Altman Z″
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
SHANKESH · Diamond & Jewellery · INE1WFC01025
Analyst mean 0.00 · 0 analysts · 0% bullishThis company listed within the last twelve months, so its prospectus is still the primary source. The figures below were extracted from the DRHP and RHP before listing and scored then, and they are shown here as they stand in the IPO record rather than restated.
Each flag is a fact read in the filing, shown with the context that makes it meaningful.
Stated objects, as worded in the offer document. Deployment against them is tracked separately.
Claims made in the offer document, to be read against what the company has reported since.
Incorporated in 2005 and headquartered in Zaveri Bazaar, Mumbai, Shankesh Jewellers Limited is a B2B wholesale gold jewellery company with a multi-decade legacy dating back to 1992. The company specializes in designing and distributing premium hand-crafted gold jewellery in 22-karat and 18-karat purity. Its extensive product portfolio includes bangles, bridal sets, chokers, jhumkas, long and short necklaces, rings, and mangalsutras. Shankesh Jewellers operates on an asset-light business model, outsourcing 100% of its physical manufacturing to a network of localized, non-exclusive job workers (Karigars) located mainly in Mumbai, Maharashtra. This model allows the company to minimize capital expenditures, optimize inventory management, and adapt quickly to shifting fashion trends. On the distribution side, the company caters to a nationwide customer base of 418 clients across 21 states and 4 union territories in India as of Fiscal 2026. This customer base includes prominent national and regional corporate retail chains such as Joyalukkas India Limited, Kalyan Jewellers India Limited, P. N. Gadgil Jewellers Limited, Novel Jewels Limited, and Bhima Jewellery, alongside numerous independent non-corporate retailers. In terms of scale, the company processed 1,397.48 kilograms of gold in Fiscal 2026, generating ₹1,630.79 crore in revenue from operations (growing at a 23.93% CAGR from Fiscal 2024 to Fiscal 2026) and restated profit after tax of ₹106.68 crore.
Shankesh Jewellers' competitive moat lies in its highly efficient, asset-light B2B business model, which completely outsources the capital-intensive manufacturing process to a network of 72 skilled local job workers (Karigars) in Mumbai. This de-risks the company from high capital expenditures, fixed overheads, and depreciation, allowing it to focus resources on strategic design innovation, quality checks, and inventory management. This model is strengthened by three decades of deep-rooted supplier and customer relationships, enabling the company to offer a comprehensive product catalog under one roof and serve elite national retail brands such as Joyalukkas, Kalyan, and P.N. Gadgil with low client turnover (334 repeat corporate and non-corporate clients in Fiscal 2026).
Shankesh Jewellers Limited is an established B2B wholesale gold jewellery player based in Zaveri Bazaar, Mumbai, with a pan-India presence of over three decades. The company specializes in hand-crafted gold jewellery of 22-karat and 18-karat purity, managing design, material sourcing, and finished jewellery making through localized job workers.
Source: p. 195, 201-203
Where the revenue came from, as the document splits it.
| Name | Pct | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Sale of 22 Karat Gold Jewellery | 85.6 | p. 195 |
| Sale of 18 Karat Gold Jewellery | 13.55 | p. 195 |
| Job Work Services | 0.85 | p. 195 |
According to the CareEdge Report, the Indian gems and jewellery industry contributes approximately 7.00% to India's GDP and represents around 15.00% of total merchandise exports. In CY2025, the domestic gems and jewellery industry reached a market size of ₹9,99,820.00 crore, while the gold jewellery segment was valued at ₹7,90,770.00 crore. The gold jewellery wholesale market, which is the primary addressable market for Shankesh Jewellers' B2B business model, was valued at ₹2,17,610.00 crore in CY2025. Driven by increasing formalization, mandatory hallmarking, and expanding corporate retail networks, the gold wholesale segment is projected to grow at a CAGR of 13.10% to reach ₹4,02,470.00 crore by CY2030P, creating substantial growth opportunities for the company.
Growth rate: 11.20% CAGR (CY2020 to CY2025) and projected 12.80% CAGR (CY2025 to CY2030P)
Market size: ₹9,99,820.00 crore (Indian Gems and Jewellery Industry in CY2025)
Sector slug: gems-and-jewellery
Source: p. 153-155, 170-171
The comparable set the company chose, which is itself a disclosure.
| Name | Margin | Pb | Pe | Roe | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Shanti Gold International Limited | 10.04 | 23.42% | p. 125, 126 | ||
| Sky Gold & Diamonds Limited | 34.86 | 23.37% | p. 125, 126 |
As presented in the offer document. Post-listing figures are in the statements above.
| Basis | Period | Related party revenue cr | Pat cr | Ebitda cr | Pat margin | Revenue cr | Pat margin derived |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| standalone | FY26 | 106.681 | 157.9 | 6.54% | 1630.787 | yes | |
| standalone | FY25 | 40.312 | 65.347 | 2.87% | 1403.826 | yes | |
| standalone | FY24 | 12.816 | 28.599 | 1.21% | 1061.783 | yes |
Written before listing, answered from the document itself.
