Anawil Wire & Engineering
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride earnings profile with PAT margin expanding to 25.57% while CFO realization lags at 50% of PAT
- Working capital absorption in inventory (Rs 50.69 Cr) and trade receivables (Rs 38.95 Cr)
- Rs 115.00 Cr of fresh issue proceeds allocated to debt repayment
- Core factory civil construction performed by promoter group company (Darpan Infrastructure) alongside heavy loan flows
- Extreme regional revenue concentration (93.87% in Karnataka)
- Rs 3.67 Cr direct tax demand and recurring ROC secretarial delays
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Anawil Wire and Engineering Limited is an unlisted Indian company engaged in the manufacturing of heavy fabrication components for wind turbine towers, having originally commenced operations in wire mesh production.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Anawil Wire and Engineering Limited commenced commercial operations in April 2021, initially focusing on the production of wire mesh products. Leveraging its expertise in steel fabrication, the company strategically shifted in 2023 into the wind energy sector, specializing in the manufacturing of heavy fabrication components for wind turbine towers. Operations are conducted through manufacturing facilities, including Manufacturing/Factory Unit I in Pardi, Gujarat and a new manufacturing unit in Kutch, Gujarat. Production capacity and facility utilization are certified by an independent Chartered Engineer. The company supplies its heavy fabrication components to original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) and developers operating within the wind energy and renewable energy infrastructure sector. Products and fabricated components are delivered directly from its manufacturing facilities to designated customer project sites across India.
In-house manufacturing facility with a stringent quality control mechanism, strategically located manufacturing plants, and a strong order book.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment and/or pre-payment, in full or part, of borrowing availed by our Company — ₹115.00 cr
- General Corporate Purpose
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 143.2669 | 78.5886 | 54.0665 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 36.6283 | 12.3058 | 4.3918 |
| PAT Margin | 25.57% | 15.66% | 8.12% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 143.27 | 78.59 | 54.07 |
| Other Income | 0.36 | 0.81 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 143.63 | 79.40 | 54.08 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 47.32 | 25.01 | 19.16 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 4.15 | 2.73 | 2.19 |
| Finance Cost | 5.95 | 5.94 | 5.75 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 11.30 | 10.05 | 11.34 |
| Other Expenses | 32.44 | 22.15 | 18.28 |
| Total Expenses | 99.12 | 64.52 | 48.74 |
| Profit Before Tax | 44.50 | 14.88 | 5.34 |
| Tax Expense | 7.88 | 2.57 | 0.95 |
| Profit After Tax | 36.63 | 12.31 | 4.39 |
| EPS - Basic | 19.13 | 6.71 | 2.40 |
| EPS - Diluted | 19.13 | 6.71 | 2.40 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 61.09 | 29.98 | 22.22 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 19.72 | 9.65 | 9.65 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 69.80 | 30.43 | 18.12 |
| Net Worth | 89.51 | 40.08 | 27.77 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 98.44 | 38.98 | 39.85 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 29.80 | 16.13 | 12.00 |
| Total Borrowings | 128.25 | 55.11 | 51.86 |
| Trade Payables | 46.66 | 8.73 | 4.38 |
| Current Liabilities | 103.29 | 35.12 | 21.94 |
| Total Liabilities | 291.62 | 114.42 | 89.64 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 135.90 | 58.86 | 62.99 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 5.85 | 1.24 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.32 | 0.26 | 0.28 |
| Investments | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 50.69 | 12.05 | 10.64 |
| Trade Receivables | 38.95 | 25.17 | 3.83 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1.60 | 0.13 | 0.08 |
| Current Assets | 144.77 | 53.43 | 25.83 |
| Total Assets | 291.62 | 114.42 | 89.64 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 18.44 | 9.66 | 8.89 |
| Capital Expenditure | 93.05 | 7.15 | 6.79 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -97.27 | -7.01 | -6.96 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 80.30 | -2.60 | -1.97 |
| Net Change in Cash | 1.47 | 0.05 | -0.04 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 42.5 | 37.8 | 41.1 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 35.1 | 26.2 | 20.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 25.6 | 15.7 | 8.1 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 40.9 | 30.7 | 15.8 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 23.2 | 21.9 | 13.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 12.6 | 10.8 | 4.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 1.43 | 1.38 | 1.87 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 2.07 | 1.83 | 2.33 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 8.48 | 3.5 | 1.93 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.4 | 1.52 | 1.18 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.91 | 1.18 | 0.69 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.49 | 0.69 | 0.6 |
