ABH Healthcare
A distinct read of SME-specific danger (liquidity, concentration, forensic flags) — separate from the FinMinutes Score. Higher band = more caution warranted.
- Dressed bride financials: FY26 profits grew to ₹5.64 Cr but cash conversion plummeted to 37% (CFO of ₹2.11 Cr) due to trade receivables tripling to ₹33.11 Cr (63.05% of revenue)
- Bilateral promoter lending: over ₹3.35 Cr in unsecured personal loans moved to and from promoters Dr. Saurabh Baghi, Dr. Kamal Baghi, and Dr. Vaishali Saini in the pre-listing year
- Balance sheet repair: 77.27% of specified IPO proceeds (₹17.00 Cr) are utilized to repay borrowings rather than creating productive healthcare assets
- Elevated litigation risk: promoters face ₹2.59 Cr in civil negligence/contract lawsuits alongside outstanding TRACES TDS defaults and ROC secretarial backlogs of up to 735 days
Educational risk signal grounded in the filing — not a buy/sell call.
First time with SME IPOs? Read the SME IPO guide and the risks before applying.
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
ABH Healthcare Limited (formerly ABH Healthcare Private Limited) owns and operates 'Anil Baghi Hospital', a super-specialty healthcare facility established in 1985 in Ferozepur, Punjab, with 150 beds offering 25 medical specialties.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
ABH Healthcare Limited owns and operates 'Anil Baghi Hospital', a multi-specialty tertiary care hospital in Ferozepur, Punjab, originally established in 1985 with 30 beds and acquired by the company in 2022. The hospital has consistently expanded its infrastructure, scaling its capacity to 150 beds by Fiscal 2026. As of March 31, 2026, the hospital has 125 operational beds, including 70 intensive care unit (ICU) beds. The hospital's average bed occupancy rate has registered a downward trend over the last three financial years, declining from 63% in Fiscal 2024 to 49% in Fiscal 2025 and 47% in Fiscal 2026. The facility offers 25 specialties including cardiology, neurology, orthopedics, urology, and critical care. Its customer base is heavily driven by tie-ups with government schemes (such as Ayushman Bharat-Sarbat Sehat Bima Yojana), corporate bodies, and third-party insurance administrators, which collectively accounted for 60.05% of revenues in Fiscal 2026. The company reaches patients directly at its hospital facility and also operates an off-campus outpatient clinic established under its subsidiary ABH Clinics LLP.
Operational moats include established brand recall of the 3-decade-old Anil Baghi Hospital in Punjab, US-trained doctor-led professional promoter management, key empanelment with major government programs like Ayushman Bharat, and advanced technology integrations being accredited with NABH Digital Standards (Silver Category).
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment / prepayment, in part or full, of certain of our borrowings — ₹17.00 cr
- Funding our Working Capital Requirements — ₹5.00 cr
- Funding inorganic growth through unidentified acquisitions and general corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 52.5069 | 49.2671 | 41.3802 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 5.6394 | 5.347 | 1.6556 |
| PAT Margin | 10.74% | 10.85% | 4% |
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 52.51 | 49.27 | 41.38 |
| Other Income | 0.08 | 0.05 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 52.59 | 49.32 | 41.39 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 10.10 | 10.24 | 11.32 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 9.01 | 8.49 | 7.06 |
| Finance Cost | 4.48 | 3.71 | 2.96 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 2.39 | 2.10 | 1.74 |
| Other Expenses | 18.68 | 17.34 | 16.10 |
| Total Expenses | 44.66 | 41.89 | 39.19 |
| Profit Before Tax | 7.93 | 7.43 | 2.21 |
| Tax Expense | 2.29 | 2.08 | 0.55 |
| Profit After Tax | 5.64 | 5.35 | 1.66 |
| EPS - Basic | 7.05 | 6.68 | 2.07 |
| EPS - Diluted | 7.05 | 6.68 | 2.07 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 14.72 | 13.20 | 6.89 |
| EBIT | 12.33 | 11.09 | 5.15 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 8.00 | 2.00 | 2.00 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 9.34 | 9.69 | 4.35 |
| Net Worth | 17.34 | 11.69 | 6.35 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 48.39 | 28.90 | 24.53 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 6.64 | 12.98 | 11.25 |
| Total Borrowings | 55.04 | 41.88 | 35.79 |
| Trade Payables | 6.60 | 6.78 | 5.57 |
| Current Liabilities | 14.14 | 21.15 | 18.95 |
| Total Liabilities | 67.93 | 52.20 | 44.99 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 41.85 | 36.59 | 33.75 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.02 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Investments | 1.74 | 0.29 | 0.12 |
| Inventories | 3.25 | 4.46 | 2.89 |
| Trade Receivables | 33.11 | 19.74 | 11.98 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.03 | 0.61 | 0.02 |
| Current Assets | 41.54 | 26.62 | 17.12 |
| Total Assets | 85.27 | 63.90 | 51.35 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 2.11 | 3.54 | 0.89 |
| Capital Expenditure | 8.28 | 4.65 | 14.14 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -9.14 | -4.53 | -13.06 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 9.45 | 1.58 | 12.04 |
| Net Change in Cash | 2.42 | 0.59 | -0.14 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 28 | 26.8 | 16.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 23.4 | 22.5 | 12.4 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 10.7 | 10.9 | 4 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 32.5 | 45.7 | 26.1 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 17 | 20.7 | 12.2 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 6.6 | 8.4 | 3.2 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 3.17 | 3.58 | 5.63 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 3.53 | 3.13 | 5.19 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 2.75 | 2.99 | 1.74 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.94 | 1.26 | 0.9 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 2.71 | 1.05 | 0.75 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.62 | 0.77 | 0.81 |
