Fly-Hi Maritime Travels
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Active statutory auditor resignations twice within a 12-month window
- Pending criminal cheating and forgery cases against key promoter Jitendra Kumar Negi
- Brand name 'FLY HI' challenged in a ₹2.00 crore Delhi High Court trademark civil suit by Frankfinn
- Extreme and rising regional revenue dependence on the UAE (76.95% in FY25)
- Anomalous pre-IPO operating margin surge (to 18.41% in 3M-FY26) on stagnant revenues
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Fly-Hi Maritime Travels Limited manages end-to-end travel logistics for the crew of commercial shipping companies, coordinating flights, accommodations, ground travel, visas, and transit requirements.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Fly-Hi Maritime Travels Limited is a boutique marine travel agency that specializes in managing end-to-end travel logistics for the crew of commercial shipping companies. The company plans and arranges tailor-made travel itineraries for seafarers of mixed nationalities, moving crew from more than seven countries to ports of boarding for customers located across more than six countries. Its core services include global crew ticketing (international, regional, and multi-leg flights), route planning based on airline reliability and transit visa rules, visa and immigration coordination, 'OK to board' confirmations, and 24/7 real-time travel monitoring and emergency disruption handling. The operations are centralized in its corporate office in Mumbai, Maharashtra, with direct connectivity to airlines and hotels or through third-party aggregators. Since the company is a service provider, capacity and capacity utilization metrics, as well as plant and machinery, are not applicable. It is an International Air Transport Association (IATA) accredited company.
Niche specialization exclusively in commercial shipping crew travel logistics, managing complex international travel regulations and multi-leg itineraries with 24/7 emergency support and established relationships with marquee global shipping companies.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding Working Capital Requirements of our Company — ₹24.24 cr
- Repayment/Pre-payment of Loan — ₹4.00 cr
- Towards Business Marketing and Development activities — ₹2.75 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 45.395 | 45.0805 | 48.0239 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 3.4434 | 1.8214 | 4.3307 |
| PAT Margin | 7.59% | 4.04% | 9.02% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-07
- Pre Application Start2026-08-31
- Bidding Start2026-09-01
- Bidding End2026-09-03
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-04
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-07
- Listing Day2026-09-08
- Mandate End2026-10-15
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 45.40 | 45.08 | 48.02 |
| Other Income | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.35 |
| Total Income | 45.75 | 45.41 | 48.37 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 33.04 | 34.66 | 34.50 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 3.61 | 3.54 | 2.92 |
| Finance Cost | 0.70 | 0.44 | 0.24 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.37 | 0.11 | 0.01 |
| Other Expenses | 3.31 | 4.12 | 4.69 |
| Total Expenses | 41.03 | 42.87 | 42.37 |
| Profit Before Tax | 4.72 | 2.53 | 6.00 |
| Tax Expense | 1.27 | 0.71 | 1.67 |
| Profit After Tax | 3.44 | 1.82 | 4.33 |
| EPS - Basic | 3,443.43 | 1,821.38 | 4,330.74 |
| EPS - Diluted | 3,443.43 | 1,821.38 | 4,330.74 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 5.43 | 2.76 | 5.91 |
| EBIT | 5.06 | 2.65 | 5.90 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 9.52 | 6.08 | 4.49 |
| Net Worth | 9.53 | 6.09 | 4.50 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 4.20 | 1.87 | 1.19 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 5.83 | 2.97 | 1.66 |
| Total Borrowings | 10.03 | 4.84 | 2.85 |
| Trade Payables | 1.15 | 3.81 | 5.32 |
| Current Liabilities | 9.22 | 8.49 | 8.49 |
| Total Liabilities | 13.47 | 10.38 | 9.68 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 2.39 | 1.16 | 0.07 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 2.44 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Trade Receivables | 9.73 | 9.62 | 7.96 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.67 | 2.93 | 3.21 |
| Current Assets | 16.76 | 14.98 | 13.78 |
| Total Assets | 23.00 | 16.47 | 14.18 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 3.78 | 0.40 | 3.46 |
| Capital Expenditure | 4.04 | 1.20 | 0.07 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -4.84 | -0.99 | 0.00 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 1.80 | 0.32 | -0.36 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.73 | -0.27 | 3.10 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 11.9 | 6.1 | 12.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 11.1 | 5.8 | 12.2 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 7.6 | 4 | 9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 36.1 | 29.9 | 96.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 25.9 | 24.2 | 80.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 15 | 11.1 | 30.5 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 1.05 | 0.79 | 0.63 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.17 | 0.69 | -0.06 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 7.26 | 6 | 24.52 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.82 | 1.76 | 1.62 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.82 | 1.76 | 1.62 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.97 | 2.74 | 3.39 |
| Receivable Days | 78 | 78 | 60 |
| Inventory Days | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Payable Days | 13 | 40 | 56 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 65 | 38 | 4 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.1 | 0.22 | 0.8 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -1.4 | 8.6 | 6.1 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 11.03 | 11.03 | 7.01 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 7.6% | 4% | 9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.97x | 2.74x | 3.39x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.41x | 2.7x | 3.15x |
| = Return on Equity | 36.1% | 29.9% | 96.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.73x | 0.72x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.93x | 0.96x | 1.02x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 11.1% | 5.9% | 12.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.1x reported profit in FY25. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
Part-Year PeriodThe stub period, kept apart from the full years.
