Reliance Jio
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Jio Platforms Limited, a subsidiary of Reliance Industries Limited, is India's leading digital connectivity and digital services provider operating across mobile broadband, fixed broadband, and digital applications. Serving over 533.3 million customers through its licensed subsidiary Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited as of June 30, 2026, the company operates an all-IP pan-India 4G and 5G standalone network.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Jio Platforms Limited is a technology platform that integrates digital connectivity with a comprehensive ecosystem of digital products, applications, and enterprise solutions. Its core operations encompass mobile broadband (4G LTE and 5G Standalone), fixed broadband (JioFiber and JioAirFiber via Fixed Wireless Access), digital entertainment (JioTV+, JioSaavn, JioHotstar, JioGames), cloud & productivity (JioAICloud, JioPC), and enterprise digital services (cloud, IoT, CPaaS, and managed security). Operating through its licensed subsidiary, Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (RJIL), the company serves 533.3 million customers as of June 30, 2026, including 284.9 million 5G subscribers and 28.6 million fixed broadband subscribers. Its pan-India all-IP network covers over 99% of India's population for wireless broadband and extends across ~98% of pin codes, supported by 360,537 network towers and over 1.0 million route kilometres of fibre network. Jio Platforms operates a phygital distribution architecture combining its digital interfaces (MyJio app with 227.6 million MAUs and Jio Set-top-box) with Reliance Retail Limited's extensive nationwide physical store footprint under a master distribution agreement. Sourcing infrastructure components and customer premise equipment from global technology partners and contract manufacturers like Sanmina-SCI, the company relies on its in-house proprietary technology stack—spanning 5G core, cloud-native architecture, and the 'JioBrain' AI suite—to maintain vertical integration, low cost per GB, and rapid innovation cycles.
- Digital Connectivity Services — Mobile broadband (4G LTE, Standalone 5G), fixed wired broadband (JioFiber), and fixed wireless access (JioAirFiber) provided by licensed subsidiary RJIL to 533.3 million customers.
- Consumer Digital Applications & Media — Digital entertainment, audio streaming, cloud compute, and smart home applications including JioTV+, JioSaavn, JioGames, JioAICloud, JioPC, and JioHome bundled with connectivity or offered standalone.
- Enterprise Digital Solutions & Managed Services — Enterprise cloud services, CPaaS (JioCX), Enterprise IoT (JioThings), SD-WAN, managed network operations, and AI enterprise tools (JioBrain) for large enterprises and MSMEs.
Market leadership in wireless broadband (49.78% market share) and fixed broadband (43.32% market share in Q1 FY27), proprietary end-to-end 5G SA and 4G technology stack with in-house OSS/BSS, largest spectrum holding in India (26,800.8 MHz with 15.8 years average life), unmatched scale carrying ~60% of India's wireless data traffic, self-reinforcing technology/data/distribution flywheels, and exclusive pan-India phygital distribution network via MyJio App (227.6 million MAUs) and Reliance Retail integration.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Prepayment, in full or in part, of certain outstanding borrowings availed by the Material Subsidiary, RJIL — ₹2,750.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
100% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 146885.3 | 128218.4 | 109558.1 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 30049.1 | 26120.3 | 21434 |
| PAT Margin | 20.46% | 20.37% | 19.56% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Digital Connectivity & Related Services (Value of Services) (Fiscal 2026): 98.15%
- Sale of Goods / Devices (Value of Sales) (Fiscal 2026): 1.85%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Finance Costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 76.4% | Finance costs increased primarily due to the recognition of interest costs pertaining to deferred payment liabilities and borrowings in relation to 5G assets, a portion of which was capitalised in Q4 FY25 as finance costs, along with higher interest on lease liabilities. | Structural |
| Other Expenses - Rent (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 106.3% | Rent expense increased due to higher rental expense including low-value lease assets pertaining to customer premises equipment as the fixed broadband subscriber base expanded following the ramp-up of 5G FWA and 5G UBR offerings. | Structural |
| Other Expenses - Content Charges (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 89.5% | Content charges increased primarily due to an increase in JioAirFiber subscriptions, expanded partnerships with content providers, and the integration of additional content on the platform with mobility and fixed broadband services. | Structural |
| Other Income (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 157.8% | Other income increased significantly primarily due to higher interest income on bank fixed deposits and callable corporate instruments. | Cyclical |
