Fly-Hi Maritime Travels
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Active statutory auditor resignations twice within a 12-month window
- Pending criminal cheating and forgery cases against key promoter Jitendra Kumar Negi
- Brand name 'FLY HI' challenged in a ₹2.00 crore Delhi High Court trademark civil suit by Frankfinn
- Extreme and rising regional revenue dependence on the UAE (76.95% in FY25)
- Anomalous pre-IPO operating margin surge (to 18.41% in 3M-FY26) on stagnant revenues
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Fly-Hi Maritime Travels Limited manages end-to-end travel logistics for the crew of commercial shipping companies, coordinating flights, accommodations, ground travel, visas, and transit requirements.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Fly-Hi Maritime Travels Limited is a boutique marine travel agency that specializes in managing end-to-end travel logistics for the crew of commercial shipping companies. The company plans and arranges tailor-made travel itineraries for seafarers of mixed nationalities, moving crew from more than seven countries to ports of boarding for customers located across more than six countries. Its core services include global crew ticketing (international, regional, and multi-leg flights), route planning based on airline reliability and transit visa rules, visa and immigration coordination, 'OK to board' confirmations, and 24/7 real-time travel monitoring and emergency disruption handling. The operations are centralized in its corporate office in Mumbai, Maharashtra, with direct connectivity to airlines and hotels or through third-party aggregators. Since the company is a service provider, capacity and capacity utilization metrics, as well as plant and machinery, are not applicable. It is an International Air Transport Association (IATA) accredited company.
Niche specialization exclusively in commercial shipping crew travel logistics, managing complex international travel regulations and multi-leg itineraries with 24/7 emergency support and established relationships with marquee global shipping companies.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding Working Capital Requirements of our Company — ₹24.24 cr
- Repayment/Pre-payment of Loan — ₹4.00 cr
- Towards Business Marketing and Development activities — ₹2.75 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | 3M-FY26 | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 11.5688 | 45.395 | 45.0805 | 48.0239 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 1.4319 | 3.4434 | 1.8214 | 4.3307 |
| PAT Margin | 12.38% | 7.59% | 4.04% | 9.02% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | 3M-FY26 | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 11.57 | 45.40 | 45.08 | 48.02 |
| Other Income | 0.12 | 0.35 | 0.33 | 0.35 |
| Total Income | 11.68 | 45.75 | 45.41 | 48.37 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 7.69 | 33.04 | 34.66 | 34.50 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 0.88 | 3.61 | 3.54 | 2.92 |
| Other Expenses | 0.87 | 3.31 | 4.12 | 4.69 |
| Total Expenses | 9.77 | 41.03 | 42.87 | 42.37 |
| EBITDA | 2.13 | 5.43 | 2.76 | 5.91 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.10 | 0.37 | 0.11 | 0.01 |
| EBIT | 2.03 | 5.06 | 2.65 | 5.90 |
| Finance Cost | 0.23 | 0.70 | 0.44 | 0.24 |
| Profit Before Tax | 1.91 | 4.72 | 2.53 | 6.00 |
| Tax Expense | 0.48 | 1.27 | 0.71 | 1.67 |
| Profit After Tax | 1.43 | 3.44 | 1.82 | 4.33 |
| EPS - Basic | 1,431.90 | 3,443.43 | 1,821.38 | 4,330.74 |
| EPS - Diluted | 1,431.90 | 3,443.43 | 1,821.38 | 4,330.74 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | 3M-FY26 | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 10.96 | 9.52 | 6.08 | 4.49 |
| Net Worth | 10.97 | 9.53 | 6.09 | 4.50 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 3.76 | 4.20 | 1.87 | 1.19 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 6.11 | 5.83 | 2.97 | 1.66 |
| Total Borrowings | 9.87 | 10.03 | 4.84 | 2.85 |
| Trade Payables | 2.10 | 1.15 | 3.81 | 5.32 |
| Current Liabilities | 10.57 | 9.22 | 8.49 | 8.49 |
| Total Liabilities | 14.37 | 13.47 | 10.38 | 9.68 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 2.29 | 2.39 | 1.16 | 0.07 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 2.53 | 2.44 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Trade Receivables | 11.93 | 9.73 | 9.62 | 7.96 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.84 | 3.67 | 2.93 | 3.21 |
| Current Assets | 19.12 | 16.76 | 14.98 | 13.78 |
| Total Assets | 25.34 | 23.00 | 16.47 | 14.18 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | 3M-FY26 | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 0.76 | 3.78 | 0.40 | 3.46 |
| Capital Expenditure | 0.09 | 4.04 | 1.20 | 0.07 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 0.03 | -4.84 | -0.99 | 0.00 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -0.62 | 1.80 | 0.32 | -0.36 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.17 | 0.73 | -0.27 | 3.10 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | 3M-FY26 | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | ||||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 18.2 | 11.9 | 6.1 | 12.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 17.4 | 11.1 | 5.8 | 12.2 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 12.4 | 7.6 | 4 | 9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 13.1 | 36.1 | 29.9 | 96.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 9.7 | 25.9 | 24.2 | 80.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 5.7 | 15 | 11.1 | 30.5 |
| Leverage | ||||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.9 | 1.05 | 0.79 | 0.63 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 2.83 | 1.17 | 0.69 | -0.06 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 8.73 | 7.26 | 6 | 24.52 |
| Liquidity | ||||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.81 | 1.82 | 1.76 | 1.62 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.81 | 1.82 | 1.76 | 1.62 |
| Efficiency | ||||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.46 | 1.97 | 2.74 | 3.39 |
| Receivable Days | 376 | 78 | 78 | 60 |
