Rentomojo
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Rentomojo Limited operates a technology-driven, full-stack direct-to-consumer (D2C) online rental and subscription platform for home furniture and appliances in India. Operating across an omnichannel network of an online platform and 82 experience stores across 17 cities, the company offers flexible subscription plans for essential home products such as beds, washing machines, refrigerators, and water purifiers.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Rentomojo Limited operates India's leading technology-driven, full-stack D2C online rental and subscription platform for home furniture and appliances. The company serves urban households, young working professionals, and mobile workers across 29 cities in India through an omnichannel setup combining digital platforms with 82 experience stores across 17 cities and 20 warehouses providing 538,933 sq. ft. of space. Its product portfolio spans 851,184 live items across furniture (beds, mattresses, sofas, wardrobes, study tables) and appliances (refrigerators, washing machines, televisions, air conditioners, water purifiers). Rentomojo also offers private-label appliances under 'Zenovi by Mojo', manufactured via strategic contract manufacturing partnerships with Dixon Technologies (for refrigerators and washing machines) and Sarjan Watertech (for water purifiers). Sourcing is supported by 252 suppliers across 29 cities. Scale is underpinned by an in-house refurbishment ecosystem with 1,688 technicians and workers that completed 617,525 refurbishments in Fiscal 2026, achieving an average delivery turnaround time of 2.35 days and maintaining an 83.34% asset occupancy rate.
- Furniture Rentals — Subscription and rental services for home furniture including beds, mattresses, sofas, wardrobes, dining sets, and study tables. Generated converted revenue of ₹ 195.79 Crore (50.59% of operations) in Fiscal 2026.
- Appliances and Other Recurring Subscriptions — Subscription and rental services for appliances including refrigerators, washing machines, televisions, air conditioners, and water purifiers. Generated converted revenue of ₹ 183.08 Crore (47.31% of operations) in Fiscal 2026.
- Other Operating Revenue — Quality, inspection, optional damage waiver charges (MojoSecure), and delivery and installation fees. Generated converted revenue of ₹ 8.12 Crore (2.10% of operations) in Fiscal 2026.
Rentomojo holds market leadership in the organized home furniture and appliances rental market (excluding water purifiers), with a 42%–47% subscription revenue share and over 50%–55% of live subscribers in Fiscal 2025. Its moat is powered by an integrated multi-stack flywheel spanning e-commerce (shared route logistics), subscription (11-touchpoint lifecycle and ML credit underwriting achieving 99.00% revenue realization efficiency), and re-commerce (in-house refurbishment infrastructure extending asset useful life to 10 years, driving 4.49x–5.12x revenue multiples on 9+ year-old cohorts).
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment/ prepayment, in full or in part, of certain outstanding borrowings and accrued interest thereon availed by our Company — ₹70.00 cr
- Payment of lease rental/ license fee for our warehouses and experience stores — ₹42.50 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings, so the post-issue figure will differ once the fresh capital is deployed. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
90% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 386.988 | 265.959 | 192.701 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 104.299 | 43.106 | 22.412 |
| PAT Margin | 26.95% | 16.21% | 11.63% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Furniture rentals: 50.59%
- Appliances and other recurring subscription revenue: 47.31%
- Other operating revenue (Quality, inspection, damage waiver, delivery & installation): 2.1%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand is strong and our read of the filing supports it. Agreement is not proof, but a disagreement would have been worth explaining, and there is not one.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 45.5% | Revenue from operations increased primarily due to higher rental revenue driven by growth in gross items ordered, live items, and live subscribers across furniture and appliances. | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 46.7% | Employee benefits expense increased primarily due to an expansion in headcount from 568 to 835 employees to support business scaling and higher compensation levels for existing staff. | Structural |
| Depreciation and amortisation expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 44.4% | Depreciation and amortisation increased primarily due to additions in rental equipment gross block and increased right-of-use asset depreciation from store and warehouse network expansion. | Structural |
| Other expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 49.2% | Other expenses grew primarily due to increases in contractual manpower, logistics volumes, asset refurbishment costs, performance marketing spend, and IT investments. | Structural |
| Restated profit after tax (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 142.0% | Profit after tax increased sharply due to operating leverage from scale, improved asset utilization, and the recognition of a deferred tax credit of ₹ 366.43 million. | Structural |
| Net cash from operating activities (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 49.6% | Operating cash flows expanded due to higher operating profit before working capital changes alongside favorable working capital movements in trade payables and other liabilities. | Structural |
