Paras Healthcare
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Paras Healthcare Limited is a clinical specialty-led hospital platform providing tertiary and quaternary healthcare services through a network of eight operational hospitals under the Paras Health brand across North India, Bihar, and Jharkhand. As of June 30, 2026, the company operates an aggregate bed capacity of 2,211 beds comprising 1,502 operational beds, supported by 1,084 doctors and 1,937 nurses.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Paras Healthcare Limited provides tertiary and quaternary healthcare services with a focus on high-acuity clinical specialties, including cardiac sciences, oncology, neurosciences, gastro sciences, orthopedics, and renal sciences (collectively termed CONGOR specialties), which contributed 74.35% of revenue from operations in the three months ended June 30, 2026. The company operates eight multi-specialty hospitals across Gurugram and Panchkula in Haryana, Patna and Darbhanga in Bihar, Kanpur in Uttar Pradesh, Udaipur in Rajasthan, Ranchi in Jharkhand, and Srinagar in Jammu and Kashmir. Geographically, North India contributes 68.07% of revenue from operations. Customer payors are diversified across self-pay patients (31.30%), private insurance/TPAs (25.07%), and government schemes/PSUs (43.63%). Paras Healthcare operates through a calibrated mix of owned and leased facilities, utilizing centralized procurement via its Central Buying Unit for medical equipment, pharmaceuticals, and surgical consumables sourced from international and domestic suppliers. As of June 30, 2026, the company operated 2,211 total bed capacity with 1,502 operational beds (including 559 ICU beds), achieving a bed occupancy rate of 69.72% and ARPOB of ₹ 49,351.70 per day, while generating ₹ 1,605.95 Crore in annual revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
- In-patient Department (IPD) — Provides admitted care, complex surgeries, and quaternary clinical treatments across 2,211 total bed capacity, contributing 78.25% of revenue from operations in 3M FY27.
- Out-patient Department (OPD) — Provides consultations, day-care procedures, diagnostic evaluations, and outpatient clinical care, contributing 18.16% of revenue from operations in 3M FY27.
- Pharmacy & Auxiliary Operations — In-house 24/7 hospital pharmacies and auxiliary services including scrap sales and sponsorship income, contributing 3.59% of revenue from operations in 3M FY27.
Established regional leadership and brand presence in underserved North and East India healthcare markets, high-acuity clinical specialization with 74.35% revenue from CONGOR specialties, capital-efficient asset-light expansion model with average capex per bed of ₹ 0.77 Crore, and strong institutional empanelment across government schemes and private insurers.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Prepayment or scheduled re-payment, in full or part, of certain outstanding borrowings availed by our Company — ₹320.90 cr
- Investment in our wholly owned Subsidiary, PMHPL (which also operates our hospital in Srinagar), for repayment/prepayment of borrowings, in full or part, of PMHPL — ₹54.10 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
100% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 1605.952 | 1294.063 | 1129.039 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 43.834 | -57.983 | -15.331 |
| PAT Margin | 2.73% | -4.48% | -1.36% |
Revenue Breakdown
- In-patient Department (IPD) (Fiscal 2026): 78.26%
- Out-patient Department (OPD) (Fiscal 2026): 17.8%
- Pharmacy Operations (Fiscal 2026): 3.79%
- Others (Sponsorship & Scrap) (Fiscal 2026): 0.15%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (3M FY27 vs 3M FY26) | ↑ 27.7% | Revenue from operations increased primarily due to higher patient volumes and clinical service growth across key specialties, driven by doctor additions and ramp-up in emerging and new hospitals. | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (3M FY27 vs 3M FY26) | ↑ 41.9% | Employee benefits expense increased due to annual salary increments, headcount additions to support business growth, share-based payment expenses, and higher staff welfare costs. | Structural |
| Other income (3M FY27 vs 3M FY26) | ↑ 44.9% | Other income increased primarily due to higher interest income on bank deposits and interest received on income tax refunds. | Cyclical |
| Operating EBITDA (3M FY27 vs 3M FY26) | ↑ 73.7% | Operating EBITDA increased due to strong operating leverage at mature hospitals, improved fixed cost absorption at emerging hospitals, and reduction in initial operating losses at new hospitals. | Structural |