| Inventory Days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Payable Days | 66 | 9 | 31 | 40 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 310 | 69 | 47 | 20 |
| Quality of Earnings | ||||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.53 | 1.1 | 0.22 | 0.8 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 2.7 | -1.5 | 8.6 | 6.1 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.82 | 11.03 | 11.03 | 7.01 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | 3M-FY26 | FY25 | FY24 | FY23 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 12.4% | 7.6% | 4% | 9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.46x | 1.97x | 2.74x | 3.39x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.31x | 2.41x | 2.7x | 3.15x |
| = Return on Equity | 13.1% | 36.1% | 29.9% | 96.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.73x | 0.72x | 0.72x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.94x | 0.93x | 0.96x | 1.02x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 17.5% | 11.1% | 5.9% | 12.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Receivable days rose from 60 in FY23 to 376 in 3M-FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 8.73x in 3M-FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = 0.61An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 4.814 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.811 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.928 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 0.255 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 3.053 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.991 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.969 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0266 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = 0.61, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.21 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.337 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.432 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.08 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.763 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.21 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 10.97 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.8%
0.8% of revenue in 3M-FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.63x
Short-term borrowings of 6.11 cr against cash of 3.84 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 11%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.16 cr against a profit of 1.43 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth1.43 ÷ 10.97What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)2.03 ÷ (10.97 + 9.87) = 2.03 ÷ 20.83Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue2.13 ÷ 11.57Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth9.87 ÷ 10.97How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost2.03 ÷ 0.23How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(11.93 ÷ 11.57) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days0 + 376 − 66How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT0.76 ÷ 1.43Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(1.43 − 0.76) ÷ 25.34 = 0.67 ÷ 25.34The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹102.00 × 14,270,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash145.55 + 9.87 − 3.84What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA151.58 ÷ 2.13The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT145.55 ÷ 1.43The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in 3M-FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Statutory Auditor Churn and Instability
The statutory audit history of the company reveals high risk, with BDMV & Co. resigning in September 2023 and Dixit Dattatray & Associates resigning in February 2024 after only 5 months. The frequent change of statutory auditors just prior to filing the draft prospectus is a strong signal of control environment weakness.
Source: p.68Trademark Injunction and Litigation Exposure
The company operates its entire travel business under the 'FLY HI' brand, but does not own any registered trademark. Frankfinn Aviation Services has sued the company in the Delhi High Court (CS (Comm) - 83/2024) seeking an injunction against using the mark 'FLY HI' and claiming damages of ₹2.00 crore, which exposes the company's core branding to existential risk.
Source: p.218Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Jitendra Kumar Negi (Managing Director & Chairman)
Litigation: Company: ₹2.00 crore material trademark civil litigation (High Court of Delhi CS(Comm)-83/2024 instituted by Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited seeking a permanent injunction and damages) and ₹0.0098 crore direct tax/TDS disputes. Promoters: Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi faces CT No. 1994 of 2017 before Saket Courts involving a claims amount of ₹0.5912 crore, and Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 (FIR 439/2023) alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents. Directors (other than promoters): None. Group Companies: None.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company has experienced high auditor turnover within the pre-IPO period: BDMV & Co. resigned on September 06, 2023, and their successor, Dixit Dattatray & Associates, resigned within five months on February 15, 2024, before M/s S Sood & Co. was appointed on June 12, 2024.
p.68The company's promoter Jitendra Kumar Negi is facing a criminal case (Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 / FIR 439/2023) alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents. Furthermore, the company faces a ₹2.00 crore brand trademark dispute in the Delhi High Court filed by Frankfinn Aviation Services seeking an injunction against the 'FLY HI' name.
p.218, p.219The company's revenues are overwhelmingly concentrated in a single country, with the UAE market contributing 76.95% of total revenue in FY25, up from 65.01% in FY24 and 56.54% in FY23.
p.35The company's EBITDA margins expanded from 6.12% in FY24 to 11.96% in FY25, and spiked to 18.41% in the 3M-FY26 period, while top-line revenue remained essentially stagnant (₹45.08 crore in FY24 vs ₹45.39 crore in FY25).
