Apana Logistics
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Pre-IPO year shows classic 'Dressed Bride' pattern with a 43.9% revenue surge alongside falling operating cash flow.
- Interest-free related-party loans and advances of Rs. 4.04 crore are funded by high-cost secured bank debt of up to 18% interest.
- Statutory audit trail and edit log was not enabled in accounting software throughout the entire three-year audit period.
- Comparison with VRL Logistics represents a severe category error to justify valuation multiples.
- Resignation of statutory auditors in August 2024 within 24 months of the IPO.
- Extreme customer concentration with 97.79% of revenue dependent on just 5 clients.
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
The company provides logistics support for container handling and transportation, utilizing a fleet of owned and third-party assets like reach stackers, forklifts, and truck-trailers. Its service offerings are diversified across container handling at CFS/ICD/ports, road transportation, cargo handling at third-party warehouses, and repair, operations & maintenance of trucks and trailers.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Apana Logistics Limited is engaged in providing logistics support for the handling and transportation of containers. The company operates through a hybrid business model utilizing both owned and hired assets, including heavy equipment such as reach stackers, forklifts, truck-trailers, and cranes. As of March 31, 2026, the company owned 5 reach stackers, 33 truck-trailers, and 2 cranes. Its core business locations for container handling yard operations are spread across Nhava Sheva (Maharashtra), ICD-Whitefield (Bangalore), ICD-Balli (Goa), Varnama (Gujarat), Pithampur (Madhya Pradesh), and Nagalapally (Andhra Pradesh). The company also handles cargo at a third-party warehouse in Balli, Goa, deploying forklifts and personnel on a need basis. It enters into long-term contracts ranging from 1 to 5 years with its customer base, which includes Container Freight Stations (CFS), Inland Container Depots (ICD), and port operators. Capacity and utilization metrics are not applicable to the company as it operates in the logistics service sector. The company has a highly concentrated customer base, with its top 5 customers contributing 97.79% of its revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
The company's competitive strengths include its diverse service offerings across multiple logistics verticals, long-standing relationships with renowned clients (including relationships over 10 years with top customers), and the extensive industry experience of its promoter.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding capital expenditure requirement of our company towards purchase of reach stackers ("Vehicles") — ₹25.00 cr
- To meet out the General Corporate Purposes — ₹5.04 cr
Valuation at the Offer Price
These are the multiples the issuer is required to disclose under “Basis for the Offer Price”. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 30.8513 | 21.435 | 20.0964 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 5.8647 | 3.1065 | 3.0031 |
| PAT Margin | 19.01% | 14.49% | 14.94% |
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 30.85 | 21.44 | 20.10 |
| Other Income | 0.22 | 0.18 | 0.23 |
| Total Income | 31.07 | 21.61 | 20.33 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 2.74 | 3.10 | 2.99 |
| Finance Cost | 1.08 | 1.03 | 0.34 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.23 | 0.94 | 0.52 |
| Other Expenses | 1.48 | 1.04 | 0.84 |
| Total Expenses | 21.84 | 17.24 | 16.22 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 9.23 | 4.37 | 4.11 |
| Profit Before Tax | 9.23 | 4.37 | 4.11 |
| Tax Expense | 3.36 | 1.26 | 1.11 |
| Profit After Tax | 5.86 | 3.11 | 3.00 |
| EPS - Basic | 4.96 | 2.63 | 2.54 |
| EPS - Diluted | 4.96 | 2.63 | 2.54 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 11.82 | 11.82 | 1.97 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 8.45 | 2.59 | 9.90 |
| Net Worth | 20.27 | 14.41 | 11.87 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 4.00 | 6.16 | 6.82 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 2.30 | 1.85 | 2.43 |
| Total Borrowings | 6.30 | 8.00 | 9.26 |
| Trade Payables | 3.48 | 2.79 | 2.19 |
| Current Liabilities | 9.27 | 6.84 | 5.16 |
| Total Liabilities | 16.56 | 14.54 | 13.18 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 19.36 | 16.39 | 14.42 |
| Investments | 0.02 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Trade Receivables | 6.92 | 4.07 | 3.61 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.66 | 1.38 | 1.55 |
| Current Assets | 12.92 | 8.00 | 9.40 |
| Total Assets | 36.84 | 28.95 | 25.05 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 6.06 | 8.18 | 1.06 |
| Capital Expenditure | -4.21 | -2.91 | -8.00 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -4.00 | -6.08 | -7.70 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -2.78 | -2.28 | 7.25 |
| Net Change in Cash | -0.72 | -0.17 | 0.62 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 37.1 | 29.3 | 24.5 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 33.2 | 25 | 21.9 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 19 | 14.5 | 14.9 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 28.9 | 21.6 | 25.3 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 38.8 | 24.1 | 21.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 15.9 | 10.7 | 12 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.31 | 0.56 | 0.78 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.49 | 1.05 | 1.55 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 9.53 | 5.24 | 13.07 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.39 | 1.17 | 1.82 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.84 | 0.74 | 0.8 |