| Access Charges (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 27.8% | Access charges increased due to higher interconnection usage charges paid to service providers, international long-distance voice transit traffic, and SMS termination charges driven by customer base growth and traffic. | Cyclical |
| Selling and Distribution Expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 23.5% | Selling and distribution expenses increased primarily due to higher customer acquisition costs in line with customer base growth and continued amortisation of subscriber acquisition costs over subscriber life. | Structural |
| Revenue from Operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 14.6% | Revenue from operations increased due to a larger customer base and an increase in ARPU driven by an increasing mix of 5G and fixed broadband customers along with higher per-customer data consumption. | Structural |
| Other Expenses - Rent (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 1,333.5% | Rent expense increased substantially due to higher rental expenses for customer premises equipment as the fixed broadband subscriber base grew following the launch and initial ramp-up of JioAirFiber 5G FWA services. | Structural |
| Other Expenses - Content Charges (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 152.6% | Content charges increased due to the ramp-up of JioAirFiber subscriptions, an increase in content provider partnerships, and bundling of media content with connectivity plans. | Structural |
| Other Income (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 80.6% | Other income increased primarily due to higher interest income generated from investments in callable corporate instruments. | Cyclical |
| Selling and Distribution Expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 45.2% | Selling and distribution expenses increased primarily due to higher customer acquisition costs associated with expanding the subscriber base and ongoing subscriber acquisition cost amortisation. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 21.2% | Finance costs increased primarily due to an increase in borrowings raised to fund network rollout and spectrum obligations. | Structural |
| Access Charges (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 20.2% | Access charges increased primarily due to higher international interconnection usage charges paid to third-party providers and increased SMS termination charges driven by customer base growth. | Cyclical |
| Revenue from Operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 17.0% | Revenue increased due to net customer additions and an increase in ARPU driven by higher user engagement, an industry-wide tariff revision in Q2 FY25, and higher data consumption. | Structural |
Headwinds
- High capital expenditure requirements for 5G network rollout, spectrum acquisition, and infrastructure upgrades company persistent
Network expansion and 5G/FWA deployment require substantial ongoing capex in spectrum, active equipment, and fibre, exposing the business to technology implementation, execution, and commercial return risks. - Regulatory requirements regarding licence fees, spectrum usage charges, and potential pricing interventions sector persistent
Annual licence fees (8% of AGR) and spectrum usage charges payable to DoT, alongside potential TRAI regulatory pricing interventions or tariff floor/ceiling policies, may constrain margin expansion and tariff flexibility. - Dependence on a limited set of passive infrastructure service providers and related-party suppliers company persistent
Significant reliance on Summit Digitel for tower infrastructure (174,451 towers) and Jio Digital Fibre for ~98% of optic fibre network requirements exposes network availability to potential vendor operational or service disruptions. - Intense market competition and potential subscriber churn following tariff rationalisation sector persistent
The telecom industry remains highly competitive; while periodic tariff revisions drive ARPU growth, future price increases may face resistance in price-sensitive consumer segments or lead to elevated subscriber churn.
Tailwinds
- Rapid growth of India's digital economy and supportive government policy framework macro
India's digital economy is projected to reach ₹ 12,580,000.00 Crore ($1.4 trillion) by FY31, supported by the Telecommunications Act 2023, Digital Bharat Nidhi, and streamlined Right of Way rules. - In-house proprietary technology stack, 5G Standalone architecture, and JioAirFiber market leadership company
Full ownership of 5G SA core, cloud-native OSS/BSS, UBR fixed wireless technology, and 'JioBrain' AI platform provides a lower cost per GB, rapid innovation cycles, and international technology licensing opportunities. - Large addressable market for 2G-to-4G/5G migration and low household fixed broadband penetration sector
With 261.0 million 2G users in India and fixed broadband household penetration at ~21%, significant structural room exists for customer additions, 5G upgrade migration, and ARPU uplift through bundled digital services.
