Amtech Esters
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Trade receivables expanded by 48.57% in FY26, far exceeding revenue growth of 10.26%.
- Substantial family promoter group remuneration of ~Rs. 0.91 crore (~21.5% of FY26 PAT).
- Minor GST Show Cause Notice of Rs. 0.1870 crore pending under Section 73.
- Bonus issue of 32.23 lakh shares allotted to promoters 7 months prior to IPO.
- Clean operating cash flow conversion with FY26 CFO standing at Rs. 4.15 crore on PAT of Rs. 4.22 crore.
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Amtech Esters Limited is a B2B manufacturer of Unsaturated Polyester Resins (UPRs) and trader of complementary products including fiber resin, hardeners, silicones, and ancillary products.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Amtech Esters Limited operates in the B2B specialty chemicals industry, specializing in the manufacturing of Unsaturated Polyester Resins (UPRs) and trading of complementary products such as fiber resins, hardeners, silicones, and ancillary materials. The company's manufacturing facility is located in Bahadurgarh, Jhajjar, Haryana, with an installed capacity of 2,960 MTPA across two reactor vessels. Its products serve diverse end-user industries including automotive components, paints and coatings, electrical switchgears, apparel accessories, FRP sheets, and decorative items. In Fiscal 2024, the company acquired Croda Pigments Private Limited (CPPL) as a wholly owned subsidiary to vertically integrate into pigment manufacturing. Sales are distributed primarily through direct B2B channels and distribution networks across India, with Delhi accounting for 27.30% of FY26 revenue. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, manufacturing operations contributed 36.52 crore (89.78% of revenue) while trading contributed 4.16 crore (10.22% of revenue).
Diversified product portfolio of 79 SKUs across UPRs, pigments, and trading products, forward integration with wholly owned subsidiary CPPL for pigment manufacturing, established supplier relationships, and experienced management.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Investment in wholly owned subsidiary (Croda Pigments Private Limited) by way of debt towards capital expenditure requirements — ₹3.41 cr
- Investment in wholly owned subsidiary (Croda Pigments Private Limited) by way of debt to meet incremental working capital requirements — ₹5.40 cr
- Repayment or prepayment, in full or in part, of certain borrowings availed by our Company — ₹4.20 cr
- Funding inorganic growth through unidentified acquisitions and general corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
78% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 40.6712 | 36.8869 | 24.6037 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 4.2228 | 3.7222 | 2.8371 |
| PAT Margin | 10.38% | 10.09% | 11.53% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 40.67 | 36.89 | 24.60 |
| Other Income | 0.08 | 0.08 | 2.64 |
| Total Income | 40.75 | 36.97 | 27.24 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 24.21 | 22.73 | 15.16 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 4.87 | 4.36 | 3.66 |
| Changes in Inventories | -0.49 | -0.39 | 0.07 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 2.59 | 2.21 | 2.23 |
| Finance Cost | 0.33 | 0.45 | 0.43 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.50 | 0.98 | 0.46 |
| Other Expenses | 2.00 | 1.47 | 1.83 |
| Total Expenses | 35.01 | 31.81 | 23.84 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 5.75 | 5.16 | 3.40 |
| Profit Before Tax | 5.75 | 5.16 | 3.40 |
| Tax Expense | 1.46 | 1.36 | 0.55 |
| Profit After Tax | 4.22 | 3.72 | 2.84 |
| EPS - Basic | 6.55 | 5.78 | 4.40 |
| EPS - Diluted | 6.55 | 5.78 | 4.40 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 6.45 | 3.22 | 3.22 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 13.14 | 12.14 | 8.41 |
| Net Worth | 19.58 | 15.36 | 11.64 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.17 | 0.40 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 3.41 | 3.82 | 4.09 |
| Total Borrowings | 3.41 | 3.99 | 4.49 |
| Trade Payables | 6.76 | 4.26 | 4.02 |
| Current Liabilities | 14.32 | 11.90 | 12.35 |
| Total Liabilities | 14.63 | 12.31 | 13.03 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 7.13 | 7.13 | 4.87 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 1.88 | 0.52 | 1.12 |
| Intangible Assets | 3.02 | 3.02 | 3.02 |
| Investments | 1.18 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 4.63 | 3.43 | 2.65 |
| Trade Receivables | 10.24 | 6.89 | 4.67 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1.63 | 2.37 | 3.77 |
| Current Assets | 19.76 | 14.26 | 13.40 |
| Total Assets | 34.47 | 27.86 | 24.79 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 4.15 | 2.72 | 1.97 |
| Capital Expenditure | -2.85 | -3.18 | -8.77 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -3.99 | -3.18 | -1.36 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -0.91 | -0.94 | 3.11 |
| Net Change in Cash | -0.75 | -1.40 | 3.72 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 18.6 | 17.8 | 15.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 14.9 | 15.2 | 14.1 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 10.4 | 10.1 | 11.5 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 21.6 | 24.2 | 24.4 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 26.4 | 29 | 23.7 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 12.3 | 13.4 | 11.4 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.17 | 0.26 | 0.39 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.24 | 0.25 | 0.17 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 18.52 | 12.57 | 9 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.38 | 1.2 | 1.09 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.06 | 0.91 | 0.87 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.18 | 1.32 | 0.99 |
| Receivable Days | 92 | 68 | 69 |
| Inventory Days | 42 | 34 | 39 |
