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Needs current assets and current liabilities.
PRANAV · Engineering - Construction · INE0H4201019
Analyst mean 0.00 · 0 analysts · 0% bullishThis company listed within the last twelve months, so its prospectus is still the primary source. The figures below were extracted from the DRHP and RHP before listing and scored then, and they are shown here as they stand in the IPO record rather than restated.
Each flag is a fact read in the filing, shown with the context that makes it meaningful.
Stated objects, as worded in the offer document. Deployment against them is tracked separately.
Claims made in the offer document, to be read against what the company has reported since.
Pranav Constructions Limited is a pure-play real estate redevelopment company specializing in the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai (MCGM) region. Geographically, its operations are heavily concentrated in Mumbai's Western Suburbs, which contributed over 99% of its operational revenue across Fiscals 2024, 2025, and 2026. The company’s residential product portfolio targets the economical (apartments up to ₹15 million), mid-and-mass (₹15 million to ₹30 million), and aspirational (₹30 million to ₹70 million) housing segments, with typologies ranging from 1BHK to 3BHK configurations. Its customers include existing members of the Cooperative Housing Societies undergoing redevelopment, who receive redeveloped homes and compensation, alongside new buyers purchasing the sale-component inventory. Employing an asset-light business model, the company secures development rights from societies without outright land purchase, outsourcing civil construction, demolition, and plumbing to third-party contractors while maintaining in-house control over architecture, legal approvals, planning, and project management. As of March 31, 2026, the company's scale of operations includes a portfolio of 65 redevelopment projects, comprising 28 completed projects (1.42 million square feet of developable area), 20 under-construction projects (1.63 million square feet), and 17 upcoming projects (1.96 million square feet). The company also has an average project cycle of 26 months and employs a dedicated workforce of 198 permanent employees to execute its pipeline.
Our competitive strengths are centered on our market leadership in MCGM pure-play redevelopment, particularly in the Western Suburbs of Mumbai. We operate an asset-light business model, securing development rights from Co-operative Housing Societies rather than purchasing land outright. This model is supported by a dedicated in-house team of 198 permanent employees (including civil engineers and architects) capable of managing complex legal, stakeholder, and architectural processes, creating high entry barriers for competitors.
Pranav Constructions Limited is a pure-play real estate redevelopment company based in Mumbai, India, with a focus on cooperative housing society redevelopment. The company primarily operates in the Western Suburbs of Mumbai, targeting the economical, mid-and-mass, and aspirational housing segments.
Source: p.206, p.209
Where the revenue came from, as the document splits it.
Pranav Constructions Limited operates in Mumbai’s highly competitive real estate redevelopment market, where land scarcity limits greenfield development and shifts focus to redevelopment under DCPR 2034. Within the MCGM region, under-construction redevelopment projects dominant the residential supply at 62% (104,859 units) over greenfield developments (38%) from CY17 to Q1 CY26. The Western Suburbs hold the highest redevelopment supply share of 44% (46,218 units) and record the highest absorption at 48% of total sold units. This pure-play redevelopment market features shorter project cycles and enhanced investor IRR compared to greenfield developments. Additionally, MCGM redevelopment supply grew multifold post-pandemic, with 87% of all units launched between CY21 and Q1 CY26, creating a highly supportive environment for the company's expansion plans.
MMR residential unit launches grew 85% YoY in CY21 and 47% YoY in CY22. Additionally, MCGM redevelopment supply grew multifold post-pandemic, with 87% of all units (59,904 units out of 68,888 units) launched between CY21 and Q1 CY26.
The cumulative Indian real estate sector is expected to grow to USD 1 trillion by 2030, while the total under-construction redevelopment supply in the MCGM region stood at 104,859 units as of Q1 CY26.
Sector slug: real-estate-redevelopment
Source: p.138, p.142
The comparable set the company chose, which is itself a disclosure.
| Name | Margin | Pb | Pe | Roe | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Keystone Realtors Limited | 3.6 | 64.86 | 3.34 | p.124-125 | |
| Godrej Properties Limited | 35.87 | 33.25 | 9.97 | p.124-125 | |
| Lodha Developers Limited (Formerly known as Macrotech Developers Limited) | 20.57 | 33.48 | 15.71 | p.124-125 | |
| Suraj Estate Developers Limited | 16.25 | 9.94 | 9.53 | p.124-125 | |
| Kolte-Patil Developers Limited | -5.18 | -3.73 | p.124-125 | ||
| Arkade Developers Limited | 0.65 | 482.59 | 0.6 | p.124-125 | |
| Kalpataru Limited | 2.33 | 56.64 | 2.45 | p.124-125 |
As presented in the offer document. Post-listing figures are in the statements above.
