Aegeus Technologies
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride profile: PAT nearly tripled in FY26 while CFO turned negative (-Rs 1.51 Cr) due to trade receivables reaching Rs 15.77 Cr
- Statutory auditor resignation in FY25 and auditor Emphasis of Matter on non-functional audit trail software
- Extreme FEMA non-compliance (1,674 days delay) penalized by RBI compounding order
- Inconsistent reporting basis (FY26 Consolidated vs FY25/FY24 Standalone)
- Chronic secretarial ROC and monthly PF return filing delays
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Aegeus Technologies Limited designs and develops advanced robotic and intelligent automation solutions for the solar energy industry, focusing on waterless robotic cleaning and O&M automation.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Aegeus Technologies Limited designs and develops advanced robotic and intelligent automation solutions for the solar energy industry, with a focus on waterless robotic cleaning and O&M automation. Headquartered in Bengaluru, the company operates two integrated manufacturing facilities in Bengaluru for the design, assembly, and testing of autonomous systems. Utilizing robotics, AI, ML, and IoT, it offers a suite of solutions for automating solar plant operations and maintenance. Its flagship cleaning robots, Unicorn and Shreem, serve ground-mounted and rooftop solar power plants. The company maintains technological leadership through patented technologies across multiple countries to deliver solutions to solar developers and O&M providers. Manufacturing operations are conducted across two leased facilities located at Harapanahalli Village, Anekal Taluk, Bengaluru, alongside a corporate office at JP Nagar, Bengaluru. Products and services are delivered to customers both within India and in international markets outside India.
Patented technologies across multiple countries, proprietary waterless robotic cleaning solutions (Unicorn and Shreem), and in-house R&D and manufacturing capabilities in solar panel cleaning and O&M automation.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Investment in Product Development. — ₹2.86 cr
- Funding Capital Expenditure towards Setting up of Manufacturing Facility through Purchase of Land and Civil Works. — ₹5.74 cr
- To meet out the expenses for Working Capital to fund business growth — ₹8.00 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 40.9369 | 21.8901 | 15.2739 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 4.0177 | 1.3918 | 0.9287 |
| PAT Margin | 9.81% | 6.36% | 6.08% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 40.94 | 21.89 | 15.27 |
| Other Income | 0.28 | 0.01 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 41.22 | 21.90 | 15.28 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 12.32 | 9.58 | 8.05 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 5.46 | 3.36 | 2.24 |
| Finance Cost | 1.35 | 1.00 | 0.47 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.36 | 0.35 | 0.31 |
| Other Expenses | 17.18 | 6.14 | 3.34 |
| Total Expenses | 35.80 | 20.00 | 14.36 |
| Profit Before Tax | 5.42 | 1.90 | 0.92 |
| Tax Expense | 1.40 | 0.50 | -0.01 |
| Profit After Tax | 4.02 | 1.39 | 0.93 |
| EPS - Basic | 6.57 | 2.40 | 1.68 |
| EPS - Diluted | 6.57 | 2.40 | 1.68 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 6.48 | 3.13 | 1.66 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 6.12 | 6.12 | 0.02 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 9.28 | 5.30 | 5.82 |
| Net Worth | 15.40 | 11.42 | 5.83 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 3.10 | 2.37 | 1.20 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 8.82 | 1.73 | 2.96 |
| Total Borrowings | 11.93 | 4.10 | 4.16 |
| Trade Payables | 4.31 | 3.09 | 2.31 |
| Current Liabilities | 20.46 | 8.02 | 6.37 |
| Total Liabilities | 39.36 | 22.09 | 13.56 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 0.90 | 0.76 | 0.79 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.24 | 0.46 | 0.68 |
| Inventories | 4.53 | 3.17 | 2.39 |
| Trade Receivables | 15.77 | 8.05 | 4.85 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.35 | 1.66 | 0.25 |
| Current Assets | 25.58 | 14.37 | 8.32 |
| Total Assets | 39.36 | 22.09 | 13.56 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -1.51 | 1.05 | -0.70 |
| Capital Expenditure | 6.20 | 2.81 | 2.20 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -6.19 | -2.78 | -2.06 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 6.40 | 3.13 | 2.99 |
| Net Change in Cash | -1.30 | 1.40 | 0.22 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 15.7 | 14.3 | 10.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 16.4 | 13.2 | 9.1 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 9.8 | 6.4 | 6.1 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 26.1 | 12.2 | 15.9 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 24.7 | 18.7 | 13.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 10.2 | 6.3 | 6.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.77 | 0.36 | 0.71 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.79 | 0.78 | 2.36 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 5.02 | 2.9 | 2.95 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.25 | 1.79 | 1.31 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.03 | 1.4 | 0.93 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.04 | 0.99 | 1.13 |
| Receivable Days | 141 | 134 | 116 |