| Receivable Days | 99 | 117 | 26 |
| Inventory Days | 391 | 176 | 203 |
| Payable Days | 360 | 127 | 83 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 130 | 166 | 146 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.5 | 0.79 | 2.02 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 6.2 | 2.3 | -5 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 8.23 | 0.71 | 0.6 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 25.6% | 15.7% | 8.1% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.49x | 0.69x | 0.6x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 3.26x | 2.86x | 3.23x |
| = Return on Equity | 40.9% | 30.7% | 15.8% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.82x | 0.83x | 0.82x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.88x | 0.71x | 0.48x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 35.2% | 26.5% | 20.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Receivable days rose from 26 in FY24 to 99 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 165% while profit grew 734%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 8.48x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.849 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.018 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.823 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.9 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.807 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.068 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0624 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.45 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.142 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.239 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.173 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.307 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.45 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
5 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹2.6 cr in FY25, ₹18.2 cr in FY26
- ○Receivable days rising · 117 days in FY25, 99 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 176 days in FY25, 391 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 20.5% of revenue in FY25, 37.4% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 17.1% of net block in FY25, 8.3% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 154.9% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 89.51 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.05x
Short-term borrowings of 29.80 cr against cash of 1.60 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 0.9%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.34 cr against a profit of 36.63 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹270.00, the market value is ₹675 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹67.5 cr | 1.8x | 4.4 | 2.7 |
| 12% a year | ₹81.0 cr | 2.2x | 5.7 | 3.6 |
| 14% a year | ₹94.5 cr | 2.6x | 6.8 | 4.2 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 5.43% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -11.05% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹74.6 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth36.63 ÷ 89.51What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)50.45 ÷ (89.51 + 128.25) = 50.45 ÷ 217.76Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue61.09 ÷ 143.27Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth128.25 ÷ 89.51How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost50.45 ÷ 5.95How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(38.95 ÷ 143.27) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days391 + 99 − 360How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT18.44 ÷ 36.63Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(36.63 − 18.44) ÷ 291.62 = 18.19 ÷ 291.62The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹270.00 × 24,999,800 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash674.99 + 128.25 − 1.60What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA801.65 ÷ 61.09The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT674.99 ÷ 36.63The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹36.63 cr ÷ ₹674.99 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-74.61 cr ÷ ₹674.99 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)18.43 ÷ 197.7%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Pre-IPO Margin Expansion Unmatched by Operating Cash Generation
Anawil Wire and Engineering demonstrated rapid top-line growth to Rs 143.27 Cr in FY26, with PAT margin expanding from 8.12% in FY24 to 25.57% in FY26 (PAT of Rs 36.63 Cr). However, operating cash flow conversion lagged at Rs 18.44 Cr due to heavy capital lockup in inventory (Rs 50.69 Cr) and trade receivables (Rs 38.95 Cr), signaling aggressive pre-IPO earnings recognition.
Source: p. 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 168, 169, 170, 171, 211, 212Public Capital Solicits Balance Sheet Debt Clearance
The objects of the fresh issue specify Rs 115.00 Cr for the repayment/pre-payment of bank debt out of total borrowings of Rs 128.25 Cr. Rather than channeling capital into capacity expansion or R&D, the public issue functions primarily as a debt deleveraging mechanism.