| Receivable Days | 230 | 146 | 106 |
| Inventory Days | 117 | 159 | 93 |
| Payable Days | 238 | 242 | 180 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 109 | 63 | 19 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.37 | 0.66 | 0.54 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 4.1 | 2.8 | 1.5 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 3.47 | 2.21 | 8.12 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 10.7% | 10.9% | 4% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.62x | 0.77x | 0.81x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 4.92x | 5.47x | 8.08x |
| = Return on Equity | 32.5% | 45.7% | 26.1% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.71x | 0.72x | 0.75x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.64x | 0.67x | 0.43x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 23.5% | 22.5% | 12.4% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was only 0.37x reported profit in FY26. Less than half of the profit on the income statement arrived as cash.
- Receivable days rose from 106 in FY24 to 230 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 27% while profit grew 241%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Debt to equity stood at 3.17x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.574 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.981 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.066 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.008 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.006 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.936 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0414 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.95 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.321 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.109 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.145 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.255 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.95 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
5 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹1.8 cr in FY25, ₹3.5 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 146 days in FY25, 230 days in FY26
- ○Inventory days rising · 159 days in FY25, 117 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 3.7% of revenue in FY25, 4.1% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 5.8% of net block in FY25, 5.7% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 33.4% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was 0.37x profit in FY26, against 0.66x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.3%
Contingent liabilities of 0.05 cr against a net worth of 17.34 cr — 0.3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.46x
Short-term borrowings of 6.64 cr against cash of 3.03 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 7.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.42 cr against a profit of 5.64 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹102.00, the market value is ₹117 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹11.7 cr | 2.1x | 5.2 | 3.3 |
| 12% a year | ₹14.0 cr | 2.5x | 6.5 | 4.1 |
| 14% a year | ₹16.3 cr | 2.9x | 7.6 | 4.8 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 4.84% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -5.29% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹6.2 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth5.64 ÷ 17.34What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)12.33 ÷ (17.34 + 55.04) = 12.33 ÷ 72.37Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue14.72 ÷ 52.51Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth55.04 ÷ 17.34How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost12.33 ÷ 4.48How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(33.11 ÷ 52.51) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days117 + 230 − 238How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT2.11 ÷ 5.64Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(5.64 − 2.11) ÷ 85.27 = 3.53 ÷ 85.27The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹102.00 × 11,429,600 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash116.58 + 55.04 − 3.03What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA168.59 ÷ 14.72The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT116.58 ÷ 5.64The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹5.64 cr ÷ ₹116.58 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-6.17 cr ÷ ₹116.58 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)20.67 ÷ 5.5%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
Exponential Profit Growth Decoupled from Real Cash Realizations
ABH Healthcare Limited shows a classic pre-IPO profit-dressing profile. While PAT rose to ₹5.64 Cr in FY26, Cash Flow from Operations collapsed to ₹2.11 Cr because trade receivables tripled to ₹33.11 Cr (63.05% of revenue). This indicates aggressive revenue recognition with uncollected billings.
Source: p. 177, 180, 184, 186Serious Corporate Governance Deficits via Unsecured Promoter Loans
The prospectus reveals significant governance deficits: the company lent over ₹1.43 Cr in unsecured personal loans directly to promoters Dr. Saurabh Baghi, Dr. Kamal Baghi, and Dr. Vaishali Saini in the pre-IPO year. Additionally, the promoters face ₹2.59 Cr in civil medical negligence and contract claims.