| Inventory Days | 134 | 121 | 108 |
| Payable Days | 128 | 118 | 105 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 147 | 137 | 119 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.38 | 0.75 | -0.76 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 14 | 1.6 | 12 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 17.29 | 7.96 | 6.99 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 9.8% | 6.4% | 6.1% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.04x | 0.99x | 1.13x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.56x | 1.93x | 2.32x |
| = Return on Equity | 26.1% | 12.2% | 15.9% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.73x | 1.01x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.8x | 0.65x | 0.66x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 16.5% | 13.2% | 9.1% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 4.02 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -1.51 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 116 in FY24 to 141 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.21An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.048 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.804 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 1.038 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.87 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.117 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.274 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.274 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1405 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.21, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.44 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.13 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.236 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.172 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.391 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.44 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
5 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
6 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹0.3 cr in FY25, ₹5.5 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 134 days in FY25, 141 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 121 days in FY25, 134 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 6.9% of revenue in FY25, 12.0% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 46.7% of net block in FY25, 39.8% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 78.2% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 87% in FY26, against 43% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.38x profit in FY26, against 0.75x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 15.40 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.04x
Short-term borrowings of 8.82 cr against cash of 0.35 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 13.9%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.56 cr against a profit of 4.02 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹105.00, the market value is ₹87.9 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹8.8 cr | 2.2x | 5.6 | 3.5 |
| 12% a year | ₹10.6 cr | 2.6x | 6.9 | 4.3 |
| 14% a year | ₹12.3 cr | 3.1x | 8.0 | 5.0 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 4.57% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -8.77% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹7.7 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth4.02 ÷ 15.40What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)6.76 ÷ (15.40 + 11.93) = 6.76 ÷ 27.33Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue6.48 ÷ 40.94Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth11.93 ÷ 15.40How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost6.76 ÷ 1.35How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(15.77 ÷ 40.94) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days134 + 141 − 128How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-1.51 ÷ 4.02Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(4.02 − -1.51) ÷ 39.36 = 5.53 ÷ 39.36The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹105.00 × 8,374,593 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash87.93 + 11.93 − 0.35What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA99.50 ÷ 6.48The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT87.93 ÷ 4.02The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹4.02 cr ÷ ₹87.93 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-7.71 cr ÷ ₹87.93 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)21.89 ÷ 188.7%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Profit Growth Diverges from Cash Conversion amid Receivables Lockup
Aegeus Technologies reported a sharp 3x increase in PAT to Rs 4.02 Cr in FY26. However, operating cash flow collapsed into negative territory at Rs -1.51 Cr, as trade receivables expanded to Rs 15.77 Cr. This indicates that recent revenue and profit growth are tied up in uncollected customer balances.
Source: p. 62, 63, 64, 65, 118, 121, 218, 221Auditor Turnover, Audit Trail Lapses, and Extreme RBI Compounding Penalty
The filing discloses multiple governance issues: statutory auditor M/s Rakchamps & Co LLP resigned in March 2025, and the FY25 auditor report flagged that audit trail features in the accounting software were non-functional. Additionally, severe FEMA compliance delays exceeding 4.5 years resulted in an RBI compounding order and monetary penalty.
