Shah Investor’s Home
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Shah Investor's Home Limited (SIHL) is an integrated financial services provider in India offering equity and commodity broking, depository services, margin trading facility, and financial product distribution. Operating through online platforms like SIHL Moneymaker and an offline branch network, the company serves retail, HNI, and corporate clients primarily across Gujarat.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Shah Investor's Home Limited is a financial services company with an operating history in stock broking, depository services, margin trading facility (MTF), and distribution of mutual funds, insurance, and portfolio management services. Operating through its proprietary online platform 'SIHL Moneymaker' and a physical branch and authorised person network primarily across Gujarat, SIHL caters to over 85,000 total clients including 38,189 active trading clients as of Fiscal 2026. The company generates revenue primarily through brokerage and fees (64.78% of operating revenue in FY26), interest income from margin trading and loans, and distribution commissions. Its subsidiary SIHL Fincap Limited operates as an NBFC offering margin funding and loans against securities. Consolidated total income reached ₹ 72.40 crore in Fiscal 2026 with a Profit After Tax of ₹ 13.11 crore.
- Broking & Depository Services — Equity, derivative, commodity broking, and depository participant services through NSDL.
- Margin Trading Facility — Margin funding to equity trading clients against security collateral.
- Distribution Services — Distribution of mutual funds, bonds, insurance, and PMS products.
Established regional market leadership in Gujarat, long-term client relationships with average tenor exceeding 5 years for majority of active clients, and an integrated financial services model combining broking, NBFC margin funding, and wealth distribution.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Augmenting working capital requirement of our Company
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 71.48 | 94.27 | 77.82 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 13.11 | 23.42 | 18.05 |
| PAT Margin | 18.34% | 24.84% | 23.19% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Brokerage and Fees Income: 64.78%
- Interest Income: 32.91%
- Dividend Income: 1.64%
- Rental & Other Operating Income: 0.67%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 24.2% | Revenue from operations decreased primarily due to a 29.73% decline in brokerage and commission income reflecting lower retail client trading activity and lower traded values on equity exchanges. | Cyclical |
| Employee benefits expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 6.6% | Employee benefit expenses increased due to salary increments and employee retention. | Structural |
| Restated PAT (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 43.5% | Restated PAT contracted due to lower top-line brokerage revenue amidst softer market trading activity. | Cyclical |
| Operating cash flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 38.2% | Operating cash outflow reduced from ₹ 31.86 crore in FY25 to ₹ 19.70 crore in FY26 primarily due to lower working capital lock-up in trade payables and other current liabilities. | Cyclical |
| Revenue from operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 21.1% | Revenue grew due to higher brokerage income and higher delayed payment interest charges driven by strong retail market participation. | Cyclical |
Headwinds
- Dependence on Secondary Market Equity Trading Activity sector persistent
Brokerage income is directly tied to capital market sentiment and retail trading turnover, making revenues susceptible to market downturns or volatility. - Price Competition from Discount Broking Platforms sector persistent
Discount brokers offering zero/flat brokerage attract high retail order volumes, compressing brokerage yields across traditional full-service brokers.