Source: p. 25, 26, 236-242Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Dr. Saurabh Baghi (Managing Director)
Litigation: Against the Company: 3 material civil consumer and employment lawsuits totaling ₹0.2008 Cr, and 3 tax proceedings (TRACES TDS defaults) of ₹0.0466 Cr. Against the Promoters: 5 civil negligence and contract claims of ₹2.5931 Cr, and 6 direct tax proceedings (outstanding income tax and TDS demands) of ₹0.1003 Cr. Against Directors (excl. Promoters): 1 tax TDS default of ₹0.0031 Cr. Against Controlled Entities: 2 tax TDS defaults of ₹0.0005 Cr. Filed BY the Company: 1 statutory income tax appeal of ₹0.1857 Cr. Filed BY the Promoters: 3 civil suits (insurance and utility claims) totaling ₹0.4216 Cr. Filed BY Directors: 1 civil negligence appeal of ₹0.0020 Cr.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None disclosed
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sangani Hospitals Limited | 24.52 | — | 16.2 | 5.17 |
| Maitreya Medicare Limited | -34.11 | — | -8.1 | -5.5 |
| Asarfi Hospital Limited | 27.63 | — | 18.65 | 9.6 |
At the ₹102 upper band, the issue is priced at 14.5x earnings — a 44% discount to the peer median of 26.1x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company's reported consolidated PAT increased from Standalone ₹1.66 Cr in FY24 to Consolidated ₹5.35 Cr in FY25 and ₹5.64 Cr in FY26. However, Cash Flow from Operations (CFO) has severely decayed relative to profitability, dropping from ₹3.54 Cr in FY25 to just ₹2.11 Cr in FY26 (representing a cash-to-PAT conversion of only 37.41%). This cash deterioration is driven by uncollected trade receivables ballooning from Standalone ₹11.98 Cr in FY24 to Consolidated ₹19.74 Cr in FY25 and Consolidated ₹33.11 Cr in FY26 (now representing 63.05% of annual revenues). Additionally, the switch from Standalone reporting in FY24 to Consolidated in FY25/FY26 silently distorts historical trend comparisons.
p. 177, 180, 184, 186 and 1 moreDuring FY26, the company engaged in extensive bilateral lending and treasury transfers with its directors and promoters. Promoter-Director Dr. Saurabh Baghi was advanced personal loans of ₹0.69 Cr and repaid ₹0.98 Cr; Promoter-Director Dr. Kamal Baghi was advanced loans of ₹0.45 Cr and repaid ₹0.54 Cr; and Promoter-Director Dr. Vaishali Saini was advanced loans of ₹0.29 Cr and repaid ₹0.40 Cr. Total loan transactions with promoters exceeded ₹3.35 Cr during the pre-IPO period.
p. 26, 240, 241Out of the specified allocations of the fresh issue proceeds, the company has designated ₹17.00 Cr (77.27% of specified proceeds) for the 'repayment / prepayment, in part or full, of certain of our borrowings', while only ₹5.00 Cr (22.73% of specified proceeds) is allocated for 'funding working capital requirements'.
p. 85, 86The company has disclosed significant statutory compliance backlogs, including unresolved processed TDS defaults of ₹4.61 Lakhs (₹0.0461 Cr) on the TRACES portal. It also suffered extensive secretarial delays, with Form DPT-3 (return of deposits) delayed by up to 735 days, and delays in filing Form AOC-4 for FY23, alongside past failures in filing forms for creating charges on PKF Finance loans. Furthermore, the company changed its statutory auditor within the last 3 years.
p. 25, 38, 46, 47 and 1 moreThe promoters face 5 active civil negligence and contract claims totaling ₹2.59 Cr and 6 direct tax proceedings of ₹0.10 Cr, while the company operates out of a single hospital location in Ferozepur, Punjab (100% geographic concentration). Furthermore, 60.05% of its FY26 operating revenue is concentrated in third-party payers including corporate and government-backed empanelments.