Source: p. 35, 38, 73, 217, 254, 255Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Suraj Vernekar'D
Litigation: Direct Tax against Company: 0.4946 Crore (Order u/s 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act rejecting condonation of delay for A.Y. 2020-21 to claim carry forward of business loss amounting to Rs 49.46 Lakhs). Promoters/Directors/KMPs/Subsidiaries: Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Emphasis of Matter in FY25 auditor's report noting that the company needs to strengthen its documentation of Loans and Borrowings and Term Deposits, and non-operational feature of audit trail in accounting software throughout FY25.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In FY26, the company reported a nearly 3x increase in PAT to Rs 4.02 Cr (up from Rs 1.39 Cr in FY25 and Rs 0.93 Cr in FY24) and PAT margin expansion to 9.81% (up from 6.36% in FY25). However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) collapsed to negative Rs -1.51 Cr (down from positive Rs 1.05 Cr in FY25), driven by trade receivables nearly doubling to Rs 15.77 Cr (representing ~38.5% of annual revenue).
p. 62, 63, 64, 65 and 5 moreStatutory auditor M/s Rakchamps & Co LLP resigned on March 6, 2025, due to pre-occupation, leading to the casual vacancy appointment of M/s A G R A and Co. Furthermore, the auditor report for FY25 contained an Emphasis of Matter noting that the feature of audit trail in the accounting software was non-functional throughout FY25, alongside the need to strengthen documentation for loans, borrowings, and term deposits.
p. 73, 217, 254, 255The company incurred severe delays in FEMA FC-GPR compliance (delayed by up to 1,674 days), resulting in an RBI compounding order C.A. BGL 1128/2025 imposing a penalty of Rs 87,708 remitted on January 19, 2026. Additionally, the company disclosed chronic delays in filing monthly Provident Fund (PF) returns across FY24, FY25, and FY26 (delays up to 72 days) and extensive secretarial ROC filing delays (ADT-1 delayed up to 158 days, DPT-3 up to 425 days, CHG-4 up to 347 days).
p. 34, 35, 38, 295The restated financial information presents FY26 on a Consolidated basis (including overseas subsidiary Solar Robotic Company), whereas FY25 and FY24 are presented on a Standalone basis.
p. 62, 63, 64, 65 and 3 moreOn September 23, 2024, the company executed a 350:1 bonus issue by capitalising free reserves, allotting 55,10,050 equity shares. Consequently, the promoters' weighted average cost of acquisition stands at Rs 3.54 per share for Suraj Vernekar'D, Rs 0.03 for Roopa Vernekar, and Rs 4.93 for Nishith Rameshchandra Shah.
p. 78, 81, 92, 124The company's post-issue paid-up equity capital is 83,74,593 shares of face value Rs 10 each (Rs 8.37 Cr capital), keeping it within the Rs 25.00 Cr threshold under Regulation 229(1) of SEBI ICDR Regulations for listing on the BSE SME platform.
p. 8, 48, 60, 67 and 2 moreDirect Tax against Company: 0.4946 Crore (Order u/s 119(2)(b) of the Income Tax Act rejecting condonation of delay for A.Y. 2020-21 to claim carry forward of business loss amounting to Rs 49.46 Lakhs). Promoters/Directors/KMPs/Subsidiaries: Nil.
p. 2, 26, 39, 40 and 6 moreEmphasis of Matter in FY25 auditor's report noting that the company needs to strengthen its documentation of Loans and Borrowings and Term Deposits, and non-operational feature of audit trail in accounting software throughout FY25.
p. 2, 26, 39, 40 and 6 moreOperating cash flow was negative ₹1.51 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹4.02 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Short-term borrowings of ₹8.82 cr against cash of ₹0.35 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
While the company holds patents in multiple countries and operates two leased facilities in Bengaluru, capacity utilization for its flagship Shreem robot remained low at 21.79% in FY26 (17 units produced out of 78 installed capacity), and Unicorn Smart utilization stood at 26.67%.
p. 27, 28, 184, 187Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Skyline Financial Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (17 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh issue proceeds being allocated?
The fresh issue proceeds are allocated towards meeting working capital requirements (Rs 8.00 Cr), capital expenditure for setting up a manufacturing facility through land purchase and civil works (Rs 5.74 Cr), investment in product development (Rs 2.86 Cr), and general corporate purposes.
p. 96, 110Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Suraj Vernekar'D, Roopa Vernekar, and Nishith Rameshchandra Shah, who collectively hold 64.75% pre-issue. Due to a 350:1 bonus issue in September 2024, their average acquisition costs are Rs 3.54, Rs 0.03, and Rs 4.93 per share, respectively.
p. 45, 78, 84, 92, 124Are there material related party transactions or director loan movements?