Tailwinds
- Financialization of Indian Household Savings and Tier 2/3 Market Penetration macro
Expanding demat account additions, rising mutual fund SIPs, and MTF adoption across Tier 2 and Tier 3 cities drive long-term structural demand for financial services.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-05
- Pre Application Start2026-09-25
- Bidding Start2026-09-28
- Bidding End2026-09-30
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-01
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-05
- Listing Day2026-10-06
- Mandate End2026-11-11
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 71.48 | 94.27 | 77.82 |
| Other Income | 0.92 | 0.19 | 1.23 |
| Total Income | 72.40 | 94.47 | 79.05 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.35 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 12.27 | 11.52 | 10.92 |
| Finance Cost | 2.35 | 2.46 | 0.91 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 1.88 | 1.64 | 1.44 |
| Other Expenses | 37.59 | 47.45 | 41.43 |
| Total Expenses | 54.09 | 63.06 | 55.05 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 18.31 | 31.40 | 24.01 |
| Exceptional Items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 18.31 | 31.40 | 24.01 |
| Tax Expense | 5.20 | 7.99 | 5.95 |
| Profit After Tax | 13.11 | 23.42 | 18.05 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | -0.05 | -4.27 | 16.90 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 13.05 | 19.15 | 34.95 |
| EPS - Basic | 8.38 | 14.84 | 11.38 |
| EPS - Diluted | 8.38 | 14.84 | 11.38 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 15.75 | 15.75 | 15.75 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 163.95 | 152.34 | 134.79 |
| Net Worth | 179.71 | 168.09 | 150.54 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.49 | 0.66 | 0.42 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 17.98 | 5.04 | 3.12 |
| Total Borrowings | 18.47 | 5.71 | 3.54 |
| Trade Payables | 102.79 | 124.15 | 136.55 |
| Current Liabilities | 104.64 | 138.19 | 143.01 |
| Total Liabilities | 123.90 | 133.50 | 147.27 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 22.71 | 21.04 | 20.86 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 2.37 | 1.08 | 0.40 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.07 | 0.04 | 0.06 |
| Investments | 82.51 | 77.30 | 72.24 |
| Trade Receivables | 26.89 | 16.86 | 7.78 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 64.29 | 85.11 | 130.07 |
| Current Assets | 168.05 | 182.61 | 182.64 |
| Total Assets | 304.44 | 302.57 | 298.76 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -19.70 | -31.86 | 110.19 |
| Capital Expenditure | 4.82 | 2.41 | 1.64 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -9.94 | -11.23 | -1.52 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 8.83 | -1.86 | -6.98 |
| Net Change in Cash | -20.82 | -44.96 | 101.69 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 31.1 | 37.6 | 33.3 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 28.5 | 35.8 | 31.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 18.3 | 24.8 | 23.2 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 7.3 | 13.9 | 12 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 10.4 | 19.5 | 16.2 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 4.3 | 7.7 | 6 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.1 | 0.03 | 0.02 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | -2.03 | -2.24 | -4.8 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 8.79 | 13.76 | 27.38 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.61 | 1.32 | 1.28 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.23 | 0.31 | 0.26 |
| Receivable Days | 137 | 65 | 36 |
| Payable Days | 525 | 481 | 640 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -1.5 | -1.36 | 6.1 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 10.8 | 18.3 | -30.8 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.56 | 1.47 | 1.14 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 18.3% | 24.8% | 23.2% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.23x | 0.31x | 0.26x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.69x | 1.8x | 1.98x |
| = Return on Equity | 7.3% | 13.9% | 12% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.72x | 0.75x | 0.75x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.89x | 0.93x | 0.96x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 28.9% | 35.9% | 32% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 13.11 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -19.70 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 36 in FY24 to 137 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 8.79x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 2.103 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 1.142 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 0.758 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.946 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.115 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.752 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1078 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 8.35 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.208 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.539 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.068 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.45 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 8.35 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -1.5x profit in FY26, against -1.36x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 35.8%
Contingent liabilities of 64.25 cr against a net worth of 179.71 cr — 35.8% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.1%
0.1% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 3.58x
Short-term borrowings of 17.98 cr against cash of 64.29 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 6.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.84 cr against a profit of 13.11 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth13.11 ÷ 179.71What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)20.66 ÷ (179.71 + 18.47) = 20.66 ÷ 198.18Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue22.54 ÷ 71.48Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth18.47 ÷ 179.71How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost20.66 ÷ 2.35How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(26.89 ÷ 71.48) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-19.70 ÷ 13.11Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(13.11 − -19.70) ÷ 304.44 = 32.81 ÷ 304.44The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹167.00 × 21,153,200 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash353.26 + 18.47 − 64.29What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA307.44 ÷ 22.54The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT353.26 ÷ 13.11The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisitionAcquired at nil or near-nil considerationEvery offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Here the entry price is nil, which means a bonus issue or a transfer for no consideration. A multiple cannot be computed against zero, and that is the fact worth noticing rather than a number to print. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
Growth needed to reach the peer multiple on earnings alone26.95x against a peer median of 16.28xThis is not a forecast and not a target. It is the price restated as a question: at this multiple, with the price unchanged, earnings would have to compound at this rate to arrive at what the filing’s own peer group trades on. Whether the business can do that is the argument — we are only stating what the argument is about.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the CareEdge Report, the Indian financial services and broking industry has experienced substantial growth driven by increasing retail participation, rising demat accounts, financialization of household savings, and digital onboarding. Aggregate ADTO across key exchanges expanded rapidly, with retail participation growing across cash and F&O segments. Operating in a highly competitive market against national brokers like SMC Global, Share India, and Arihant Capital, regional market leaders leverage localized client relationships and integrated NBFC funding models to maintain client stickiness.