| Total borrowings (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 21.4% | Total borrowings grew as the company drew down additional term loans from banks to fund capital expenditures for rental asset procurement. | Structural |
| Trade receivables (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 35.1% | Trade receivables increased in line with overall growth in subscriber base and revenue from operations. | Structural |
| Revenue from operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 38.0% | Revenue from operations grew due to higher rental volumes of furniture and appliances as gross items ordered and live subscribers increased. | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 34.0% | Employee benefits expense grew due to headcount expansion from 446 to 568 employees and annual salary revisions. | Structural |
| Depreciation and amortisation expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 62.0% | Depreciation and amortisation rose significantly due to substantial capital additions in rental assets and higher right-of-use asset depreciation from opening new experience stores and warehouses. | Structural |
| Other expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 29.3% | Other expenses increased due to higher contractual manpower, logistics spend, asset refurbishment, performance marketing, and branding initiatives. | Structural |
| Restated profit after tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 92.3% | Profit after tax grew strongly as revenue expansion outpaced growth in operating expenses, demonstrating operating leverage. | Structural |
| Net cash from operating activities (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 26.2% | Operating cash flow increased driven by higher profit before tax and increased non-cash adjustments for depreciation. | Structural |
| Trade receivables (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 39.1% | Trade receivables grew in proportion to higher rental business volumes and live subscriber growth. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Asset-intensive nature requiring significant upfront capital sector persistent
The rental model requires substantial upfront capital expenditure in assets along with ongoing spending on warehousing, logistics, and refurbishment, where returns depend heavily on maintaining high asset utilization and deployment velocity. - Subscriber payment delays, premature cancellations, and auto-pay adoption risk company persistent
Low adoption of auto-pay functions among subscribers increases manual collection reliance, potential delays or defaults, and premature contract cancellations that can elevate reverse logistics and refurbishment costs. - Evolving energy efficiency regulations for appliances sector persistent
Mandatory phase-outs or retrofitting requirements for lower energy-efficiency rated appliances could reduce product resale value, shorten usable asset lives, or increase compliance and replacement costs.
Tailwinds
- Accelerating urban migration and shift toward commitment-light subscription consumption macro
Rapid urban expansion, workforce mobility, nuclear household formation, and rising preferences for flexible access over ownership are expanding the active furniture and appliance rental addressable market in India. - In-house refurbishment flywheel extending asset useful lives to 10 years company
Proprietary re-commerce and refurbishment capabilities extend useful lives of rental assets beyond 10 years, driving 4.49x to 5.12x revenue multiples on original asset cost and enhancing return on capital employed. - Acyclical business model resilience across macroeconomic cycles company
During economic slowdowns, consumers shift from outright purchases to renting to defer capital expenditure, while economic expansions drive urbanization and workforce mobility, generating counter-cyclical strength.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Rental Asset Portfolio | FY26 | 83.3% |
| Rental Asset Portfolio | FY25 | 82.8% |
| Rental Asset Portfolio | FY24 | 86.4% |
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 386.99 | 265.96 | 192.70 |
| Other Income | 7.10 | 6.00 | 3.10 |
| Total Income | 394.09 | 271.96 | 195.80 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 60.80 | 41.44 | 30.94 |
| Finance Cost | 25.34 | 26.52 | 25.61 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 70.47 | 48.81 | 30.13 |
| Other Expenses | 167.25 | 112.08 | 86.71 |
| Total Expenses | 323.85 | 228.86 | 173.39 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 70.24 | 43.11 | 22.41 |
| Exceptional Items | -2.58 | — | — |
| Profit Before Tax | 67.66 | 43.11 | 22.41 |
| Tax Expense | 36.64 | — | — |
| Profit After Tax | 104.30 | 43.11 | 22.41 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 0.36 | -0.04 | 0.08 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 104.66 | 43.07 | 22.49 |
| EPS - Basic | 10.42 | 4.31 | 2.52 |
| EPS - Diluted | 10.10 | 4.18 | 2.45 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 3.45 | 0.02 | 0.02 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 292.36 | 183.59 | 139.59 |
| Net Worth | 295.81 | 183.61 | 139.61 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 109.79 | 81.88 | 78.11 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 77.80 | 72.70 | 69.11 |
| Total Borrowings | 187.59 | 154.58 | 147.22 |
| Trade Payables | 39.15 | 16.57 | 13.10 |
| Current Liabilities | 201.99 | 160.99 | 135.65 |
| Total Liabilities | 345.31 | 266.26 | 226.59 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 426.17 | 289.75 | 162.71 |
| Intangible Assets | 1.78 | 2.14 | 1.28 |
| Investments | 5.79 | 22.04 | 6.05 |
| Trade Receivables | 41.56 | 30.77 | 22.12 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 23.10 | 12.52 | 43.20 |
| Current Assets | 110.81 | 84.78 | 102.34 |
| Total Assets | 641.12 | 449.87 | 366.20 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 172.87 | 115.55 | 91.57 |
