Credent Connect N Care
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride financials: FY26 revenues and PAT surged to Rs 214.16 Cr and Rs 18.45 Cr, but operating cash flow collapsed to negative Rs -6.62 Cr due to uncollected trade receivables of Rs 58.83 Cr
- Severe related-party transactions: Over Rs 13.62 Cr in interest-free or unsecured loans advanced to promoters and directors, representing over 31% of the company's net worth
- Extreme compliance failures: Nine-year omission of attaching Cash Flow Statements with ROC Form AOC-4, plus technical non-compliance under Sections 73 and 185 of the Companies Act
- Reporting basis mismatch: Comparing Standalone FY24/FY25 figures directly against Consolidated FY26 numbers
- IPO proceeds deployment: Over 87% of specified proceeds allocated to discretionary and unauditable working capital, with only Rs 3.00 Cr allocated to capital expenditure
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Credent Connect N Care Limited operates a technology-enabled courier aggregation and logistics platform in India, providing courier aggregation, COD reconciliation, and cold-chain logistics services.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Credent Connect N Care Limited operates a technology-enabled healthcare support, operations, and supply chain logistics platform. The company provides smart courier aggregation through its 'C3 Post' vertical and specializes in cold-chain logistics for diagnostic samples, medical supplies, reagents, and instruments. It operates from a registered office in Ashok Vihar, Delhi, and maintains rented branch or warehouse locations in Pune, Varanasi, Saki Naka (Mumbai), and T Nagar (Chennai). Since the company is primarily a service provider and does not manufacture physical goods, capacity and capacity utilization metrics are not applicable to its business. Its primary customers are diagnostic laboratories, healthcare providers, and wellness clients, having associated with 2,530 laboratories as of March 31, 2026. The company reaches its clients directly via integrated systems for home collection, centralized aggregation points, and partner courier networks.
Comprehensive healthcare ecosystem and logistics platform, well-established relationships with diagnostic laboratories, experienced promoters and directors, and a widespread reach in domestic markets.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Investment in our wholly owned subsidiary, Credent Healthcare Private Limited to meet its working capital requirement — ₹26.80 cr
- To meet Working Capital Requirements of our Company — ₹37.00 cr
- Repayment and/or pre-payment, in full or part, of borrowing availed by our Company — ₹6.00 cr
- Investment in our wholly owned subsidiary, Credent Healthcare Private Limited to finance its capital expenditure requirements for machinery — ₹3.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured26%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured12%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured22%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly, and it is the one that moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 214.1618 | 77.9426 | 75.7332 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 18.4478 | 2.2467 | 2.6644 |
| PAT Margin | 8.61% | 2.88% | 3.52% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 214.16 | 77.94 | 75.73 |
| Other Income | 0.27 | 0.29 | 0.28 |
| Total Income | 214.43 | 78.23 | 76.02 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 73.18 | 27.71 | 21.23 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 84.61 | 27.17 | 35.78 |
| Other Expenses | 27.55 | 18.02 | 14.37 |
| Total Expenses | 189.83 | 75.23 | 72.43 |
| EBITDA | 28.46 | 4.99 | 4.30 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 3.11 | 1.38 | 0.51 |
| Finance Cost | 1.38 | 0.95 | 0.53 |
| Profit Before Tax | 24.59 | 3.01 | 3.59 |
| Tax Expense | 6.15 | 0.76 | 0.93 |
| Profit After Tax | 18.45 | 2.25 | 2.66 |
| EPS - Basic | 13.95 | 2.20 | 2.61 |
| EPS - Diluted | 13.95 | 2.20 | 2.61 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 13.25 | 0.20 | 0.20 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 30.54 | 15.70 | 13.46 |
| Net Worth | 43.79 | 15.90 | 13.66 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 5.20 | 0.38 | 1.46 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 16.75 | 7.04 | 5.39 |
| Total Borrowings | 21.95 | 7.42 | 6.85 |
| Trade Payables | 0.99 | 0.49 | 0.55 |
| Current Liabilities | 30.63 | 12.32 | 10.62 |
| Total Liabilities | 37.78 | 13.59 | 12.76 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 9.34 | 6.26 | 1.67 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 1.59 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 2.04 | 0.06 | 0.02 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Trade Receivables | 58.83 | 17.91 | 19.02 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 2.21 | 1.16 | 2.90 |
| Current Assets | 63.05 | 19.34 | 22.14 |
| Total Assets | 81.57 | 29.50 | 26.41 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -6.62 | 5.48 | 0.81 |
| Capital Expenditure | 5.51 | 6.86 | 0.01 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -10.78 | -6.19 | -1.13 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 18.66 | -0.38 | 2.16 |