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 24.1% | Revenue from operations increased due to higher patient volumes across key CONGOR specialties, clinician recruitment, and accelerated revenue ramp-up at new facilities in Kanpur and Srinagar. | Structural |
| Purchases of stock-in-trade (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 29.4% | Purchases of stock-in-trade increased driven by business volume expansion, higher number of surgical procedures, and a shift toward high-acuity clinical specialties requiring more medical consumables. | Cyclical |
| Finance costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 27.6% | Finance costs increased on account of higher interest on term loans availed for medical equipment procurement and working capital, along with increased lease liability interest. | Structural |
| Depreciation and amortization expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 24.2% | Depreciation expense increased due to continuous capex for medical equipment purchases, bed capacity expansions, and facility renovations across existing hospitals. | Structural |
| Retainers and consultants fee (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 22.1% | Retainers and consultants fee increased due to the engagement of additional clinicians, doctors, and healthcare professionals to support scaling operations. | Structural |
| Finance costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 35.6% | Finance costs increased due to higher borrowings raised to fund capital expenditure for new hospital projects and operational working capital. | Structural |
| Depreciation and amortization expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 43.2% | Depreciation increased significantly following the addition of property, plant, equipment, and right-of-use assets at new hospital facilities in Srinagar and Kanpur. | Structural |
Headwinds
- High operating cost intensity across doctor fees, staff salaries, and medical consumable purchases sector persistent
Healthcare delivery involves substantial fixed and variable operating costs, including clinician retainers and medical supplies (~65% of expenses); failure to pass on cost increases to patients or payors can adversely affect profit margins. - Government pricing regulations, ceiling caps on drugs and devices, and fixed scheme reimbursement tariffs regulatory persistent
Downward pricing revisions by NPPA/DPCO on drugs and medical implants, alongside fixed tariff structures under government schemes (CGHS/ECHS), restrict price flexibility and pass-through capability. - Gestational drag and initial operating losses at newly commissioned hospitals company temporary
Newly launched hospitals typically require 12 to 24 months to achieve EBITDA breakeven and optimal bed occupancy, creating temporary earnings drag during early ramp-up phases.
Tailwinds
- Structural demand growth and low bed density in target North and East India markets sector
Significant gap in hospital bed density relative to National Health Policy benchmarks, combined with rising non-communicable disease incidence and expanding health insurance coverage, underpins long-term volume expansion. - Operating leverage and margin expansion from maturing hospital network company
A balanced hospital portfolio enables steady cash flow from mature facilities while emerging and new hospitals scale occupancy, driving overall Operating EBITDA margin expansion and cost absorption.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Gurugram Hospital | 3M FY27 | 89.1% |
| Gurugram Hospital | FY26 | 83.9% |
| Gurugram Hospital | FY25 | 74.3% |
| Patna Hospital | 3M FY27 | 72.9% |
| Patna Hospital | FY26 | 73.2% |
| Patna Hospital | FY25 | 65.0% |
| Panchkula Hospital | 3M FY27 | 67.3% |
| Panchkula Hospital | FY26 | 67.6% |
| Panchkula Hospital | FY25 | 66.3% |
| Darbhanga Hospital | 3M FY27 | 61.6% |
| Darbhanga Hospital | FY26 | 58.7% |
| Darbhanga Hospital | FY25 | 43.5% |
| Udaipur Hospital | 3M FY27 | 58.7% |
| Udaipur Hospital | FY26 | 55.7% |
| Udaipur Hospital | FY25 | 48.6% |
| Ranchi Hospital | 3M FY27 | 74.7% |
| Ranchi Hospital | FY26 | 59.9% |
| Ranchi Hospital | FY25 | 49.3% |
| Srinagar Hospital | 3M FY27 | 53.1% |
| Srinagar Hospital | FY26 | 36.1% |
| Srinagar Hospital | FY25 | 13.4% |
| Kanpur Hospital | 3M FY27 | 65.6% |
| Kanpur Hospital | FY26 | 31.0% |
| Kanpur Hospital | FY25 | 8.6% |
Movements the filing does not explain
- Trade receivables FY26 vs FY25 — Trade receivables increased by 49.01% (from ₹ 234.59 million in FY25 to ₹ 349.57 million in FY26), but MD&A omits a specific narrative explanation for this balance sheet expansion.