Movements the filing does not explain
- Trade receivables FY25 vs FY24 — Trade receivables increased by 107.03% (from ₹ 285.12 Crore in FY24 to ₹ 590.23 Crore in FY25), but MD&A text omits a specific narrative explanation for this balance sheet expansion.
- Trade payables FY25 vs FY24 — Trade payables increased by 38.53% (from ₹ 644.34 Crore in FY24 to ₹ 892.61 Crore in FY25), but MD&A does not provide a detailed breakdown or rationale for this increase.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-27
- Pre Application Start2026-10-16
- Bidding Start2026-10-21
- Bidding End2026-10-23
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-26
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-27
- Listing Day2026-10-28
- Mandate End2026-12-04
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 146,885.30 | 128,218.40 | 109,558.10 |
| Other Income | 2,873.80 | 1,114.60 | 617.30 |
| Total Income | 149,759.10 | 129,333.00 | 110,175.40 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 6,648.70 | 6,207.90 | 5,382.30 |
| Finance Cost | 8,653.40 | 4,905.10 | 4,047.60 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 27,248.90 | 24,137.60 | 22,103.10 |
| Other Expenses | 66,855.00 | 58,955.10 | 49,834.40 |
| Total Expenses | 109,406.00 | 94,205.70 | 81,367.40 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 40,353.10 | 35,127.30 | 28,808.00 |
| Share of Profit of Associates / JV | -3.60 | -11.30 | -10.80 |
| Profit Before Tax | 40,353.10 | 35,127.30 | 28,808.00 |
| Tax Expense | 10,300.40 | 9,007.00 | 7,374.00 |
| Profit After Tax | 30,049.10 | 26,120.30 | 21,434.00 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 938.80 | 604.70 | 220.10 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 30,987.90 | 26,713.70 | 21,643.30 |
| EPS - Basic | 33.63 | 29.21 | 23.96 |
| EPS - Diluted | 33.59 | 29.17 | 23.93 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 8,939.00 | 8,939.00 | 8,939.00 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 327,037.90 | 296,108.40 | 269,347.40 |
| Net Worth | 335,976.90 | 305,047.40 | 278,286.40 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 51,454.80 | 45,228.90 | 43,182.50 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 19,326.20 | 27,831.40 | 11,166.40 |
| Total Borrowings | 70,781.00 | 73,060.30 | 54,348.90 |
| Trade Payables | 893.16 | 765.61 | 644.34 |
| Current Liabilities | 67,180.70 | 78,101.10 | 71,218.20 |
| Total Liabilities | 278,517.80 | 275,052.60 | 260,158.70 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 250,991.60 | 187,270.90 | 148,873.80 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 14,467.30 | 60,328.70 | 81,176.80 |
| Intangible Assets | 227,996.30 | 173,760.60 | 88,282.40 |
| Investments | 30,420.20 | 22,664.20 | 6,037.20 |
| Inventories | 262.90 | 227.40 | 119.20 |
| Trade Receivables | 252.68 | 246.14 | 285.12 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1,694.66 | 842.36 | 2,910.50 |
| Current Assets | 72,756.60 | 55,913.30 | 38,239.20 |
| Total Assets | 615,594.00 | 581,233.80 | 539,580.40 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 77,556.30 | 68,155.70 | 57,661.60 |
| Capital Expenditure | 34,184.30 | 44,268.00 | 53,509.60 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -43,590.90 | -63,726.40 | -56,587.60 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -25,419.00 | 1,093.30 | 379.30 |
| Net Change in Cash | 8,546.40 | 5,522.60 | 1,453.30 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 50.9 | 49.6 | 49.9 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 32.7 | 31 | 29.8 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 20.5 | 20.4 | 19.6 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 8.9 | 8.6 | 7.7 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 12 | 10.6 | 9.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 4.9 | 4.5 | 4 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.21 | 0.24 | 0.2 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.91 | 1.13 | 0.94 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 5.66 | 8.16 | 8.12 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.08 | 0.72 | 0.54 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.08 | 0.71 | 0.54 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.24 | 0.22 | 0.2 |
| Receivable Days | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Inventory Days | 1 | 1 | 0 |
| Payable Days | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 0 | 0 | -1 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 2.58 | 2.61 | 2.69 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -7.7 | -7.2 | -6.7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.25 | 1.83 | 2.42 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against revenue. Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 20.5% | 20.4% | 19.6% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.24x | 0.22x | 0.2x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.83x | 1.91x | 1.94x |
| = Return on Equity | 8.9% | 8.6% | 7.7% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.74x | 0.74x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.82x | 0.88x | 0.88x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 33.4% | 31.2% | 30% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 2.58x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
Part-Year PeriodThe stub period, kept apart from the full years.
