Rays of Belief
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Rays of Belief Limited is India’s largest For-Profit Social Enterprise offering personalized intervention plans and therapy services for children with Neurodevelopmental Disorders (NDDs) such as Autism and ADHD. The company operates a multi-channel early intervention platform under the brand 'Mom's Belief', combining in-person care at physical learning centers with digital e-therapy programs.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Rays of Belief Limited, incorporated in 2017 and headquartered in New Delhi with corporate offices in Gurugram, operates a leading multi-channel behavioural health and child development platform under the brand 'Mom’s Belief'. The company provides evidence-based, personalized care and therapy plans for children aged 18 months up to 15 years presenting with Neurodevelopmental Disorders (NDDs), including Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), ADHD, developmental delays, and speech disorders. To scale geographically while maintaining capital efficiency, the company operates an asset-light leasing model through multiple formats: Company Learning Centres, School Collaboration Centres, and Company Learning Centres in partnership with Licensed Professionals. As of March 31, 2026, the company’s domestic footprint expanded to 136 operational centers across 57 cities in 20 Indian states and union territories. Following the strategic acquisition of Mom’s Belief US, Inc. and its step-down subsidiary Allergy & Immunology Virginia, LLC in June 2025, the group integrated three specialized medical centers in the United States, expanding its international footprint and clinical capabilities. Sourcing leverages a massive proprietary repository of over 150 assessment tools and 2,000+ home-based learning kits. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, the company’s consolidated revenue from operations stood at ₹81.66 crore (₹816.62 million) with a profit after tax of ₹4.96 crore (₹49.59 million), serving over 9,205 children and families globally.
- Overseas Centres (US Segment) — Represents specialized clinical allergy, immunology, and behavioural support services delivered through three acquired centers in Virginia, USA. This segment contributed ₹34.09 crore (₹340.85 million) or 41.74% of consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026.
- Domestic Centre Operations — Delivers in-person early intervention, speech, and occupational therapies across self-operated Company Learning Centres and centers operated in partnership with Licensed Professionals or schools in India, contributing ₹26.17 crore (₹261.68 million) or 32.04% of consolidated revenue in Fiscal 2026.
- Export of Services — Provides ongoing clinical research, development of therapeutic kits, play-based training tools, and global business support services (accounting, HR, IT, digital marketing) to overseas promoter entities in Singapore and the US, contributing ₹20.87 crore (₹208.72 million) or 25.56% of consolidated revenue in Fiscal 2026.
- Online Services & Other Operating Revenue — Includes domestic virtual e-therapy and parent training programs along with ancillary service fees, contributing ₹0.54 crore (₹5.37 million) or 0.66% of consolidated revenue in Fiscal 2026.
Rays of Belief's competitive moat is established by its status as India's largest and most geographically diversified For-Profit Social Enterprise in the NDD space. Operating 136 domestic centers across 20 states and union territories creates a deep network effect and massive barrier to entry. This physical scale is reinforced by its capital-efficient, asset-light lease model and partnership formats (e.g. licensed professional and school collaborations), enabling rapid expansion with minimal capital commitments. Furthermore, the company possesses highly specialized, proprietary clinical intellectual property, including a portfolio of 150+ in-center teaching tools and 2,000+ home-based developmental kits. The moat is deepened by its robust digital e-therapy ecosystem, a professional team of over 340 clinical psychologists and therapists, and strong clinical innovation from its dedicated in-house R&D wing, making it exceptionally difficult for unorganized local clinics or trusts to compete on scale, quality, or technological reach.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding capital expenditure towards establishment of new centres on leased premises (tenure of 11 months - 3 years) and associated technology (hardware) costs — ₹41.36 cr
- Expenditure for lease payments for our existing centres in India — ₹14.45 cr
- Investment in our Subsidiary, Mom's Belief US Inc., for making lease / license payments for our existing centres in the USA — ₹10.13 cr
- Expenditure for brand awareness and inclusive outreach programs — ₹10.21 cr
- Funding inorganic growth through unidentified acquisition and General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
70% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality, Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 81.662 | 36.419 | 30.608 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 4.959 | 5.881 | 0.853 |
| PAT Margin | 6.07% | 16.15% | 2.79% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Overseas Centres (US Segment): 41.74%
- Domestic Centre Operations (India Segment): 32.04%