p. 25, 26, 130, 236-242Against the Company: 3 material civil consumer and employment lawsuits totaling ₹0.2008 Cr, and 3 tax proceedings (TRACES TDS defaults) of ₹0.0466 Cr. Against the Promoters: 5 civil negligence and contract claims of ₹2.5931 Cr, and 6 direct tax proceedings (outstanding income tax and TDS demands) of ₹0.1003 Cr. Against Directors (excl. Promoters): 1 tax TDS default of ₹0.0031 Cr. Against Controlled Entities: 2 tax TDS defaults of ₹0.0005 Cr. Filed BY the Company: 1 statutory income tax appeal of ₹0.1857 Cr. Filed BY the Promoters: 3 civil suits (insurance and utility claims) totaling ₹0.4216 Cr. Filed BY Directors: 1 civil negligence appeal of ₹0.0020 Cr.
p. 3, 5, 25, 26 and 4 moreTrade receivables grew 67.8% against revenue growth of 6.6% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthShort-term borrowings of ₹6.64 cr against cash of ₹3.03 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
The company's liquidity is heavily stressed, with trade receivables ballooning to ₹33.11 Cr (63.05% of revenue) and actual operating cash flow collapsing to just ₹2.11 Cr in FY26. Furthermore, its balance sheet carries ₹55.04 Cr in total borrowings, prompting it to allocate over 77% of specified IPO proceeds to pay down debt rather than adding clinical capacity.
p. 85, 177, 180, 184Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (08 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How are the fresh IPO proceeds allocated and is there debt refinancing?
The fresh issue proceeds are heavily designated for balance sheet repair: ₹17.00 Cr is allocated for the repayment or prepayment of outstanding borrowings (representing 77.27% of specified proceeds), and ₹5.00 Cr is allocated for funding working capital requirements. Capital expenditure on fresh healthcare assets is Nil.
p. 85, 86, 87Who are the promoters and what is their acquisition cost?
The promoters are Dr. Kamal Baghi, Dr. Saurabh Baghi, and Dr. Vaishali Saini. Following a massive bonus issue of 6,000,000 shares on 2025-04-29 (which capitalized reserves), their nominal cost of acquisition per share is highly diluted to nominal fractional levels.
p. 76, 77, 78Are there material related party transactions or director loan movements?
Yes. In FY26, the company advanced unsecured personal loans to promoters and directors: Dr. Saurabh Baghi took ₹0.69 Cr and repaid ₹0.98 Cr, Dr. Kamal Baghi took ₹0.45 Cr and repaid ₹0.54 Cr, and Dr. Vaishali Saini took ₹0.29 Cr and repaid ₹0.40 Cr. Group entities Five Creeks Healthcare LLP and ABH Clinics LLP are also core operational dependencies.
p. 26, 147-149, 240, 241Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
No. In FY26, despite reported consolidated net profit (PAT) growing to ₹5.64 Cr, Cash Flow from Operations was only ₹2.11 Cr. This low cash conversion was driven by trade receivables more than doubling in 24 months to ₹33.11 Cr.
p. 177, 180, 184, 186What structural market parameters apply to this SME offer?
The offer is a 100% book-built fresh issue listing on the NSE EMERGE platform. Rikhav Securities Limited acts as the market maker with up to 1,72,800 shares reserved. Post-issue capital is structured at ₹11.43 Cr (11,429,600 equity shares).
p. 3, 8, 10, 52, 70What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dr. Saurabh Baghi | ₹10.00 | 2021-03-02 | 10.2x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 10.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Dr. Vaishali Saini | ₹10.00 | 2021-03-02 | 10.2x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 10.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Late Mrs. Mukta Baghi | ₹10.00 | 2021-03-02 | 10.2x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 10.2x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Dr. Kamal Baghi | ₹20.00 | 2022-11-24 | 5.1x |
| An early round from roughly 4 years ago, at roughly 5.1x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Dr. Saurabh Baghi | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
| Dr. Kamal Baghi | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
| Dr. Vaishali Saini | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
| Mr. Hem Raj Saini | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
| Mrs. Rita Saini | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
| Mrs. Sukarma Khanna | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
| Mr. Pradeep Khanna | — | 2025-04-29 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 01 Sep 2046promoterMinimum Promoters' Contribution constituting 20.09% of post-Issue share capital locked in for 3 years from date of Allotment2,296,000 shares (20.09% of total)
- 01 Sep 2076promoter50% of Promoters' holding in excess of minimum promoters' contribution locked-in for a period of two years from the date of Allotment2,851,992 shares (24.95% of total)
- 01 Sep 2076promoterRemaining 50% of Promoters' holding in excess of minimum promoters' contribution locked-in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment2,851,992 shares (24.95% of total)
- 01 Sep 2027otherStandard pre-Issue non-promoter shareholding of locked-in for a period of one year from the date of Allotment16 shares
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