The filing also reports a period shorter than a full year. It is shown here as filed and not annualised, and no ratio or model on this page uses it: comparing part of a year with a full year would misstate every growth rate and multiple.
| Part-year period, as filed (₹ Cr) | 3M-FY26 part-year |
|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 11.57 |
| Total Income | 11.68 |
| Total Expenses | 9.77 |
| Profit Before Tax | 1.91 |
| Tax Expense | 0.48 |
| Profit After Tax | 1.43 |
| EPS - Basic (not annualised) | 1,431.90 |
| Total Assets | 25.34 |
| Net Worth | 10.97 |
| Total Borrowings | 9.87 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.84 |
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 0.76 |
| Capital Expenditure | 0.09 |
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = 0.35An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.004 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.849 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 8.348 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.007 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.645 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.898 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.927 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0145 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = 0.35, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.97 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.328 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.414 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.22 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.708 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.97 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
3 of 5 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY25 against FY24. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly. Signs the filing gives no inputs for are shown as — and left out of the count.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹1.4 cr in FY24, ₹-0.3 cr in FY25
- ●Receivable days rising · 78 days in FY24, 78 days in FY25
- —Inventory days rising · 0 days in FY24, 0 days in FY25 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 5.4% of revenue in FY24, 7.4% in FY25 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 9.4% of net block in FY24, 15.3% in FY25
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 39.6% in FY25
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 9.53 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 2%
2% of revenue in FY25 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.63x
Short-term borrowings of 5.83 cr against cash of 3.67 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 19.2%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.66 cr against a profit of 3.44 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹102.00, the market value is ₹146 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY25 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY25 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹14.6 cr | 4.2x | 10.3 | 6.5 |
| 12% a year | ₹17.5 cr | 5.1x | 11.6 | 7.3 |
| 14% a year | ₹20.4 cr | 5.9x | 12.7 | 8.0 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 2.37% (FY25 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -0.18% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹0.3 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth3.44 ÷ 9.53What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)5.06 ÷ (9.53 + 10.03) = 5.06 ÷ 19.56Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue5.43 ÷ 45.40Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth10.03 ÷ 9.53How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost5.06 ÷ 0.70How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(9.73 ÷ 45.40) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days0 + 78 − 13How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT3.78 ÷ 3.44Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(3.44 − 3.78) ÷ 23.00 = -0.33 ÷ 23.00The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹102.00 × 14,270,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash145.55 + 10.03 − 3.67What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA151.92 ÷ 5.43The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT145.55 ÷ 3.44The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹3.44 cr ÷ ₹145.55 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-0.26 cr ÷ ₹145.55 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)42.27 ÷ 89.1%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY25.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Statutory Auditor Churn and Instability
The statutory audit history of the company reveals high risk, with BDMV & Co. resigning in September 2023 and Dixit Dattatray & Associates resigning in February 2024 after only 5 months. The frequent change of statutory auditors just prior to filing the draft prospectus is a strong signal of control environment weakness.
Source: p.68Trademark Injunction and Litigation Exposure
The company operates its entire travel business under the 'FLY HI' brand, but does not own any registered trademark. Frankfinn Aviation Services has sued the company in the Delhi High Court (CS (Comm) - 83/2024) seeking an injunction against using the mark 'FLY HI' and claiming damages of ₹2.00 crore, which exposes the company's core branding to existential risk.
Source: p.218Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Jitendra Kumar Negi (Managing Director & Chairman)
Litigation: Company: ₹2.00 crore material trademark civil litigation (High Court of Delhi CS(Comm)-83/2024 instituted by Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited seeking a permanent injunction and damages) and ₹0.0098 crore direct tax/TDS disputes. Promoters: Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi faces CT No. 1994 of 2017 before Saket Courts involving a claims amount of ₹0.5912 crore, and Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 (FIR 439/2023) alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents. Directors (other than promoters): None. Group Companies: None.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company has experienced high auditor turnover within the pre-IPO period: BDMV & Co. resigned on September 06, 2023, and their successor, Dixit Dattatray & Associates, resigned within five months on February 15, 2024, before M/s S Sood & Co. was appointed on June 12, 2024.
p.68The company's promoter Jitendra Kumar Negi is facing a criminal case (Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 / FIR 439/2023) alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents. Furthermore, the company faces a ₹2.00 crore brand trademark dispute in the Delhi High Court filed by Frankfinn Aviation Services seeking an injunction against the 'FLY HI' name.
p.218, p.219The company's revenues are overwhelmingly concentrated in a single country, with the UAE market contributing 76.95% of total revenue in FY25, up from 65.01% in FY24 and 56.54% in FY23.