- Working capital requirement 3M FY27 vs 3M FY26 — Working capital requirement expanded from ₹ 828.85 million in 3M FY26 to ₹ 2,214.61 million in 3M FY27, driven by receivables and inventory build-up without itemized narrative breakdown in MD&A.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-27
- Pre Application Start2026-10-19
- Bidding Start2026-10-21
- Bidding End2026-10-23
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-26
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-27
- Listing Day2026-10-28
- Mandate End2026-12-04
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 1,605.95 | 1,294.06 | 1,129.04 |
| Other Income | 22.83 | 20.14 | 21.98 |
| Total Income | 1,628.78 | 1,314.21 | 1,151.02 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 434.78 | 336.13 | 304.90 |
| Changes in Inventories | -4.56 | 0.71 | -8.18 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 181.57 | 173.81 | 167.26 |
| Finance Cost | 115.98 | 90.92 | 67.06 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 143.57 | 115.58 | 80.72 |
| Other Expenses | 681.42 | 647.10 | 532.64 |
| Total Expenses | 1,552.75 | 1,364.24 | 1,144.39 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 76.03 | -50.04 | 6.63 |
| Profit Before Tax | 76.03 | -50.04 | 6.63 |
| Tax Expense | 32.20 | 7.95 | 21.96 |
| Profit After Tax | 43.83 | -57.98 | -15.33 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 1.15 | -0.03 | -0.38 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 44.99 | -58.02 | -15.71 |
| EPS - Basic | 4.34 | -5.94 | -1.57 |
| EPS - Diluted | 4.34 | -5.94 | -1.57 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 10.10 | 9.76 | 9.76 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 384.84 | 270.73 | 328.75 |
| Net Worth | 394.94 | 280.49 | 338.51 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 454.21 | 436.44 | 358.40 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 399.89 | 291.49 | 189.13 |
| Total Borrowings | 854.10 | 727.93 | 547.53 |
| Trade Payables | 208.10 | 190.54 | 137.48 |
| Current Liabilities | 718.42 | 619.43 | 420.99 |
| Total Liabilities | 1,676.20 | 1,529.96 | 1,139.15 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 1,204.61 | 1,167.00 | 980.24 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 28.73 | 37.81 | 28.78 |
| Intangible Assets | 6.03 | 6.41 | 7.48 |
| Inventories | 31.89 | 26.29 | 27.80 |
| Trade Receivables | 349.57 | 234.59 | 156.31 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 302.73 | 205.52 | 160.29 |
| Current Assets | 774.89 | 517.72 | 373.63 |
| Total Assets | 2,071.14 | 1,810.45 | 1,477.66 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 163.51 | 86.19 | 92.48 |
| Capital Expenditure | 169.42 | 136.67 | 197.55 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -239.40 | -147.25 | -194.06 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 85.89 | 82.82 | 93.98 |
| Net Change in Cash | 9.99 | 21.76 | -7.60 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 20.6 | 11.9 | 13.4 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 11.8 | 3.1 | 6.4 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 2.7 | -4.5 | -1.4 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 11.1 | -20.7 | -4.5 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 15.4 | 4.1 | 8.3 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 2.1 | -3.2 | -1 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 2.16 | 2.6 | 1.62 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 1.64 | 3.34 | 2.51 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 1.66 | 0.45 | 1.1 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.08 | 0.84 | 0.89 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.03 | 0.79 | 0.82 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.78 | 0.71 | 0.76 |
| Receivable Days | 79 | 66 | 51 |
| Inventory Days | 27 | 28 | 34 |
| Payable Days | 177 | 206 | 169 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | -71 | -112 | -84 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 3.73 | -1.49 | -6.03 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -5.8 | -8 | -7.3 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.18 | 1.18 | 2.45 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 2.7% | -4.5% | -1.4% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.78x | 0.71x | 0.76x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 5.24x | 6.45x | 4.37x |
| = Return on Equity | 11.1% | -20.7% | -4.5% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.58x | 1.16x | -2.31x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.4x | -1.22x | 0.09x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12% | 3.2% | 6.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 3.73x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Receivable days rose from 51 in FY24 to 79 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 1.66x in FY26. A meaningful share of operating profit is going to service debt rather than fund the business.
