SBI Funds Management Limited
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
SBI Funds Management Limited is India's largest asset management company, offering a comprehensive suite of mutual funds, portfolio management services, and alternative investment funds. The company generates revenue primarily through management and advisory fees charged as a percentage of its assets under management.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
SBI Funds Management Limited is India's largest asset management company (AMC), commanding a mutual fund QAAUM of ₹12,509.98 billion and a 15.3% market share as of March 31, 2026. The company manages a highly diversified portfolio of 128 mutual fund schemes spanning active equity, fixed income, hybrids, and passive ETF/index funds. Beyond traditional mutual funds, it is India’s largest Portfolio Management Services (PMS) provider with a 39.7% market share, heavily anchored by a massive mandate from the EPFO, and operates growing Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) and Specialized Investment Fund (SIF) platforms. A key differentiator is its dual parentage: State Bank of India provides an unparalleled domestic distribution engine via 23,000+ branches and the YONO digital platform, while Amundi brings global investment expertise and international distribution networks. This extensive reach makes SBI AMC the clear leader in India's underpenetrated 'Beyond Top 30' (B-30) cities (19.2% market share) and in Systematic Investment Plans (SIPs) with 16.21 million live accounts. The company's massive scale translates into superior operating leverage, boasting the lowest operating expense ratio (0.08%) among top peers, while its multi-channel distribution network integrates physical presence with digital applications like InvesTap to drive consistent, long-term retail inflows.
- Mutual Funds — Management fees derived from managing domestic open and closed-ended equity, debt, hybrid, ETF, index, and offshore fund-of-funds schemes.
- Portfolio Management & Advisory Services — Fees earned from providing discretionary and non-discretionary PMS to institutional and HNI clients, alternative investment funds (AIFs), and offshore advisory mandates.
Unparalleled scale advantages (lowest peer operating expense ratio of 0.08%) combined with a unique dual-parentage distribution edge: SBI's massive domestic banking network and YONO platform paired with Amundi's global reach, driving dominant market shares in SIPs and B-30 cities.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Entirely an offer for sale. The company will not receive any proceeds — the money goes to the selling shareholders, State Bank of India and Amundi India Holding.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures, what it is worth, and where we are still using a neutral default rather than guessing. Weighted across 7 components.
How this is measured6%
The market window around the issue date. This is currently a neutral placeholder: we have not yet wired it to index trend and recent listing performance, so it does not move the score in either direction.
How this is measured12%
Whether marquee anchor investors took part, and how many. Held at a neutral 50 when no marquee anchor is identified in the filing.
How this is measured10%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured24%
Taken from the three-year numbers in the filing: whether the company was profitable in the latest year, and whether profit is rising or falling across the disclosed period.
How this is measured16%
Where the multiples printed in the filing sit against the peer median. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this is held at a neutral 55 rather than guessed.
How this is measured14%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue. It sits at a neutral 60 unless three or more banks are involved. We have not yet built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal.
How this is measured18%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material red flag we find in the filing: contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications. This is the component our DRHP forensics drives directly.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 4389.488 | 3597.757 | 2690.558 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 3067.376 | 2540.154 | 2072.785 |
| PAT Margin | 69.88% | 70.6% | 77.04% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Management fees: 96.47%
- Portfolio management & other advisory fees: 3.53%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe full profit and loss as restated in the filing.