| Receivable Days | 82 | 69 | 66 |
| Payable Days | 41 | 47 | 40 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.03 | 2.63 | 0.35 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -0.5 | -17.5 | 7.8 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 3.41 | 3.1 | 15.36 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 19% | 14.5% | 14.9% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.84x | 0.74x | 0.8x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.82x | 2.01x | 2.11x |
| = Return on Equity | 28.9% | 21.6% | 25.3% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.64x | 0.71x | 0.73x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.9x | 0.81x | 0.92x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 33.4% | 25.2% | 22.2% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.03x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Interest coverage was 9.53x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.18 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.785 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.439 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.905 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.707 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.803 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0053 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.81 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.099 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.229 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.28 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.224 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.81 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
7 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 44% in FY26, against 7% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 3.5%
Contingent liabilities of 0.71 cr against a net worth of 20.27 cr — 3.5% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 14.5%
14.5% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.29x
Short-term borrowings of 2.30 cr against cash of 0.66 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.12 cr against a profit of 5.86 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth5.86 ÷ 20.27What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)10.31 ÷ (20.27 + 6.30) = 10.31 ÷ 26.57Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue11.54 ÷ 30.85Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth6.30 ÷ 20.27How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost10.31 ÷ 1.08How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(6.92 ÷ 30.85) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT6.06 ÷ 5.86Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(5.86 − 6.06) ÷ 36.84 = -0.20 ÷ 36.84The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹60.00 × 17,510,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash105.06 + 6.30 − 0.66What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA110.70 ÷ 11.54The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT105.06 ÷ 5.86The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)17.91 ÷ 88.8%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Related Party Subsidy: Paying 18% to Lend at 0%
A deep dive into Note 17 (Short-Term Loans and Advances) reveals that Apana Logistics is acting as an interest-free treasury for its promoter and group entities. As of March 31, 2026, the company has Rs. 4.04 crore of outstanding advances to related parties, none of which carry interest. At the same time, the company carries Rs. 5.94 crore of bank and NBFC debt, paying rates between 10.51% and 12.47% to IndusInd Bank, and a staggering 18.00% to Mannappuram Finance. By borrowing at high double-digit rates from commercial lenders to fund interest-free cash advances to insiders, the company is directly draining its operating profitability to subsidize private promoter-owned businesses.
Source: p.198, F-11, F-18Receivables Expansion: Growth Built on Unpaid Bills
While the revenue CAGR of 15.36% and EBITDA CAGR of 34.71% paint a picture of stellar growth, the underlying quality of this revenue is deteriorating rapidly. In FY26, trade receivables grew by 69.85%, far outstripping the revenue growth of 43.93%. Outstanding receivables exceeding six months more than doubled in FY26 to Rs. 1.36 crore. This receivable expansion has pushed trade receivable days from 66 days in FY24 to 82 days in FY26. The fact that Rs. 3.36 crore of these receivables are owed by group company Roadwings Western Private Limited indicates that pre-IPO sales numbers may be artificially propped up by related-party transactions that remain uncollected.
Source: p.28, F-15Untraceable Records & Delayed Filings: A History of Governance Lapses
The prospectus contains alarming disclosures regarding the complete absence of historical secretarial records. The company admits that it is unable to trace its return of allotments (Form 2) for further capital issues in 1993 and 1994, several Board and Shareholder minute books, and various statutory form filings. Compounding this, the company failed to file Form PAS-3 for a massive 2020 bonus allotment of 17.73 lakh shares for five years, only seeking regulatory compounding in September 2025. These historical lapses, combined with the lack of an enabled statutory audit trail throughout FY24-FY26, indicate a weak internal control environment.