- Debt to equity stood at 2.16x in FY26.
Part-Year PeriodThe stub period, kept apart from the full years.
The filing also reports a period shorter than a full year. It is shown here as filed and not annualised, and no ratio or model on this page uses it: comparing part of a year with a full year would misstate every growth rate and multiple.
| Part-year period, as filed (₹ Cr) | 3M FY27 part-year |
|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 470.28 |
| Total Income | 478.75 |
| Total Expenses | 430.63 |
| Profit Before Tax | 48.12 |
| Tax Expense | -1.56 |
| Profit After Tax | 49.68 |
| EPS - Basic (not annualised) | 4.92 |
| Total Assets | 2,202.88 |
| Net Worth | 444.96 |
| Total Borrowings | 888.89 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 298.77 |
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 64.34 |
| Capital Expenditure | 31.63 |
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.201 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.637 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.241 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.846 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.847 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.971 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0578 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 4.9 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.027 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.186 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.093 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.236 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 4.9 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
7 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
4 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹-144.2 cr in FY25, ₹-119.7 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 66 days in FY25, 79 days in FY26
- ○Inventory days rising · 28 days in FY25, 27 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 4.0% of revenue in FY25, 5.6% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 9.9% of net block in FY25, 11.9% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 14.4% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 8.8 percentage points in FY26, having moved -1.6 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 98.9%
Contingent liabilities of 390.50 cr against a net worth of 394.94 cr — 98.9% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.76x
Short-term borrowings of 399.89 cr against cash of 302.73 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 12.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 5.38 cr against a profit of 43.83 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹693.00, the market value is ₹6,998 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹700 cr | 16.0x | 19.8 | 12.4 |
| 12% a year | ₹840 cr | 19.2x | 21.1 | 13.2 |
| 14% a year | ₹980 cr | 22.4x | 22.2 | 13.9 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 0.63% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -0.08% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹5.9 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth43.83 ÷ 394.94What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)192.01 ÷ (394.94 + 854.10) = 192.01 ÷ 1,249.04Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue335.58 ÷ 1,605.95Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth854.10 ÷ 394.94How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost192.01 ÷ 115.98How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(349.57 ÷ 1,605.95) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days27 + 79 − 177How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT163.51 ÷ 43.83Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(43.83 − 163.51) ÷ 2,071.14 = -119.68 ÷ 2,071.14The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹693.00 × 100,986,187 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash6,998.34 + 854.10 − 302.73What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA7,549.71 ÷ 335.58The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT6,998.34 ÷ 43.83The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹693.00 ÷ ₹43.15Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
Growth needed to reach the peer multiple on earnings alone159.66x against a peer median of 55.16xThis is not a forecast and not a target. It is the price restated as a question: at this multiple, with the price unchanged, earnings would have to compound at this rate to arrive at what the filing’s own peer group trades on. Whether the business can do that is the argument — we are only stating what the argument is about.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹43.83 cr ÷ ₹6,998.34 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-5.91 cr ÷ ₹6,998.34 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the CRISIL Report, the Indian healthcare delivery market was valued at approximately ₹ 700,000.00 Crore in FY2025 and is projected to expand at a CAGR of 10% to 12% to reach ₹ 1,120,000.00 Crore to ₹ 1,220,000.00 Crore by FY2030. Growth is propelled by rising non-communicable disease burden, aging population demographics, expanding health insurance coverage, and low bed density relative to the National Health Policy benchmark of 20 beds per 10,000 population. The North India healthcare market is forecast to reach ₹ 360,000.00 Crore to ₹ 380,000.00 Crore by FY2030, while the Bihar and Jharkhand market is projected to reach ₹ 40,000.00 Crore to ₹ 50,000.00 Crore.
