EAAA India Alternatives
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
EAAA India Alternatives Limited is a multi-strategy alternative asset management platform in India managing India-focused funds across Real Assets and Private Credit. The company caters to a diverse client base of global and domestic institutional investors, UHNIs/HNIs, and family offices.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Incorporated in Financial Year 2009, EAAA India Alternatives Limited operates as a multi-strategy alternative asset management platform in India. The company offers a wide range of alternative investment products primarily focused on income and yield sub-verticals across two primary divisions: Real Assets and Private Credit. Its Real Assets division focuses on renewable energy, roads infrastructure, and commercial real estate assets, managing a portfolio that includes 3.10 million square feet of office space, 4,586 lane kilometers of roads, 1,835 circuit kilometers of transmission lines, and 1.73 gigawatts of solar assets as of June 30, 2026. Its Private Credit division provides tailored credit solutions to corporates, projects, or sponsors requiring flexible capital for growth, acquisitions, and equity stake enhancements across Performing Credit, Special Situations, Real Estate Credit, and Investment Grade Credit sub-verticals. The company caters to global pension and insurance companies, institutional investors, UHNIs/HNIs, and family offices across North America, Europe, Middle East, Japan, Australia, and South Korea, supported by presence in Mumbai, New Delhi, GIFT City, and Singapore. As of June 30, 2026, the platform manages a Total FPAUM of ₹ 48,623.18 Crore, with an investment team of 85 professionals and an asset operating team of 58 members operated through its subsidiary Sekura India Management Limited.
- Real Assets — Focuses on renewable energy, roads infrastructure, and commercial real estate assets, managing renewable solar assets, high-quality roads, transmission lines, and office properties.
- Private Credit — Provides tailored credit solutions to corporates, projects, or sponsors requiring flexible capital for growth, M&A, and equity stake enhancements across Performing Credit, Special Situations, Real Estate Credit, and IG Credit.
- Others — Focuses on investing in high-growth mid-stage companies with strong unit economics, established markets, and experienced leadership.
Scaled and experienced multi-strategy alternatives platform with over 17 years of track record in India; dedicated portfolio operating and management platform operated through Sekura; diverse, long-standing global and domestic institutional client relationships with recurring capital commitments; and comprehensive risk management systems.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Carry out the Offer for Sale of Equity Shares by the Promoter Selling Shareholder and achieve the benefits of listing the Equity Shares on the Stock Exchanges
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
100% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 869.54 | 670.259 | 492.579 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 265.197 | 229.779 | 175.16 |
| PAT Margin | 30.5% | 34.28% | 35.56% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Management and Advisory Fees: 60.08%
- Variable Additional Return: 30.14%
- GP Income: 8.3%
- Miscellaneous Income: 1.48%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 29.7% | Growth was driven by an increase in Fee Paying AUM (FPAUM) by ₹ 1,087.72 crore and an 86.89% increase in Variable Additional Return due to additional qualifying funds. | Structural |
| Revenue from operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 36.1% | Increased due to a 20.48% rise in management and advisory fees from FPAUM expansion of ₹ 343.53 crore and a 101.69% increase in Variable Additional Return from additional qualifying funds. | Structural |
| Other income (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 19.0% | Decreased primarily due to lower interest income on debt instruments and pass through certificates, partially offset by fair value gains on AIF investments. | Cyclical |
| Other income (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 26.9% | Increased primarily due to higher interest income earned on debt instruments and pass through certificates. | Cyclical |
| Employee benefits expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 26.3% | Increased owing to annual salary increments, headcount growth from 264 to 273 employees, and higher Variable Additional Return related costs. | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 39.4% | Increased due to employee headcount expansion from 233 to 264, annual salary increments, and higher Variable Additional Return related bonus costs. | Structural |
| Finance costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 34.6% | Increased due to higher borrowings to support investment and working capital requirements, leading to increased interest on term loans and working capital facilities. | Structural |
| Depreciation and amortisation (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 15.9% | Increased due to higher amortisation of right-of-use assets following leasehold office space additions and ongoing amortisation of asset management rights. | Structural |
| Depreciation and amortisation (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 109.9% | Increased primarily due to additions of leasehold office space increasing ROU asset amortisation and the acquisition of asset management rights in FY25. | One-off |
| Other expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 18.1% | Increased primarily due to higher selling and distribution expenses driven by incremental fund-raising activities. | Cyclical |
| Other expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 23.3% | Increased mainly on account of higher selling and distribution expenses resulting from fund-raising activities. | Cyclical |
| Operating Cash Flow (CFO) (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 295.8% | Turned positive due to significantly higher cash realisations from Variable Additional Return (₹ 430.69 crore) and increased management fees collections, offsetting higher employee and distribution expenses. | Cyclical |
| Operating Cash Flow (CFO) (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 805.6% | Operating cash outflow widened due to lower cash collections from management fees and higher cash outlays for employee benefits and selling and distribution expenses. | Cyclical |
Headwinds
- Unpredictability and timing lag of Variable Additional Return realisations company persistent
Variable Additional Return is recognized on an accrual basis based on fund NAV and hurdle rates prior to actual cash realization upon exit events, creating cash flow volatility. - Evolving regulatory framework and compliance requirements sector persistent
Regulatory changes by SEBI, RBI, IFSCA, and MAS may increase operational compliance costs and impact product structuring or fee mechanisms. - Increasing competition from Banks and NBFCs in wholesale credit sector persistent
Aggressive expansion by banks and NBFCs into wholesale lending poses competitive pressure on Private Credit strategies and yields.
