Farm Peace
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Massive group company GST/tax litigation of ₹68.74 crore exceeding company Net Worth
- Receivables representing 66% of revenue in the pre-IPO year
- Three consecutive years of negative Cash Flow from Operations (CFO)
- Highly soft issue objects with 86.87% allocated to working capital and GCP
- Promoter loan cycling and high transactional flow with related parties
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Farm Peace Limited is primarily engaged in contract farming, seed trading, agri-input distribution, and trading of agricultural produce, primarily potatoes, along with related storage, maintenance, and ancillary services.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Farm Peace Limited operates an integrated contract farming model centered on processed-grade potato varieties, including Santana, Frysona, Lady Rosetta, Chipsona, and Innovator, in Gujarat, India. The company engages contract farmers through seasonal verbal buy-back arrangements, providing them with certified seeds, fertilizers, crop protection products, and technical agronomic support. Field-level monitoring is conducted by local field officers who use the company's proprietary 'Farm Peace' mobile application to track crop progress and record on-farm conditions. Post-harvest, all harvested produce is sorted, graded, and preserved in leased temperature-controlled cold storage facilities. The leased cold storage capacity stood at 13,000 metric tonnes in Fiscal 2026, and the company has no self-owned manufacturing units. Capacity and capacity utilisation metrics are not applicable to the company since its business is not in the nature of industrial manufacturing. The company supplies its processed-grade potatoes directly to snack food manufacturers, food processing clients, and starch factories. Transportation and logistics are coordinated and managed by the company to ensure safe and timely delivery of the produce to buyers.
Operates an integrated contract farming model with a 100% buy-back assurance, leveraging the regional agro-climatic advantages of Gujarat, supported by an expanding network of over 850 farmers and a proprietary mobile application that ensures digital tracking and traceability from seed to harvest.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding our incremental working capital requirements — ₹23.00 cr
- General corporate purposes — ₹4.80 cr
Valuation at the Offer Price
These are the multiples the issuer is required to disclose under “Basis for the Offer Price”. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 90.8277 | 79.2422 | 62.5538 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 7.5287 | 6.6615 | 6.162 |
| PAT Margin | 8.29% | 8.41% | 9.85% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-07
- Pre Application Start2026-08-31
- Bidding Start2026-09-01
- Bidding End2026-09-03
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-04
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-07
- Listing Day2026-09-08
- Mandate End2026-10-15
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 90.83 | 79.24 | 62.55 |
| Other Income | 0.01 | 0.73 | 0.20 |
| Total Income | 90.84 | 79.98 | 62.75 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 65.24 | 74.80 | 55.39 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 0.57 | 0.53 | 0.24 |
| Finance Cost | 1.57 | 0.28 | 0.24 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.08 | 0.06 | 0.04 |
| Other Expenses | 9.10 | 7.83 | 3.93 |
| Total Expenses | 80.00 | 70.32 | 53.54 |
| Profit Before Tax | 10.84 | 9.65 | 9.21 |
| Tax Expense | 3.31 | 2.99 | 3.05 |
| Profit After Tax | 7.53 | 6.66 | 6.16 |
| EPS - Basic | 4.97 | 4.63 | 6.11 |
| EPS - Diluted | 4.97 | 4.63 | 6.11 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 12.48 | 9.26 | 9.30 |
| EBIT | 12.40 | 9.20 | 9.26 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 15.16 | 3.79 | 2.52 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 28.32 | 32.16 | 6.52 |
| Net Worth | 43.48 | 35.95 | 9.04 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 3.14 | 0.17 | 0.42 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 8.14 | 2.29 | 6.70 |
| Total Borrowings | 11.28 | 2.46 | 7.12 |
| Trade Payables | 30.69 | 25.73 | 12.16 |
| Current Liabilities | 53.20 | 33.17 | 22.29 |
| Total Liabilities | 56.37 | 33.37 | 22.72 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 0.26 | 0.34 | 0.19 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 1.04 | 1.04 | 1.04 |
| Inventories | 19.46 | 22.89 | 9.72 |
| Trade Receivables | 59.95 | 25.67 | 17.18 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.11 | 0.05 | 0.02 |
| Current Assets | 98.51 | 67.93 | 28.03 |
| Total Assets | 99.84 | 69.32 | 31.76 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -7.17 | -17.57 | -1.54 |
| Capital Expenditure | 0.02 | 0.20 | 0.22 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -0.02 | 2.30 | -3.64 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 7.25 | 15.30 | 4.87 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.05 | 0.03 | -0.31 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 13.7 | 11.6 | 14.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 13.7 | 11.5 | 14.8 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 8.3 | 8.4 | 9.9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 17.3 | 18.5 | 68.2 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 22.7 | 24 | 57.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 7.5 | 9.6 | 19.4 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.26 | 0.07 | 0.79 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.89 | 0.26 | 0.76 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 7.89 | 32.6 | 38.34 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.85 | 2.05 | 1.26 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.49 | 1.36 | 0.82 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.91 | 1.14 | 1.97 |
| Receivable Days | 241 | 118 | 100 |
| Inventory Days | 109 | 112 | 64 |
