Altman Z″
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
SUMAX · Engineering · INE11Z001019
Analyst mean 0.00 · 0 analysts · 0% bullishThis company listed within the last twelve months, so its prospectus is still the primary source. The figures below were extracted from the DRHP and RHP before listing and scored then, and they are shown here as they stand in the IPO record rather than restated.
Each flag is a fact read in the filing, shown with the context that makes it meaningful.
Stated objects, as worded in the offer document. Deployment against them is tracked separately.
Claims made in the offer document, to be read against what the company has reported since.
Sumax Engineering Limited was originally incorporated in December 1994 and converted to a public limited company in September 2024. The Company operates two manufacturing and storage facilities: Unit I in Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu (26,000 sq. ft.) and Unit II in Manesar, Gurgaon, Haryana (31,559 sq. ft.). Because the company operates a customized system of make-to-order manufacturing for its OEM clients, conventional fixed capacity and capacity utilization metrics are based on line-by-line product categories (such as Buffing Pads, Masking Tapes, and Car Covers), with Unit I and Unit II utilizing up to 94% and 96% of capacity respectively in key lines like Buffing Pads for Fiscal 2026. The company primarily sells its products B2B directly to major automotive OEMs and also to the aftermarket auto refinish segment. To reaches these customers, the company leverages long-term partnerships, direct OEM sales teams, and active participation in prominent global expos (such as Automechanika Frankfurt). The company's products are marketed and sold under the 'SUMAX' brand, and its processing facilities are accredited with ISO 9001:2015 and IATF 16949:2016 certifications.
The Company's primary operational moat is its established, three-decade-long supplier relationships and strategic certifications (IATF 16949:2016) with major automotive OEMs, allowing them to integrate directly into OEM production lines. This is supported by its well-known 'SUMAX' brand recall and a dual-segment marketing strategy targeting both high-end OEMs and the fragmented refinish aftermarket.
Sumax Engineering Limited (formerly known as Sumax Engineering Private Limited) is a Secunderabad-based company engaged in both the manufacturing and trading of a diverse range of products tailored for the Automotive OEM (Original Equipment Manufacturer) Market and Auto Refinish Market.
Source: p. 111, 112, 122, 123
As presented in the offer document. Post-listing figures are in the statements above.
| Basis | Period | Related party revenue cr | Pat cr | Ebitda cr | Pat margin | Revenue cr | Pat margin derived |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| standalone | FY26 | 0.9388 | 12.7586 | 19.0796 | 8.64% | 147.6906 | yes |
| standalone | FY25 | 1.2637 | 9.9816 | 15.0266 | 6.83% | 146.126 | yes |
| standalone | FY24 | 1.1099 | 7.4314 | 11.625 | 5.68% | 130.7945 | yes |
Written before listing, answered from the document itself.
How are the fresh IPO proceeds being utilized, and is there any debt repayment component?
The fresh issue proceeds are entirely growth-oriented: ₹4.89 Cr is allocated to construct a new Unit I in Karoli, Rajasthan; ₹16.62 Cr is for constructing Unit II in Jhajjar, Haryana; and ₹12.00 Cr is for funding working capital. No portion of the specified proceeds is allocated to the repayment of borrowings.
p. 71, 72
Who are the promoters, and what is their pre-IPO acquisition history and cost?
The promoters are Sudeep Mehta and Smriti Mehta. Their entry cost is extremely low due to early allotments at face value (₹100.00 prior to split) and subsequent sequential dilution cushions, including a 14:1 bonus in August 2018, a 1:10 stock split in March 2024 (reducing face value to ₹10.00), and a massive 6:1 bonus issue in March 2026.
p. 61, 62, 63
Are there material financing or operational RPT dependencies?
Yes. The company is operationally and financially linked to its promoter group. In FY26, it purchased ₹0.76 Cr and sold ₹0.94 Cr of goods to group entity Autokrom India Private Limited. Financially, relative Sumer Chand Mehta provided unsecured loans of ₹3.13 Cr (repaid ₹0.09 Cr) and was paid ₹0.34 Cr in interest.
p. 46
Does operating cash flow align with reported profitability?