Tailwinds
- Underpenetrated Indian alternatives market macro
Low penetration of private credit (0.6% of GDP) and real assets (0.8% of GDP) compared to mature markets provides strong structural tailwinds for growth. - Strong growth in Yield and Income strategy demand sector
Yield and Income alternatives strategy AUM in India is projected to expand at 16% to 18% CAGR from CY25 to CY30. - Established track record and strong client retention company
77% of AUM is from repeat institutional and UHNI clients, reflecting high client trust and proven multi-strategy execution capabilities.
Movements the filing does not explain
- Trade Receivables FY26 vs FY25 (+38.88%) and FY25 vs FY24 (+45.96%) — MD&A provides no specific commentary or explanation for the year-on-year increase in trade receivables balance.
- Trade Payables FY26 vs FY25 (-18.79%) and FY25 vs FY24 (-24.83%) — MD&A does not contain disclosures explaining the reasons for changes in trade payables.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-30
- Pre Application Start2026-10-23
- Bidding Start2026-10-26
- Bidding End2026-10-28
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-29
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-30
- Listing Day2026-11-02
- Mandate End2026-12-09
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 869.54 | 670.26 | 492.58 |
| Other Income | 94.22 | 116.28 | 91.67 |
| Total Income | 963.76 | 786.54 | 584.25 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 381.65 | 302.11 | 216.72 |
| Finance Cost | 55.96 | 49.12 | 36.48 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 13.02 | 11.23 | 5.35 |
| Other Expenses | 164.62 | 139.77 | 113.01 |
| Total Expenses | 615.24 | 502.24 | 371.56 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 348.52 | 284.31 | 212.69 |
| Exceptional Items | -9.88 | — | — |
| Profit Before Tax | 338.64 | 284.31 | 212.69 |
| Tax Expense | 73.44 | 54.53 | 37.53 |
| Profit After Tax | 265.20 | 229.78 | 175.16 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 26.14 | 6.71 | -1.57 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 291.34 | 236.49 | 173.59 |
| EPS - Basic | 41.26 | 35.75 | 27.25 |
| EPS - Diluted | 40.36 | 35.75 | 27.25 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 32.14 | 32.14 | 18.85 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 1,043.40 | 934.31 | 710.64 |
| Net Worth | 1,075.54 | 966.45 | 729.48 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 250.00 | 341.67 | 176.85 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 191.03 | 165.83 | 267.98 |
| Total Borrowings | 441.03 | 507.49 | 444.83 |
| Trade Payables | 114.99 | 141.61 | 188.39 |
| Current Liabilities | 598.53 | 593.74 | 646.95 |
| Total Liabilities | 1,094.74 | 1,118.62 | 1,040.18 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 23.39 | 26.79 | 14.68 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.79 | — | — |
| Intangible Assets | 15.03 | 18.66 | 0.68 |
| Investments | 1,081.97 | 1,225.39 | 1,038.46 |
| Trade Receivables | 166.90 | 120.17 | 82.33 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 160.54 | 161.04 | 178.61 |
| Current Assets | 1,044.81 | 1,032.71 | 885.58 |
| Total Assets | 2,170.28 | 2,085.07 | 1,769.66 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 235.24 | -120.17 | -13.27 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.13 | 23.70 | 0.49 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 111.70 | 87.81 | -152.64 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -344.06 | 7.60 | 178.04 |
| Net Change in Cash | 12.80 | -18.36 | 8.48 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 43.3 | 43.8 | 43.6 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 42 | 42.4 | 42.6 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 30.5 | 34.3 | 35.6 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 24.7 | 23.8 | 24 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 26.7 | 22.6 | 21.2 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 12.2 | 11 | 9.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.41 | 0.53 | 0.61 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.67 | 1.01 | 1.05 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 7.23 | 6.79 | 6.83 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.75 | 1.74 | 1.37 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.4 | 0.32 | 0.28 |
| Receivable Days | 70 | 65 | 61 |
| Payable Days | 48 | 77 | 140 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.89 | -0.52 | -0.08 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 1.4 | 16.8 | 10.6 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.09 | 2.11 | 0.09 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against revenue. Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 30.5% | 34.3% | 35.6% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.4x | 0.32x | 0.28x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.02x | 2.16x | 2.43x |
