Farm Peace
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Massive group company GST/tax litigation of ₹68.74 crore exceeding company Net Worth
- Receivables representing 66% of revenue in the pre-IPO year
- Three consecutive years of negative Cash Flow from Operations (CFO)
- Highly soft issue objects with 86.87% allocated to working capital and GCP
- Promoter loan cycling and high transactional flow with related parties
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Farm Peace Limited is primarily engaged in contract farming, seed trading, agri-input distribution, and trading of agricultural produce, primarily potatoes, along with related storage, maintenance, and ancillary services.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Farm Peace Limited operates an integrated contract farming model centered on processed-grade potato varieties, including Santana, Frysona, Lady Rosetta, Chipsona, and Innovator, in Gujarat, India. The company engages contract farmers through seasonal verbal buy-back arrangements, providing them with certified seeds, fertilizers, crop protection products, and technical agronomic support. Field-level monitoring is conducted by local field officers who use the company's proprietary 'Farm Peace' mobile application to track crop progress and record on-farm conditions. Post-harvest, all harvested produce is sorted, graded, and preserved in leased temperature-controlled cold storage facilities. The leased cold storage capacity stood at 13,000 metric tonnes in Fiscal 2026, and the company has no self-owned manufacturing units. Capacity and capacity utilisation metrics are not applicable to the company since its business is not in the nature of industrial manufacturing. The company supplies its processed-grade potatoes directly to snack food manufacturers, food processing clients, and starch factories. Transportation and logistics are coordinated and managed by the company to ensure safe and timely delivery of the produce to buyers.
Operates an integrated contract farming model with a 100% buy-back assurance, leveraging the regional agro-climatic advantages of Gujarat, supported by an expanding network of over 850 farmers and a proprietary mobile application that ensures digital tracking and traceability from seed to harvest.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding our incremental working capital requirements — ₹23.00 cr
- General corporate purposes — ₹4.80 cr
Valuation at the Offer Price
These are the multiples the issuer is required to disclose under “Basis for the Offer Price”. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 90.8277 | 79.2422 | 62.5538 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 7.5287 | 6.6615 | 6.162 |
| PAT Margin | 8.29% | 8.41% | 9.85% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 90.83 | 79.24 | 62.55 |
| Other Income | 0.01 | 0.73 | 0.20 |
| Total Income | 90.84 | 79.98 | 62.75 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 65.24 | 74.80 | 55.39 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 0.57 | 0.53 | 0.24 |
| Other Expenses | 9.10 | 7.83 | 3.93 |
| Total Expenses | 80.00 | 70.32 | 53.54 |
| EBITDA | 12.48 | 9.26 | 9.30 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
| EBIT | 12.40 | 9.20 | 9.26 |
| Finance Cost | 1.57 | 0.28 | 0.24 |
| Profit Before Tax | 10.84 | 9.65 | 9.21 |
| Tax Expense | 3.31 | 2.99 | 3.05 |
| Profit After Tax | 7.53 | 6.66 | 6.16 |
| EPS - Basic | 4.97 | 4.63 | 6.11 |
| EPS - Diluted | 4.97 | 4.63 | 6.11 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 15.16 | 3.79 | 2.52 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 28.32 | 32.16 | 6.52 |
| Net Worth | 43.48 | 35.95 | 9.04 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 3.14 | 0.17 | 0.42 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 8.14 | 2.29 | 6.70 |
| Total Borrowings | 11.28 | 2.46 | 7.12 |
| Trade Payables | 30.69 | 25.73 | 12.16 |
| Current Liabilities | 53.20 | 33.17 | 22.29 |
| Total Liabilities | 56.37 | 33.37 | 22.72 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.19 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 |
| Inventories | 19.46 | 22.89 | 9.72 |
| Trade Receivables | 59.95 | 25.67 | 17.18 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| Current Assets | 98.51 | 67.93 | 28.03 |
| Total Assets | 99.84 | 69.32 | 31.76 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -7.17 | -17.57 | -1.54 |
| Capital Expenditure | 0.02 | 0.20 | 0.22 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -0.02 | 2.30 | -3.64 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 7.25 | 15.30 | 4.87 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.31 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 13.7 | 11.6 | 14.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 13.7 | 11.5 | 14.8 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 8.3 | 8.4 | 9.9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 17.3 | 18.5 | 68.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 22.7 | 24 | 57.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 7.5 | 9.6 | 19.4 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.26 | 0.07 | 0.79 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.89 | 0.26 | 0.76 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 7.89 | 32.6 | 38.34 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.85 | 2.05 | 1.26 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.49 | 1.36 | 0.82 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.91 | 1.14 | 1.97 |
| Receivable Days | 241 | 118 | 100 |
| Inventory Days | 78 | 105 | 57 |