| Net Change in Cash | 1.25 | -1.09 | 1.84 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 13.3 | 6.4 | 5.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 12.1 | 5.1 | 5.4 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 8.6 | 2.9 | 3.5 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 42.1 | 14.1 | 19.5 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 39.5 | 17 | 20.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 22.6 | 7.6 | 10.1 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.5 | 0.47 | 0.5 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.69 | 1.25 | 0.92 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 18.8 | 4.17 | 7.81 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.06 | 1.57 | 2.09 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 2.06 | 1.57 | 2.09 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2.63 | 2.64 | 2.87 |
| Receivable Days | 100 | 84 | 92 |
| Inventory Days | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Payable Days | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 98 | 82 | 89 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.36 | 2.44 | 0.3 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 30.7 | -11 | 7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.78 | 4.98 | 0.02 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 8.6% | 2.9% | 3.5% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2.63x | 2.64x | 2.87x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.86x | 1.85x | 1.93x |
| = Return on Equity | 42.1% | 14.1% | 19.5% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.75x | 0.74x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.76x | 0.87x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12.1% | 5.1% | 5.4% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 18.45 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -6.62 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 183% while profit grew 592%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 18.8x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = 0.6An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.196 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.979 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.851 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 2.748 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.723 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.903 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.02 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.3074 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = 0.6, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 10.43 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.397 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.374 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.318 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.159 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 10.43 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 175% in FY26, against 3% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 6.9 percentage points in FY26, having moved 0.7 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.36x profit in FY26, against 2.44x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 1.4%
Contingent liabilities of 0.62 cr against a net worth of 43.79 cr — 1.4% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.6%
0.6% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.13x
Short-term borrowings of 16.75 cr against cash of 2.21 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.43 cr against a profit of 18.45 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth18.45 ÷ 43.79What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)25.97 ÷ (43.79 + 21.95) = 25.97 ÷ 65.74Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue28.46 ÷ 214.16Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth21.95 ÷ 43.79How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost25.97 ÷ 1.38How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(58.83 ÷ 214.16) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days0 + 100 − 2How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-6.62 ÷ 18.45Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(18.45 − -6.62) ÷ 81.57 = 25.07 ÷ 81.57The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹189.00 × 18,786,900 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash355.07 + 21.95 − 2.21What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA374.81 ÷ 28.46The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT355.07 ÷ 18.45The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)19.25 ÷ 721.1%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Earnings Growth Decoupled from Cash Realization on Aggressive Revenue Recognition
Credent Connect N Care reported a massive surge in consolidated PAT to Rs 18.45 Cr in FY26. However, actual cash generation was negative, with CFO collapsing to negative Rs -6.62 Cr due to uncollected trade receivables tripling to Rs 58.83 Cr. This severe mismatch highlights aggressive billing practices prior to the IPO.
Source: p. 173, 174, 175, 176Severe Corporate Governance Violations via Multi-Crore Director Loans and ROC Filing Failures
The prospectus reveals profound governance deficits: the company has advanced over Rs 13.62 Cr in personal loans to its directors, representing more than 31% of its net worth. Additionally, there are chronic statutory failures, including a nine-year omission of submitting mandatory Cash Flow Statements to the ROC with Form AOC-4.
