change in Cash | -1.42 | 2.74 | -0.87 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 10.9 | 6.1 | 5.5 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 9.8 | 5.6 | 5.1 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 6.7 | 3.6 | 2.5 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 31.1 | 20.1 | 16.4 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 30.6 | 23.5 | 26.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 13.3 | 9.1 | 6.7 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.49 | 0.34 | 0.29 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.61 | 0.32 | 0.19 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 11.73 | 10.99 | 11.35 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.74 | 1.67 | 1.58 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.61 | 1.57 | 1.56 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2 | 2.55 | 2.66 |
| Receivable Days | 119 | 86 | 86 |
| Inventory Days | 11 | 7 | 2 |
| Payable Days | 9 | 9 | 12 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 121 | 84 | 76 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.32 | 0.23 | 0.14 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 17.6 | 7 | 5.7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.81 | 3.9 | 2.77 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 6.7% | 3.6% | 2.5% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2x | 2.55x | 2.66x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.33x | 2.22x | 2.47x |
| = Return on Equity | 31.1% | 20.1% | 16.4% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.73x | 0.69x | 0.51x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.93x | 0.93x | 0.95x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 9.8% | 5.6% | 5.1% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 10.47 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -3.31 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 86 in FY24 to 119 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 40% while profit grew 273%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 11.73x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.28An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.39 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.992 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.748 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.192 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.636 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.95 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.033 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1757 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.28, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.4 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.355 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.324 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.196 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.429 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.4 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 4.8 percentage points in FY26, having moved 0.6 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.32x profit in FY26, against 0.23x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 25.9%
Contingent liabilities of 8.72 cr against a net worth of 33.67 cr — 25.9% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.39x
Short-term borrowings of 15.48 cr against cash of 6.01 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.36 cr against a profit of 10.47 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth10.47 ÷ 33.67What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)15.36 ÷ (33.67 + 16.47) = 15.36 ÷ 50.14Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue17.05 ÷ 156.41Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth16.47 ÷ 33.67How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost15.36 ÷ 1.31How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(51.16 ÷ 156.41) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days11 + 119 − 9How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-3.31 ÷ 10.47Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(10.47 − -3.31) ÷ 78.40 = 13.78 ÷ 78.40The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹130.00 × 11,279,190 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash146.63 + 16.47 − 6.01What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA157.09 ÷ 17.05The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT146.63 ÷ 10.47The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)14.01 ÷ 124.5%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Margin Expansion Masks Cash Flow Drain
G V Electricals reported a surge in FY26 profitability, with PAT doubling to Rs 10.47 Cr and EBITDA margins expanding to 10.90%. However, this expansion failed to yield cash, as operating cash flow dropped to negative Rs -3.31 Cr. The cash drain is tied directly to Rs 51.16 Cr in trade receivables, indicating that reported earnings are currently locked in uncollected utility bills.
Source: p.100, p.225-229, p.231-232, p.237-238, p.241Systemic Statutory Compliance Delays
The filing reveals extensive statutory remittance delays across multiple fiscal years. In FY26 alone, the company recorded 158 instances of Provident Fund payment delays (ranging up to 214 days and involving Rs 9.11 Cr) and 45 instances of ESIC delays. These persistent delays highlight operational working capital bottlenecks.
Source: p.31-32, p.35-36, p.137-140, p.151-154Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Furquan Akhtar
Litigation: Direct Tax against Company: 0.0131 Crore; Indirect Tax against Company: 0.7690 Crore; Statutory/regulatory actions against Company: 4 cases (amount not ascertainable); Direct Tax against Promoters/Directors: 0.0245 Crore; Indirect Tax against Promoters/Directors: 0.0097 Crore.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rajesh Power Services Limited | 10.69 | — | 35.26 | — |
| Parth Electricals & Engineering Limited | 39.2 | — | 12.78 | — |
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
In FY26, the company reported a sharp doubling of PAT to Rs 10.47 Cr (up from Rs 4.66 Cr in FY25) and EBITDA margin expansion to 10.90% (up from 6.13% in FY25). However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) collapsed into negative territory at Rs -3.31 Cr, driven by trade receivables ballooning to Rs 51.16 Cr (representing ~33% of revenue).
p.100, p.225-229, p.231-232, p.237-238, p.241, p.243, p.246The company disclosed persistent, large-scale delays in statutory remittances during FY26, including 158 instances of Provident Fund (PF) payment delays (up to 214 days, involving Rs 9.11 Cr), 45 instances of ESIC delays (up to 148 days, involving Rs 1.23 Cr), and 24 instances of TDS delays. Outstanding interest payable to MSME creditors stands at Rs 13.85 Lakhs, alongside active TDS defaults on the TRACES portal.
p.31-32, p.35-36, p.137-140, p.151-154, p.225The company is unable to trace historical secretarial records, including ROC Form 2 (return of allotment) for 4,000 equity shares, initial incorporation allotment filings, and bank statements for pre-2012 share transfers between promoters. Furthermore, the company changed its statutory auditor within the last 3 years.