The filing also reports a period shorter than a full year. It is shown here as filed and not annualised, and no ratio or model on this page uses it: comparing part of a year with a full year would misstate every growth rate and multiple.
| Part-year period, as filed (₹ Cr) | 3M FY27 part-year |
|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 39,172.90 |
| Total Income | 40,197.90 |
| Total Expenses | 29,770.80 |
| Profit Before Tax | 10,427.10 |
| Tax Expense | 2,663.00 |
| Profit After Tax | 7,764.10 |
| EPS - Basic (not annualised) | 8.69 |
| Total Assets | 622,905.30 |
| Net Worth | 34,379.50 |
| Total Borrowings | 61,372.20 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1,941.59 |
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 23,445.90 |
| Capital Expenditure | 4,183.80 |
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.896 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.815 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.146 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.166 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.985 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.908 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0772 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.84 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.009 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.531 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.08 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.206 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.84 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
3 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹-42,035.4 cr in FY25, ₹-47,507.2 cr in FY26
- ○Receivable days rising · 1 days in FY25, 1 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 1 days in FY25, 1 days in FY26 (on revenue)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 42.6% of revenue in FY25, 48.0% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 12.9% of net block in FY25, 10.9% in FY26
- ○Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 5.9% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.4%
Contingent liabilities of 1,502.10 cr against a net worth of 335,976.90 cr — 0.4% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 2.5%
2.5% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.09x
Short-term borrowings of 19,326.20 cr against cash of 1,694.66 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 0.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 80.60 cr against a profit of 30,049.10 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹1,119.00, the market value is ₹1,030,491 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹103,049 cr | 3.4x | 8.8 | 5.5 |
| 12% a year | ₹123,659 cr | 4.1x | 10.1 | 6.3 |
| 14% a year | ₹144,269 cr | 4.8x | 11.2 | 7.0 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 2.92% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: 4.21% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, ₹43,372 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth30,049.10 ÷ 335,976.90What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)49,010.10 ÷ (335,976.90 + 70,781.00) = 49,010.10 ÷ 406,757.90Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue76,259.00 ÷ 146,885.30Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth70,781.00 ÷ 335,976.90How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost49,010.10 ÷ 8,653.40How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(252.68 ÷ 146,885.30) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days1 + 1 − 2How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT77,556.30 ÷ 30,049.10Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(30,049.10 − 77,556.30) ÷ 615,594.00 = -47,507.20 ÷ 615,594.00The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹1,119.00 × 9,209,030,830 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash1,030,490.55 + 70,781.00 − 1,694.66What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA1,099,576.89 ÷ 76,259.00The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT1,030,490.55 ÷ 30,049.10The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Growth needed to reach the peer multiple on earnings alone34.29x against a peer median of 22.35xThis is not a forecast and not a target. It is the price restated as a question: at this multiple, with the price unchanged, earnings would have to compound at this rate to arrive at what the filing’s own peer group trades on. Whether the business can do that is the argument — we are only stating what the argument is about.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹30,049.10 cr ÷ ₹1,030,490.55 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹43,372.00 cr ÷ ₹1,030,490.55 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)34.29 ÷ 15%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
India's digital economy is projected to expand from ₹ 4,960,000.00 Crore (USD 0.6 trillion) in FY2026 to ₹ 12,580,000.00 Crore (USD 1.4 trillion) by FY2031, contributing ~22% to GVA, according to the Analysys Mason Report. Digital connectivity forms the foundational layer powering mobile broadband, fixed wireless access (FWA), cloud computing, and enterprise digitalization. Mobile broadband penetration stands at 69.62%, while fixed broadband penetration remains low at ~21%, offering massive headroom for expansion toward ~46% by FY2031. Jio Platforms leads the Indian digital connectivity landscape, carrying ~60% of the nation's wireless data traffic, maintaining a 49.78% wireless broadband share and 43.32% overall fixed broadband share, and driving 5G adoption and digital service monetization across consumers and enterprises.