| Basis | Period | Related party revenue cr | Pat cr | Pat margin | Revenue cr | Pat margin derived | Cff cr |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| consolidated | FY26 | 0 | 71.324 | 9.37% | 761.596 | yes | 24.629 |
| consolidated | FY25 | 0 | 62.254 | 9.78% | 636.272 | yes | 94.169 |
| consolidated | FY24 | 0.838 | 39.617 | 8.85% | 447.483 | yes | 0.572 |
Written before listing, answered from the document itself.
Given that the objects of the Fresh Issue have not been appraised by any bank, what controls are in place to prevent cost overruns or delay in fund deployment?
The deployment of ₹145.718 crore for project expenses is based entirely on internal management estimates. However, the company has appointed CRISIL Ratings Limited as an independent Monitoring Agency to review the utilization of proceeds quarterly. Any variation in the utilization of funds also requires prior approval from the company's shareholders.
p.30, p.94, p.95
How does the company plan to manage its extreme geographic concentration, with 99.70% of Fiscal 2026 revenue coming from Mumbai's Western Suburbs?
The company does not intend to diversify geographically in the near term, as its core competitive advantage lies in its deep relationships with housing societies and micro-market expertise in Mumbai's Western Suburbs. This suburb is the largest redevelopment hub in MCGM, representing 44% of total supply and 48% of total unit absorption, which the company believes justifies its hyper-local focus.
p.13, p.138
How do project stalls like Nirmal Bhavan CHSL affect the operating margins and profitability of the company?
When a redevelopment project is stalled due to litigation or approval delays, the company is still contractually obligated to pay monthly alternate accommodation rents and hardship compensation to the displaced members. These continuous cash outflows are capitalized into Project Costs (which reached ₹63.547 crore in FY26), directly inflating project overheads and lowering realized operating margins upon final sale.
p.29, p.94, p.170
What are the liquidity implications of carrying ₹23.604 crore in unsecured borrowings that are repayable on demand at interest rates of up to 18% p.a.?
These unsecured loans, primarily inter-corporate deposits from related parties, carry high interest rates that directly inflate finance costs (₹3.273 crore in FY26). Because they are repayable on demand, any sudden recall of funds could create severe liquidity distress, particularly as the company recorded negative operating cash flows of -₹4.119 crore in Fiscal 2026 and -₹9.260 crore in Fiscal 2025.
p.49, p.201, p.272
What the issue priced at, on the figures in the document.
Pe basis: Price band is not determined yet
The peer set includes MMR-focused standalone, township, and PAN-India developers such as Keystone Realtors, Godrej Properties, Lodha Developers, Suraj Estate, Kolte-Patil, Arkade Developers, and Kalpataru.
Source: p.124-125
How the book filled. A category that bid far above the rest is a different signal from a uniformly covered issue.
| Date | Name | Shares | Price per share | Category | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2018-12-21 | RiverCrest India Infrastructure Private Limited | 1000 | 447.5 | Investor | p.77 |
| 2023-03-31 | RiverCrest India Infrastructure Private Limited | 1003055 | Investor | p.77 | |
| 2023-03-31 | RiverCrest India Infrastructure Private Limited | 2645 | Investor | p.77 | |
| 2023-12-30 | BioUrja India Infra Private Limited | 151488 | 1000 | Investor Selling Shareholder | p.77 |
| 2024-12-02 | Nine Realms Advisory LLP | 500000 | 250 | Member of Promoter Group | p.78 |
| 2024-12-02 | Jitendra Kantilal Shah | 400000 | 250 | Investor | p.78 |
| 2024-12-02 | Pooja Jinit Dharia | 100000 | 250 | Investor | p.78 |
Ceo: Pranav Kiran Ashar
Direct tax claims against Company: ₹1.515 crore (5 cases). Indirect tax claims against Company: ₹0.210 crore (1 case). Direct tax claims against Promoters: ₹0.128 crore (2 cases). Direct tax claims against Directors: ₹0.001 crore (1 case). Indirect tax claims against Directors: ₹0.020 crore (1 case). Domestic violence and maintenance claim against Promoter Pranav Kiran Ashar by estranged spouse Vaisshali Pranav Ashar: ₹10.210 crore. Material civil suit against Company and Priyadarshini CHSL by Shakuntala Hemant Joshi & Ors seeking damages of ₹10.000 crore. Civil suit against Company and Laxman Tower CHSL by Pandharinath Laxman Bhandari: amount not quantifiable. Criminal revision application against Director Suneet J Desai alleging fraud in redevelopment tender: amount not quantifiable.