| Payable Days | 172 | 126 | 80 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 178 | 104 | 84 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.95 | -2.64 | -0.25 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 14.7 | 35 | 24.3 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.27 | 3.5 | 6.01 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 8.3% | 8.4% | 9.9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.91x | 1.14x | 1.97x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.3x | 1.93x | 3.51x |
| = Return on Equity | 17.3% | 18.5% | 68.2% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.69x | 0.69x | 0.67x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.87x | 1.05x | 1x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 13.7% | 11.6% | 14.8% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 7.53 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -7.17 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 100 in FY24 to 241 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 2.037 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.199 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.146 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.641 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.01 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.173 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1472 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.8 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.454 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.284 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.124 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.771 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.8 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
2 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
2 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹24.2 cr in FY25, ₹14.7 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 118 days in FY25, 241 days in FY26
- ○Inventory days rising · 112 days in FY25, 109 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ○Other current assets rising against revenue · 24.4% of revenue in FY25, 20.9% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 17.2% of net block in FY25, 29.6% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 44.0% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.1%
Contingent liabilities of 0.04 cr against a net worth of 43.48 cr — 0.1% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.01x
Short-term borrowings of 8.14 cr against cash of 0.11 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.23 cr against a profit of 7.53 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹59.00, the market value is ₹121 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹12.1 cr | 1.6x | 3.4 | 2.1 |
| 12% a year | ₹14.6 cr | 1.9x | 4.7 | 3.0 |
| 14% a year | ₹17.0 cr | 2.3x | 5.8 | 3.6 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 6.20% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -5.92% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹7.2 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth7.53 ÷ 43.48What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)12.40 ÷ (43.48 + 11.28) = 12.40 ÷ 54.76Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue12.48 ÷ 90.83Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth11.28 ÷ 43.48How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost12.40 ÷ 1.57How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(59.95 ÷ 90.83) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days109 + 241 − 172How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-7.17 ÷ 7.53Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(7.53 − -7.17) ÷ 99.84 = 14.70 ÷ 99.84The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹59.00 × 20,579,300 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash121.42 + 11.28 − 0.11What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA132.59 ÷ 12.48The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT121.42 ÷ 7.53The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Both figures, side by sideOurs 16.13x · filing 11.87xThe “Basis for the Offer Price” section strikes its own multiple. Ours is computed from the restated statements. A gap usually means a different earnings basis — diluted against basic, or restated against reported — and the filing states its basis here: Basic and Diluted restated EPS of Fiscal 2026 (₹4.97) from Basis for Issue Price. We show both rather than pick one.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹7.53 cr ÷ ₹121.42 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-7.19 cr ÷ ₹121.42 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)16.13 ÷ 13%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Fake Input Tax Credit (ITC) Disputes
Auditor disclosures and outstanding litigation reveal that key group companies, which share common promoters, are heavily involved in GST investigations for allegedly claiming fake ITC on invoices from non-existent, ab-initio-cancelled, or fictitious entities. The total exposure stands at ₹68.74 crore, presenting a severe shadow over promoter integrity and governance.
Source: p.265, p.320Disproportionate Receivables Growth
A deep dive into the restated balance sheet reveals that trade receivables rose from ₹17.18 crore in FY24 to ₹59.95 crore in FY26, far outstripping operational revenue growth. This indicates that a vast majority of pre-IPO sales are sitting on credit with Q4 billing concentration, leading to persistent cash deficits.
Source: p.59, p.141, p.143Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Sandipkumar Narsinhbhai Patel (Managing Director)
Litigation: Company: ₹0.0433 crore (TDS/direct tax defaults); Promoters: ₹0.6403 crore (tax proceedings); Directors: 1 tax proceeding (amount not ascertainable); Group Companies: ₹68.7354 crore (73 tax proceedings, primarily GST/ITC disputes involving Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel).