Source: p. 21, 149, 150, 173, 225, 255-259, 275, 276Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Tarun Sharma
Litigation: Indirect Tax proceedings (GST demand for FY 2019-20) against the Company: 2 cases of Rs 0.6212 Cr. Criminal or other material proceedings against Company, Promoters, or Directors: Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Audit report for FY24 contains an emphasis of matter regarding the need to formally document the policies and procedures adopted for the internal financial controls system over financial reporting.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
In FY26, the company reported an explosive jump in consolidated revenue to Rs 214.16 Cr (up from standalone Rs 77.94 Cr in FY25) and consolidated net profit (PAT) to Rs 18.45 Cr (up from Rs 2.25 Cr in FY25). However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) collapsed to negative Rs -6.62 Cr in FY26 (down from positive Rs 5.48 Cr in FY25), driven by trade receivables more than tripling to Rs 58.83 Cr (up from Rs 17.91 Cr in FY25).
p. 173, 174, 175, 176The company has advanced extensive loans to directors, with outstanding balances of Rs 5.84 Cr to Dimple Sharma, Rs 5.74 Cr to Ashok Kumar Sharma, and Rs 2.04 Cr to Tarun Sharma, totaling over Rs 13.62 Cr as of FY26 (representing over 31% of the company's net worth of Rs 43.79 Cr). Additionally, the company outsources its core healthcare support and logistics IT integration function to group company Alltrak Technologies Private Limited, which accounted for Rs 1.30 Cr in sales and was granted a loan of Rs 0.26 Cr.
p. 17, 18, 149, 150, 173, 225, 275, 276The company disclosed several major statutory non-compliances, including the failure to file Form CHG-1 for vehicle loan charges, technical non-compliance under Section 73 (accepting loans from non-directors) and Section 185 (unpermitted loans/advances to related parties), and the omission of attaching Cash Flow Statements with Form AOC-4 for nine consecutive years (FY 2015-16 to 2023-24). In FY24, the auditor also issued an Emphasis of Matter regarding undocumented internal financial controls.
p. 21, 173, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 267, 268The company presented its financial statements on a Standalone basis for FY24 and FY25, but switched to a Consolidated basis in FY26 to include its newly acquired or formed subsidiary, Credent Healthcare Private Limited.
p. 173, 174, 175On 2025-10-10, promoters Ashok Kumar Sharma and Dimple Sharma received a preferential allotment of 59,900 shares at Rs 1,576 per share via loan conversion. Just four months later, on 2026-02-09, the company declared a massive 50:1 bonus issue. This post-allotment bonus mathematically diluted their real cost of acquisition to Rs 30.90 per share.
p. 71, 72The company has allocated Rs 37.00 Cr for parent working capital and Rs 26.80 Cr as working capital investment in its subsidiary, totaling Rs 63.80 Cr. Additionally, Rs 6.00 Cr is earmarked for debt repayment, meaning growth capital (capital expenditure) is limited to just Rs 3.00 Cr.
p. 87The company reported FY26 consolidated revenue of Rs 214.16 Cr and PAT of Rs 18.45 Cr, which easily exceeds the mainboard listing financial requirements. However, they chose to list on the NSE Emerge platform by capping their post-issue capital at Rs 18.79 Cr (below the Rs 25 Cr mainboard threshold).
p. 1, 3, 50, 71, 239Indirect Tax proceedings (GST demand for FY 2019-20) against the Company: 2 cases of Rs 0.6212 Cr. Criminal or other material proceedings against Company, Promoters, or Directors: Nil.
p. 1, 2, 71, 155, 167, 173, 237, 252, 253, 283, 284Audit report for FY24 contains an emphasis of matter regarding the need to formally document the policies and procedures adopted for the internal financial controls system over financial reporting.
p. 1, 2, 71, 155, 167, 173, 237, 252, 253, 283, 284Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company's financial position is heavily stressed by working capital lockups, with trade receivables ballooning to Rs 58.83 Cr and operating cash flow collapsing to negative Rs -6.62 Cr in FY26. Furthermore, its balance sheet is exposed to over Rs 13.62 Cr in outstanding loans advanced to its own directors and promoters.
p. 119, 173-177Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (28 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue IPO proceeds allocated?