Auditor name: M S K A & Associates LLP
Promoters hold 55,218,845 equity shares, representing 63.35% of the pre-Offer paid-up equity capital. The average cost of acquisition is ₹0.29 per share for Pranav Kiran Ashar and ₹2.79 per share for Ravi Ramalingam. 20% of the post-Offer capital is locked in for 3 years as Minimum Promoters' Contribution, with the excess locked in for 1 year.
The CARO report of subsidiary PCPL Infra Private Limited contains a qualification/flag under Clause xvii for cash losses of ₹0.005 crore in Fiscal 2026, ₹0.009 crore in Fiscal 2025, and ₹0.009 crore in Fiscal 2024.
Auditor changed last 3y: No
Source: p.32, p.40, p.67, p.68, p.81, p.84, p.86, p.164, p.186, p.387-390
Transactions with promoters, directors and their entities, as disclosed.
| Counterparty | Amount cr | Nature | Relationship | Core function | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Pranav Kiran Ashar | 227.25 | Personal Guarantee Taken (outstanding) | Promoter and Managing Director | Personal guarantee provided for construction finance loans and bank overdraft facilities obtained by the Company | p.67, p.328 |
| Pranav Kiran Ashar | 5.096 | Bank Guarantee Given on behalf of | Promoter and Managing Director | Guarantees given by the bank on behalf of the Promoter to third parties | p.67, p.328 |
| Pranav Kiran Ashar | 0.763 | Remuneration | Promoter and Managing Director | Remuneration paid for acting as Managing Director | p.319, p.328 |
| Techsec Digital Global Private Limited | 0.08 | Trade Payable | Group Company | Trade payable outstanding for services rendered | p.67, p.328 |
| En-vision Design Studio Private Limited | 0.048 | Trade Payable | Group Company | Trade payable outstanding for design services rendered | p.67, p.328 |
| Positive Constructions | 0.033 | Trade Payable | Entity controlled by directors | Trade payable outstanding for civil construction works | p.67, p.328 |
CARO reports for Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 disclose that the Company had slight delays in depositing undisputed statutory dues (including GST, provident fund, ESIC, income tax, and cess) with appropriate authorities, though all dues were subsequently paid and no undisputed amounts were outstanding for more than six months. There is an outstanding disputed income tax demand of ₹0.760 crore (₹7.60 million) for AY 2017-18 pending in appeal before the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals), Mumbai.
Source: p.32, p.33, p.328
A change between the two filings is a disclosure in itself.
Numbered markers are corporate actions and, once the filings are read, capital and governance events. Prices are split-adjusted so the series is continuous.
What the numbers mean when read together — computed from the filings, not a score.
The business reported a profit, yet its operations drained cash rather than generating it. Profit that comes with negative operating cash is the single most important thing to understand here.
Why this reading: Flagged on a single year deliberately: negative operating cash alongside a reported profit is plain, material, and hard to explain benignly — exactly the kind of obvious signal that should never be smoothed over.
Operating cash flow ₹-41 cr against trailing net profit ₹71 cr. When operations consume cash while the P&L shows profit, ask whether receivables are ballooning, revenue is booked ahead of collection, or costs are being capitalised.
Borrowings rose 166% over 3 years, but only about 4% of the new debt shows up as productive assets — worth understanding what the rest funded.
Why this reading: Kept at caution rather than flagged: the disproportion is real but not extreme, and part of the borrowing may fund working capital or intangibles that this view doesn't capture.
New borrowing ₹166 cr against an asset build of ₹6 cr. Some gap is normal (working capital, dividends); a persistent or widening gap is where it becomes a concern.
Free cash flow is negative — the business consumes more than it generates once capex is paid. Fine if it is deliberate growth investment; a problem if it is structural.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Latest free cash flow ₹-44 cr, negative in 3 of 5 years. Check whether the burn funds expansion (dark stores, plants, ports) or merely sustains operations.
Borrowings rose 169% over two years while the company also carries ₹3 cr in investments. Why borrow at interest while parking money elsewhere is a fair question.