| Capital Expenditure | 175.83 | 138.30 | 148.85 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -158.34 | -111.31 | -184.11 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -4.20 | -34.68 | 113.10 |
| Net Change in Cash | 10.34 | -30.45 | 20.56 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 42.1 | 43.5 | 39.9 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 24.3 | 25.6 | 24.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 27 | 16.2 | 11.6 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 35.3 | 23.5 | 16.1 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 19.8 | 20.6 | 16.7 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 16.3 | 9.6 | 6.1 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.63 | 0.84 | 1.05 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.99 | 1.2 | 1.33 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 3.77 | 2.63 | 1.88 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 0.55 | 0.53 | 0.75 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.6 | 0.59 | 0.53 |
| Receivable Days | 39 | 42 | 42 |
| Payable Days | 37 | 23 | 25 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.66 | 2.68 | 4.09 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -10.7 | -16.1 | -18.9 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.5 | 2.83 | 4.94 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 27% | 16.2% | 11.6% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.6x | 0.59x | 0.53x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.17x | 2.45x | 2.62x |
| = Return on Equity | 35.3% | 23.5% | 16.1% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 1.54x | 1x | 1x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.71x | 0.62x | 0.47x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 24.7% | 26.2% | 24.9% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.66x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 101% while profit grew 365%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- The current ratio was 0.55x in FY26 — current liabilities exceeded current assets. The company depends on continued access to short-term funding.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.928 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.97 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.455 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.016 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.021 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.901 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.107 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 5.7 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | -0.142 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.456 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.149 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.857 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 5.7 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
7 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test and score out of eight, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0.8%
Contingent liabilities of 2.45 cr against a net worth of 295.81 cr — 0.8% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.3x
Short-term borrowings of 77.80 cr against cash of 23.10 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 3.41 cr against a profit of 104.30 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth104.30 ÷ 295.81What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)95.57 ÷ (295.81 + 187.59) = 95.57 ÷ 483.40Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue166.04 ÷ 386.99Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth187.59 ÷ 295.81How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost95.57 ÷ 25.34How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(41.56 ÷ 386.99) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT172.87 ÷ 104.30Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(104.30 − 172.87) ÷ 641.12 = -68.57 ÷ 641.12The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹404.00 × 103,266,337 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash4,171.96 + 187.59 − 23.10What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA4,336.45 ÷ 166.04The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT4,171.96 ÷ 104.30The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)40 ÷ 142%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian home furniture and appliances rental market is a rapidly expanding sector with a Total Addressable Market (TAM) of ₹ 69,520.00 Crore (USD 8.2 billion) in CY2025, forecasted to reach ₹ 117,210.00 Crore (USD 13.8 billion) by CY2030 at an 11% CAGR. Growth is driven by rapid urban expansion (522 million urban residents in CY2025), rising nuclear households, a mobile formal workforce, and high upfront purchasing costs. The active rental market expanded at a 45% CAGR from ₹ 350.00 Crore in CY2021 to ₹ 1,550.00 Crore in CY2025, and is projected to reach ₹ 6,030.00 Crore by CY2030 at a 31% CAGR. Organized players account for 80%–85% of this market, with Rentomojo holding the dominant market leadership position.
Future Planning
Rentomojo plans to utilize ₹ 42.50 Crore from IPO proceeds to fund lease rentals for expansion of experience stores and warehouses, while deploying ₹ 70.00 Crore for debt repayment to reduce finance costs.
Source: p.142Competitive Position
Rentomojo holds 42%-47% market share in subscription revenue and over 50%-55% share in live subscribers among organized furniture and appliance rental companies in India as of Fiscal 2025.
Source: p.153, 233Execution Track Record
Rentomojo expanded revenue from operations from ₹ 192.70 Crore in FY24 to ₹ 386.99 Crore in FY26 (CAGR of 41.71%) while turning restated PAT positive from ₹ 22.41 Crore in FY24 to ₹ 104.30 Crore in FY26.