What is the primary destination of the public offer proceeds, and will it reduce finance expenses?
The Net Proceeds of the Fresh Issue are primarily allocated to prepay or repay ₹158.00 crore of bank borrowings (with HDFC Bank and Kotak Mahindra Bank), which will help lower finance costs (₹13.336 crore u/s FY26). Additionally, ₹38.00 crore is allocated to fund working capital requirements for inventory procurement.
p. 111, 112
How concentrated is the supplier and buyer base, and what are the cash flow implications?
Buyer concentration is moderate with the top 10 clients contributing 39.56% of revenues in FY26. However, supplier concentration is extremely high, with the top 10 gold and metal suppliers accounting for 91.22% of total purchases u/s FY26 (88.45% in FY25), presenting substantial raw material sourcing risks.
p. 22, 116, 331
What factors drove the 164.6% year-on-year PAT margin expansion u/s Fiscal 2026?
Restated PAT rose from ₹40.312 crore in FY25 to ₹106.681 crore in FY26, driven by higher average gold selling prices (averaging ₹115,996 per 10 grams in FY26) which improved inventory realizations, and an increase in the revenue share of corporate retail chain clients from 55.80% in FY25 to 64.25% in FY26.
p. 58, 116, 178
What contingent liabilities or off-balance sheet disclosures present risk u/s the footnotes?
Contingent liabilities include a disputed income tax demand of ₹1.064 crore (₹10.64 million) u/s AY 2019-20 under appeal u/s Section 250, and a ₹3.00 crore bank guarantee. Off-balance sheet risks include systematic quarterly differences (up to ₹3.05 crore) between CA statements submitted to banks and actual books due to premature bank submissions.
p. 63, 288, 332
What the issue priced at, on the figures in the document.
| Date | Name | Shares | Price per share | Category | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2005-07-11 | MoA Subscribers (Kantilal Kheemraj Jain & Jugraj Kheemraj Jain) | 50000 | 10 | promoter & promoter group | p. 77 |
| 2007-11-30 | Kantilal Kheemraj Jain, Mahavir Kantilal Jain, Manoj Kantilal Jain and others | 450000 | 10 | promoter & promoter group | p. 77 |
| 2011-03-17 | Bonus Allotment (4:5) | 400000 | promoter & promoter group | p. 78, 92 | |
| 2012-07-05 | Bonus Allotment (4:9) | 400000 | promoter & promoter group | p. 79, 92 | |
| 2015-10-29 | Rights Allotment (Manoj Kantilal Jain and others) | 380000 | 25 | promoter & promoter group | p. 80 |
| 2018-06-18 | Preferential Allotment (Loan Conversion) | 1111200 | 63 | promoter & promoter group | p. 80 |
| 2024-10-04 | Bonus Allotment (25:10) | 6978000 | promoter & promoter group | p. 82, 93 | |
| 2025-09-05 | Private Placement Allottees (37 individuals) | 26585 | 800 | public | p. 83 |
| 2025-09-10 | Bonus Allotment (5:1) | 48978925 | promoter, promoter group & public | p. 86, 94 | |
| 2025-09-13 | Share Split (Face Value ₹10 to ₹5) | 58774710 | all shareholders | p. 91, 105 |
Ceo: Manoj Kantilal Jain (Managing Director)
Outstanding direct tax proceeding against the company u/s AY 2019-20 consists of 1 case under appeal u/s Section 250 involving ₹1.064 crore. Outstanding direct tax proceeding against the company u/s AY 2025-26 consists of 1 case involving NIL demand under Section 143(2). Promoters/directors have filed 1 active Writ Petition (No. 1942 of 2024) before the Bombay High Court against Brihanmumbai Municipal Corporation challenging a One Time Premium demand notice of ₹5.511 crore, where they have deposited ₹3.022 crore as undisputed and ₹2.489 crore as disputed in court.
Auditor name: M/s V J Shah & Co.
Promoters collectively hold 74.25% (8,72,84,400 Equity Shares) of the pre-Offer paid-up Equity Share capital, with nil promoter shares pledged or encumbered.