Why this reading: Noted with caution — worth watching, but not yet conclusive on its own. Business has ups and downs; one soft reading is not a verdict.
Borrowings moved to ₹266 cr from ₹99 cr. Simultaneous large investments can be legitimate treasury management, or a sign that reported cash is not freely available.
Net margin improved from 1.8% to 9.3% year-on-year — the business is keeping more of each rupee.
Why this reading: A positive signal in the numbers, shown for balance alongside the concerns.
Quarter net margin 9.3% vs 1.8% four quarters earlier. Expansion from operating leverage is healthy; verify it is not a one-off gain.
Every score below is calculated here from the reported numbers — none of it is asserted. Open the notebook at the foot of the section to see each formula with this company's figures in it.
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
Piotroski F-Score — fundamental momentum — Joseph Piotroski, University of Chicago, 2000, in a study of whether accounting signals could improve returns among cheap stocks.
Nine yes-or-no tests across profitability, leverage and operating efficiency. Each pass scores one. It asks a narrow question: is this business getting better or worse on its own terms, year over year?
How to read it7 or more suggests improving fundamentals; 3 or fewer suggests deterioration. It measures direction, not quality — a weak company improving can score higher than a strong one holding steady.
Where it failsA single year of comparison, so one unusual year distorts it. Says nothing about valuation, competitive position or management. Piotroski designed it to rank already-cheap stocks, not to judge a company in isolation.
Needs trade receivables, current assets, other expenses.
Accruals are 7.4% of assets. Free cash flow negative in 3 of 5 years.
DuPont decomposition — Devised inside the DuPont Corporation in the 1920s and still the standard way to read a return on equity.
Splits return on equity into its three sources, so the same headline number can be traced to very different businesses.
How to read itA 20% ROE built on margin and turnover is a different proposition from a 20% ROE built on 3× leverage. The first survives a downturn; the second amplifies it.
Where it failsA single year. Negative equity makes it meaningless. Leverage is structural for lenders, so the third term carries no signal there.
Revenue grew faster than the capital behind it, which is what operating leverage looks like: the existing asset base is working harder.
cumulative operating cash flow ÷ cumulative net profit
₹-117 cr ÷ ₹197 cr, over 5 years
-0.59×
Below 1.0 and persistent means profit is being recognised before the cash arrives.(net profit − operating cash flow) ÷ average total assets
(₹71 − ₹-41) cr ÷ average assets
7.4%
The share of profit that is accounting entries rather than cash. Above ~10% is where accruals start to dominate.net margin × asset turnover × leverage
9.3% × 0.42 × 7.28
28.7%
Splits ROE into whether returns come from operations or from borrowing.EBIT ÷ finance cost
₹127 cr ÷ ₹33 cr
3.85×
How many times operating profit covers the interest bill.borrowings ÷ net worth
₹266 cr ÷ ₹247 cr
1.08×
Read against the sector — infrastructure carries more than software.growth in fixed assets + CWIP, against growth in revenue
capital +100% vs revenue +115%, FY2023 to FY2026
-15pp gap
Money going in far faster than revenue coming out. For an incubator this is expected — the test is whether it eventually converts.Needs more balance-sheet detail (only 3 of 6 flags testable).
NOPAT over equity plus debt less cash, at a notional 25% tax. Incremental ROIC is the return on money put in since then — the number that decides whether growth creates value or consumes it.
Return on invested capital, and incremental ROIC — Standard in corporate finance; the incremental form was popularised by Michael Mauboussin as the test of whether growth creates value.
ROIC measures what the business earns on all the capital it employs — equity plus debt, less cash. Incremental ROIC asks a sharper question: what has it earned on the money put in since a chosen year?
How to read itROIC comfortably above the cost of capital — call it 11–13% in India — means growth compounds. Below it, growth consumes. Incremental below headline means recent investment is earning less than the legacy business.
Where it failsDistorted in the year of a large acquisition. Understated for companies mid-build, where capital is deployed but capacity has not yet been commissioned — an incubator will look poor until it does not.
Read downward. Cash can cover EBITDA and still not survive capex — the third rung is where a capital-hungry business shows itself.
The earnings quality ladder — Not a named model — the standard sequence an analyst walks when testing whether reported profit is real.
Three ratios read in order, each stricter than the last.
How to read itRead downward. Each rung failing where the one above passed tells you exactly where the cash is going.
Where it failsA single year of heavy capex depresses the third rung legitimately. Judge it across a cycle.