Source: p.24, 75, F-25Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Pratyaksh Sureka
Litigation: Criminal cases against company: 2 Section 138 NI Act cases by SREI (Rs. 3.50 lakh and Rs. 5.50 lakh), 1 motor vehicle challan. Civil cases against company: 1 motor accident claim before Thane MACT for Rs. 35.00 lakhs. Criminal cases against promoter: 1 Section 138 NI Act case by Total Energies against promoter as Accused No. 2 (Rs. 3.29 lakhs). Litigations against Group Companies: 2 motor vehicle claims against Roadwings Western. Tax demands: Rs. 7.21 lakhs (Direct Tax) and Rs. 228.05 lakhs (GST) against company; Rs. 12.01 lakhs against promoters; Rs. 1.11 lakhs against directors. All amounts in lakhs.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Premier Roadlines Limited | 6.97 | — | 14.23 | 4.13 |
| VRL Logistics Limited | 22.15 | — | 21.27 | 7.35 |
At the ₹60 upper band, the issue is priced at 12.1x earnings — a 17% discount to the peer median of 14.6x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In FY26 (the pre-IPO year), revenue from operations jumped 43.93% and PAT surged 88.78%, while Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) declined by 25.96% from 818.46 lakhs to 606.00 lakhs. Simultaneously, trade receivables ballooned by 69.85% (from 407.13 lakhs to 691.53 lakhs), far outstripping the revenue growth. Trade receivable days expanded from 69 to 82 days.
p.28, 128The company has given interest-free, repayable-on-demand advances totaling Rs. 404.39 lakhs to related parties as of March 31, 2026 (including Rs. 52.25 lakhs to promoter Pratyaksh Sureka and Rs. 240.96 lakhs to Freightrans Logistics). Meanwhile, the company maintains Rs. 593.71 lakhs of secured bank and NBFC borrowings carrying interest rates of up to 18.00% p.a., effectively subsidizing related parties with high-cost interest-bearing debt.
p.195, 198The company benchmarks its valuation and accounting ratios against VRL Logistics Limited, which is a mainboard-listed giant with over 100x the scale (annual revenue of Rs. 3,221.11 crore compared to the issuer's Rs. 30.85 crore). This comparison is used to justify a premium implied multiple of 12.10x.
p.94, 97The statutory auditors certified that the company used Tally as its accounting software, but the Audit Trail (Edit Log) facility was not enabled at the database level and application level throughout the period from April 1, 2023, to March 31, 2026.
p.205The company failed to file E-Form PAS-3 for its bonus share allotment of 17,73,000 shares made on March 25, 2020. The company only filed a compounding application with the Regional Director on September 27, 2025, after a delay of over 5 years.
p.24, 75The top 5 customers of the company contribute 97.79% of its total revenue from operations in FY26 (and up to 98.85% in FY25), leaving the company's business model highly vulnerable to the loss of any single client relationship.
p.23, 128Statutory auditors Parasmal Jain & Associates resigned on August 12, 2024, citing 'pre-occupation'. They were subsequently replaced by Amit Ray & Co. on September 25, 2024.
p.65, 202Criminal cases against company: 2 Section 138 NI Act cases by SREI (Rs. 3.50 lakh and Rs. 5.50 lakh), 1 motor vehicle challan. Civil cases against company: 1 motor accident claim before Thane MACT for Rs. 35.00 lakhs. Criminal cases against promoter: 1 Section 138 NI Act case by Total Energies against promoter as Accused No. 2 (Rs. 3.29 lakhs). Litigations against Group Companies: 2 motor vehicle claims against Roadwings Western. Tax demands: Rs. 7.21 lakhs (Direct Tax) and Rs. 228.05 lakhs (GST) against company; Rs. 12.01 lakhs against promoters; Rs. 1.11 lakhs against directors. All amounts in lakhs.
p.156, 178, 196, 20114.5% of FY26 revenue came from connected entities.
rule: RPT revenue 5-15%Short-term borrowings of ₹2.30 cr against cash of ₹0.66 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While the debt-to-equity ratio of 0.31 is mathematically correct based on total borrowings of Rs. 6.30 crore, this ignores the fact that Rs. 4.04 crore (or 64.1% of borrowings) has been diverted as interest-free advances to promoters and group companies. The company is paying up to 18% interest to commercial lenders to subsidize interest-free cash outflows to insiders, meaning the net interest burden on the core business is far more severe than the consolidated ratio suggests.
p.134, F-11, F-18The average cost of acquisition of equity shares for promoter Pratyaksh Sureka is Rs. Nil, and the WACA for all pre-IPO primary/secondary transactions in the last three years is Rs. Nil due to bonus issues and gift deeds. Public investors are paying a premium of Rs. 60 per share, while the promoter holds 1.05 crore shares at zero cost of acquisition.
p.93, 98, 99While the company does secure contracts of 1 to 5 years, it is highly dependent on its top 5 customers, who contributed 97.79% of its total revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026. Any non-renewal, contract dispute, or credit delay by these five customers is existential, as trade receivables days expanded to 82 days in FY26.
p.23, 28, 128Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (21 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What is the detailed breakdown of the IPO proceeds, and how much is allocated to general corporate purposes?