Source: p. 74, 75, 224, 239Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi
Litigation: Pending material litigation against Company: 1 case amounting to Rs 0.04 Cr. Direct Tax proceedings against Company: 1 case amounting to Rs 3.6725 Cr. Pending criminal proceedings against Group Company (Darpan Infrastructure Pvt Ltd): 1 case (amount unascertainable). Litigation involving Promoters and Directors: Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In FY26, the company reported a tripling of PAT to Rs 36.63 Cr (up from Rs 12.31 Cr in FY25 and Rs 4.39 Cr in FY24), with PAT margins expanding to 25.57% (from 8.12% in FY24). However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) lagged significantly at Rs 18.44 Cr (approx. 50% of PAT) due to inventory ballooning to Rs 50.69 Cr (up from Rs 12.05 Cr in FY25) and trade receivables increasing to Rs 38.95 Cr.
p. 44, 45, 46, 47 and 7 moreThe objects of the offer allocate Rs 115.00 Cr from the fresh issue proceeds towards full or partial repayment/pre-payment of outstanding borrowings, against total borrowings of Rs 128.25 Cr as of FY26.
p. 74, 75, 224, 239Group entity Darpan Infrastructure Private Limited executed core civil construction for factory fixed assets (Rs 1.2767 Cr in FY26, Rs 4.9871 Cr in FY24) and provided corporate guarantees (commission Rs 0.9760 Cr in FY26). Additionally, substantial circular loan movements took place with promoter Nimish Vashi (Rs 14.42 Cr loan taken / Rs 10.40 Cr repaid) and Darpan Infrastructure (Rs 5.76 Cr loan repaid).
p. 48, 211, 212In FY26, 93.87% of total revenue from operations (Rs 134.49 Cr out of Rs 143.27 Cr) was generated from a single state (Karnataka), down slightly from 99.95% in FY25.
p. 67, 186The company disclosed recurring delays in secretarial ROC filings, including form PAS-3 (delayed up to 78 days), AOC-4 (up to 22 days), MGT-14 (up to 48 days), and DIR-12 (up to 33 days). In FY26, the company incurred Rs 0.1596 Cr in interest on delayed tax payments and faces an active direct tax demand proceeding of Rs 3.6725 Cr.
p. 20, 210, 215, 240 and 1 moreOn April 25, 2025, sixteen months prior to the offer, the company issued 86,85,000 bonus equity shares in the ratio of 9:10, bringing promoter Nimish Vashi's average cost of acquisition to Rs 7.65 per share.
p. 62, 67, 139The company reported FY26 revenue of Rs 143.27 Cr, EBITDA of Rs 61.09 Cr, and Net Worth of Rs 89.51 Cr, while structuring post-issue capital at 24,999,800 shares (Rs 25.00 Cr capital) to qualify for SME platform listing under Regulation 229(2).
p. 41, 50, 61, 87 and 2 morePending material litigation against Company: 1 case amounting to Rs 0.04 Cr. Direct Tax proceedings against Company: 1 case amounting to Rs 3.6725 Cr. Pending criminal proceedings against Group Company (Darpan Infrastructure Pvt Ltd): 1 case (amount unascertainable). Litigation involving Promoters and Directors: Nil.
p. 6, 20, 47, 65 and 6 moreShort-term borrowings of ₹29.80 cr against cash of ₹1.60 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While the company operates manufacturing facilities in Pardi and Kutch, civil construction of factory fixed assets is executed by promoter-controlled Darpan Infrastructure Private Limited, and operations shifted to wind turbine components only in 2023 from wire mesh manufacturing.
p. 85, 112, 188, 212Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (16 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue proceeds being deployed?
The company has allocated Rs 115.00 Cr of the fresh issue proceeds towards repayment or pre-payment of outstanding borrowings, with the balance earmarked for general corporate purposes.
p. 74, 75, 80Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi, Ayush Nimish Vashi, Bhavin Navinchandra Desai, and Bijal Nimesh Vashi, holding 89.35% pre-issue. Nimish Vashi's average cost of acquisition is Rs 7.65 per share, and other promoters' cost is Rs 5.26 per share, following a 9:10 bonus issue in April 2025.
p. 65, 69, 72, 139Are there material related party transactions or promoter entity dependencies?