None. Statutory auditors issued an unmodified examination report on the Restated Financial Information with no reservations, qualifications, or adverse remarks.
Auditor changed last 3y: No
Source: p. 2, 42, 63, 101, 260, 262, 331, 332, 333
A change between the two filings is a disclosure in itself.
Numbered markers are corporate actions and, once the filings are read, capital and governance events. Prices are split-adjusted so the series is continuous.
What the numbers mean when read together — computed from the filings, not a score.
Operating cash is only 0% of profit, and operating cash has been negative in 3 of the last 4 years — this is a pattern, not a one-off timing gap.
Why this reading: Flagged because the shortfall is persistent (3 weak years), material, and unexplained by a single year of working-capital movement.
Latest operating cash ₹0 cr vs trailing profit ₹107 cr. A repeated gap between profit and cash points to structural earnings quality issues rather than benign timing.
Borrowings rose 71% over 3 years, but only about 21% of the new debt shows up as productive assets — worth understanding what the rest funded.
Why this reading: Kept at caution rather than flagged: the disproportion is real but not extreme, and part of the borrowing may fund working capital or intangibles that this view doesn't capture.
New borrowing ₹70 cr against an asset build of ₹15 cr. Some gap is normal (working capital, dividends); a persistent or widening gap is where it becomes a concern.
Free cash flow is negative — the business consumes more than it generates once capex is paid. Fine if it is deliberate growth investment; a problem if it is structural.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Latest free cash flow ₹-12 cr, negative in 3 of 4 years. Check whether the burn funds expansion (dark stores, plants, ports) or merely sustains operations.
Every score below is calculated here from the reported numbers — none of it is asserted. Open the notebook at the foot of the section to see each formula with this company's figures in it.
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
Piotroski F-Score — fundamental momentum — Joseph Piotroski, University of Chicago, 2000, in a study of whether accounting signals could improve returns among cheap stocks.
Nine yes-or-no tests across profitability, leverage and operating efficiency. Each pass scores one. It asks a narrow question: is this business getting better or worse on its own terms, year over year?
How to read it7 or more suggests improving fundamentals; 3 or fewer suggests deterioration. It measures direction, not quality — a weak company improving can score higher than a strong one holding steady.
Where it failsA single year of comparison, so one unusual year distorts it. Says nothing about valuation, competitive position or management. Piotroski designed it to rank already-cheap stocks, not to judge a company in isolation.
Needs trade receivables, current assets, other expenses.
Accruals are 32.7% of assets. Free cash flow negative in 3 of 4 years.
DuPont decomposition — Devised inside the DuPont Corporation in the 1920s and still the standard way to read a return on equity.
Splits return on equity into its three sources, so the same headline number can be traced to very different businesses.
How to read itA 20% ROE built on margin and turnover is a different proposition from a 20% ROE built on 3× leverage. The first survives a downturn; the second amplifies it.
Where it failsA single year. Negative equity makes it meaningless. Leverage is structural for lenders, so the third term carries no signal there.
cumulative operating cash flow ÷ cumulative net profit
₹-30 cr ÷ ₹170 cr, over 4 years
-0.18×
Below 1.0 and persistent means profit is being recognised before the cash arrives.(net profit − operating cash flow) ÷ average total assets
(₹107 − ₹0) cr ÷ average assets
32.7%
The share of profit that is accounting entries rather than cash. Above ~10% is where accruals start to dominate.net margin × asset turnover × leverage
6.6% × 4.04 × 1.92
51.0%
Splits ROE into whether returns come from operations or from borrowing.EBIT ÷ finance cost
₹156 cr ÷ ₹13 cr
12.00×
How many times operating profit covers the interest bill.borrowings ÷ net worth
₹168 cr ÷ ₹210 cr
0.80×
Read against the sector — infrastructure carries more than software.Needs more balance-sheet detail (only 3 of 6 flags testable).
NOPAT over equity plus debt less cash, at a notional 25% tax. Incremental ROIC is the return on money put in since then — the number that decides whether growth creates value or consumes it.
Return on invested capital, and incremental ROIC — Standard in corporate finance; the incremental form was popularised by Michael Mauboussin as the test of whether growth creates value.
ROIC measures what the business earns on all the capital it employs — equity plus debt, less cash. Incremental ROIC asks a sharper question: what has it earned on the money put in since a chosen year?
How to read itROIC comfortably above the cost of capital — call it 11–13% in India — means growth compounds. Below it, growth consumes. Incremental below headline means recent investment is earning less than the legacy business.