Yes. In FY26, the company's operating cash flow (CFO) was highly robust at ₹18.80 Cr, comfortably exceeding its reported PAT of ₹12.76 Cr. This is a strong positive divergence indicating excellent invoice realizations and working capital stabilization compared to FY25 (where CFO was only ₹0.70 Cr vs PAT of ₹9.98 Cr).
p. 44, 46, 58
What is the capital structure of this offer, and why was the SME route chosen?
The offer is structured as a 100% book-built issue to be listed on the NSE EMERGE platform, with GYR Capital Advisors as the lead manager. Despite having revenues of ₹147.69 Cr and net profits of ₹12.76 Cr which easily qualify for a Mainboard listing, the company chose the SME platform to benefit from lighter disclosure and regulatory review loads.
p. 1, 3, 5, 8, 44
What the issue priced at, on the figures in the document.
The company states that there are no listed companies in India that engage in a business similar to theirs, and hence no peer comparison is presented.
Source: p. 85
| Date | Name | Shares | Price per share | Category | Issue type | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1994-12-21 | Subscribers to MOA (Sumer Chand Mehta, Sudeep Mehta, Vimla Mehta) | 30 | 100 | promoter | initial | p. 60, 61 |
| 1996-06-30 | Sudeep Mehta and Veena Mangal | 5000 | 100 | other | preferential | p. 60, 61 |
| 1997-01-03 | Hemant Jain | 5000 | 100 | other | preferential | p. 60, 61 |
| 2001-02-02 | Sudeep Mehta | 1000 | 100 | promoter | preferential | p. 60, 61 |
| 2001-03-01 | Hemant Jain | 2000 | 100 | other | preferential | p. 61 |
| 2002-06-01 | Vimla Mehta | 1000 | 100 | promoter group | preferential | p. 61 |
| 2018-08-10 | Allottees of Bonus Issue (ratio 14:1) | 196420 | promoter group | bonus | p. 61, 62 | |
| 2024-03-27 | Share split / sub-division (1:10 split) | 1894050 | other | split | p. 61, 63 | |
| 2026-03-11 | Allottees of Bonus Issue (ratio 6:1) | 12627000 | promoter group | bonus | p. 61, 62 | |
| 2026-07-10 | Pre-IPO Secondary Share Transfers (Sudeep Mehta & Vimla Mehta to Aditi, Superb Real Estate LLP, Chappidi Siva Kumar Reddy, etc.) | 506400 | 101 | other | transfer | p. 86-88 |
Ceo: Sudeep Mehta (Chairman and Managing Director)
Outstanding direct and indirect tax demand proceedings against the Company totaling ₹0.1766 Cr (comprising 7 direct tax cases of ₹0.0700 Cr and 3 indirect tax GST cases of ₹0.1066 Cr). Commercial suit COS/63/2025 filed BY the Company against Santhosh V. Panse & others for recovery of ₹1.6000 Cr based on a breached settlement agreement. FIR No. 123/2025 filed BY the Company against employee Santhosh V. Panse for fraud and customer data theft. Litigations against Promoters, Directors, and Key Managerial Personnel are Nil.
Auditor name: M/s. Sunil & Sanjay, Chartered Accountants
Skin in game: 89.76%
Auditor rpt flags: None disclosed
Auditor changed last 3y: Yes
Source: p. 47, 148, 150, 191, 192, 193, 208
Numbered markers are corporate actions and, once the filings are read, capital and governance events. Prices are split-adjusted so the series is continuous.
What the numbers mean when read together — computed from the filings, not a score.
Free cash flow is negative — the business consumes more than it generates once capex is paid. Fine if it is deliberate growth investment; a problem if it is structural.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Latest free cash flow ₹-8 cr, negative in 1 of 4 years. Check whether the burn funds expansion (dark stores, plants, ports) or merely sustains operations.
Borrowings rose 117% over two years while the company also carries ₹1 cr in investments. Why borrow at interest while parking money elsewhere is a fair question.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Borrowings moved to ₹13 cr from ₹6 cr. Simultaneous large investments can be legitimate treasury management, or a sign that reported cash is not freely available.
Operating cash is 146% of trailing profit — the earnings are converting to real cash, not just accruals.
Why this reading: A positive signal: cash conversion at or above ~0.9 means reported profit is showing up as actual cash.
