ENS Enterprises
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride financials: H1-FY26 revenue (₹28.34 Cr) matched the entire previous fiscal year, but trade receivables skyrocketed to ₹15.84 Cr and operating cash flow plummeted to negative ₹-1.69 Cr
- Preferential pre-IPO rights allotment at ₹65.00 was immediately followed by a 269:100 bonus, cutting the effective cost of pre-IPO investors to ₹17.62 per share
- 95.2% of specified fresh issue proceeds are allocated to soft, un-auditable, and highly discretionary objects (manpower hiring and internal IT infrastructure)
- Unresolved processed TDS defaults on the TRACES portal and persistent secretarial filing delays of up to 167 days with a recent auditor change
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
ENS Enterprises Limited is an ISO 27001:2022 & ISO 9001:2015 certified technology company engaged in providing end-to-end digital commerce, custom e-commerce, and software-as-a-service (SaaS) solutions.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
ENS Enterprises Limited (formerly ENS Enterprises Private Limited) was incorporated on January 07, 2016, and specializes in custom e-commerce development, fintech, tourism, and media-tech solutions. Headquartered in Noida, Uttar Pradesh, the company operates from a leased registered office admeasuring approximately 7,000 square feet with a monthly rent of ₹0.00496 crore (₹4.96 lakhs). Since it is a pure software and services delivery business, traditional factory capacities and utilization metrics are not applicable; instead, its operations are powered by a skilled team of 148 employees (including 139 in the Engineering & Technology department). Its clients span major domestic and global enterprise brands in FMCG, telecom, and public sectors. The company reaches clients directly through dedicated enterprise account managers and key channel partnerships, leveraging its status as a certified Technology Service Provider (TSP) under the government-backed Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC). Geographically, while most operations are situated in India, the company maintains business footprints in the United States, Japan, Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Canada.
ENS Enterprises possesses a distinct operational moat as a certified Technology Service Provider (TSP) under the Open Network for Digital Commerce (ONDC), providing it a first-mover advantage. Additionally, it has deep strategic alliances with Google and Shopify (ranking as the #4 Shopify Plus Partner in Asia), which establishes robust platform capabilities and high customer retention.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Investment related to enhancement, maintenance and upgrading of existing products through manpower hiring — ₹17.02 cr
- Investment in upgradation of IT Infrastructure — ₹6.75 cr
- Repayment of Borrowings — ₹1.20 cr
- General Corporate Purposes (flexible allocation limited to 15% of gross proceeds or ₹10.00 crore, whichever is lower)
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured18%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) | FY25 (ended March 31, 2025) | FY24 (ended March 31, 2024) | FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 28.3424 | 28.3333 | 10.1092 | 7.3554 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 4.023 | 3.704 | 0.9032 | 0.5557 |
| PAT Margin | 14.19% | 13.07% | 8.93% | 7.55% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) | FY25 (ended March 31, 2025) | FY24 (ended March 31, 2024) | FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 28.34 | 28.33 | 10.11 | 7.36 |
| Other Income | 0.00 | 0.28 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 28.35 | 28.62 | 10.12 | 7.37 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 17.96 | 13.07 | 2.82 | 2.57 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 3.73 | 6.41 | 4.92 | 3.13 |
| Other Expenses | 0.86 | 3.37 | 0.99 | 0.78 |
| Total Expenses | 22.85 | 23.29 | 8.89 | 6.56 |
| EBITDA | 5.79 | 5.77 | 1.40 | 0.88 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.27 | 0.43 | 0.16 | 0.07 |
| EBIT | 5.52 | 5.33 | 1.24 | 0.81 |
| Finance Cost | 0.02 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 5.50 | 5.33 | 1.24 | 0.81 |
| Tax Expense | 1.48 | 1.63 | 0.33 | 0.25 |
| Profit After Tax | 4.02 | 3.70 | 0.90 | 0.56 |
| EPS - Basic | 4.03 | 18.07 | 4.45 | 2.74 |
| EPS - Diluted | 4.03 | 18.07 | 4.45 | 2.74 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) | FY25 (ended March 31, 2025) | FY24 (ended March 31, 2024) | FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 9.99 | 2.71 | 0.03 | 0.03 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 4.07 | 7.33 | 1.87 | 0.97 |
| Net Worth | 14.06 | 10.04 | 1.90 | 1.00 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 1.20 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total Borrowings | 1.20 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Trade Payables | 1.16 | 6.79 | 0.27 | 0.24 |
| Current Liabilities | 9.31 | 10.59 | 1.57 | 0.65 |
| Total Liabilities | 9.62 | 10.85 | 1.76 | 0.76 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 0.73 | 0.97 | 0.25 | 0.17 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Trade Receivables | 15.84 | 11.16 | 2.02 | 0.77 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.12 | 1.62 | 0.37 | 0.49 |
| Current Assets | 22.81 | 17.78 | 3.27 | 1.44 |
| Total Assets | 23.68 | 20.90 | 3.67 | 1.76 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) | FY25 (ended March 31, 2025) | FY24 (ended March 31, 2024) | FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -1.69 | 2.50 | 0.11 | 0.39 |