| Income Statement (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 4,389.49 | 3,597.76 | 2,690.56 |
| Other Income | 586.62 | 638.39 | 735.52 |
| Total Income | 4,976.11 | 4,236.15 | 3,426.08 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 441.01 | 421.08 | 368.39 |
| Other Expenses | 404.94 | 337.67 | 290.03 |
| Total Expenses | 970.62 | 871.81 | 752.46 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 43.84 | 40.00 | 37.49 |
| Finance Cost | 9.12 | 8.60 | 7.71 |
| Profit Before Tax | 4,005.49 | 3,364.34 | 2,673.62 |
| Tax Expense | 952.44 | 838.81 | 613.32 |
| Profit After Tax | 3,067.38 | 2,540.15 | 2,072.79 |
| EPS - Basic | 15.08 | 12.53 | 10.29 |
| EPS - Diluted | 15.04 | 12.50 | 10.23 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 203.68 | 50.79 | 50.58 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 5,759.38 | 8,246.75 | 6,697.17 |
| Net Worth | 5,963.06 | 8,297.53 | 6,747.75 |
| Trade Payables | 23.86 | 20.24 | 19.63 |
| Total Liabilities | 457.39 | 474.33 | 359.18 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 389.51 | 266.47 | 253.24 |
| Capital Work in Progress | — | 109.97 | — |
| Intangible Assets | 1.49 | 3.44 | 5.93 |
| Investments | 5,632.88 | 8,054.28 | 6,602.87 |
| Trade Receivables | 88.22 | 122.89 | 107.70 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 19.74 | 15.46 | 3.68 |
| Total Assets | 6,420.45 | 8,771.86 | 7,106.93 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 2,487.60 | 1,992.38 | 1,438.21 |
| Capital Expenditure | 28.09 | 119.83 | 11.70 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 2,974.47 | -937.55 | -1,304.91 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -5,457.79 | -1,043.05 | -131.62 |
| Net Change in Cash | 4.28 | 11.78 | 1.68 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 81.6 | 80.6 | 79.4 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 80.7 | 79.6 | 78.3 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 69.9 | 70.6 | 77 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 51.4 | 30.6 | 30.7 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 47.8 | 29 | 29.2 |
| Leverage | |||
| Interest Coverage (x) | 440.34 | 392.07 | 347.73 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.68 | 0.41 | 0.38 |
| Receivable Days | 7 | 12 | 15 |
| Payable Days | 2 | 2 | 3 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.81 | 0.78 | 0.69 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 9 | 6.2 | 8.9 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.64 | 3 | 0.31 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 69.9% | 70.6% | 77% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.68x | 0.41x | 0.38x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.08x | 1.06x | 1.05x |
| = Return on Equity | 51.4% | 30.6% | 30.7% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.77x | 0.76x | 0.78x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 1x | 1x | 1x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 91.5% | 93.8% | 99.7% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Interest coverage was 440.34x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
5 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.588 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.22 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.29 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.914 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0903 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- —Long-term leverage decreasing
- —Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 3%
Contingent liabilities of 176.21 cr against a net worth of 5,963.06 cr — 3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth3,067.38 ÷ 5,963.06What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue4,058.44 ÷ 4,389.49Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost4,014.61 ÷ 9.12How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(88.22 ÷ 4,389.49) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT2,487.60 ÷ 3,067.38Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(3,067.38 − 2,487.60) ÷ 6,420.45 = 579.77 ÷ 6,420.45The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹574.00 × 2,036,827,612 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash116,913.90 + − 19.74What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA116,894.17 ÷ 4,058.44The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT116,913.90 ÷ 3,067.38The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)38.12 ÷ 20.8%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian mutual fund industry has experienced rapid expansion, driven by the increasing financialization of household savings, a young demographic profile, and the surging popularity of Systematic Investment Plans (SIPs). Despite this growth, mutual fund penetration remains relatively low at 23.2% of GDP, indicating substantial headroom for future asset accumulation compared to global peers. The market is highly concentrated, with the top 10 AMCs managing over 76% of the industry's assets, though competition is intensifying with the entry of digital-first fintech brokers and passive-focused funds. Key industry dynamics include a structural shift toward equity-oriented products among retail investors and regulatory pressures surrounding expense ratio caps, compelling AMCs to rely on scale, digital distribution, and B-30 city penetration to sustain profitability.
Future Planning & Capital Allocation
The company is aggressively expanding its alternative investment and offshore footprint. It recently launched a Specialised Investment Fund (SIF) platform, capturing 28.2% market share almost instantly. It has also established a wholly-owned subsidiary in GIFT City to launch India-focused feeder funds for NRIs and FPIs, diversifying revenue streams away from pure domestic retail mutual funds.