Strategic Expansion of Margin Trading Facility (MTF)
SIHL's MTF book grew by 117.40% to ₹ 20.96 crore in FY26 and further expanded to ₹ 54.20 crore by August 2026. The proposed IPO working capital injection is aimed at expanding MTF funding capacity to capture client demand.
Source: p.355, p.360, p.445Dominant Footprint in Gujarat Retail Broking Segment
Operating through 11 physical branches and 184 authorised persons primarily across Gujarat, SIHL maintains over 38,000 active trading clients with an average client relationship tenor exceeding 5 years for over 70% of clients.
Source: p.437, p.439Integrated Financial Services Model via NBFC and Wealth Distribution
Through its NBFC subsidiary SIHL Fincap Limited and distribution arms, SIHL combines equity/commodity brokerage with margin funding, mutual fund distribution (₹ 54.38 crore AUM), and portfolio management services.
Source: p.437, p.508Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Tanmay Upendra Shah
Litigation: ₹ 420.20 lakhs (₹ 4.20 crore) in direct/indirect tax proceedings against the Company, and ₹ 3,423.05 lakhs (₹ 34.23 crore) in direct tax proceedings by Promoters.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None; Statutory auditor examination reports contain no qualifications or adverse remarks for FY24-FY26.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| SMC Global Securities Limited | 16.28 | — | 7.82 | 5.41 |
| Share India Securities Limited | 11.68 | — | 12.28 | 21.73 |
| Arihant Capital Markets Limited | 27.09 | — | 7.13 | 15.24 |
At the ₹167 upper band, the issue is priced at 19.9x earnings — a 22% premium to the peer median of 16.3x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Broking Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Active trading clients | 38,189 | active clients on NSE in FY26 (37,814 in FY25) |
| Overall ADTO | ₹ 179.75 crore | overall average daily turnover in FY26 (₹ 238.74 crore in FY25) |
| Margin Trading Facility (MTF) Book | ₹ 20.96 crore | MTF book size as of March 31, 2026 (expanded to ₹ 54.20 crore as of August 2026) |
| Total Assets Under Distribution (Mutual Funds) | ₹ 54.38 crore | mutual fund assets under distribution in FY26 (₹ 49.17 crore in FY25) |
Source: p.370, p.437, p.445
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), Ministry of Corporate Affairs, issued a summons dated August 05, 2025 in relation to client fund flows of a third-party company where SIHL acted as market maker; SIHL submitted its response on September 22, 2026.
p.608SEBI issued an adjudication order dated February 11, 2026 imposing a penalty of ₹ 4.00 lakhs on SIHL for non-adherence to EOD upstreaming cut-off time guidelines under client fund flow frameworks.
p.608SIHL generated negative cash flow from operations of ₹ -19.70 crore in FY26 and ₹ -31.86 crore in FY25 due to working capital lock-up in margin trading loans and bank deposits.