| = Return on Equity | 24.7% | 23.8% | 24% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.78x | 0.81x | 0.82x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.84x | 0.85x | 0.85x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 46.5% | 49.7% | 50.6% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.071 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 1.032 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.297 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.826 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.953 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.872 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0138 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.45 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.206 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.481 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.186 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.982 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.45 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
1 of 5 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly. Signs the filing gives no inputs for are shown as — and left out of the count.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹349.9 cr in FY25, ₹30.0 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 65 days in FY25, 70 days in FY26
- —Inventory days rising · — days in FY25, — days in FY26 (on revenue)
- ○Other current assets rising against revenue · 112.1% of revenue in FY25, 82.5% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 41.9% of net block in FY25, 55.6% in FY26
- ○Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 4.1% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 3.5%
Contingent liabilities of 37.70 cr against a net worth of 1,075.54 cr — 3.5% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.84x
Short-term borrowings of 191.03 cr against cash of 160.54 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹1,665.00, the market value is ₹10,765 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹1,077 cr | 4.1x | 10.0 | 6.3 |
| 12% a year | ₹1,292 cr | 4.9x | 11.3 | 7.1 |
| 14% a year | ₹1,507 cr | 5.7x | 12.4 | 7.8 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 2.46% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: 2.17% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, ₹234 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth265.20 ÷ 1,075.54What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)404.47 ÷ (1,075.54 + 441.03) = 404.47 ÷ 1,516.56Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue417.49 ÷ 869.54Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth441.03 ÷ 1,075.54How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost404.47 ÷ 55.96How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(166.90 ÷ 869.54) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT235.24 ÷ 265.20Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(265.20 − 235.24) ÷ 2,170.28 = 29.95 ÷ 2,170.28The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹1,665.00 × 64,655,246 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash10,765.10 + 441.03 − 160.54What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA11,045.59 ÷ 417.49The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT10,765.10 ÷ 265.20The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Market Cap ÷ (PAT − exceptional items, tax-effected)10,765.10 ÷ (265.20 − -9.88 at 21.7% tax)The latest year carries an exceptional item of ₹-9.88 cr, which depressed reported profit. Both multiples are shown because both are true: one is what the year printed, the other is what the business did. Which one belongs in your judgement is your call, not ours.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹1,665.00 ÷ ₹925.00Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
Growth needed to reach the peer multiple on earnings alone40.59x against a peer median of 35.67xThis is not a forecast and not a target. It is the price restated as a question: at this multiple, with the price unchanged, earnings would have to compound at this rate to arrive at what the filing’s own peer group trades on. Whether the business can do that is the argument — we are only stating what the argument is about.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹265.20 cr ÷ ₹10,765.10 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹234.12 cr ÷ ₹10,765.10 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)40.59 ÷ 15.4%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian alternatives market represents one of the fastest-growing investment segments, supported by strong economic growth and low market penetration. Within the alternatives landscape, the yield and income strategy—comprising private credit and real assets—is projected to grow from USD 50.6 billion in CY25 to USD 112.9 billion by CY30 at a CAGR of 16% to 18%, while total alternatives AUM in India is expected to reach approximately USD 267 billion by 2030 (12% to 14% CAGR). Low penetration of private credit (0.6% of GDP) and real assets (0.8% of GDP) relative to mature markets provides substantial headroom for expansion. EAAA India Alternatives Limited, with over 17 years of operational presence across Real Assets and Private Credit, is positioned as a leading multi-strategy platform in India.
Future Planning
The company plans to expand its FPAUM by launching new series of flagship funds in Real Assets and Private Credit, deepening domestic UHNI distribution channels, and expanding GIFT City and Singapore offshore fundraising hubs.
Source: p.234, p.249Competitive Position
EAAA India Alternatives Limited is positioned as one of India's largest multi-strategy alternative asset managers with an integrated asset management and operating platform (Sekura) managing 3.10 million sq ft of office space, 4,586 lane km of roads, and 1.73 GW of solar assets.