Source: DRHP p.237, 239Competitive Position
SBI AMC leverages a 'Dual Parentage' moat that is nearly impossible for peers to replicate. SBI provides an unparalleled physical and digital distribution engine (YONO), giving it a commanding 19.2% share in B-30 cities where customer acquisition costs are typically high. Simultaneously, Amundi provides global asset management infrastructure and credibility for offshore mandates.
Source: DRHP p.234Execution / Track Record
The company has demonstrated exceptional operating leverage. Between FY24 and FY26, total income grew by 45.2% while employee benefit expenses grew by only 10.9%. This scale efficiency has allowed it to achieve a sector-leading operating expense ratio of just 0.08% of QAAUM.
Source: DRHP p.221, 367Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Debasish Mishra
Litigation: Against the company: ₹1,485.53 million. Separately, the filing discloses ₹1,172,633.41 million of litigation against the promoter, State Bank of India — these are SBI's own tax demands as a bank, not liabilities of SBI Funds Management.
Auditor / RPT Flags: CARO 2020 observations record three instances of fraud, including employee misappropriation of investor funds (₹49.20 million, ₹20.30 million and ₹0.19 million).
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| HDFC Asset Management Company Limited | 51.1 | — | 32.22 | — |
| Nippon Life India Asset Management Limited | 42.25 | — | 28.61 | — |
| ICICI Prudential Asset Management Company Limited | 31.57 | — | 31.41 | — |
The filing does not print a P/E for the company itself. Listed AMC peers trade between 31.6x and 51.1x, with a median of 41.64x.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Risks hiding outside the risk section — mined from MD&A, related-party notes, contingent liabilities and litigation. This is the FinMinutes edge.
The auditor's CARO report and risk factors detail multiple instances of fraud, including an employee misappropriating ₹49.20 million, another third-party siphoning ₹20.30 million, and an FIR filed against a sales executive for falsifying vouchers to misappropriate ₹41.02 million.
DRHP p.133, 432, 840The company faces a disputed GST demand of ₹1,319.30 million (tax of ₹659.65 million + penalty of ₹659.65 million) for input tax credit availed on distribution commissions between July 2017 and October 2018. An unfavorable order was already received from Commissioner Appeals.
DRHP p.189, 431The issue is a 100% Offer for Sale (OFS) of up to 203,709,239 equity shares by promoters State Bank of India and Amundi India Holding.
DRHP p.72, 118The top 10 mutual fund schemes account for 59.47% of total mutual fund QAAUM and generate 46.45% of the total mutual fund scheme revenue.
DRHP p.110-111Against the company: ₹1,485.53 million. Separately, the filing discloses ₹1,172,633.41 million of litigation against the promoter, State Bank of India — these are SBI's own tax demands as a bank, not liabilities of SBI Funds Management.
RHP p.18, 287, 427-428, 840CARO 2020 observations record three instances of fraud, including employee misappropriation of investor funds (₹49.20 million, ₹20.30 million and ₹0.19 million).
RHP p.18, 287, 427-428, 840Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Do the CRISIL report and QAAUM data support the leadership claim?
DRHP p.226, 209-210Do the financials validate this extreme operating leverage against peers?
DRHP p.232, 221Do the operational metrics and CRISIL report align with this assertion?
DRHP p.233Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Dominant market leadership in mutual funds (15.3% share) and Portfolio Management Services (39.7% share, largely driven by the massive EPFO mandate).
- Unmatched distribution reach via dual parentage, leveraging SBI's 23,000+ branches and YONO app, resulting in an industry-leading 19.2% market share in B-30 (Beyond Top 30) cities.
Weaknesses
- Significant dependence on the EPFO mandate for scale in the PMS segment, which accounts for 91.9% of its PMS AUM and operates at highly compressed fee structures.
- Over 32% of mutual fund QAAUM is concentrated in passive products (ETFs and Index funds), which exert downward pressure on blended management fee realizations.
Opportunities
- Low mutual fund penetration in India relative to traditional bank deposits presents a massive structural growth runway for household financialization.