- Export of Services (Clinical R&D and business support): 25.56%
- Domestic Online Services: 0.48%
- Other Domestic Operating Revenue: 0.18%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-07
- Pre Application Start2026-08-31
- Bidding Start2026-09-01
- Bidding End2026-09-03
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-04
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-07
- Listing Day2026-09-08
- Mandate End2026-10-15
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 81.66 | 36.42 | 30.61 |
| Other Income | 0.40 | 0.12 | 0.15 |
| Total Income | 82.06 | 36.54 | 30.76 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 39.45 | 21.11 | 15.97 |
| Finance Cost | 1.10 | 0.59 | 0.13 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 4.31 | 2.19 | 1.41 |
| Other Expenses | 30.31 | 12.29 | 13.15 |
| Total Expenses | 75.16 | 36.19 | 30.66 |
| Profit Before Tax | 6.90 | 0.35 | 0.10 |
| Tax Expense | 1.94 | -5.53 | -0.75 |
| Profit After Tax | 4.96 | 5.88 | 0.85 |
| EPS - Basic | 3.21 | 3.84 | 0.56 |
| EPS - Diluted | 3.21 | 3.84 | 0.56 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 11.91 | 3.02 | 1.49 |
| EBIT | 7.60 | 0.83 | 0.08 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 15.59 | 0.32 | 0.31 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 15.22 | 14.70 | 5.47 |
| Net Worth | 30.81 | 15.02 | 5.78 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 2.75 | 3.60 | — |
| Short-term Borrowings | 0.86 | 0.76 | — |
| Total Borrowings | 3.61 | 4.36 | — |
| Trade Payables | 3.70 | 0.66 | 0.47 |
| Current Liabilities | 13.62 | 5.55 | 3.67 |
| Total Liabilities | 20.08 | 11.10 | 7.12 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 1.82 | 2.01 | 1.30 |
| Capital Work in Progress | — | 0.31 | 0.39 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.05 | 0.09 | 0.15 |
| Trade Receivables | 18.09 | 3.08 | 0.18 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 3.26 | 5.34 | 4.29 |
| Current Assets | 32.77 | 14.02 | 7.15 |
| Total Assets | 50.89 | 26.12 | 12.89 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -1.94 | -1.81 | 2.10 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.14 | 1.85 | 1.15 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -6.18 | -2.04 | -2.75 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 6.04 | 4.90 | 1.04 |
| Net Change in Cash | -2.09 | 1.05 | 0.39 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 14.5 | 8.3 | 4.8 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 9.3 | 2.3 | 0.3 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 6.1 | 16.1 | 2.8 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 16.1 | 39.2 | 14.8 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 22.1 | 4.3 | — |
| Return on Assets (%) | 9.7 | 22.5 | 6.6 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.12 | 0.29 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.03 | -0.33 | — |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 6.93 | 1.39 | 0.63 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 2.41 | 2.53 | 1.95 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.6 | 1.39 | 2.37 |
| Receivable Days | 81 | 31 | 2 |
| Payable Days | 17 | 7 | 6 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.39 | -0.31 | 2.46 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 13.6 | 29.4 | -9.7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.27 | 0.84 | 0.82 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against revenue. Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 6.1% | 16.1% | 2.8% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.6x | 1.39x | 2.37x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.65x | 1.74x | 2.23x |
| = Return on Equity | 16.1% | 39.2% | 14.8% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.72x | 16.9x | 8.53x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.91x | 0.42x | 1.2x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 9.3% | 2.3% | 0.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 4.96 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -1.94 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 2 in FY24 to 81 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 167% while profit grew 481%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 2.62 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.829 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 2.242 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.742 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.931 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.918 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1356 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 9.31 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.376 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.299 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.149 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.535 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 9.31 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
2 of 5 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly. Signs the filing gives no inputs for are shown as — and left out of the count.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹7.7 cr in FY25, ₹6.9 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 31 days in FY25, 81 days in FY26
- —Inventory days rising · — days in FY25, — days in FY26 (on revenue)