| Capital Expenditure | -0.02 | 1.16 | 0.23 | 0.23 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 0.02 | -3.65 | -0.23 | -0.22 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 3.18 | 2.39 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Net Change in Cash | 1.51 | 1.25 | -0.12 | 0.17 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) | FY25 (ended March 31, 2025) | FY24 (ended March 31, 2024) | FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | ||||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 20.4 | 20.1 | 13.8 | 11.9 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 19.5 | 18.6 | 12.2 | 11 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 14.2 | 13.1 | 8.9 | 7.6 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 28.6 | 36.9 | 47.4 | 55.5 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 36.2 | 53.1 | 65 | 80.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 17 | 17.7 | 24.6 | 31.6 |
| Leverage | ||||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.09 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | -0.33 | -0.28 | -0.26 | -0.55 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 260.37 | — | — | — |
| Liquidity | ||||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.45 | 1.68 | 2.08 | 2.2 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 2.45 | 1.68 | 2.08 | 2.2 |
| Efficiency | ||||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.2 | 1.36 | 2.76 | 4.19 |
| Receivable Days | 204 | 144 | 73 | 38 |
| Inventory Days | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Payable Days | 15 | 87 | 10 | 12 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 189 | 57 | 63 | 26 |
| Quality of Earnings | ||||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.42 | 0.67 | 0.12 | 0.7 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 24.1 | 5.8 | 21.6 | 9.4 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.09 | 2.66 | 1.48 | 3.27 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) | FY25 (ended March 31, 2025) | FY24 (ended March 31, 2024) | FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 14.2% | 13.1% | 8.9% | 7.6% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.2x | 1.36x | 2.76x | 4.19x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.68x | 2.08x | 1.93x | 1.76x |
| = Return on Equity | 28.6% | 36.9% | 47.4% | 55.5% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.73x | 0.69x | 0.73x | 0.69x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 1x | 1x | 1x | 1x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 19.5% | 18.8% | 12.2% | 11% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) the company reported a profit of 4.02 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -1.69 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 38 in FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) to 204 in H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025). The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY23 (ended March 31, 2023) and H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) revenue grew 285% while profit grew 624%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 260.37x in H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025). Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -0.91An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.419 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.471 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.06 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.147 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.47 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.776 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.2414 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -0.91, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 10.65 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.57 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.172 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.233 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.462 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 10.65 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
2 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.42x profit in H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025), against 0.67x in FY25 (ended March 31, 2025). Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 2.3%
Contingent liabilities of 0.32 cr against a net worth of 14.06 cr — 2.3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in H1-FY26 (6M ended Sep 30, 2025) came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 2.6x
Short-term borrowings of 1.20 cr against cash of 3.12 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 14%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.56 cr against a profit of 4.02 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth4.02 ÷ 14.06What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)5.52 ÷ (14.06 + 1.20) = 5.52 ÷ 15.26Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue5.79 ÷ 28.34Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth1.20 ÷ 14.06How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost5.52 ÷ 0.02How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(15.84 ÷ 28.34) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days0 + 204 − 15How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-1.69 ÷ 4.02Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(4.02 − -1.69) ÷ 23.68 = 5.72 ÷ 23.68The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Exceptional Pre-IPO Profit Expansion Lacks Cash Backing
ENS Enterprises exhibits a significant surge in pre-IPO financials, with H1-FY26 standalone revenue of ₹28.34 Cr matching the entirety of FY25. However, this growth is entirely on paper: Cash Flow from Operations turned deeply negative to ₹-1.69 Cr in H1-FY26 as trade receivables swelled to ₹15.84 Cr, indicating potential revenue front-loading.