Future Planning
The company intends to utilize ₹ 2,750.00 Crore from net proceeds to prepay material subsidiary RJIL's borrowings, while expanding 5G FWA coverage, scaling enterprise digital solutions, and advancing its proprietary 'JioBrain' AI suite and cloud ecosystem.
Source: p.116, p.196, p.216Competitive Position
Jio Platforms holds the top position in Indian telecom carrying ~60% of data traffic with 533.3 million subscribers and 284.9 million 5G users, competing primarily against Bharti Airtel (567.5M global / 385M+ India users) and Vodafone Idea (210.1M users).
Source: p.126, p.152, p.202Execution Track Record
Since launching commercial operations in 2016, Jio built the world's fastest 5G Standalone network, scaled to 533.3 million subscribers, raised ₹ 152,055.30 Crore from 13 global marquee investors in 2020, and reached ₹ 14,688.53 Crore in annual consolidated revenue.
Source: p.75, p.127, p.196Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Pankaj Mohan Pawar (Chief Executive Officer)
Litigation: Outstanding tax claims against subsidiaries aggregate to ₹ 9,412.90 Crore (including ₹ 6,795.50 Crore GST ITC disallowance claims on tower equipment), and criminal proceedings against subsidiaries aggregate ₹ 0.61 Crore. Tax proceedings against promoter Reliance Industries Limited aggregate to ₹ 38,449.90 Crore, and civil/regulatory claims against promoter aggregate to ₹ 44,187.00 Crore.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Joint statutory auditors issued an unmodified examination report on the Restated Consolidated Financial Information without exceptions or CARO qualifications.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Bharti Airtel Limited | 40.71 | — | 20.32 | 20.32 |
| Vodafone Idea Limited | 3.99 | — | — | — |
At the ₹1,119 upper band, the issue is priced at 33.3x earnings — a 49% premium to the peer median of 22.4x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Telecom Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Total customer base | 533.3 million | As of June 30, 2026 (524.4 million in FY26) |
| 5G customer base | 284.9 million | As of June 30, 2026 (268.5 million in FY26) |
| Fixed broadband subscribers | 28.6 million | As of June 30, 2026 (includes 14.0 million JioAirFiber FWA) |
| ARPU | ₹ 215.6/month | Exit quarter Q1 FY27 (₹ 214.0/month in FY26) |
| Monthly data consumption per customer | 43.7 GB/month | Exit quarter Q1 FY27 (42.3 GB/month in FY26) |
| Monthly churn rate | 1.61% | Exit quarter Q1 FY27 (1.67% in FY26) |
| Total data traffic | 60.4 billion GB | Q1 FY27 (241.4 billion GB in FY26) |
| Spectrum holdings | 26,800.8 MHz | Pan-India across low, mid, and mmWave bands as of June 30, 2026 |
| Network towers access | 360,537 towers | Majority fiberised as of June 30, 2026 |
| Optic fibre network length | >1.0 million Rkm | 30.0+ million fibre pair kilometres as of June 30, 2026 |
Source: p.126, p.202, p.204, p.205
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The IPO is structured as a 100% Fresh Issue of 27,00,00,000 Equity Shares with no Offer for Sale by promoter Reliance Industries Limited or public shareholders (Meta, Google, PIF, KKR, Vista).