- ○Other current assets rising against revenue · 15.4% of revenue in FY25, 14.0% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 109.2% of net block in FY25, 237.2% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 94.8% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 124% in FY26, against 19% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
- Profit moved backwards in FY26: net profit fell 15.7% to ₹5 cr even as revenue grew 124.2% to ₹82 cr. Net margin compressed from 16.1% to 6.1%. A premium multiple asked on a year when earnings moved backwards is worth understanding: the profit the price is measured against is not the peak the company has shown.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.39x profit in FY26, against -0.31x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 25.6%
25.6% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 3.78x
Short-term borrowings of 0.86 cr against cash of 3.26 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 14.6%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.73 cr against a profit of 4.96 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹239.00, the market value is ₹369 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹36.9 cr | 7.4x | 14.4 | 9.0 |
| 12% a year | ₹44.3 cr | 8.9x | 15.7 | 9.8 |
| 14% a year | ₹51.7 cr | 10.4x | 16.8 | 10.5 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 1.34% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -0.84% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹3.1 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth4.96 ÷ 30.81What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)7.60 ÷ (30.81 + 3.61) = 7.60 ÷ 34.42Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue11.91 ÷ 81.66Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth3.61 ÷ 30.81How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost7.60 ÷ 1.10How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(18.09 ÷ 81.66) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-1.94 ÷ 4.96Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(4.96 − -1.94) ÷ 50.89 = 6.90 ÷ 50.89The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹239.00 × 15,448,598 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash369.22 + 3.61 − 3.26What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA369.57 ÷ 11.91The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT369.22 ÷ 4.96The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹4.96 cr ÷ ₹369.22 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-3.09 cr ÷ ₹369.22 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the CARE Report, the market for Neurodevelopmental Disorders (NDDs) in India represents a major, rapidly expanding, yet highly underserved healthcare vertical. The overall Indian NDD therapy market reached ₹5,262.30 crore (₹52,623 million) in CY2025. Within this, the market sizes for Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), ADHD, and Speech Disorders stood at ₹1,090.00 crore, ₹1,750.00 crore, and ₹166.00 crore respectively, and are projected to grow at strong CAGRs of 6.29%, 5.56%, and 11.76% through CY2034. This structural expansion is driven by increasing clinical awareness, rising diagnostic rates, the transition from unorganized trusts to organized multi-channel providers, and supportive government initiatives like the Niramaya Health Insurance Scheme, positioning Rays of Belief to capture substantial headroom.
Future Planning
Rays of Belief plans to utilize ₹41.36 crore of its Fresh Issue proceeds to establish 50 new Company Learning Centres on leased premises across major Indian metros and Tier-1 cities, including associated IT infrastructure and hardware provisioning. Additionally, ₹14.45 crore and ₹10.13 crore will be deployed to secure lease liabilities for existing centers in India and the US, respectively, through Fiscal 2029.
Source: p. 105, 106, 125Competitive Position
As the absolute pioneer and largest organized multi-channel player in the child development segment in India, the company maintains a unique position. Unlike fragmented, local non-profit trusts or individual clinical therapists, the 'Mom's Belief' platform combines clinical precision with physical delivery and home-based learning materials, facilitating scale and continuous child monitoring.
Source: p. 21, 137, 204Execution Track Record
Under Nitin Bindlish, the company has successfully expanded its physical footprint to 136 domestic centers across 57 cities in just under 8 years. Consolidated revenues scaled to ₹81.66 crore in Fiscal 2026, primarily driven by the strategic acquisition and integration of its profitable US-based clinical allergy and immunology segment (₹34.09 crore) alongside stable related-party exports.
Source: p. 12, 22, 221Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Nitin Bindlish (Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer)
Litigation: As of March 31, 2026, there are no outstanding criminal, material civil, or tax litigations pending against the Company, its Promoters, or its Directors. Outstanding direct or indirect tax demands are Nil.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None. The statutory auditors' examination report on the Restated Financial Information for Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 is unmodified and contains no reservations, qualifications, or adverse remarks.