Source: p.70, 153Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Geetansh Bamania
Litigation: Pending litigation involving Company: 1 direct tax proceeding of ₹ 1.48 Crore (₹ 14.80 million) and 5 criminal proceedings with no quantifiable monetary liability. Pending litigation against Promoter Geetansh Bamania: 1 criminal proceeding (F.I.R. regarding customer stolen vehicle) with no quantifiable monetary liability.
Auditor / RPT Flags: The statutory auditor Walker Chandiok & Co LLP issued unmodified examination reports on the Restated Financial Information for Fiscal 2026, 2025, and 2024. CARO 2020 reports disclosed minor delays in statutory dues deposit (TDS and Provident Fund) and technical non-compliance in quarterly return filings with banks against working capital facilities.
Retail Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Store count | 82 experience stores | Across 17 cities in Fiscal 2026 |
| Live subscribers | 253,825 | Up 38.21% from 183,651 in FY25 |
| Live items | 851,184 | Up 35.12% from 615,120 in FY25 |
| Occupancy rate | 83.34% | FY26 vs 82.82% in FY25 |
| Warehouses & Area | 20 warehouses (538,933 sq. ft.) | Across 17 cities in Fiscal 2026 |
| Average delivery turnaround time | 2.35 days | FY26 vs 2.48 days in FY25 |
Source: p.42, 50, 153, 208 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Promoter Geetansh Bamania holds only 14.69% of the pre-Offer paid-up equity capital, which will further dilute post-IPO, while selling 3,680,102 shares in the Offer for Sale.
p.118, 119The company recorded an overall workforce attrition rate of 42.37% in Fiscal 2026 (down from 48.12% in Fiscal 2025) across its total workforce of 2,495 employees.
p.50, 202Restated PAT surged 141.96% in FY26 to ₹ 104.30 Crore, significantly boosted by the recognition of ₹ 36.64 Crore in deferred tax credit following past unabsorbed business losses.
p.280, 431Pending litigation involving Company: 1 direct tax proceeding of ₹ 1.48 Crore (₹ 14.80 million) and 5 criminal proceedings with no quantifiable monetary liability. Pending litigation against Promoter Geetansh Bamania: 1 criminal proceeding (F.I.R. regarding customer stolen vehicle) with no quantifiable monetary liability.
p. 50, 118, 334, 335 and 1 moreThe statutory auditor Walker Chandiok & Co LLP issued unmodified examination reports on the Restated Financial Information for Fiscal 2026, 2025, and 2024. CARO 2020 reports disclosed minor delays in statutory dues deposit (TDS and Provident Fund) and technical non-compliance in quarterly return filings with banks against working capital facilities.
p. 50, 118, 334, 335 and 1 moreShort-term borrowings of ₹77.80 cr against cash of ₹23.10 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Confirmed by independent Crisil Intelligence Report metrics showing 253,825 live subscribers and ₹ 386.99 Crore operational revenue in FY26, outperforming unorganized and organized peers.
p.153, 233Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Dominant market leadership with 42%-47% revenue share in organized Indian furniture and appliance rentals.
- In-house re-commerce and refurbishment flywheel extending rental asset useful life beyond 10 years, driving 4.49x-5.12x revenue multiples on original asset cost.
- Omnichannel distribution spanning digital platforms and 82 experience stores across 17 cities achieving 83.34% asset occupancy.
Weaknesses
- Asset-intensive capital structure requiring ongoing borrowings and capex for rental fleet expansion.
- High workforce attrition rate of 42.37% in Fiscal 2026 across warehousing and field operations.
Opportunities
- Accelerating urban migration and nuclear family formation expanding TAM to ₹ 117,210.00 Crore by CY2030.
- Expansion of private-label 'Zenovi by Mojo' appliances through contract manufacturing partnerships.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Subscriber payment defaults, subscription cancellations, and low auto-pay adoption increasing manual collection costs. risk_section
Why it matters: Payment collection friction directly impacts cash flow efficiency and elevates reverse logistics overhead. - Potential regulatory changes in energy efficiency standards for appliances shortening asset useful lives. risk_section
Why it matters: New rating standards could force premature replacement or lower secondary market resale value of rental appliances.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (23 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the ₹ 150.00 Crore Fresh Issue proceeds be deployed?