p.31-32, p.37, p.76, p.137-140, p.190, p.271, p.470, p.494In FY26, 69.05% of total operating revenue (Rs 108.00 Cr) was derived from a single state (Odisha). Additionally, the top 10 customers contributed 97.74% of total revenue from operations.
p.28, p.34, p.131, p.147, p.231On January 15, 2026, six months prior to the IPO, the company executed a 200:1 bonus issue, allotting 82,38,000 equity shares of face value Rs 10 to promoters and promoter group members. Consequently, the weighted average cost of acquisition for promoters Jawed Akhtar, Sunil Lakshman Vatsa, and Furquan Akhtar is Rs 0 per share.
p.76, p.78, p.86, p.102The company reported FY26 revenue of Rs 156.41 Cr, PAT of Rs 10.47 Cr, and Net Worth of Rs 33.67 Cr, which meet the financial thresholds for a Mainboard listing.
p.100, p.225-229, p.231-232, p.237-238Direct Tax against Company: 0.0131 Crore; Indirect Tax against Company: 0.7690 Crore; Statutory/regulatory actions against Company: 4 cases (amount not ascertainable); Direct Tax against Promoters/Directors: 0.0245 Crore; Indirect Tax against Promoters/Directors: 0.0097 Crore.
p.31-32, p.76, p.137-140, p.190, p.271, p.470, p.494None disclosed
p.31-32, p.76, p.137-140, p.190, p.271, p.470, p.494Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company owns no manufacturing facilities and operates strictly via a contract-based logistics framework, executing O&M and EPC works by deploying technical personnel and leased equipment.
p.127, p.128, p.141, p.231Live Subscription Status
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue IPO proceeds allocated?
Out of the fresh issue proceeds, Rs 22.00 Cr is allocated towards working capital requirements and Rs 6.00 Cr is allocated for repayment of cash credit facilities from Bank of Maharashtra, with the remainder earmarked for general corporate purposes.
p.90, p.91, p.92Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Jawed Akhtar, Sunil Lakshman Vatsa, and Furquan Akhtar, who hold 84.97% pre-issue. Due to a 200:1 bonus issue in January 2026, their weighted average cost of acquisition is Rs 0 per share.
p.76, p.86, p.102, p.190Are there material related party transactions or promoter loan flows?
Yes. The company engages in significant to-and-fro unsecured loan transactions with directors Jawed Akhtar and Sunil Lakshman Vatsa, and promoter-controlled entities Nucleus Engineering Corporation and Vatsa Electric.
p.246, p.247, p.251, p.252Does the company's operating cash flow align with reported profits?
No. In FY26, despite a reported profit after tax of Rs 10.47 Cr, Cash Flow from Operations was negative at Rs -3.31 Cr due to working capital absorption in trade receivables (Rs 51.16 Cr).
p.100, p.227, p.230What structural market parameters apply to this offer?
The offer consists of a Fresh Issue (up to 30,00,000 shares) and an Offer for Sale (up to 2,50,000 shares). Mansi Share and Stock Broking Private Limited acts as the market maker with 2,80,000 shares reserved. Minimum application size is 2 lots, with 5% circuit filters applying post-listing.
p.1, p.4, p.53, p.54, p.66, p.70What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Anil Sadashiv Rajwade | ₹100.00 | 1985-02-28 | 1.3x |
| Suhasini Anil Rajwade | ₹100.00 | 1985-02-28 | 1.3x |
| Anant Gajanan Tulpule | ₹100.00 | 1985-02-28 | 1.3x |
| Anil Sadashiv Rajwade | ₹100.00 | 1988-10-24 | 1.3x |
| Suhasini Anil Rajwade | ₹100.00 | 1988-10-24 | 1.3x |
| Dilip M Pradhan | ₹100.00 | 1988-10-24 | 1.3x |
| D.V. Saligram | ₹100.00 | 1988-10-24 | 1.3x |
| P Krishnamurthy | ₹100.00 | 1988-10-24 | 1.3x |
| N.S. Rajwade | ₹100.00 | 1988-10-24 | 1.3x |
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2025-05-27 | — |
| Jawed Akhtar | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Sunil Lakshman Vatsa | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Bindu Sunil Vatsa | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Rutvik Sunil Vatsa | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Nahid Naazli | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Furquan Akhtar | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| Areeba Akhtar | — | 2026-01-15 | — |
| The 1 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Suhasini Anil Rajwade | ₹151,872.00 | 2025-03-31 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 07 Aug 2029promoterthree years from the date of allotment of Equity shares issued pursuant to this offer2,400,000 shares (21.28% of total)
- 07 Aug 2028promoter2 years2,192,396 shares
- 07 Aug 2027promoter1 year2,192,394 shares
- 07 Aug 2027promoter groupone year from the date of allotment in this Offer884,400 shares
- 07 Aug 2027otherone year from the date of allotment in this Offer360,000 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.