Yes. In FY26, managing director Suraj Vernekar'D provided unsecured loans of Rs 1.72 Cr to the company, and director Nishith Shah provided loans of Rs 0.58 Cr. Director remuneration to Suraj Vernekar'D stood at Rs 0.56 Cr.
p. 39, 62, 306, 307, 308Does operating cash flow align with reported net profit?
No. In FY26, despite reported net profit expanding to Rs 4.02 Cr, Cash Flow from Operations was negative at Rs -1.51 Cr. This disconnect was driven by working capital lockup, as trade receivables expanded to Rs 15.77 Cr.
p. 62, 63, 64, 65, 118, 121What structural market parameters apply to this offer?
The offer consists of a Fresh Issue of 22,58,400 equity shares on the BSE SME platform. Prabhat Financial Services Limited acts as the market maker with 3,25,200 shares reserved. Application lot size is 1,200 shares (above Rs 2 Lakhs minimum investment), with 20% circuit filters applying post-listing.
p. 8, 18, 48, 60, 67, 72, 302, 345What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Subscribers to MOA (Suraj Vernekar’D, Roopa Vernekar, Praful Bhimsen Roogi) | ₹10.00 | 2017-04-20 | 10.5x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 10.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| CCPS Holders (Conversion of CCPS into Equity Shares) | ₹10.00 | 2024-05-22 | 10.5x |
| Existing Shareholders (Suraj Vernekar, Roopa Vernekar, Nishith Ramesh Chandra Shah, and others) | — | 2024-09-23 | — |
| Jasmeet Walia, Shailesh Suresh Vaidya, Jyoti Prakash, Sagar P Brahmbhatt | ₹71.00 | 2024-10-10 | 1.5x |
| Minakshi Sharma, Kalpeshbhai R Kalthia, Sunit Sadashiv Kavathekar, JM Global Equities Private Limited, Rohit Narang, Vijay Goyal, Ruchika Panda, Pankaj Kumar | ₹71.00 | 2024-10-21 | 1.5x |
| Sujit Uday Potnis, Sanjaylalasaheb Jadhav, Samir Purushottam Inamdar, Ashish Dilipkumar Unadkat, Kirtikant Jasvantrai Vagadia, Shinohub Growth Ventures LLP, Utsav Pramod Kumar Srivastava (HUF), Divakar Kaza, Vansha Comtrade LLP, Jitendra Vaiday | ₹71.00 | 2024-11-15 | 1.5x |
| Allotted below the band — 11 entries | |||
| Existing Shareholders | ₹11,329.00 | 2020-12-15 | as disclosed |
| Existing Shareholders | ₹11,329.00 | 2020-12-16 | as disclosed |
| Existing Shareholders | ₹11,329.00 | 2020-12-17 | as disclosed |
| Existing Shareholders | ₹11,329.00 | 2020-12-18 | as disclosed |
| Existing Shareholders | ₹11,329.00 | 2020-12-19 | as disclosed |
| Existing Shareholders | ₹11,329.00 | 2020-12-21 | as disclosed |
| Allottee under Private placement | ₹11,329.00 | 2021-03-18 | as disclosed |
| Allottee under Private Placement | ₹26,084.00 | 2023-06-30 | as disclosed |
| Allottee under Private Placement | ₹26,084.00 | 2023-07-03 | as disclosed |
| Allottee under Private Placement | ₹26,084.00 | 2023-07-06 | as disclosed |
| Allottee under Private Placement | ₹26,084.00 | 2023-07-25 | as disclosed |
The 11 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 11 Aug 2029promoter3 years from the date of commencement of commercial production or date of allotment in the Initial Public Offer, whichever is later1,676,400 shares (20.02% of total)
- 11 Aug 2076promoterlock-in for 50% promoters’ holding in excess of MPC shall be released after 2 years1,147,200 shares (13.7% of total)
- 11 Aug 2027otherone year from the date of Allotment in the Public Issue3,292,593 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