p.29, p.200The promoters' average cost of acquisition is virtually nil (₹0.02 for Jitendra Kumar Negi and Nil for Mridul Dilip Singhvi) following a massive 500:1 bonus issue on November 08, 2025, which capitalized ₹5.00 crore of reserves just before the IPO filing.
p.72, p.92The company has cycled unsecured loans with its promoters, having outstanding unsecured business loans of ₹1.00 crore from Mridul Dilip Singhvi as of June 30, 2025, while previously having given loans of ₹1.83 crore to him in FY24.
p.31, p.216The fresh issue proceeds are entirely designated for working capital funding (₹24.24 crore) and bank loan prepayments (₹4.00 crore), with zero allocations for physical assets or capital expenditures.
p.86Company: ₹2.00 crore material trademark civil litigation (High Court of Delhi CS(Comm)-83/2024 instituted by Frankfinn Aviation Services Private Limited seeking a permanent injunction and damages) and ₹0.0098 crore direct tax/TDS disputes. Promoters: Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi faces CT No. 1994 of 2017 before Saket Courts involving a claims amount of ₹0.5912 crore, and Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 (FIR 439/2023) alleging criminal breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents. Directors (other than promoters): None. Group Companies: None.
p.1, p.29, p.218-223, p.239None disclosed
p.1, p.29, p.218-223, p.239Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Although Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi has 14+ years of maritime experience, his track record is significantly stressed by pending criminal litigation alleging breach of trust, cheating, and forging bank sanction documents.
p.25, p.218The company claims geographic diversification (USA, UK, Cyprus, UAE, India), but actual financial records reveal that UAE-based clients alone generated 76.95% of total sales in FY25, showing an extreme single-country vulnerability.
p.35, p.135Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is 100% of the fresh issue proceeds being used to fund working capital and repay debt rather than building fixed assets?
As an asset-light marine travel agency, the company relies on third-party airline and hotel aggregators rather than owning physical assets. Its business requires significant working capital credit lines to support shipping crew travel, making ₹24.24 crore for working capital and ₹4.00 crore for debt repayment highly aligned with its business model.
p.86, p.145What are the specific details of the criminal case and trademark dispute involving the promoters and the brand name?
Promoter Mr. Jitendra Kumar Negi is facing CT No. 1994/2017 and Criminal Case No. 5312/2024 alleging forgery of bank sanction documents, cheating, and breach of trust. Additionally, Frankfinn Aviation Services has filed a civil suit (CS(Comm)-83/2024) in the Delhi High Court seeking a permanent injunction against the use of the 'FLY HI' brand and demanding ₹2.00 crore in damages.
p.218, p.219What is the level of related-party sales and lending to promoters disclosed in the notes?
The company recorded sales to group company Rigel Marine Services Private Limited of ₹0.89 crore in FY25 and ₹2.04 crore in FY24. In terms of loans, the company had outstanding unsecured loans from promoters/shareholders of ₹1.25 crore as of June 30, 2025, and previously extended loans to Whole Time Director Mridul Dilip Singhvi totaling ₹1.83 crore in FY24.
p.31, p.216How does the company reconcile its growing trade receivables with its operating cash flows?
While revenues were stagnant (FY24 ₹45.08 cr vs FY25 ₹45.39 cr), trade receivables increased from ₹7.96 crore in FY23 to ₹9.73 crore in FY25 and rose further to ₹11.93 crore in 3M-FY26. CFO has tracked positively but is highly sensitive to the credit terms extended to major shipping clients.
p.29, p.35What makes the company eligible for the BSE SME platform rather than a mainboard listing?
With a pre-issue paid-up capital of ₹5.01 crore and post-issue capital estimated at ₹7.14 crore, the company's capitalization falls below the ₹10.00 crore threshold typical of voluntary migration or direct listing on the Main Board, making the SME route the appropriate choice.
p.72, p.231What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to Memorandum of Association | ₹10.00 | 2021-09-29 | 10.2x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 10.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Subdivision / Share Split (1 share of ₹10 to 2 shares of ₹5) | — | 2025-08-21 | — |
| Bonus Issue (Ratio 500:1) | — | 2025-11-08 | — |
| The 2 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Transfer from Jitendra Kumar Negi to Mridul Dilip Singhvi | ₹6,000.00 | 2024-04-16 | as disclosed |
| Transfer from Jitendra Kumar Negi to Employees / SMPs | ₹1,500.00 | 2025-12-04 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years from the date of Allotment
- 08 Sep 2028Promoters' holding in excess of minimum contribution (50%)2 years from the date of Allotment
- 08 Sep 2027Promoters' holding in excess of minimum contribution (Remaining 50%)1 year from the date of Allotment
- 08 Sep 2027Pre-issue share capital held by persons other than promoters1 year from the date of Allotment
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.