Operating cash ₹19 cr against trailing net profit ₹13 cr. Consistent conversion near or above 1.0 is a hallmark of genuine earnings.
Debt rose over 3 years, and most of it (313%) has turned into fixed assets and projects under construction — the borrowing is building the business.
Why this reading: A positive signal: leverage taken on is visibly becoming productive capacity, not disappearing.
New borrowing ₹8 cr largely matched by an asset build of ₹25 cr. Debt that funds capacity is a different thing from debt that funds nothing.
Every score below is calculated here from the reported numbers — none of it is asserted. Open the notebook at the foot of the section to see each formula with this company's figures in it.
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
Piotroski F-Score — fundamental momentum — Joseph Piotroski, University of Chicago, 2000, in a study of whether accounting signals could improve returns among cheap stocks.
Nine yes-or-no tests across profitability, leverage and operating efficiency. Each pass scores one. It asks a narrow question: is this business getting better or worse on its own terms, year over year?
How to read it7 or more suggests improving fundamentals; 3 or fewer suggests deterioration. It measures direction, not quality — a weak company improving can score higher than a strong one holding steady.
Where it failsA single year of comparison, so one unusual year distorts it. Says nothing about valuation, competitive position or management. Piotroski designed it to rank already-cheap stocks, not to judge a company in isolation.
Needs trade receivables, current assets, other expenses.
Accruals are -7.9% of assets. Free cash flow negative in 1 of 4 years.
DuPont decomposition — Devised inside the DuPont Corporation in the 1920s and still the standard way to read a return on equity.
Splits return on equity into its three sources, so the same headline number can be traced to very different businesses.
How to read itA 20% ROE built on margin and turnover is a different proposition from a 20% ROE built on 3× leverage. The first survives a downturn; the second amplifies it.
Where it failsA single year. Negative equity makes it meaningless. Leverage is structural for lenders, so the third term carries no signal there.
Capital is going in far faster than revenue is coming out. For a business mid-build that is expected — the test is whether it converts.
cumulative operating cash flow ÷ cumulative net profit
₹27 cr ÷ ₹35 cr, over 4 years
0.77×
Below 1.0 and persistent means profit is being recognised before the cash arrives.(net profit − operating cash flow) ÷ average total assets
(₹13 − ₹19) cr ÷ average assets
-7.9%
Negative means cash exceeded profit — the healthier reading. Positive above ~10% is where accruals start to dominate earnings.net margin × asset turnover × leverage
8.8% × 1.73 × 1.37
21.0%
Splits ROE into whether returns come from operations or from borrowing.EBIT ÷ finance cost
₹18 cr ÷ ₹1 cr
18.00×
How many times operating profit covers the interest bill.borrowings ÷ net worth
₹13 cr ÷ ₹62 cr
0.21×
Read against the sector — infrastructure carries more than software.growth in fixed assets + CWIP, against growth in revenue
capital +357% vs revenue +17%, FY2023 to FY2026
340pp gap
Money going in far faster than revenue coming out. For an incubator this is expected — the test is whether it eventually converts.Needs more balance-sheet detail (only 3 of 6 flags testable).
NOPAT over equity plus debt less cash, at a notional 25% tax. Incremental ROIC is the return on money put in since then — the number that decides whether growth creates value or consumes it.
Return on invested capital, and incremental ROIC — Standard in corporate finance; the incremental form was popularised by Michael Mauboussin as the test of whether growth creates value.
ROIC measures what the business earns on all the capital it employs — equity plus debt, less cash. Incremental ROIC asks a sharper question: what has it earned on the money put in since a chosen year?
How to read itROIC comfortably above the cost of capital — call it 11–13% in India — means growth compounds. Below it, growth consumes. Incremental below headline means recent investment is earning less than the legacy business.
Where it failsDistorted in the year of a large acquisition. Understated for companies mid-build, where capital is deployed but capacity has not yet been commissioned — an incubator will look poor until it does not.
Read downward. Cash can cover EBITDA and still not survive capex — the third rung is where a capital-hungry business shows itself.
The earnings quality ladder — Not a named model — the standard sequence an analyst walks when testing whether reported profit is real.