| Payable Days | 123 | 119 | 71 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 196 | 104 | 86 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.95 | -2.64 | -0.25 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 14.7 | 35 | 24.3 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.27 | 3.5 | 6.01 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 8.3% | 8.4% | 9.9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.91x | 1.14x | 1.97x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.3x | 1.93x | 3.51x |
| = Return on Equity | 17.3% | 18.5% | 68.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.69x | 0.69x | 0.67x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.87x | 1.05x | 1x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 13.7% | 11.6% | 14.8% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 7.53 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -7.17 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 100 in FY24 to 241 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.35An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 2.037 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.199 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.711 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.146 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.641 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.01 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.173 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1472 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.35, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.8 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.454 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.284 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.124 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.771 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.8 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
2 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.1%
Contingent liabilities of 0.04 cr against a net worth of 43.48 cr — 0.1% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.01x
Short-term borrowings of 8.14 cr against cash of 0.11 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.23 cr against a profit of 7.53 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth7.53 ÷ 43.48What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)12.40 ÷ (43.48 + 11.28) = 12.40 ÷ 54.76Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue12.48 ÷ 90.83Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth11.28 ÷ 43.48How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost12.40 ÷ 1.57How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(59.95 ÷ 90.83) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days78 + 241 − 123How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-7.17 ÷ 7.53Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(7.53 − -7.17) ÷ 99.84 = 14.70 ÷ 99.84The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹59.00 × 20,579,296 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash121.42 + 11.28 − 0.11What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA132.59 ÷ 12.48The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT121.42 ÷ 7.53The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)16.13 ÷ 13%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Fake Input Tax Credit (ITC) Disputes
Auditor disclosures and outstanding litigation reveal that key group companies, which share common promoters, are heavily involved in GST investigations for allegedly claiming fake ITC on invoices from non-existent, ab-initio-cancelled, or fictitious entities. The total exposure stands at ₹68.74 crore, presenting a severe shadow over promoter integrity and governance.
Source: p.265, p.320Disproportionate Receivables Growth
A deep dive into the restated balance sheet reveals that trade receivables rose from ₹17.18 crore in FY24 to ₹59.95 crore in FY26, far outstripping operational revenue growth. This indicates that a vast majority of pre-IPO sales are sitting on credit with Q4 billing concentration, leading to persistent cash deficits.
Source: p.59, p.141, p.143Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Sandipkumar Narsinhbhai Patel (Managing Director)
Litigation: Company: ₹0.0433 crore (TDS/direct tax defaults); Promoters: ₹0.6403 crore (tax proceedings); Directors: 1 tax proceeding (amount not ascertainable); Group Companies: ₹68.7354 crore (73 tax proceedings, primarily GST/ITC disputes involving Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel).
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company's trade receivables increased from ₹17.18 crore in FY24 to ₹59.95 crore in FY26, representing 66% of FY26 revenue, while Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) was negative in all three years (totaling -₹26.28 crore).
p.59, p.141, p.143Promoter-controlled group companies Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel are embroiled in 73 outstanding tax proceedings and GST disputes totaling ₹68.74 crore, primarily regarding fake Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims from non-existent or ab-initio-cancelled suppliers.
p.265, p.280, p.290, p.320Insiders and preferential allotment investors were issued shares at ₹150 in late 2024. Following a 3:1 bonus issue in August 2025, their adjusted acquisition price fell to ₹37.50 per share (a 36.4% discount to the ₹59 IPO price) within 21 months of the offer.
p.75Promoters routinely cycle unsecured loans to and from the company, with ₹6.50 crore of loan receipts in FY26 and ₹2.79 crore remaining outstanding as repayable-on-demand loans as of March 31, 2026.