p.1, p.10, p.116Tax authorities across multiple jurisdictions have disallowed Input Tax Credit availed by RJIL on telecom tower equipment aggregating ₹ 6,795.50 Crore, which is being contested across judicial fora and not recognized as a contingent liability.
p.47, p.473RJIL relies heavily on Reliance Retail Limited as its sole pre-paid distributor (recharge vouchers limit up to ₹ 210,800.00 Crore in FY27) and on Summit Digitel and JDFPL for passive tower and fibre infrastructure.
p.31, p.37, p.83RJIL is contesting TRAI quality of service / UCC financial disincentives of ₹ 27.11 Crore and DoT spectrum usage charge (SUC) demand on shared spectrum of ₹ 1,389.10 Crore (principal ₹ 715.40 Crore), both of which are currently stayed by TDSAT.
p.40, p.466, p.467Outstanding tax claims against subsidiaries aggregate to ₹ 9,412.90 Crore (including ₹ 6,795.50 Crore GST ITC disallowance claims on tower equipment), and criminal proceedings against subsidiaries aggregate ₹ 0.61 Crore. Tax proceedings against promoter Reliance Industries Limited aggregate to ₹ 38,449.90 Crore, and civil/regulatory claims against promoter aggregate to ₹ 44,187.00 Crore.
p.6, p.47, p.293, p.308, p.320, p.324Joint statutory auditors issued an unmodified examination report on the Restated Consolidated Financial Information without exceptions or CARO qualifications.
p.6, p.47, p.293, p.308, p.320, p.324Goodwill and intangibles of ₹227,996.30 cr are 67.9% of net worth. An impairment would fall straight through to reported profit.
rule: intangibles > 30% of net worthShort-term borrowings of ₹19,326.20 cr against cash of ₹1,694.66 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Analysys Mason Report confirms a 49.78% market share in wireless broadband and 43.32% share in overall fixed broadband as of June 30, 2026.
p.152, p.196, p.202End-to-end ownership of 5G SA core, OSS/BSS, and UBR fixed wireless technology enables low network operating costs and lower cost per GB compared to peer operators.
p.196, p.203, p.216Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Market leadership across wireless broadband (49.78% share) and fixed broadband (43.32% share) with 533.3 million subscribers
- In-house end-to-end 5G SA and 4G proprietary technology stack delivering vertical integration and high operational efficiency
- Strong revenue growth (₹ 14,688.53 Crore in FY26) with robust 53.26% EBITDA margin and healthy operating cash flows (₹ 7,755.63 Crore in FY26)
Weaknesses
- High capital intensity and debt servicing requirements related to 5G network rollout, spectrum liabilities, and FWA CPE deployment
- Operational concentration and dependency on Reliance Retail Limited for sole pre-paid subscriber distribution and customer onboarding
Opportunities
- Expansion of fixed wireless access (JioAirFiber) targeting penetration growth across India's ~300 million households
- Monetization of 5G enterprise solutions, cloud compute (JioAICloud), CPaaS, and AI applications ('JioBrain')
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Regulatory and policy uncertainty surrounding telecom license conditions, spectrum pricing, and tariff interventions risk_section
Why it matters: Evolving TRAI quality of service norms, SUC shared spectrum calculations, and licence fee compliance could impose financial penalties or higher levies. - Intense market competition and potential subscriber churn following tariff rationalisation mda
Why it matters: Intense competition or subscriber pushback against tariff revisions could slow ARPU expansion and increase subscriber churn.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (04 Dec 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the net proceeds from the IPO be deployed and what is the debt reduction impact?