| Payable Days | 61 | 42 | 60 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 73 | 60 | 48 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.98 | 0.73 | 0.7 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 0.2 | 3.6 | 3.5 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.91 | 3.25 | 19.26 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 10.4% | 10.1% | 11.5% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.18x | 1.32x | 0.99x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.76x | 1.81x | 2.13x |
| = Return on Equity | 21.6% | 24.2% | 24.4% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.73x | 0.72x | 0.83x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.92x | 0.89x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 14.9% | 15.2% | 15.6% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 0.98x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Receivable days rose from 69 in FY24 to 92 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 18.52x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -2.15An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.347 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.948 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.948 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.103 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.695 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.13 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.959 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0021 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = -2.15, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.12 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.158 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.381 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.176 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.338 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.12 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 19.58 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.48x
Short-term borrowings of 3.41 cr against cash of 1.63 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 9.2%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.39 cr against a profit of 4.22 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth4.22 ÷ 19.58What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)6.08 ÷ (19.58 + 3.41) = 6.08 ÷ 22.99Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue7.57 ÷ 40.67Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth3.41 ÷ 19.58How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost6.08 ÷ 0.33How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(10.24 ÷ 40.67) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days42 + 92 − 61How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT4.15 ÷ 4.22Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(4.22 − 4.15) ÷ 34.47 = 0.07 ÷ 34.47The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹75.00 × 8,829,168 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash66.22 + 3.41 − 1.63What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA68.00 ÷ 7.57The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT66.22 ÷ 4.22The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)15.68 ÷ 13.4%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
CPPL Subsidiary Debt Routing: Deploying 49% of IPO Proceeds into Unlisted Subsidiary
Amtech Esters Limited is allocating Rs. 8.8142 crore (49.29% of fresh issue proceeds) as loan/debt to its wholly owned subsidiary Croda Pigments Private Limited (CPPL)—comprising Rs. 3.4142 crore for CPPL's capex and Rs. 5.4000 crore for CPPL's working capital. While CPPL provides forward integration into pigment manufacturing, routing half the public capital as inter-company debt puts group returns heavily on CPPL's ramp-up execution.
Source: p.84, 138Receivables Expansion Outpacing Revenue Growth
While revenue grew by 10.26% in FY26 (from Rs. 36.89 crore to Rs. 40.67 crore), trade receivables expanded by 48.57% (from Rs. 6.89 crore to Rs. 10.24 crore). This pushed trade receivable days from 57 days in FY25 to 77 days in FY26, indicating that the company is granting extended credit terms to sustain its top-line growth.
Source: p.50, 195, 196Promoter Family Remuneration Drains 21.5% of Net Profits
In FY26, total remuneration paid to promoter directors and their relatives (Avtar Singh Bawa, Harvind Singh Bawa, Gurveen Kaur Bawa, and Anjali Bansal) totaled Rs. 0.9070 crore against restated PAT of Rs. 4.2228 crore. Extracting over one-fifth of net profits as family remuneration represents a significant ongoing cash distribution to the promoter group.
Source: p.50, 55Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Ajit Singh Bawa
Litigation: Indirect Tax (GST Delhi) Show Cause Notice under Section 73 for Rs. 0.1870 crore (Rs. 18.70 lakhs) involving CGST, SGST, IGST, interest and penalty for FY23. Direct Tax demand under Section 143(1)(a) against non-promoter Director Paras Suri for Rs. 0.0013 crore (Rs. 0.13 lakhs) for AY 2018-19. Criminal, civil, or statutory actions against Company/Promoters/Subsidiary: NIL.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
On February 19, 2026, the company allotted 32,22,584 bonus shares at Rs. 0.0 to Ajit Singh Bawa & Others (Promoter Group), expanding the share capital from 3.22 crore to 6.45 crore just seven months prior to the IPO offering.
p.68In FY26, trade receivables expanded by 48.57% (from Rs. 6.89 crore to Rs. 10.24 crore) while revenue from operations grew by only 10.26% (from Rs. 36.89 crore to Rs. 40.67 crore), leading to a drop in receivables turnover ratio from 6.38x to 4.75x.
p.50, 195, 196The company is subject to a GST Show Cause Notice from GST Delhi under Section 73 for Rs. 0.1870 crore (Rs. 18.70 lakhs) involving CGST, SGST, IGST, interest, and penalties for FY 2022-23.
p.211, 212The company states in its offer document that there are no comparable listed companies in India operating in the same line of business (Unsaturated Polyester Resins and Pigments manufacturing/trading).