p.63, p.407, p.409Working capital requirements (₹23.00 crore) and General Corporate Purposes (₹4.80 crore) comprise 86.87% of the total ₹32.00 crore issue proceeds, with zero allocation for physical capacity expansion or fixed assets.
p.91The top 10 customers accounted for 80.68% of potato sales in FY26 (82.04% in FY25, 92.70% in FY24), exposing the business to substantial client-loss risks.
p.176, p.232Company: ₹0.0433 crore (TDS/direct tax defaults); Promoters: ₹0.6403 crore (tax proceedings); Directors: 1 tax proceeding (amount not ascertainable); Group Companies: ₹68.7354 crore (73 tax proceedings, primarily GST/ITC disputes involving Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel).
p.79, p.215, p.265, p.380None disclosed
p.79, p.215, p.265, p.380Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company does not execute formal written agreements with farmers; instead, it relies on informal verbal arrangements and a standard one-page note. Although the prospectus states that no defaults have occurred, the lack of legally binding agreements means the company has limited recourse in case of side-selling or farmer disputes.
p.28, p.156, p.162The application is used by field officers to document on-farm conditions and KYC. However, its effectiveness is constrained in rural regions due to power outages and unreliable internet connectivity, which can delay field reporting.
p.55, p.152Supported by high concentration in Gujarat, but highly dependent on the top 10 customers who make up 80.68% of sales.
p.176, p.183Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is 86.87% of the pre-issue funds allocated to working capital and general corporate purposes instead of physical capacity or asset creation?
The company's contract farming model relies on leasing cold storage facilities and third-party logistics rather than owning industrial manufacturing units. Hence, ₹23.00 crore is required to fund seasonal potato purchases and seed distribution cycles, with ₹4.80 crore for general corporate expenses.
p.91, p.102What is the material risk associated with the ₹68.74 crore in pending tax litigation against group companies?
The group companies Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel are facing 73 tax proceedings, primarily CGST/SGST disputes involving allegations of fake Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims from non-existent/fictitious suppliers and paper transactions under Section 74. This aggregate liability exceeds the company's total Net Worth of ₹43.48 crore.
p.265, p.280, p.290, p.320How are loans and advances cycled between the company and its promoters, and what are the outstanding balances?
During FY26, the company cycled ₹4.25 crore in loans from Sudhir Haribhai Patel (repaid ₹2.10 crore) and ₹2.25 crore from Sandipkumar Narsinhbhai Patel (repaid ₹1.9023 crore). As of March 31, 2026, outstanding unsecured loans from promoters/directors stood at ₹2.79 crore, which can be recalled at any time.
p.63, p.407, p.409Why has the company recorded negative Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) for three consecutive years despite reporting profit?
The company has recorded negative CFO of -₹1.54 crore (FY24), -₹17.57 crore (FY25), and -₹7.17 crore (FY26). This is primarily driven by massive working capital lockups, with trade receivables rising 249% over two years to ₹59.95 crore (66% of FY26 revenue) and inventory holdings rising to ₹19.46 crore.
p.59, p.141, p.143What are the legal risks associated with the company's informal contract farming procurement structure?
The company does not execute legally binding written contracts with farmers, operating instead on seasonal verbal arrangements and one-page local circulars. This informal structure limits legal recourse in the event of crop side-selling, farmer disputes, or crop disease failures, though the company plans to transition to written agreements going forward.
p.28, p.162What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to Memorandum of Association | ₹10.00 | 2021-10-20 | 5.9x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 5.9x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Promoter, Promoter Group and Others | ₹10.00 | 2022-12-13 | 5.9x |
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 3:1) | — | 2025-08-25 | — |
| The 5 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Public Shareholders (non-promoters) | ₹222.00 | 2024-06-01 | as disclosed |
| Promoter and Others | ₹150.00 | 2024-11-11 | as disclosed |
| Promoters, Promoter Group and Others | ₹150.00 | 2024-11-21 | as disclosed |
| Promoters and Promoter Group | ₹150.00 | 2024-12-04 | as disclosed |
| Promoter and Others | ₹150.00 | 2024-12-27 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years from the date of Allotment4,157,018 shares (20.2% of total)
- 08 Sep 2027Remaining Pre-Issue Equity Share Capital1 year from the date of Allotment10,998,278 shares (53.44% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.