Source: p. 56, 177, 186Disproportionate Allocation of IPO Proceeds to Intangible Expenses
Over 95% of specified fresh issue proceeds are dedicated to soft, internal, and difficult-to-audit objects—principally manpower hiring for product updates (₹17.02 Cr) and IT infrastructure upgrades (₹6.75 Cr). This heavy tilt leaves only 4.8% of capital for tangible liabilities or balance sheet repair.
Source: p. 24, 25Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Manish Kumar Srivastava (Whole-Time Director & CFO)
Litigation: Pending GST and direct tax processed default demands against the Company totaling ₹0.3184 Cr (comprising 3 GST cases of ₹0.2541 Cr and 4 TDS default cases of ₹0.0643 Cr). Direct tax or material proceedings against Promoters and other Directors are Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ASM Technologies Limited | 155.69 | — | 15.08 | — |
| InfoBeans Technologies Limited | 32.1 | — | 16.09 | — |
| Silver Touch Technologies Limited | 0.76 | — | 17.35 | — |
At the ₹92 upper band, the issue is priced at 22.8x earnings — a 29% discount to the peer median of 32.1x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The company's standalone revenue and profitability grew exponentially right before the IPO. Revenue was ₹10.11 Cr in FY24, ₹28.33 Cr in FY25, and reached ₹28.34 Cr in just the first six months of H1-FY26 (matching the entire previous year). Similarly, PAT climbed from ₹0.90 Cr in FY24 to ₹3.70 Cr in FY25 and ₹4.02 Cr in H1-FY26. However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) collapsed from a positive ₹2.50 Cr in FY25 to a negative ₹-1.69 Cr in H1-FY26, driven by trade receivables ballooning from ₹2.02 Cr in FY24 to ₹11.16 Cr in FY25 and ₹15.84 Cr in H1-FY26 (representing over 55% of the 6-month revenue).
p. 56, 177, 186The company executed a preferential rights allotment of 6,76,998 shares on 2025-03-26 at ₹65.00 per share to Raman Talwar and Connect Fund. Just under four months later, on 2025-07-16, the company declared a massive 269:100 bonus issue, which applied to these shares. This immediate capitalization of reserves mathematically diluted the acquisition cost of these pre-IPO investors to ₹17.62 per share, giving them a heavy cost advantage just prior to the public offering.
p. 43, 209, 210, 211Out of the specified objects of the fresh issue, the company has allocated ₹17.02 Cr (68.1% of specified proceeds) to 'enhancement, maintenance and upgrading of existing products through manpower hiring' and ₹6.75 Cr (27.0% of specified proceeds) to 'upgradation of IT Infrastructure'. Together, these soft, uncapped, and highly subjective allocations represent 95.2% of the issue's capital allocation, while tangible growth capital (repayment of borrowings) is restricted to only ₹1.20 Cr (4.8%).