p.35The company's EBITDA margins expanded from 6.12% in FY24 to 11.96% in FY25, and spiked to 18.41% in the 3M-FY26 period, while top-line revenue remained essentially stagnant (₹45.08 crore in FY24 vs ₹45.39 crore in FY25).
p.29, p.200The promoters' average cost of acquisition is virtually nil (₹0.02 for Jitendra Kumar Negi and Nil for Mridul Dilip Singhvi) following a massive 500:1 bonus issue on November 08, 2025, which capitalized ₹5.00 crore of reserves just before the IPO filing.
p.72, p.92The company has cycled unsecured loans with its promoters, having outstanding unsecured business loans of ₹1.00 crore from Mridul Dilip Singhvi as of June 30, 2025, while previously having given loans of ₹1.83 crore to him in FY24.
p.31, p.216The fresh issue proceeds are entirely designated for working capital funding (₹24.24 crore) and bank loan prepayments (₹4.00 crore), with zero allocations for physical assets or capital expenditures.
p.86Company: ₹2.00 crore material trademark civil litigation (High Court of Delhi CS(Comm)-83/2024 instituted by Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited seeking a permanent injunction and damages) and ₹0.0098 crore direct tax/TDS disputes. Promoters: Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi faces CT No. 1994 of 2017 before Saket Courts involving a claims amount of ₹0.5912 crore, and Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 (FIR 439/2023) alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents. Directors (other than promoters): None. Group Companies: None.
p.1, p.29, p.218-223, p.239Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Although Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi has 14+ years of maritime experience, his track record is significantly stressed by pending criminal litigation alleging breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents.
p.25, p.218The company claims geographic diversification (USA, UK, Cyprus, UAE, India), but actual financial records reveal that UAE-based clients alone generated 76.95% of total sales in FY25, showing an extreme single-country vulnerability.
p.35, p.135Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is 100% of the fresh issue proceeds being used to fund working capital and repay debt rather than building fixed assets?
As an asset-light marine travel agency, the company relies on third-party airline and hotel aggregators rather than owning physical assets. Its business requires significant working capital credit lines to support shipping crew travel, making ₹24.24 crore for working capital and ₹4.00 crore for debt repayment highly aligned with its business model.
p.86, p.145What are the specific details of the criminal case and trademark dispute involving the promoters and the brand name?
Promoter Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi is facing CT No. 1994/2017 and Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 alleging forgery of bank sanction documents, cheating, and breach of trust. Additionally, Frankfinn Aviation Services has filed a civil suit (CS(Comm)-83/2024) in the Delhi High Court seeking a permanent injunction against the use of the 'FLY HI' brand and demanding ₹2.00 crore in damages.
p.218, p.219What is the level of related-party sales and lending to promoters disclosed in the notes?
The company recorded sales to group company Rigel Marine Services Private Limited of ₹0.89 crore in FY25 and ₹2.04 crore in FY24. In terms of loans, the company had outstanding unsecured loans from promoters/shareholders of ₹1.25 crore as of June 30, 2025, and previously extended loans to Whole Time Director Mridul Dilip Singhvi totaling ₹1.83 crore in FY24.
p.31, p.216How does the company reconcile its growing trade receivables with its operating cash flows?
While revenues were stagnant (FY24 ₹45.08 cr vs FY25 ₹45.39 cr), trade receivables increased from ₹7.96 crore in FY23 to ₹9.73 crore in FY25 and rose further to ₹11.93 crore in 3M-FY26. CFO has tracked positively but is highly sensitive to the credit terms extended to major shipping clients.
p.29, p.35What makes the company eligible for the BSE SME platform rather than a mainboard listing?
With a pre-issue paid-up capital of ₹5.01 crore and post-issue capital estimated at ₹7.14 crore, the company's capitalization falls below the ₹10.00 crore threshold typical of voluntary migration or direct listing on the Main Board, making the SME route the appropriate choice.
p.72, p.231What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to Memorandum of Association | ₹10.00 | 2021-09-29 | 10.2x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 10.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Subdivision / Share Split (1 share of ₹10 to 2 shares of ₹5) | — | 2025-08-21 | — |
| Bonus Issue (Ratio 500:1) | — | 2025-11-08 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 2 entries | |||
| Transfer from Jitendra Kumar Negi to Mridul Dilip Singhvi | ₹6,000.00 | 2024-04-16 | as disclosed |
| Transfer from Jitendra Kumar Negi to Employees / SMPs | ₹1,500.00 | 2025-12-04 | as disclosed |
The 2 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years from the date of Allotment
- 08 Sep 2028Promoters' holding in excess of minimum contribution (50%)2 years from the date of Allotment
- 08 Sep 2027Promoters' holding in excess of minimum contribution (Remaining 50%)1 year from the date of Allotment
- 08 Sep 2027Pre-issue share capital held by persons other than promoters1 year from the date of Allotment
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