The total fresh issue size is Rs. 34.14 crore (3,414.00 Lakhs). From this, Rs. 25.00 crore (73.23%) is earmarked for capital expenditure to purchase Sany-make reach stackers, Rs. 5.04 crore (14.77%) is allocated for General Corporate Purposes (GCP), and Rs. 4.10 crore (12.00%) is consumed by estimated issue-related expenses. There is no allocation for working capital.
p.52, 86What is the promoter's skin in the game and their average cost of share acquisition?
Promoter Pratyaksh Sureka holds 100% of the pre-issue share capital and will hold 67.50% post-issue. His average cost of acquisition is Rs. Nil per share, as his entire holding of 1,05,73,800 shares was acquired via interest-free gifts (from relative Shrawan Kumar Sureka) and a 5:1 bonus allotment on February 6, 2025.
p.73, 97What is the scale of related-party transactions, and do they indicate wealth extraction?
Related-party transactions are exceptionally high: sales to group entity Roadwings Western Private Limited accounted for Rs. 4.46 crore (14.46% of revenue) in FY26. Furthermore, as of March 31, 2026, the company had outstanding interest-free advances of Rs. 4.04 crore given to related parties (including Rs. 52.25 lakhs to promoter Pratyaksh Sureka and Rs. 2.41 crore to group company Freightrans Logistics), while simultaneously carrying Rs. 5.94 crore in bank borrowings at interest rates of up to 18.00%.
p.198, F-11, F-18Does the company's operational cash flow support its reported net profit growth?
No, there is a severe cash flow divergence in FY26. While restated PAT grew 88.78% from Rs. 3.11 crore to Rs. 5.86 crore, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) actually declined by 25.96% from Rs. 8.18 crore to Rs. 6.06 crore. This divergence was primarily driven by trade receivables ballooning by 69.85% from Rs. 4.07 crore to Rs. 6.92 crore, with receivable days expanding from 69 days to 82 days.
p.28, F-6, F-7What are the regulatory audit and secretarial discrepancies noted in the prospectus?
The statutory auditors certified that the company did not enable its audit trail (edit log) feature in its accounting software throughout the period from April 1, 2023, to March 31, 2026. Additionally, the company failed to file E-Form-PAS-3 for its 2020 bonus issue for over 5 years, only filing a compounding application with the Regional Director on September 27, 2025.
p.24, 75, F-25What are the trading lot parameters, transaction costs, and liquidity constraints for public investors?
The IPO is structured with a lot size of 2,000 shares at a fixed price of Rs. 60, requiring a minimum retail application of 2 lots (4,000 shares) costing Rs. 2,40,000. Because trading must occur strictly in lots of 2,000 shares and lots are indivisible, partial exit or trading of odd lots is impossible. Prabhat Financial Services Limited is the designated Market Maker with a mandatory 3-year obligation period, and a 5% daily circuit limit is applicable.
p.2, 50, 52, 219What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Initial Subscribers to MOA | ₹10.00 | 1992-01-22 | 6.0x |
| An early round from roughly 35 years ago, at roughly 6.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 1993-03-30 | 6.0x |
| An early round from roughly 34 years ago, at roughly 6.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 1994-03-30 | 6.0x |
| An early round from roughly 33 years ago, at roughly 6.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2002-02-01 | 6.0x |
| An early round from roughly 25 years ago, at roughly 6.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Further Issue Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2005-03-31 | 6.0x |
| An early round from roughly 22 years ago, at roughly 6.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Bhani Ram Sureka, Shrawan Kumar Sureka, Adarsh Sureka | — | 2020-03-25 | — |
| Pratyaksh Sureka & Others | — | 2025-02-06 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 15 Sep 2029promoter3 years3,505,000 shares (20.02% of total)
- 15 Sep 2028promoter2 years3,534,400 shares (20.19% of total)
- 15 Sep 2027promoter1 year3,534,400 shares (20.19% of total)
- 15 Sep 2027promoter group1 year1,246,200 shares (7.12% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.