p.100, 101Indirect Tax (GST Delhi) Show Cause Notice under Section 73 for Rs. 0.1870 crore (Rs. 18.70 lakhs) involving CGST, SGST, IGST, interest and penalty for FY23. Direct Tax demand under Section 143(1)(a) against non-promoter Director Paras Suri for Rs. 0.0013 crore (Rs. 0.13 lakhs) for AY 2018-19. Criminal, civil, or statutory actions against Company/Promoters/Subsidiary: NIL.
p. 2, 57, 162, 177 and 2 moreGoodwill and intangibles are 15.4% of net worth.
rule: intangibles 15-30% of net worthTrade receivables grew 48.6% against revenue growth of 10.3% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthShort-term borrowings of ₹3.41 cr against cash of ₹1.63 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
In FY26, CPPL contributed Rs. 9.82 crore in manufacturing revenue (24.14% of total revenue) and pigment operations yielded higher margins. However, CPPL requires significant debt infusion from IPO proceeds (Rs. 3.41 crore for capex and Rs. 5.40 crore for working capital) to scale operations.
p.84, 136, 138While the product portfolio spans 79 SKUs across UPRs, pigments, and traded hardeners, revenue concentration remains notable with Delhi accounting for 27.30% of total sales, and trade receivables days expanding from 57 days in FY25 to 77 days in FY26.
p.136, 195, 196Current plant utilization at Bahadurgarh reached 83.38% in FY26 (up from 53.39% in FY24), justifying the need for additional resin capacity to support CPPL's pigment manufacturing and external UPR sales.
p.29, 90, 136Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Maashitla Securities
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (23 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
What is the detailed breakdown of IPO proceeds, and how much is deployed into the subsidiary vs debt repayment?
Out of the total issue proceeds, Rs. 3.4142 crore is allocated as debt to subsidiary Croda Pigments Private Limited (CPPL) for capex, Rs. 5.4000 crore as debt to CPPL for incremental working capital, Rs. 4.1973 crore for prepayment/repayment of company borrowings, and the balance for general corporate purposes and issue expenses.
p.84What is the promoters' shareholding pre and post-issue, and what is their cost of acquisition?
Promoters Ajit Singh Bawa, Gurpreet Kaur Bawa, and Meenakshi Sharma hold 49.69% pre-issue, which dilutes to 36.27% post-issue. Total promoter and promoter group pre-issue holding is 76.72%. Bonus shares were issued in February 2026 at Rs. Nil cost.
p.68, 71, 73What are the key related-party transactions, and what is the total remuneration paid to the promoter family?
Key related-party transactions include purchases of Rs. 0.7398 crore from promoter-owned Croda Enterprises. Total remuneration paid to the promoter family (directors Ajit Singh Bawa and Gurpreet Kaur Bawa, plus four relatives) was Rs. 0.9070 crore in FY26, representing 21.48% of restated PAT.
p.55How well does reported net profit convert into operating cash flow?
Cash flow conversion is strong. In FY26, restated PAT was Rs. 4.2228 crore and Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) was Rs. 4.1506 crore (98.29% conversion). In FY25, PAT was Rs. 3.7222 crore and CFO was Rs. 2.7153 crore (72.95% conversion).
p.50, 52What are the key secretarial and statutory tax compliance findings for the issuer?
Statutory CARO disclosures note minor GSTR-3B filing delays (2 to 7 days) across units, and historic filing delays for ROC forms AOC-4, MGT-14, and ADT-1. There is a pending GST Show Cause Notice under Section 73 for Rs. 0.1870 crore for FY23.
p.21, 28, 211, 212What are the lot size, application cost, market maker terms, and liquidity constraints for public investors?
The IPO issue price band is Rs. 71.00 to Rs. 75.00 per share with a market lot size of 1,600 shares, requiring a minimum retail application of 2 lots (3,200 shares) amounting to Rs. 2,40,000 at cap price. Trading occurs strictly in lot sizes of 1,600 shares, and because lots are indivisible, partial exit or trading of fractional lots is impossible. Nikunj Stock Brokers Limited is the Market Maker with a reserved quota of 1,20,000 shares (5.03%) and a mandatory 3-year obligation period. Standard SME circuit limits of 5% apply.
p.2, 8, 47, 62What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Avtar Singh Bawa, Ajit Singh Bawa | ₹10.00 | 2002-05-21 | 7.5x |
| An early round from roughly 25 years ago, at roughly 7.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Avtar Singh Bawa & Others | ₹10.00 | 2003-09-30 | 7.5x |
| An early round from roughly 23 years ago, at roughly 7.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Ajit Singh Bawa & Others | — | 2023-02-15 | — |
| Ajit Singh Bawa & Others | — | 2023-09-30 | — |
| Ajit Singh Bawa & Others | — | 2026-02-19 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 2 entries | |||
| Ambey Suppliers Pvt Ltd & Another | ₹200.00 | 2010-02-01 | as disclosed |
| Mandeep Singh & Others | ₹239.00 | 2023-03-31 | as disclosed |
The 2 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 17 Sep 2029promoter3 years1,765,800 shares (20% of total)
- 17 Sep 2028promoter2 years718,400 shares (8.13% of total)
- 17 Sep 2027promoter group and public1 year3,957,168 shares (44.82% of total)
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.