Three ratios read in order, each stricter than the last.
How to read itRead downward. Each rung failing where the one above passed tells you exactly where the cash is going.
Where it failsA single year of heavy capex depresses the third rung legitimately. Judge it across a cycle.
Against a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%.
Cost of debt — Interest expense over average borrowings — the effective rate the company actually pays.
What the lenders charge, which is a market verdict on credit quality that no rating agency delay affects.
How to read itAgainst a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%. Read the direction over years as much as the level.
Where it failsUnderstated where a large share of interest is capitalised into projects under construction. Not meaningful for lenders, where interest is cost of goods.
Models that need these lines are withheld rather than estimated: net worth, current assets, current liabilities, trade receivables, inventory, net block. Nothing on this page is back-solved from a figure the company did not publish.
Each framework below is a set of stated, mechanical criteria from published work, run against this company's own filed numbers. Passing or failing a screen is not a verdict — different frameworks disagree by design, and that disagreement is itself informative.
Benjamin Graham's stated criteria for a defensive stock, applied to the filed numbers. A company failing several is not disqualified — Graham designed these to be deliberately strict.
Two ratios only: what the business earns on its capital, and what you pay for those earnings. Designed to be ranked across a universe rather than read in isolation.
The fundamental half of William O'Neil's framework. The market and leadership components are judgement calls and are not scored here.
The characteristics long-term holders commonly look for: cash-backed earnings, high returns on capital, and debt that never forces a decision.
Median of the companies we hold in the same sector (Engineering). Every figure on both sides is the live feed's trailing twelve months, so the two are measured the same way whatever depth of extraction this company has had. A number only means something next to something else — expensive against the market and cheap against peers are different facts.
Bars are revenue; the line is net margin. Revenue rising while the line falls is the shape worth noticing.
Operating cash first, then what the business spent and raised.
One year is a snapshot. These are the two lines that matter across a cycle.
Rising debtor or inventory days against flat sales is the earliest visible sign of stress.
Set your own assumptions and watch the numbers move. A scenario calculator — the outputs are the arithmetic of your inputs.
One canonical set of figures — the same numbers used everywhere else on this page and on the screener.
Where cash gets stuck. A rising inventory or debtor line against flat sales is the earliest sign of trouble in the numbers.
| Measure | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor days
How long customers take to pay | 38 | 40 | 46 | 44 |
| Inventory days
How long stock sits before it sells | 74 | 81 | 93 | 88 |
| Payable days
How long the company takes to pay suppliers | 21 | 17 | 20 | 20 |
| Cash conversion cycle
Debtor + inventory − payable days | 92 | 104 | 119 | 112 |
| Working capital days | 68 | 75 | 91 | 82 |
| ROCE %
Return on capital employed | — | 26.0% | 27.0% | 25.0% |
The shape of the business over time (annual) — read the direction, not the single print.
| Line | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 126 | 130 | 145 | 147 |
| Other income | 1 | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Depreciation | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Finance cost | 1 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Profit before tax | 7 | 10 | 13 | 17 |
| Net profit (owners) | 5 | 7 | 10 | 13 |
| EPS (₹) | 220.43 | 35.35 | 47.42 | 8.66 |
Exceptional items, total income and EBITDA are read from the filed statements.
| Item | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Capital | 2 | 2 | 2 | 15 |
| Reserves | 29 | 37 | 47 | 47 |
| Borrowings | 5 | 6 | 8 | 13 |
| Net block | 7 | 7 | 7 | 32 |
| CWIP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Investments | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 |
| Total Assets | 46 | 54 | 66 | 85 |
| Line | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | 3 | 4 | 1 | 19 |
| Cash from investing | -2 | -2 | 0 | -27 |
| Cash from financing | -1 | 1 | 1 | 5 |
| Free cash flow | 1 | 3 | 0 | -8 |
| Net change in cash | 1 | 3 | 2 | -4 |
Cash from operations is the number profit has to answer to. Free cash flow is what remains after the business pays for its own growth.
These are coverage counts, not ratings. Each one asks a fixed set of questions of the filings and reports how many the company answered. A company that discloses nothing counts nothing here — that is a statement about the disclosure, not about the business.
The same read, applied to the companies this one competes with.