p.78, p.568Company settled historical non-compliance under Sections 56, 67, and 73 of Companies Act 1956 regarding a 2008 preferential allotment to 502 allottees by paying ₹ 12.19 lakhs settlement charges to SEBI in May 2019.
p.608₹ 420.20 lakhs (₹ 4.20 crore) in direct/indirect tax proceedings against the Company, and ₹ 3,423.05 lakhs (₹ 34.23 crore) in direct tax proceedings by Promoters.
p.1, p.29, p.351, p.508, p.606None; Statutory auditor examination reports contain no qualifications or adverse remarks for FY24-FY26.
p.1, p.29, p.351, p.508, p.606Operating cash flow was negative ₹19.70 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹13.11 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Trade receivables grew 59.5% against revenue growth of -24.2% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Filing confirms over 38,000 active clients on NSE and an operating history spanning over 30 years across broking, depository, and NBFC margin trading.
p.437, p.439SEBI imposed a ₹ 4.00 lakh penalty in Feb 2026 for upstreaming cut-off non-compliance, and SFIO issued summons in Aug 2025 regarding market making services.
p.608Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Integrated financial services platform combining broking, depository, NBFC margin funding, and financial product distribution.
- Sticky client base with average relationship tenor exceeding 5 years for majority of active clients.
Weaknesses
- Negative operating cash flows in FY25 (₹ -31.86 crore) and FY26 (₹ -19.70 crore) driven by working capital deployment.
- Geographic concentration with a major portion of clients and Authorised Persons located in Gujarat.
Opportunities
- Increasing retail participation and financialization of household savings in Tier 2/3 Indian cities.
- Expansion of Margin Trading Facility (MTF) book driving interest income growth.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Intense price competition from discount broking platforms and national zero-brokerage models. risk_section
Why it matters: Pricing pressure from discount brokers could compress brokerage fee yields and reduce active client retention. - Adverse regulatory actions or outcomes in pending SFIO investigation. risk_section
Why it matters: Adverse findings by SFIO could lead to regulatory restrictions or reputational damage affecting client trust.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (11 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the fresh issue proceeds be deployed?
The fresh issue proceeds will be utilized for augmenting the working capital requirements of the company to support margin trading funding and business expansion, alongside general corporate purposes.
p.73, p.355What drove the contraction in PAT from ₹ 23.39 crore in FY25 to ₹ 13.20 crore in FY26?
Consolidated PAT contracted in FY26 due to lower broking revenue (down from ₹ 64.91 crore to ₹ 46.30 crore) amidst broader capital market volume shifts, higher finance costs, and fair value adjustments.
p.77, p.511, p.568What is the nature of the SFIO summons issued to SIHL?
SFIO issued a summons dated August 05, 2025 seeking clarifications regarding client fund flows of a third-party company where SIHL served as market maker; SIHL submitted its response on September 22, 2026 and no formal adverse order has been issued as of the RHP date.
p.608What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Upendra Trikamlal Shah / Purnima Upendra Shah | ₹10.00 | 1994-10-12 | 16.7x |
| An early round from roughly 32 years ago, at roughly 16.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Purnima Upendra Shah | ₹10.00 | 1994-12-30 | 16.7x |
| An early round from roughly 32 years ago, at roughly 16.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Upendra Trikamlal Shah and Allottees | ₹10.00 | 2005-09-15 | 16.7x |
| An early round from roughly 21 years ago, at roughly 16.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Bonus Issue (1:1) | — | 2007-11-01 | — |
| Preferential Allottees | ₹150.00 | 2008-02-29 | 1.1x |
| Company Shareholders | ₹55.00 | 2021-02-17 | 3.0x |
| An early round from roughly 6 years ago, at roughly 3.0x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 06 Apr 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 06 Apr 2027Promoters' Shareholding in Excess of Minimum Contribution6 months
- 06 Apr 2027Entire Pre-Issue Equity Share Capital6 months
- 05 Nov 2026Anchor Investor Portion (50%)30 days
- 04 Jan 2027Anchor Investor Portion (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