p. 24, 25The company has disclosed outstanding processed TDS defaults on the TRACES portal of ₹6.43 Lakhs (₹0.0643 Cr) across multiple assessment years, alongside delayed PF/ESIC deposits and GSTR-3B filings. Significant administrative delays also exist in ROC filings, including Form ADT-1 delayed by 167 days for FY23 and Form ADT-3 delayed by 66 days for FY25. The statutory auditor has also changed within the last 3 years.
p. 38, 201, 202, 292Pending GST and direct tax processed default demands against the Company totaling ₹0.3184 Cr (comprising 3 GST cases of ₹0.2541 Cr and 4 TDS default cases of ₹0.0643 Cr). Direct tax or material proceedings against Promoters and other Directors are Nil.
p. 25, 143, 158, 202None disclosed
p. 25, 143, 158, 202Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company's scalability is severely bottlenecked by working capital demands. In H1-FY26, the company was forced to absorb ₹15.84 Cr in trade receivables, completely erasing its operating profits and resulting in deeply negative operating cash flows of ₹-1.69 Cr. The cash conversion cycle is deteriorating.
p. 56, 177, 186Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal →
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (29 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue IPO proceeds being utilized?
The fresh issue proceeds are primarily allocated to soft capital expenditures: ₹17.02 Cr for hiring additional software engineering and technology manpower to upgrade existing products, ₹6.75 Cr for upgrading IT infrastructure, and ₹1.20 Cr for the repayment of outstanding borrowings.
p. 24, 25Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, Mr. Avinash Kumar Singh, and Mr. Anupam Kumar Srivastava, holding 74.91% pre-issue. Due to early subscription at face value (₹10.00) in 2016 and subsequent sequential bonus issues of 667:10 in March 2025 and 269:100 in July 2025, their average acquisition cost per share is near nominal fractional levels.
p. 43, 207-211Are there material related party transactions or core dependencies?
Related party transactions are limited to standard executive and relative compensation. In H1-FY26, remuneration was paid to Manish Kumar Srivastava (₹0.225 Cr), Anupam Kumar Srivastava (₹0.225 Cr), Avinash Kumar Singh (₹0.1125 Cr), and relative Ruchika Kumari (₹0.1125 Cr). No core operations are outsourced to promoter-owned entities.
p. 82, 141, 432Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
No. In the pre-IPO stub period (H1-FY26), despite reported standalone PAT scaling to ₹4.02 Cr, operating cash flow was deeply negative at ₹-1.69 Cr. This divergence was driven by uncollected trade receivables rising from ₹11.16 Cr in FY25 to ₹15.84 Cr in H1-FY26.
p. 56, 177, 186What market structure parameters apply to this offer?
The offer is a 100% Fresh Issue of up to 3,602,400 equity shares listing on the BSE SME platform. Abhipra Capital Limited acts as the registrar, and Corporate Makers Capital Limited is the Book Running Lead Manager. The trading lot size and price band are to be determined.
p. 3, 25, 253What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers (Mr. Manish Kumar Srivastava, Mr. Avinash Kumar Singh, Mr. Anupam Kumar Srivastava) | ₹10.00 | 2016-01-07 | 9.2x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 9.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 667:10 via capitalization of reserves) | — | 2025-03-22 | — |
| Allottees of Rights Issue (Mr. Raman Talwar, Connect Fund) (1:3) | ₹65.00 | 2025-03-26 | 1.4x |
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 269:100 via capitalization of reserves) | — | 2025-07-16 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 21 Aug 2046promoterMinimum Promoter Contribution constituting 20% of the post-issue share capital is locked in for a period of three years from the date of allotment of Equity shares issued pursuant to this Issue
- 21 Aug 2076promoter50% of the excess promoters' contribution locked-in for a period of two years from the date of allotment of Equity shares in this Issue
- 21 Aug 2076promoterRemaining 50% of the excess promoters' contribution locked-in for a period of one year from the date of allotment of Equity shares in this Issue
- 21 Aug 2027otherStandard pre-issue public shareholding of non-promoter shares locked in for a period of one year from the date of listing / allotment2,498,122 shares (25% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.