Future Planning
The company plans to deploy ₹ 375.00 Crore from fresh issue proceeds toward de-leveraging debt at parent and subsidiary level (PMHPL), while executing a committed expansion pipeline of 800 beds across Gurugram II (300 beds) and Ludhiana (500 beds) by FY28.
Source: p.35, p.124, p.254Competitive Position
Paras Healthcare holds a strong regional market share in Bihar, Jharkhand, and Haryana with 2,211 beds across 8 hospitals, competing with listed peers like Apollo Hospitals, Fortis Healthcare, Medanta (Global Health), Max Healthcare, and Yatharth Hospital.
Source: p.143, p.155, p.253Execution Track Record
Over two decades, the platform expanded from a single flagship hospital in Gurugram (2006) to an 8-hospital network across 5 states, scaling revenue from operations to ₹ 1,605.95 Crore in FY26 with Operating EBITDA of ₹ 335.58 Crore.
Source: p.81, p.151, p.253, p.320Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar (Managing Director)
Litigation: Claims against company include tax claims of ₹ 86.70 Crore (15 income tax matters of unquantifiable impact, direct tax demands of ₹ 1.36 Crore, indirect tax demands of ₹ 85.34 Crore including ₹ 84.25 Crore GST SCN on Panchkula unit), 4 criminal proceedings against company aggregating ₹ 0.22 Crore, and civil litigation of ₹ 117.48 Crore. Criminal cases against promoter Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar include 4 proceedings (aggregating ₹ 13.02 Crore).
Auditor / RPT Flags: Unmodified examination report on Restated Consolidated Financial Information without audit qualifications.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Limited | 59.36 | — | 21.95 | 21.95 |
| Fortis Healthcare Limited | 53.6 | — | 10.7 | 10.7 |
| Global Health Limited | 54.2 | — | 13.9 | 13.9 |
| Max Healthcare Institute Limited | 72.1 | — | 13.6 | 13.6 |
| Narayana Hrudayalaya Limited | 34.5 | — | 24.3 | 24.3 |
| Yatharth Hospital and Trauma Care Services Limited | 55.16 | — | 10.36 | 10.36 |
At the ₹693 upper band, the issue is priced at 159.7x earnings — a 190% premium to the peer median of 55.2x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Hospital Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Operational beds | 1,502 beds | As of June 30, 2026 across 8 operational hospitals |
| Total bed capacity | 2,211 beds | As of June 30, 2026 |
| Bed occupancy rate | 69.72% | 3M FY27 (61.75% in FY26) |
| ARPOB | ₹ 49,351.70/day | Average revenue per occupied bed per day in 3M FY27 (₹ 47,397.82/day in FY26) |
| ALOS | 2.77 days | Average length of stay in 3M FY27 (2.93 days in FY26) |
| Bed pipeline | 800 beds | 300 beds in Gurugram II and 500 beds in Ludhiana planned by FY28 |
| Doctor count | 1,084 doctors | 553 consultants, 387 RMOs/others, 144 visiting doctors as of June 30, 2026 |
| Nurse count | 1,937 nurses | As of June 30, 2026 |
| Doctor-to-bed ratio | 0.63 times | 3M FY27 (0.58 times in FY26) |
| Nurse-to-bed ratio | 1.29 times | 3M FY27 (1.11 times in FY26) |
| Payor mix | 43.63% Govt/PSUs, 31.30% Self-Pay, 25.07% Insurance/TPA | 3M FY27 revenue share |
| High-acuity specialty mix (CONGOR) | 74.35% | 3M FY27 revenue share from Cardiac, Oncology, Neuro, Gastro, Ortho, and Renal sciences |
| In-patient vs Out-patient mix | 78.25% IPD, 18.16% OPD | 3M FY27 revenue share (78.26% IPD, 17.80% OPD in FY26) |
Source: p.151, p.155, p.253, p.258 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The IPO comprises a Fresh Issue of ₹ 500.00 Crore to prepay parent and subsidiary debt (₹ 375.00 Crore), alongside an Offer for Sale of ₹ 950.00 Crore by Promoter Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar and investor Commelina Ltd.