The company will deploy ₹ 70.00 Crore for prepayment/repayment of outstanding borrowings, ₹ 42.50 Crore for lease rental and license fee payments for warehouses and experience stores, and the remainder for general corporate purposes.
p.142What is the revenue mix between furniture and appliance rentals?
In Fiscal 2026, furniture rentals generated ₹ 195.79 Crore (50.59% of operational revenue), while appliances and other recurring subscriptions generated ₹ 183.08 Crore (47.31%).
p.42What drove the sharp rise in FY26 Restated PAT to ₹ 104.30 Crore?
PAT expansion was driven by a 45.51% increase in operating revenue due to live subscriber growth, operating leverage, and a deferred tax credit of ₹ 36.64 Crore.
p.280, 420, 431What are the key operational risks regarding promoter shareholding and workforce attrition?
Promoter Geetansh Bamania holds a low 14.69% pre-IPO equity stake, and workforce attrition remains high at 42.37% in Fiscal 2026, requiring ongoing recruitment and retention efforts.
p.50, 118What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Geetansh Bamania and Jagdish Bamania | ₹10.00 | 2012-04-16 | 40.4x |
| An early round from roughly 15 years ago, at roughly 40.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Ajay Nain, Gaurav Bamania, Central Park Securities Holdings Private Limited | ₹15.00 | 2015-08-03 | 26.9x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 26.9x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Existing Shareholders | ₹0.01 | 2025-07-24 | 40,400.0x |
| Geetansh Bamania, Gaurav Bamania, and other existing shareholders | — | 2026-03-07 | — |
| Preference Shareholders (CCPS Holders) | — | 2026-07-20 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 2 entries | |||
| Nitish Mittersain, Vishal Sampat, Central Park Securities Holdings Private Limited | ₹4,511.28 | 2015-08-11 | as disclosed |
| Accel India IV (Mauritius) Limited, IDG Ventures India Fund II LLC | ₹92,807.42 | 2015-09-10 | as disclosed |
The 2 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 17 Mar 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 17 Mar 2027Other pre-Offer Equity share capital6 months
- 16 Dec 2026Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
- 17 Oct 2026Anchor Investors (remaining 50%)30 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period The reporting period was updated from stub period (H1 FY26) to full Fiscal 2026 financial results, dropping Fiscal 2023 from comparative restated statements. | Six months period ended September 30, 2025 and Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023 | Three financial years ended March 31, 2026, March 31, 2025, and March 31, 2024 |
| Restated Financials Restated financial statements were updated to include full year Fiscal 2026 results. Revenue from operations grew 45.51% in FY26 to ₹ 386.99 Crore and restated PAT reached ₹ 104.30 Crore. | Restated Consolidated Revenue from Operations of ₹ 265.96 Crore (₹ 2,659.59 million) and PAT of ₹ 43.11 Crore (₹ 431.06 million) for Fiscal 2025; H1 FY26 Revenue of ₹ 176.61 Crore (₹ 1,766.09 million) and PAT of ₹ 61.38 Crore (₹ 613.75 million) | Restated Consolidated Revenue from Operations of ₹ 386.99 Crore (₹ 3,869.88 million) and PAT of ₹ 104.30 Crore (₹ 1,042.99 million) for Fiscal 2026; Net Worth of ₹ 295.81 Crore (₹ 2,958.07 million) |
| Statutory Auditor Statutory Auditor Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP re-issued the Independent Auditor's Examination Report on Restated Financial Information to cover full year Fiscal 2026 results. | Examination Report dated March 25, 2026 issued by Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP | Examination Report dated August 21, 2026 issued by Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP |
| Risk Factors Risk factors were expanded from 62 to 65 to disclose new developments, including impact of four new Labour Codes (Exceptional Item of ₹ 2.58 Crore / ₹ 25.79 million in FY26) and securities issued in preceding 12 months below Offer Price. | 62 risk factors disclosed as of March 27, 2026 | 65 risk factors disclosed as of September 3, 2026 |
| Contingent Liabilities Disputed GST contingent liability increased to ₹ 2.45 Crore as of March 31, 2026 due to additional tax assessment notices. | GST matters under dispute of ₹ 1.03 Crore (₹ 10.28 million) as of September 30, 2025 and ₹ 2.31 Crore (₹ 23.12 million) as of March 31, 2025 | GST matters under dispute of ₹ 2.45 Crore (₹ 24.49 million) as of March 31, 2026 and ₹ 2.31 Crore (₹ 23.12 million) as of March 31, 2025 |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.