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company's trade receivables increased from ₹17.18 crore in FY24 to ₹59.95 crore in FY26, representing 66% of FY26 revenue, while Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) was negative in all three years (totaling -₹26.28 crore).
p.59, p.141, p.143Promoter-controlled group companies Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel are embroiled in 73 outstanding tax proceedings and GST disputes totaling ₹68.74 crore, primarily regarding fake Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims from non-existent or ab-initio-cancelled suppliers.
p.265, p.280, p.290, p.320Insiders and preferential allotment investors were issued shares at ₹150 in late 2024. Following a 3:1 bonus issue in August 2025, their adjusted acquisition price fell to ₹37.50 per share (a 36.4% discount to the ₹59 IPO price) within 21 months of the offer.
p.75Promoters routinely cycle unsecured loans to and from the company, with ₹6.50 crore of loan receipts in FY26 and ₹2.79 crore remaining outstanding as repayable-on-demand loans as of March 31, 2026.
p.63, p.407, p.409Working capital requirements (₹23.00 crore) and General Corporate Purposes (₹4.80 crore) comprise 86.87% of the total ₹32.00 crore issue proceeds, with zero allocation for physical capacity expansion or fixed assets.
p.91The top 10 customers accounted for 80.68% of potato sales in FY26 (82.04% in FY25, 92.70% in FY24), exposing the business to substantial client-loss risks.
p.176, p.232Company: ₹0.0433 crore (TDS/direct tax defaults); Promoters: ₹0.6403 crore (tax proceedings); Directors: 1 tax proceeding (amount not ascertainable); Group Companies: ₹68.7354 crore (73 tax proceedings, primarily GST/ITC disputes involving Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel).
p.79, p.215, p.265, p.380Operating cash flow was negative ₹7.17 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹7.53 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Trade receivables grew 133.5% against revenue growth of 14.6% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthShort-term borrowings of ₹8.14 cr against cash of ₹0.11 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company does not execute formal written agreements with farmers; instead, it relies on informal verbal arrangements and a standard one-page note. Although the prospectus states that no defaults have occurred, the lack of legally binding agreements means the company has limited recourse in case of side-selling or farmer disputes.
p.28, p.156, p.162The application is used by field officers to document on-farm conditions and KYC. However, its effectiveness is constrained in rural regions due to power outages and unreliable internet connectivity, which can delay field reporting.
p.55, p.152Supported by high concentration in Gujarat, but highly dependent on the top 10 customers who make up 80.68% of sales.
p.176, p.183Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is 86.87% of the pre-issue funds allocated to working capital and general corporate purposes instead of physical capacity or asset creation?
The company's contract farming model relies on leasing cold storage facilities and third-party logistics rather than owning industrial manufacturing units. Hence, ₹23.00 crore is required to fund seasonal potato purchases and seed distribution cycles, with ₹4.80 crore for general corporate expenses.
p.91, p.102What is the material risk associated with the ₹68.74 crore in pending tax litigation against group companies?
The group companies Champeshvar Iron and Steel and Vireshvar Iron and Steel are facing 73 tax proceedings, primarily CGST/SGST disputes involving allegations of fake Input Tax Credit (ITC) claims from non-existent/fictitious suppliers and paper transactions under Section 74. This aggregate liability exceeds the company's total Net Worth of ₹43.48 crore.
p.265, p.280, p.290, p.320How are loans and advances cycled between the company and its promoters, and what are the outstanding balances?
During FY26, the company cycled ₹4.25 crore in loans from Sudhir Haribhai Patel (repaid ₹2.10 crore) and ₹2.25 crore from Sandipkumar Narsinhbhai Patel (repaid ₹1.9023 crore). As of March 31, 2026, outstanding unsecured loans from promoters/directors stood at ₹2.79 crore, which can be recalled at any time.
p.63, p.407, p.409Why has the company recorded negative Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) for three consecutive years despite reporting profit?
The company has recorded negative CFO of -₹1.54 crore (FY24), -₹17.57 crore (FY25), and -₹7.17 crore (FY26). This is primarily driven by massive working capital lockups, with trade receivables rising 249% over two years to ₹59.95 crore (66% of FY26 revenue) and inventory holdings rising to ₹19.46 crore.
p.59, p.141, p.143What are the legal risks associated with the company's informal contract farming procurement structure?
The company does not execute legally binding written contracts with farmers, operating instead on seasonal verbal arrangements and one-page local circulars. This informal structure limits legal recourse in the event of crop side-selling, farmer disputes, or crop disease failures, though the company plans to transition to written agreements going forward.
p.28, p.162What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to Memorandum of Association | ₹10.00 | 2021-10-20 | 5.9x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 5.9x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Promoter, Promoter Group and Others | ₹10.00 | 2022-12-13 | 5.9x |
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 3:1) | — | 2025-08-25 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 5 entries | |||
| Public Shareholders (non-promoters) | ₹222.00 | 2024-06-01 | as disclosed |
| Promoter and Others | ₹150.00 | 2024-11-11 | as disclosed |
| Promoters, Promoter Group and Others | ₹150.00 | 2024-11-21 | as disclosed |
| Promoters and Promoter Group | ₹150.00 | 2024-12-04 | as disclosed |
| Promoter and Others | ₹150.00 | 2024-12-27 | as disclosed |
The 5 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years from the date of Allotment4,157,018 shares (20.2% of total)
- 08 Sep 2027Remaining Pre-Issue Equity Share Capital1 year from the date of Allotment10,998,278 shares (53.44% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