Yes. Group entity Darpan Infrastructure Private Limited executed factory civil construction (Rs 1.2767 Cr in FY26) and provided corporate guarantees (commission Rs 0.9760 Cr). In addition, substantial loan movements occurred with promoter Nimish Vashi (Rs 14.42 Cr taken / Rs 10.40 Cr repaid) and Darpan Infrastructure (Rs 5.76 Cr repaid).
p. 48, 211, 212Does operating cash flow align with reported profits?
No. In FY26, despite reported PAT tripling to Rs 36.63 Cr, operating cash flow (CFO) was only Rs 18.44 Cr. The cash conversion lag was driven by working capital absorption, as inventory expanded to Rs 50.69 Cr and trade receivables reached Rs 38.95 Cr.
p. 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 168, 169, 170, 171, 211, 212What structural market parameters apply to this offer?
The offer comprises a Fresh Issue of 5,284,800 shares and an OFS of 1,300,800 shares. Hem Finlease Private Limited acts as the market maker with 3,31,200 shares reserved. Post-issue capital is structured at Rs 25.00 Cr (24,999,800 shares), placing it at the upper threshold for the SME NSE Emerge platform.
p. 41, 50, 61, 87What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Bhavin Navinchandra Desai | ₹10.00 | Upon Incorporation | 27.0x |
| Ayush Nimish Vashi | ₹10.00 | Upon Incorporation | 27.0x |
| Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi | ₹10.00 | 2022-01-25 | 27.0x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 27.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Existing Shareholders | ₹19.00 | 2022-06-01 | 14.2x |
| An early round from roughly 4 years ago, at roughly 14.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Existing Shareholders | ₹19.00 | 2022-06-30 | 14.2x |
| An early round from roughly 4 years ago, at roughly 14.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Darpan Infrastructure Private Limited | ₹19.00 | 2022-07-30 | 14.2x |
| An early round from roughly 4 years ago, at roughly 14.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Darpan Infrastructure Private Limited | ₹19.00 | 2022-08-19 | 14.2x |
| An early round from roughly 4 years ago, at roughly 14.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Existing Shareholders | ₹19.00 | 2022-09-19 | 14.2x |
| An early round from roughly 4 years ago, at roughly 14.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi | ₹19.00 | 2023-11-30 | 14.2x |
| Bijal Nimesh Vashi | ₹10.00 | 2024-09-27 | 27.0x |
| Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi | — | 2025-04-25 | — |
| Ayush Nimish Vashi | — | 2025-04-25 | — |
| Bhavin Navinchandra Desai | — | 2025-04-25 | — |
| Bijal Nimesh Vashi | — | 2025-04-25 | — |
| Mukul Mahavir Agrawal | ₹101.00 | 2025-08-23 | 2.7x |
| India-Ahead Venture Fund | ₹101.00 | 2025-09-04 | 2.7x |
| Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi | ₹101.00 | 2025-09-08 | 2.7x |
| Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi | ₹101.00 | 2025-09-09 | 2.7x |
| Nimish Kumar Rameshchandra Vashi | ₹101.00 | 2025-09-09 | 2.7x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 10 Aug 2029promoter3 years from the date of allotment of Equity Shares issued pursuant to this Offer5,000,000 shares (20% of total)
- 10 Aug 2076promoter50% of pre-offer promoter's holding Equity Shares shall be locked in for a period of two years5,657,072 shares
- 10 Aug 2076promoterremaining 50% of pre-offer promoter's holding equity shares shall be locked in for a period of one year5,657,071 shares
- 10 Aug 2027otherone year from the date of allotment of Equity Shares in this Offer1,352,057 shares
- 10 Aug 2027financial investorat least one year from the date of purchase748,000 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