Hospital Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Operational centres | 139 centres | As of March 31, 2026, comprising 42 Tier-1, 77 Tier-2, 17 Tier-3, and 3 overseas centres, up from 111 centres in FY25. |
| Total children served | 9,205 children | In Fiscal 2026, compared to 8,585 children in Fiscal 2025 and 9,344 in Fiscal 2024. |
| Fresh enrolments | 6,903 children | In Fiscal 2026, compared to 6,512 children in Fiscal 2025 and 7,307 in Fiscal 2024. |
| Clinical team size | 340 therapists | Full-time clinical professionals as of March 31, 2026, including 139 occupational therapists, 74 psychologists, 72 speech therapists, and 50 special educators. |
| Clinical attrition rate | 4.41% | Average monthly clinical professionals attrition in Fiscal 2026, compared to 3.33% in Fiscal 2025 and 4.49% in Fiscal 2024. |
| Active child enrolments | >2,500 active children | Active enrollees undergoing therapy across physical centres and digital modes as of March 31, 2026. |
| Enrolment mix (Case mix) | 94% Offline / 6% Online | In Fiscal 2025, offline enrolments stood at 8,080 children compared to 505 online enrolments. |
| Therapy tools library | 2,150+ tools | As of March 31, 2026, comprising 150+ in-centre assessment tools and 2,000+ home-based learning kits. |
| Centre additions planned | 319 centres | Proposed expansion rollout between Fiscal 2027 and Fiscal 2029 funded by IPO proceeds, including 190 learning centres, 121 school collaborations, 3 COERs, and 5 upskilling academies. |
| Avg. monthly revenue per mature centre | ₹3.30 lakh/month | ₹0.33 million per month across 27 centres aged over 36 months in Fiscal 2026, compared to ₹5.00 lakh/month across 7 centres in Fiscal 2025. |
| Avg. monthly revenue per centre (all) | ₹2.30 lakh/month | ₹0.23 million per month across all 80 tracked centres in Fiscal 2026, compared to ₹2.10 lakh/month across 68 centres in Fiscal 2025. |
Source: p. 13, 28, 116, 117, 124, 204, 221, 226, 227, 406, 407, 411, 414, 444, 445 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Rays of Belief Limited generated 25.56% of its Fiscal 2026 consolidated revenue from operations (₹20.87 crore out of ₹81.66 crore) through export of business consultancy and support services to its majority promoter entity, Carving Futures Pte. Ltd., Singapore. In Fiscals 2025 and 2024, this related-party export revenue stood even higher at 39.64% (₹14.44 crore) and 34.12% (₹10.44 crore) of standalone revenues, respectively.
p. 22, 221, 224Pursuant to the share purchase agreement dated June 15, 2025, the Company acquired 100.00% of Mom's Belief US Inc. for ₹15.11 crore. This acquisition resulted in the recognition of a material acquisition goodwill of ₹12.84 crore on the consolidated balance sheet as of March 31, 2026, which represents 41.67% of the group's total consolidated net worth of ₹30.81 crore. No impairment charges were recorded for Fiscal 2026.
p. 216, 221, 282The group reported consolidated cash flow from operating activities (CFO) of -₹1.94 crore in Fiscal 2026 and standalone CFO of -₹1.81 crore in Fiscal 2025. This negative cash generation is driven by long working capital cycles and extended credit terms given to partners, causing trade receivables to expand to ₹18.09 crore in FY26 (representing 22.15% of operational revenue).
p. 78, 225The company's proposed expansion plan aims to establish 50 new Company Learning Centres on leased premises. However, these premises operate under standard short-term commercial lease agreements of only 11 months to 3 years. These short leases do not guarantee long-term renewals, exposing the company to premature lease terminations or significant rental escalations.
p. 31, 105, 106Operating cash flow was negative ₹1.94 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹4.96 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>025.6% of FY26 revenue (₹20.87 cr) came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue sold to yourself is not revenue won in the market.
rule: RPT revenue > 15%Revenue rose to ₹81.66 cr in FY26 while profit fell to ₹4.96 cr. Net margin went from 16.1% to 6.1%. The profit the offer price is measured against is not the best the company has shown.
rule: revenue↑ & PAT↓ in offer yearTrade receivables grew 487.5% against revenue growth of 124.2% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Can the company scale its physical presence while maintaining positive cash flows and mitigating lease roll-over disruptions?
p. 21, 105, 106, 225Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Dominant position as India's largest For-Profit Social Enterprise in the NDD therapies domain with a physical network of 136 domestic centers across 57 cities in 20 states.
- Deep clinical IP repository including over 150 assessment tools and 2,000+ proprietary child development kits and home therapy programs.
- Capital-efficient lease-based center models and collaboration formats (schools, licensed professionals) which reduce upfront capital requirements.
Weaknesses
- Material related-party export transactions, with Carving Futures Singapore contributing 25.56% of Fiscal 2026 revenue.
- Continuous negative cash flows from operating activities (-₹1.94 crore in FY26 and -₹1.81 crore in FY25) leading to dependency on continuous financing rounds.
- High trade receivables of ₹18.09 crore in FY26, representing more than 80 days of domestic sales.
Opportunities
- Large domestic addressable market, with the Indian NDD therapy market valued at ₹5,262.30 crore in CY2025 and projected to grow rapidly through CY2034.