p.4, p.78, p.124Material subsidiaries PHRPL (Ranchi) and PMHPL (Srinagar/Udaipur) reported collective losses of ₹ 52.09 Crore in FY26, ₹ 82.24 Crore in FY25, and maintain negative net worth of ₹ (158.48) Crore and ₹ (148.89) Crore respectively as of June 30, 2026.
p.22, p.35, p.411, p.508Company received a demand-cum-show cause notice under Sections 74/76 of the CGST Act confirming a GST demand of ₹ 28.08 Crore with an equivalent penalty of ₹ 28.08 Crore (totaling ₹ 84.25 Crore including interest) for its Panchkula unit, currently under appeal before Commissioner (Appeals).
p.32, p.409, p.500Company does not hold a registered trademark for the standalone word 'Paras', and 25 out of 29 new logo trademark applications are opposed by third parties, while group entities (e.g. VRS Foods, Paras Buildtech) use 'Paras' without formal agreements.
p.45, p.51, p.287Claims against company include tax claims of ₹ 86.70 Crore (15 income tax matters of unquantifiable impact, direct tax demands of ₹ 1.36 Crore, indirect tax demands of ₹ 85.34 Crore including ₹ 84.25 Crore GST SCN on Panchkula unit), 4 criminal proceedings against company aggregating ₹ 0.22 Crore, and civil litigation of ₹ 117.48 Crore. Criminal cases against promoter Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar include 4 proceedings (aggregating ₹ 13.02 Crore).
p.1, p.32, p.33, p.101, p.354, p.488, p.500Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
CRISIL Report confirms Paras is the first corporate hospital entrant in Patna (2013) and operates 2,211 beds across 8 hospitals in North India, Bihar, and Jharkhand.
p.25, p.184, p.253Average capital expenditure per bed stands at ₹ 0.77 Crore across network hospitals, significantly lower than peer average of ₹ 1.20 - ₹ 1.50 Crore per bed.
p.26, p.155, p.272Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Market leadership and established regional brand equity across underserved healthcare markets in North India, Bihar, and Jharkhand
- High clinical specialty focus with 74.35% revenue from high-acuity CONGOR specialties
- Predictable patient volume growth with 1,502 operational beds achieving 69.72% occupancy and ₹ 49,351.70 ARPOB
Weaknesses
- Earnings drag from gestational operating losses and negative net worth at material subsidiary hospitals in Ranchi and Srinagar
- Unregistered trademark for word 'Paras' and legal opposition against 25 new brand logo trademark applications
Opportunities
- Bed expansion pipeline adding 800 beds (300 beds in Gurugram II and 500 beds in Ludhiana) by Fiscal 2028
- Rising demand for tertiary healthcare delivery in Tier-2 and Tier-3 cities in North and East India
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Adverse outcome in Panchkula unit GST demand litigation aggregating ₹ 84.25 Crore litigation
Why it matters: Demand exceeds total FY26 profit before tax and could result in material cash outflow. - Government regulatory price controls on medical procedures, drugs, implants, and government scheme tariffs (CGHS/ECHS) mda
Why it matters: Government schemes represent 43.63% of patient revenues; tariff caps restrict margin expansion.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (04 Dec 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the ₹ 500 Crore fresh issue proceeds be assigned across parent and subsidiary debt reduction?
The company will deploy ₹ 320.90 Crore to prepay/repay parent borrowings and inject ₹ 54.10 Crore into wholly owned subsidiary PMHPL to prepay term loans, reducing overall group interest expenses.
p.124, p.441What is the degree of geographic and revenue payor concentration across the platform?