Against a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%.
Cost of debt — Interest expense over average borrowings — the effective rate the company actually pays.
What the lenders charge, which is a market verdict on credit quality that no rating agency delay affects.
How to read itAgainst a policy rate near 6%, most sound Indian corporates borrow between 7% and 10%. Read the direction over years as much as the level.
Where it failsUnderstated where a large share of interest is capitalised into projects under construction. Not meaningful for lenders, where interest is cost of goods.
Models that need these lines are withheld rather than estimated: net worth, current assets, current liabilities, trade receivables, inventory, net block. Nothing on this page is back-solved from a figure the company did not publish.
Each framework below is a set of stated, mechanical criteria from published work, run against this company's own filed numbers. Passing or failing a screen is not a verdict — different frameworks disagree by design, and that disagreement is itself informative.
Benjamin Graham's stated criteria for a defensive stock, applied to the filed numbers. A company failing several is not disqualified — Graham designed these to be deliberately strict.
Two ratios only: what the business earns on its capital, and what you pay for those earnings. Designed to be ranked across a universe rather than read in isolation.
The fundamental half of William O'Neil's framework. The market and leadership components are judgement calls and are not scored here.
The characteristics long-term holders commonly look for: cash-backed earnings, high returns on capital, and debt that never forces a decision.
Bars are revenue; the line is net margin. Revenue rising while the line falls is the shape worth noticing.
Operating cash first, then what the business spent and raised.
One year is a snapshot. These are the two lines that matter across a cycle.
Rising debtor or inventory days against flat sales is the earliest visible sign of stress.
Set your own assumptions and watch the numbers move. A scenario calculator — the outputs are the arithmetic of your inputs.
One canonical set of figures — the same numbers used everywhere else on this page and on the screener.
How the register has moved over recent quarters — the direction matters more than the level.
Promoter held steady from 49.03% to 49.03% across these quarters.
FII held steady from 4.59% to 4.59% across these quarters.
MF held steady from 2.00% to 2.00% across these quarters.
Other held steady from 44.38% to 44.38% across these quarters.
Where cash gets stuck. A rising inventory or debtor line against flat sales is the earliest sign of trouble in the numbers.
| Measure | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor days
How long customers take to pay | 54 | 54 | 61 | 35 | 30 |
| Inventory days
How long stock sits before it sells | — | — | 98 | — | — |
| Payable days
How long the company takes to pay suppliers | — | — | 138 | — | — |
| Cash conversion cycle
Debtor + inventory − payable days | 54 | 54 | 22 | 35 | 30 |
| Working capital days | 6 | -7 | 31 | 72 | 105 |
| ROCE %
Return on capital employed | — | 42.0% | 36.0% | 34.0% | 28.0% |
The shape of the business over time (annual) — read the direction, not the single print.
| Line | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 219 | 355 | 447 | 636 | 762 |
| Other income | 0 | 1 | 2 | 2 | 2 |
| Depreciation | 1 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| Finance cost | 9 | 18 | 18 | 23 | 33 |
| Profit before tax | 11 | 31 | 39 | 72 | 94 |
| Net profit (owners) | 4 | 20 | 40 | 62 | 71 |
| EPS (₹) | 14.48 | 58.16 | 108.56 | 7.14 | 8.18 |
Exceptional items, total income and EBITDA are read from the filed statements.
| Item | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Capital | 2 | 4 | 4 | 87 | 87 |
| Reserves | -29 | 30 | 85 | 88 | 160 |
| Borrowings | 127 | 100 | 99 | 202 | 266 |
| Net block | 3 | 6 | 3 | 9 | 12 |
| CWIP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Investments | 0 | 3 | 5 | 1 | 3 |
| Total Assets | 628 | 703 | 967 | 1,246 | 1,799 |
| Line | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | -26 | 38 | 5 | -93 | -41 |
| Cash from investing | 0 | -29 | 20 | -1 | -5 |
| Cash from financing | 35 | -8 | 1 | 94 | 25 |
| Free cash flow | -27 | 36 | 25 | -97 | -44 |
| Net change in cash | 9 | 1 | 26 | 1 | -22 |
Cash from operations is the number profit has to answer to. Free cash flow is what remains after the business pays for its own growth.
These are coverage counts, not ratings. Each one asks a fixed set of questions of the filings and reports how many the company answered. A company that discloses nothing counts nothing here — that is a statement about the disclosure, not about the business.
The same read, applied to the companies this one competes with.