The proceeds are earmarked for working capital requirements of the company (Rs 37.00 Cr) and its subsidiary Credent Healthcare Private Limited (Rs 26.80 Cr), loan repayment (Rs 6.00 Cr), and subsidiary capital expenditure (Rs 3.00 Cr). Working capital makes up 87.63% of the specified allocations.
p. 87Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Ashok Kumar Sharma, Karan Sharma, Tarun Sharma, Dimple Sharma, and Tanveen, holding 87.52% pre-issue. Due to a 50:1 bonus issue in February 2026, their nominal acquisition cost for recent allotments (such as the October 2025 preferential allotment at Rs 1,576) is reduced to Rs 30.90 per share.
p. 71, 72Are there material related party transactions or director loan balances?
Yes. The promoters/directors have taken substantial outstanding loans from the company: Dimple Sharma (Rs 5.84 Cr), Ashok Kumar Sharma (Rs 5.74 Cr), and Tarun Sharma (Rs 2.04 Cr), totaling Rs 13.62 Cr. Additionally, the company outsources core tech integration to group company Alltrak Technologies Private Limited (Rs 1.30 Cr in FY26 sales).
p. 17, 18, 149, 150, 225, 275, 276Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
No. In FY26, despite reported consolidated net profit (PAT) jumping to Rs 18.45 Cr, Cash Flow from Operations was deeply negative at Rs -6.62 Cr. This is because uncollected trade receivables more than tripled to Rs 58.83 Cr.
p. 173, 174, 175, 176What structural market parameters apply to this offer?
The offer is a 100% Fresh Issue of up to 4,968,000 equity shares listing on the NSE Emerge platform. Hem Finlease Private Limited acts as the market maker with up to 2,52,000 shares reserved. Post-issue capital is structured at Rs 18.79 Cr (1,87,86,900 shares of face value Rs 10 each).
p. 1, 3, 50, 57, 71, 239What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers (Ashok Kumar Sharma & Kishore Kumar Gemini) | ₹100.00 | 2015-06-25 | 1.9x |
| Ashok Kumar Sharma & Karan Sharma | ₹156.00 | 2022-07-07 | 1.2x |
| Existing Shareholders (Sub-division of FV ₹100 to FV ₹1) | — | 2023-11-20 | — |
| Existing Shareholders (Consolidation of FV ₹1 to FV ₹10) | — | 2025-04-01 | — |
| Existing Shareholders (Bonus Issue 50:1) | — | 2026-02-09 | — |
| The 1 allotments below are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. These prices are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where the company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple. Bonus-adjusted cost is on the roadmap. | |||
| Ashok Kumar Sharma & Dimple Sharma (Loan Conversion) | ₹1,576.00 | 2025-10-10 | as disclosed |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 20 Aug 2029promoterlocked in for 3 years as per Regulation 238(a) of the SEBI (ICDR) Regulations i.e., for a period of three years from the date of allotment of Equity Shares in this Issue3,662,000 shares (20.1% of total)
- 20 Aug 2028promoterlocked in for a period of two years from the date of allotment of equity shares in this Issue3,969,600 shares
- 20 Aug 2027promoterlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment of equity shares in this Issue3,969,400 shares
- 20 Aug 2027otherlocked in for a period of one year from the date of allotment of Equity Shares in this issue1,439,100 shares
- 20 Aug 2027financial investorlocked in for a period of at least one year from the date of purchase214,800 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.