Net proceeds will be deployed primarily towards prepayment of ₹ 2,750.00 Crore of outstanding borrowings availed by material subsidiary Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited in FY27, reducing overall consolidated interest costs.
p.116, p.447What is the level of operational reliance on Reliance Retail and group entities for distribution and passive infrastructure?
Reliance Retail acts as the sole distributor for pre-paid recharge vouchers under a long-term master agreement, while Summit Digitel and JDFPL provide passive tower (174,451 towers) and fibre infrastructure under 30-year agreements approved by shareholders through FY2032.
p.31, p.37, p.83, p.85What factors drove the increase in finance costs and other expenses during FY26?
Finance costs increased 76.42% to ₹ 8,653.40 Crore in FY26 due to full-year interest recognition on 5G spectrum deferred payment liabilities and borrowings, while rent/content charges rose due to JioAirFiber FWA CPE deployments and OTT content bundling.
p.447, p.448What are the key tax and regulatory litigations faced by the material subsidiary RJIL?
Major legal exposures include ₹ 6,795.50 Crore in disputed GST Input Tax Credit disallowances on telecom tower equipment, ₹ 1,389.10 Crore in DoT shared spectrum SUC demands (stayed by TDSAT), and ₹ 27.11 Crore in TRAI financial disincentives.
p.40, p.47, p.466, p.473What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Reliance Industries Limited | ₹10.00 | 2019-11-15 | 111.9x |
| An early round from roughly 7 years ago, at roughly 111.9x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Jaadhu Holdings, LLC | ₹488.34 | 2020-07-07 | 2.3x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 2.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Google International LLC | ₹488.34 | 2020-07-13 | 2.3x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 2.3x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| The Public Investment Fund | ₹549.31 | 2020-07-10 | 2.0x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 2.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Omicron Asia Holdings II Pte. Ltd. | ₹549.31 | 2020-07-13 | 2.0x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 2.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 28 Apr 2028Promoter's Contribution18 months
- 28 Apr 2027Promoter (Excess) / Pre-Offer Capital6 months
- 27 Nov 2026Anchor Investors (50%)30 days
- 26 Jan 2027Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period Financial statements were updated in the RHP to include Q1 FY27 (three months ended June 30, 2026) restated interim results along with comparative Q1 FY26 numbers. | Fiscals ended March 31, 2026, 2025, and 2024 | Three months ended June 30, 2026 and June 30, 2025, and Fiscals ended March 31, 2026, 2025, and 2024 |
| Risk Factors Fifteen additional risk factors were incorporated in the RHP, covering evolving telecom regulations, 5G FWA deployment risks, customer premises equipment rental risks, and expanded issue-related risks. | 50 Risk Factors (49 Internal, 1 External/Issue) | 65 Risk Factors (54 Internal, 11 External/Issue) |
| Contingent Liabilities Consolidated contingent liabilities decreased by ₹ 33.30 Crore between March 31, 2026 and June 30, 2026. | ₹ 1,502.10 Crore as of March 31, 2026 | ₹ 1,468.80 Crore as of June 30, 2026 |
| Litigation Disputed GST ITC demands on telecom tower equipment increased by ₹ 28.80 Crore between DRHP and RHP filings. | Disputed GST Input Tax Credit claims against subsidiary RJIL stood at ₹ 6,766.70 Crore as of March 31, 2026 | Disputed GST Input Tax Credit claims against subsidiary RJIL updated to ₹ 6,795.50 Crore as of June 30, 2026 |
| Capital Structure Total consolidated debt decreased by ₹ 9,408.80 Crore (a 13.29% reduction) driven by repayments of current borrowings during Q1 FY27. | Total borrowings of ₹ 70,781.00 Crore and Total Equity of ₹ 337,076.20 Crore as of March 31, 2026 (Debt/Equity: 0.21x) | Total borrowings of ₹ 61,372.20 Crore and Total Equity of ₹ 344,891.90 Crore as of June 30, 2026 (Debt/Equity: 0.18x) |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