Source: p.228, p.234Execution Track Record
Demonstrated ability to scale FPAUM at 23.43% CAGR (FY23–FY26) while delivering ₹ 265.20 Crore PAT and 25.97% ROE in FY26.
Source: p.144, p.393Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Amit Agarwal
Litigation: Aggregate quantifiable litigation against Directors is ₹ 3.28 Crore across 4 criminal and 4 tax proceedings. Litigation against KMPs amounts to ₹ 1.66 Crore across 4 criminal proceedings.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 360 One WAM Limited | 35.67 | — | 14.39 | — |
| Aditya Birla Sun Life AMC Limited | 29.84 | — | 25.1 | — |
| Anand Rathi Wealth Limited | 90.69 | — | 47.54 | — |
| Gaja Alternative Asset Management Limited | 20.24 | — | 16.47 | — |
| HDFC Asset Management Company Limited | 38.65 | — | 32.93 | — |
| ICICI Prudential Asset Management Company Limited | 32.14 | — | 86.18 | — |
| Nippon Life India Asset Management Limited | 38.41 | — | 34.48 | — |
| Nuvama Wealth Management Limited | 24.12 | — | 27.34 | — |
| UTI Asset Management Company Limited | 19.55 | — | 10.38 | — |
At the ₹1,665 upper band, the issue is priced at 41.3x earnings — a 16% premium to the peer median of 35.7x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
AMC Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Fee Paying AUM (FPAUM) | ₹ 48,623.18 Crore | as of June 30, 2026 |
| Total Assets Under Management (AUM) | ₹ 95,344.88 Crore | across Active Funds as of June 30, 2026 |
| 3-Year FPAUM Growth CAGR | 23.43% | FY23 to FY26 |
| Management and Advisory Fees Yield | 1.47% | FY26 average FPAUM yield |
| Total Yield | 2.45% | FY26 total income on average FPAUM |
| Repeat Client Commitment Share | 77% | of total AUM as of June 30, 2026 |
| Institutional Client AUM Share | 49.32% | as of June 30, 2026 |
| Total Unique Client Relationships | 11,009 | as of June 30, 2026 |
| Real Assets FPAUM | ₹ 28,039.91 Crore | 57.67% of total FPAUM as of June 30, 2026 |
| Private Credit FPAUM | ₹ 19,272.42 Crore | 39.64% of total FPAUM as of June 30, 2026 |
Source: p.228, p.249, p.393
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The IPO is structured entirely as an Offer for Sale of ₹ 1,200.00 Crore by Promoter Selling Shareholder Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited, with zero fresh equity proceeds accruing to the company.
p.77, p.116, p.307Company paid ₹ 0.61 Crore under a SEBI settlement order dated September 30, 2025 regarding ESTAR AIF regulatory observations, and has a pending settlement application dated December 2, 2025 regarding fund inspection observations.
p.33, p.35, p.422CARO reports noted cash losses in subsidiary EAAA TransInfra Managers Limited in FY26 (₹ 0.21 Crore) and Sekura India Management Limited in FY25 and FY24.
p.308, p.318Filing notes that while AMC and wealth management companies (e.g., 360 One WAM) are listed, no pure-play Indian listed peer exists for a multi-strategy alternative asset management platform.
p.141, p.160Aggregate quantifiable litigation against Directors is ₹ 3.28 Crore across 4 criminal and 4 tax proceedings. Litigation against KMPs amounts to ₹ 1.66 Crore across 4 criminal proceedings.
p.1, p.277, p.292, p.421Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
FPAUM grown at 23.43% CAGR from FY23 to FY26 with 77% repeat institutional and UHNI client commitments, confirming market leadership in yield/income alternatives.
p.144, p.228While management/advisory fees grew 20.48% in FY25 and 18.06% in FY26, Variable Additional Return (VaR) component rose 86.89% in FY26, creating profit and cash flow volatility depending on realization timelines.
p.20, p.393Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Established 17+ year track record as a leading multi-strategy alternative asset management platform in India with ₹ 48,623.18 Crore FPAUM as of June 30, 2026.
- Strong repeat client relationships with 77% of AUM coming from long-standing institutional and UHNI/family office investors.
Weaknesses
- High concentration of FPAUM in Real Assets (57.67%) and Private Credit (39.64%), making revenue sensitive to credit cycles and real estate/infrastructure markets.
- Cash flow seasonality and lumpy realisations associated with Variable Additional Return (VaR) fee structures.
Opportunities
- Rapid expansion of the Indian alternatives market, projected to reach USD 267 billion by CY30 (12%–14% CAGR).