- Inorganic expansion and clinical collaboration in specialized allergy, immunology, and NDD care following the US consolidation of three Virginia-based centers.
- Expanding digital e-therapy services to bridge the therapist scarcity gap in Tier-2 and Tier-3 Indian cities.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Severe scarcity of qualified clinical psychologists, occupational therapists, and speech-language pathologists in India, limiting center utilization.
- Extreme regional variations in therapy preferences, languages, and parental stigmas, which limits standardized program adoption.
- Changes in healthcare billing regulations, insurance coverages, or Medicare/Medicaid policies in the US (Virginia), which impacts 41.74% of consolidated group revenues.
Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How does the allocation of ₹41.36 crore for establishing new leased centers align with the company's lease management risk?
The company is directing 54.26% of its specific capex proceeds (₹41.36 crore out of the fresh issue) to establish 50 new leased centers. While this reinforces the asset-light model, these commercial leases are short-term (11 months to 3 years). Since the company's average lease payouts stand at ₹14.45 crore for existing domestic centers, utilizing public funds reduces reliance on working capital but exposes the new locations to rollover risk.
p. 31, 105, 125What is the extent of revenue concentration in foreign jurisdictions and related-party entities?
The group exhibits high geographic and related-party concentration. The United States segment (Mom's Belief US) generated 41.74% (₹34.09 crore) of consolidated operational revenues in FY26. Furthermore, 25.56% (₹20.87 crore) of consolidated revenue was derived from export services provided to Singapore-based promoter entity Carving Futures, meaning 67.30% of total revenue is concentrated in international and related-party structures.
p. 22, 221Why did the company report a consolidated net profit of ₹4.96 crore in Fiscal 2026 while standalone operations generated only minor operating profits?
In FY26, consolidated PAT stood at ₹4.96 crore. Standalone operations in India are near breakeven due to heavy employee costs (₹21.11 crore in FY25) and center rents. Profitability was significantly boosted by: (i) the newly consolidated US segment which operates higher-margin specialized medical billing, and (ii) consistent high-margin service exports of ₹20.87 crore to Carving Futures Singapore, which carries negligible direct material cost.
p. 22, 221What are the material hidden risks disclosed in the financial footnotes regarding goodwill and lease liabilities?
The primary hidden risk is the ₹12.84 crore of goodwill recorded from the US acquisition, representing 41.67% of consolidated net worth, which carries high impairment risk if US Medicaid/insurance rates change. Additionally, the company's balance sheet includes lease liabilities representing future ROU commitments, while actual current lease contracts operate on very short roll-overs, presenting a mismatch between contract lengths and capital provisioning.
p. 28, 216, 282What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Neha Chawla and Rahul Khandelwal (Initial Subscription to MoA) | ₹10.00 | 2017-08-23 | 23.9x |
| An early round from roughly 9 years ago, at roughly 23.9x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Nitin Bindlish (Rights Issue) | ₹10.00 | 2018-05-15 | 23.9x |
| An early round from roughly 9 years ago, at roughly 23.9x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| All Shareholders (Bonus Allotment in 45:1 ratio) | — | 2025-06-19 | — |
| Saju Sebastian Eapen (Preferential Issue) | ₹182.00 | 2025-06-19 | 1.3x |
| Allotted below the band — 18 entries | |||
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Private Placement) | ₹1,000.00 | 2019-08-28 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,000.00 | 2020-06-26 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2021-07-09 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2021-10-05 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2021-12-29 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2022-04-21 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2022-07-12 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2022-12-09 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2023-02-13 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2023-03-30 | as disclosed |
| Carving Futures Pte. Ltd. (Rights Issue) | ₹1,121.00 | 2023-05-27 | as disclosed |
| Manish Agarwal, NB Ventures Limited, and Coral Pebble LLP (Private Placement) | ₹5,150.00 | 2025-03-06 | as disclosed |