- Expansion of offshore and Alternative Investment Fund (AIF) offerings via the newly established GIFT City subsidiary to attract global institutional FPI flows.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Proposed SEBI regulatory changes to Total Expense Ratios (TER) and the Base Expense Ratio (BER) frameworks. risk_section
Why it matters: Regulatory caps on expense ratios directly compress management fee margins and profitability, which cannot be easily offset without massive concurrent AUM growth. - Intensifying competition from discount fintech brokers accelerating the shift to direct, low-cost passive funds. mda
Why it matters: It fundamentally changes distributor economics and forces legacy AMCs to compete purely on price in the rapidly growing passive space.
Live Subscription Status
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Where is the money going?
The issue is a 100% Offer for Sale (up to 203,709,239 shares) by the Promoter Selling Shareholders (State Bank of India and Amundi India Holding). The company will not receive any proceeds from the IPO.
DRHP p.118How concentrated is the AUM and revenue base?
The top 10 mutual fund schemes account for 59.47% of MF QAAUM and 46.45% of scheme revenues. In the Portfolio Management Services (PMS) segment, the institutional mandate from EPFO alone accounts for 91.9% of the company's total PMS AUM.
DRHP p.110, 468Is it profitable and growing?
Yes, highly profitable. Revenue from operations grew from ₹26,905.58 million in FY24 to ₹43,894.88 million in FY26. Profit After Tax (PAT) grew from ₹20,727.85 million in FY24 to ₹30,673.76 million in FY26. The Return on Net Worth (RoNW) stands at an excellent 43.02% for FY26.
DRHP p.367, 361What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
The company has contingent liabilities of ₹1,762.09 million, dominated by a disputed GST demand of ₹1,319.30 million (tax + penalty) regarding input tax credit on distributor commissions. The CARO report also explicitly flags three instances of employee fraud and misappropriation of investor funds totaling approximately ₹70 million.
DRHP p.189, 840Reading the Offer Structure
100% offer for sale — and the company does not appear to need the cash.
A high offer-for-sale share is not automatically a concern. On the disclosed numbers this company is profitable and not heavily borrowed, so the listing reads as an exit route for existing shareholders and a route to a public market rather than a funding exercise. Large, cash-generative companies routinely list this way.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 20 Aug 2026Anchor investors (first 50%)30 days
- 19 Oct 2026Anchor investors (remaining 50%)90 days
- 21 Jan 2027Pre-offer equity share capital6 months
- 21 Jan 2028Minimum promoters' contribution18 months
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Offer Structure and Reservations The RHP introduces specific reservation quotas for employees and existing SBI shareholders. | The offer consists of QIB, NIB, and RIB portions with no reservations. | The Offer includes reservations for Eligible SBIFM Employees (up to 270,271 shares), Eligible SBI Employees (up to 2,987,076 shares), and Eligible SBI Shareholders (up to 13,055,629 shares). |
| Financial Information Period The financial statements were updated from a 9-month stub period in the DRHP to the full financial year FY26 in the RHP. | Restated consolidated financial information as at and for the nine month period ended December 31, 2025 and Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023. | Restated consolidated financial information as at and for the financial years ended March 31, 2026, March 31, 2025, and March 31, 2024. |
| SEBI Exemption Application Status SEBI approved the company's exemption request between the DRHP and RHP filings, officially excluding these SBI-held entities from the promoter group classification. | Exemption application dated February 25, 2026 filed with SEBI to exempt classifying Bombay Rayon Fashions Limited and SKS Ispat and Power Limited as 'promoter group' is pending. | SEBI granted the exemption from classifying Bombay Rayon Fashions Limited and SKS Ispat and Power Limited as 'promoter group' via an approval letter dated April 24, 2026. |
| Regulatory Litigation Status (SBI IOF) The status of the regulatory matter concerning the IFSC subsidiary was updated to reflect an ongoing settlement process with SEBI. | In relation to SBI Investment Opportunities Fund (IFSC), 'As on the date of this Draft Red Herring Prospectus, the matter is not outstanding.' | In relation to SBI Investment Opportunities Fund (IFSC), a settlement application is pending before SEBI after a payment of ₹0.30 million. |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.