North India accounts for 68.07% of revenue from operations, while patient payor mix is split between government schemes/PSUs (43.63%), self-pay (31.30%), and private insurance/TPAs (25.07%).
p.26, p.253What drove the consolidated financial turnaround from a loss of ₹ 57.98 Crore in FY25 to PAT of ₹ 43.83 Crore in FY26?
Turnaround was driven by 24.10% revenue expansion to ₹ 1,605.95 Crore, operational leverage at mature hospitals, and narrowing operating losses at newly commissioned Kanpur and Srinagar hospitals.
p.81, p.439, p.464What are the key legal and audit exposures disclosed in the prospectus?
Exposures include a pending ₹ 84.25 Crore GST demand for Panchkula unit, ₹ 398.44 Crore in contingent liabilities (primarily corporate guarantees), and negative net worth at material subsidiaries PHRPL and PMHPL.
p.32, p.35, p.500Reading the Offer Structure
66% offer for sale — and the company does not appear to need the cash.
A high offer-for-sale share is not automatically a concern. On the disclosed numbers this company is profitable and not heavily borrowed, so the listing reads as an exit route for existing shareholders and a route to a public market rather than a funding exercise. Large, cash-generative companies routinely list this way.
What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar | — | 2024-03-27 | — |
| Commelina Ltd | — | 2024-03-27 | — |
| 360 ONE Special Opportunities Fund - Series 12 | ₹237.00 | 2025-04-09 | 2.9x |
| Axis New Opportunities AIF - Series II | ₹237.00 | 2025-04-16 | 2.9x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 28 Apr 2028Promoter's Contribution18 months
- 28 Apr 2027Promoter (Excess) / Pre-Offer Capital6 months
- 27 Nov 2026Anchor Investors (50%)30 days
- 26 Jan 2027Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period Restated financial disclosures were updated in the RHP to incorporate restated interim condensed financial statements for the three months ended June 30, 2026 (Q1 FY27) and comparative Q1 FY26. | Fiscals ended March 31, 2026, 2025, and 2024 | Three months ended June 30, 2026 and June 30, 2025, and Fiscals ended March 31, 2026, 2025, and 2024 |
| Offer for Sale The OFS component was reduced by ₹ 350.00 Crore (from up to ₹ 1,300.00 Crore in DRHP to ₹ 950.00 Crore in RHP), establishing total offer size at ₹ 1,450.00 Crore (₹ 500.00 Crore Fresh Issue + ₹ 950.00 Crore OFS). | Offer for Sale up to ₹ 1,300.00 Crore across Promoter Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar (up to ₹ 300.00 Crore), Commelina Ltd (up to ₹ 800.00 Crore), and 360 ONE Funds (up to ₹ 200.00 Crore) | Offer for Sale up to ₹ 950.00 Crore by Promoter Dr. Dharminder Kumar Nagar and Investor Commelina Ltd |
| Risk Factors Two additional risk factors were incorporated in the RHP, covering updated empanelment conditions under government schemes and post-interim regulatory compliance requirements. | 59 Risk Factors (58 Internal, 1 External/Issue) | 61 Risk Factors (60 Internal, 1 External/Issue) |
| Contingent Liabilities Consolidated contingent liabilities (primarily corporate guarantees issued by the parent on behalf of operating subsidiaries) increased by ₹ 7.94 Crore between March 31, 2026 and June 30, 2026. | ₹ 390.50 Crore as of March 31, 2026 | ₹ 398.44 Crore as of June 30, 2026 |
| Litigation Litigation disclosures were updated to incorporate post-DRHP regulatory correspondence regarding the RGHS Udaipur unit transaction management system proceedings. | Disputed indirect tax claims of ₹ 85.34 Crore (including ₹ 84.25 Crore Panchkula GST show cause notice) as of March 31, 2026 | Updated disclosures reflecting RGHS Udaipur unit recovery reconsideration petition (letter dated September 1, 2026) and updated tax claims as of June 30, 2026 |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