Where it failsDistorted in the year of a large acquisition. Understated for companies mid-build, where capital is deployed but capacity has not yet been commissioned — an incubator will look poor until it does not.
Read downward. Cash can cover EBITDA and still not survive capex — the third rung is where a capital-hungry business shows itself.
The earnings quality ladder — Not a named model — the standard sequence an analyst walks when testing whether reported profit is real.
Three ratios read in order, each stricter than the last.
How to read itRead downward. Each rung failing where the one above passed tells you exactly where the cash is going.
Where it failsA single year of heavy capex depresses the third rung legitimately. Judge it across a cycle.
Against a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%.
Cost of debt — Interest expense over average borrowings — the effective rate the company actually pays.
What the lenders charge, which is a market verdict on credit quality that no rating agency delay affects.
How to read itAgainst a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%. Read the direction over years as much as the level.
Where it failsUnderstated where a large share of interest is capitalised into projects under construction. Not meaningful for lenders, where interest is cost of goods.
Models that need these lines are withheld rather than estimated: net worth, current assets, current liabilities, trade receivables, inventory, net block. Nothing on this page is back-solved from a figure the company did not publish.
Each framework below is a set of stated, mechanical criteria from published work, run against this company's own filed numbers. Passing or failing a screen is not a verdict — different frameworks disagree by design, and that disagreement is itself informative.
Benjamin Graham's stated criteria for a defensive stock, applied to the filed numbers. A company failing several is not disqualified — Graham designed these to be deliberately strict.
Two ratios only: what the business earns on its capital, and what you pay for those earnings. Designed to be ranked across a universe rather than read in isolation.
The fundamental half of William O'Neil's framework. The market and leadership components are judgement calls and are not scored here.
The characteristics long-term holders commonly look for: cash-backed earnings, high returns on capital, and debt that never forces a decision.
Bars are revenue; the line is net margin. Revenue rising while the line falls is the shape worth noticing.
Operating cash first, then what the business spent and raised.
One year is a snapshot. These are the two lines that matter across a cycle.
Rising debtor or inventory days against flat sales is the earliest visible sign of stress.
Set your own assumptions and watch the numbers move. A scenario calculator — the outputs are the arithmetic of your inputs.
One canonical set of figures — the same numbers used everywhere else on this page and on the screener.
How the register has moved over recent quarters — the direction matters more than the level.
Promoter rose from 69.53% to 70.22% across these quarters.
FII trimmed from 7.36% to 7.20% across these quarters.
Other trimmed from 23.11% to 22.58% across these quarters.
Where cash gets stuck. A rising inventory or debtor line against flat sales is the earliest sign of trouble in the numbers.
| Measure | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor days
How long customers take to pay | 18 | 14 | 21 | 28 |
| Inventory days
How long stock sits before it sells | 53 | 47 | 44 | 60 |
| Payable days
How long the company takes to pay suppliers | 9 | 0 | 0 | 1 |
| Cash conversion cycle
Debtor + inventory − payable days | 61 | 61 | 65 | 88 |
| Working capital days | 18 | 20 | 25 | 43 |
| ROCE %
Return on capital employed | — | 18.0% | 31.0% | 50.0% |
The shape of the business over time (annual) — read the direction, not the single print.
| Line | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 909 | 1,062 | 1,404 | 1,631 |
| Other income | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Depreciation | 0 | 1 | 1 | 1 |
| Finance cost | 8 | 11 | 11 | 13 |
| Profit before tax | 14 | 17 | 54 | 143 |
| Net profit (owners) | 10 | 13 | 40 | 107 |
| EPS (₹) | 37.40 | 45.93 | 41.26 | 9.08 |
Exceptional items, total income and EBITDA are read from the filed statements.
| Item | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Capital | 3 | 3 | 10 | 59 |
| Reserves | 45 | 58 | 91 | 151 |
| Borrowings | 98 | 110 | 146 | 168 |
| Net block | 0 | 2 | 4 | 3 |
| CWIP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 |
| Investments | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Assets | 174 | 177 | 250 | 404 |
| Line | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | -8 | 1 | -23 | 0 |
| Cash from investing | 0 | -1 | -3 | -13 |
| Cash from financing | 8 | 0 | 26 | 12 |
| Free cash flow | -8 | 0 | -26 | -12 |
| Net change in cash | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
Cash from operations is the number profit has to answer to. Free cash flow is what remains after the business pays for its own growth.
These are coverage counts, not ratings. Each one asks a fixed set of questions of the filings and reports how many the company answered. A company that discloses nothing counts nothing here — that is a statement about the disclosure, not about the business.
The same read, applied to the companies this one competes with.