| Rayees Ahmed Mohammed Khalfay, Nafeel Mohamood Patankar, Laique Ali Mohammed Modak, KAPICO Investment Co. L.L.C., and Rainmatter Investments (Private Placement) | ₹5,402.00 | 2025-04-24 | as disclosed |
| Manish Agarwal (Private Placement) | ₹5,402.00 | 2025-05-09 | as disclosed |
| Manish Agarwal (Private Placement) | ₹5,402.00 | 2025-05-19 | as disclosed |
| Usha Malik, Nitin Jain, Sarita Jain, Sheela Jain, and Pankaj Dhingra (Private Placement / Pre-IPO Placement) | ₹284.00 | 2026-03-03 | as disclosed |
| Myong Zin Park (Private Placement / Pre-IPO Placement) | ₹290.00 | 2026-03-24 | as disclosed |
| Jeffrey Daniel Shiring, Jennifer Lee Switzer, Vivek Jhorar, and Akhil Bansal on behalf of Tremis Moms Ray Belief (Private Placement / Pre-IPO Placement) | ₹290.00 | 2026-05-27 | as disclosed |
The 18 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years
- 08 Sep 2027Promoters' shareholding in excess of 20%1 year
- 08 Mar 2027Entire pre-Issue Equity Share capital of our Company (other than the Minimum Promoters' Contribution)6 months
- 08 Oct 2026Anchor Investors (50% of allotment)30 days
- 07 Dec 2026Anchor Investors (remaining 50% of allotment)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Issue Size & Fresh Issue share count The Fresh Issue size was reduced by 770,000 shares to adjust for the Pre-IPO Placements. There is no Offer for Sale (OFS) in either document. | Fresh Issue of up to 6,000,000 Equity Shares | Fresh Issue of up to 5,230,000 Equity Shares |
| Pre-IPO Placements The company completed Pre-IPO placements of 204,063 shares: (1) 38,731 shares at ₹284/share on March 03, 2026; (2) 79,732 shares at ₹290/share on March 24, 2026; and (3) 85,600 shares at ₹290/share on May 27, 2026. This raised amount was reduced from the Fresh Issue size. | No Pre-IPO placement completed (disclosed as contemplated only). | ₹5.895 crore (INR 58.95 million) raised across three allotments. |
| Use of Proceeds (Capital Expenditure for New Centres) Capital expenditure allocation for establishing new centres was downscaled by ₹16.259 crore (INR 162.59 million) to align with the reduced net proceeds of the public issue. The breakdown across components was adjusted proportionally: Company Learning Centres fell to ₹26.884 crore (from ₹37.087 crore), School Collaborations fell to ₹5.535 crore (from ₹6.451 crore), COERs fell to ₹2.454 crore (from ₹4.911 crore), Upskilling Academies fell to ₹2.045 crore (from ₹2.863 crore), and Hardware fell to ₹4.443 crore (from ₹6.309 crore). | ₹57.620 crore (INR 576.20 million) allocated for setting up New Centres and technology (hardware) costs. | ₹41.361 crore (INR 413.61 million) allocated for setting up New Centres and technology (hardware) costs. |
| Target Network Expansion (New Centres Planned) The target physical rollout plan for new centers was reduced by 95 locations overall to stay within the scaled-down capital expenditure budget of ₹41.361 crore. | 414 new locations planned: 260 Company Learning Centres (including Licensed Professional partnerships), 141 School Collaboration Centres, 6 Centres of Excellence and Research (COERs), and 7 Upskilling Academies. | 319 new locations planned: 190 Company Learning Centres (including Licensed Professional partnerships), 121 School Collaboration Centres, 3 Centres of Excellence and Research (COERs), and 5 Upskilling Academies. |
| Promoter Pre-Issue Shareholding Percentage While the absolute promoter share count remained identical at 14,374,264 shares, their combined holding percentage fell by 1.21% due to the expansion of pre-Issue capital from 15,467,619 shares to 15,671,682 shares after the Pre-IPO Placements. | 14,374,264 Equity Shares, representing 92.93% of pre-Issue share capital. | 14,374,264 Equity Shares, representing 91.72% of pre-Issue share capital. |
| Number of Equity Shareholders Pre-IPO placements added 9 new individual and institutional investors (including Myong Zin Park, Jeffrey Daniel Shiring, and others), expanding the shareholder base to 25. | 16 shareholders as of the UDRHP-I date. | 25 shareholders as of the RHP date. |
| Filing/Audited Reporting Period The reporting periods were rolled forward by one full financial year. Fiscal 2023 and the six-month stub period ended September 30, 2025 were dropped, while the full audited Fiscal 2026 figures were integrated. | Financial statements cover Fiscals 2025, 2024, 2023, and the six-month period ended September 30, 2025. | Financial statements cover Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024. |
| Industry Report Date The commissioned industry overview report was updated to the latest July 2026 edition to provide current macroeconomic and therapeutic sector indicators. | CARE Report on Neuro-developmental Disorders dated January 2026. | CARE Report on Neuro-developmental Disorders dated July 2026. |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