- Significant underpenetration of private credit (0.6% of GDP) and real assets (0.8% of GDP) in India compared to developed economies.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Regulatory tightening by SEBI, RBI, IFSCA, or overseas regulators increasing compliance standards and operational costs. risk_section
Why it matters: Past SEBI inspections resulted in administrative warnings, show-cause notices, and a settlement order. - Competition from commercial banks and NBFCs expanding aggressively into wholesale credit and private debt. risk_section
Why it matters: Increased institutional liquidity and lower bank lending rates could compress private credit yields and fund margins.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (09 Dec 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is the IPO structured as a 100% Offer for Sale with no fresh primary capital raised?
EAAA India Alternatives Limited generated ₹ 235.24 Crore in CFO in FY26, maintains a net worth of ₹ 1,075.54 Crore, and holds adequate capital to support ongoing fund commitments; the IPO allows the promoter selling shareholder to monetise stake while establishing a public listing.
p.77, p.137, p.307How concentrated is the company's fee revenue across its alternative fund strategies?
FPAUM is concentrated across two primary divisions: Real Assets accounts for 57.67% (₹ 28,039.91 Crore) and Private Credit accounts for 39.64% (₹ 19,272.42 Crore) of total FPAUM as of June 30, 2026.
p.228, p.249What drove the sharp expansion in PAT and ROE in FY26?
FY26 PAT grew 15.41% to ₹ 265.20 Crore (ROE 25.97%), supported by a 29.73% increase in total revenue from operations driven by FPAUM expansion and higher Variable Additional Return realisations.
p.144, p.393What regulatory or legal contingencies pose ongoing operational risks?
The company has an outstanding tax demand under dispute of ₹ 34.37 Crore (disallowance of AIF distribution expenses) and underwent a SEBI settlement (₹ 0.61 Crore paid in ESTAR matter) with pending settlement applications regarding fund inspection findings.
p.33, p.377, p.422Reading the Offer Structure
100% offer for sale — and the company does not appear to need the cash.
A high offer-for-sale share is not automatically a concern. On the disclosed numbers this company is profitable and not heavily borrowed, so the listing reads as an exit route for existing shareholders and a route to a public market rather than a funding exercise. Large, cash-generative companies routinely list this way.
What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited | ₹0.04 | 2021-03-12 | 41,625.0x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 41,625.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited | ₹10.00 | 2021-03-24 | 166.5x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 166.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited | ₹0.04 | 2022-03-29 | 41,625.0x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 41,625.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited | — | 2023-05-12 | — |
| Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited | ₹170.00 | 2024-03-26 | 9.8x |
| Edelweiss Securities and Investments Private Limited | ₹173.00 | 2024-05-08 | 9.6x |
| Edelweiss Rural & Corporate Services Limited | ₹925.00 | 2025-09-30 | 1.8x |
| Edelweiss Investment Adviser Limited | ₹925.00 | 2025-09-30 | 1.8x |
| Amit Agarwal | ₹933.00 | 2026-09-01 | 1.8x |
| Harish Agarwal | ₹933.00 | 2026-09-01 | 1.8x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 02 May 2028Promoters Contribution18 months
- 02 May 2027Promoter Excess Shareholding6 months
- 02 May 2027Other Pre-Offer Equity Capital6 months
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Offer for Sale Offer for Sale size by the Promoter Selling Shareholder reduced by ₹ 300.00 Crore. | ₹ 1,500.00 Crore | ₹ 1,200.00 Crore |
| Offer Structure Reserved portions for eligible employees and EFSL shareholders present in DRHP were removed in RHP. | Included Employee Reservation Portion (up to 5% post-offer capital) and EFSL Shareholder Reservation Portion (up to 10% of offer size) | Omitted reserved portions; entire offer of ₹ 1,200.00 Crore is available under Net Offer |
| Reporting Period Financial statements updated to include full Fiscal 2026 and Q1 Fiscal 2027 restated performance. | Restated Consolidated Financial Information for six months period ended September 30, 2025 and Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023 | Restated Consolidated Financial Information for three months period ended June 30, 2026 and Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 |
| Capital Structure Pre-issue share capital increased by 375,000 equity shares following option exercises under ESOP 2024. | Pre-issue paid-up capital of 64,280,246 equity shares of ₹ 5 each (₹ 32.14 Crore) | Pre-issue paid-up capital of 64,655,246 equity shares of ₹ 5 each (₹ 32.33 Crore) |
| Designated Stock Exchange NSE selected and confirmed as Designated Stock Exchange. | Unspecified ([•]) | National Stock Exchange of India Limited (NSE) |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
