Nityas Gems & Jewellery
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Nityas Gems and Jewellery Limited is an integrated manufacturer and trader of gold, silver, and diamond jewellery, including Laboratory Grown Diamonds (LGD). The company operates across B2B wholesale channels and expanding D2C retail networks in India and international markets.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Nityas Gems and Jewellery Limited (formerly Nityas Gems and Jewellery Private Limited) is a Surat-headquartered company engaged in the manufacturing, processing, and trading of gold, silver, and diamond jewellery (comprising natural diamonds and Laboratory Grown Diamonds). Operating through B2B channels (wholesalers, retail chains, standalone retailers) and expanding D2C channels (including retail store chains under subsidiaries Ayaani Diamonds and Ratna LGD), the company caters to domestic markets (97.44% of FY26 revenue) and export clients across international jurisdictions. Operating scale expanded significantly with consolidated revenue from operations reaching ₹ 202.89 crore in Fiscal 2026, up from ₹ 96.85 crore in Fiscal 2025 and ₹ 53.66 crore in Fiscal 2024. The company derives 95.58% of FY26 revenue from B2B operations and 4.42% from D2C retail operations.
- Jewellery Sales — Gold, silver, natural diamond, and Lab Grown Diamond (LGD) jewellery manufacturing and trading.
- Precious Metals & Bullion — Trading of gold and silver bullion.
- Making & Certification Services — Jewellery designing, certification, and making charges.
Established presence in Surat jewellery manufacturing hub, integration across natural and lab-grown diamonds, multi-channel B2B/D2C distribution, and strategic acquisitions of retail subsidiaries Ayaani Diamonds and Ratna LGD.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding working capital requirements of our Company
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 202.89 | 96.85 | 53.66 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 22.32 | 9.79 | 4.02 |
| PAT Margin | 11% | 10.11% | 7.49% |
Revenue Breakdown
- B2B Standalone Retailers: 42.75%
- B2B Wholesalers: 28.25%
- B2B Retail Chains: 24.57%
- D2C Retail Operations: 4.42%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 109.5% | Revenue from operations expanded primarily due to higher B2B sales volume of lab-grown diamond jewellery, increasing consumer acceptance of LGD products, and the consolidation of retail subsidiary Ayaani Diamonds. | Structural |
| Cost of materials consumed (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 91.1% | Cost of materials consumed increased in line with top-line production growth, reflecting higher procurement of gold bullion, fine gold, and lab-grown diamonds. | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 445.2% | Employee benefit expenses rose significantly due to headcount expansion across corporate offices and retail store network, annual increments, and director remuneration. | Structural |
| Finance costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 210.9% | Finance costs increased due to higher interest on lease liabilities following store network expansion and higher bank working capital credit facility utilization. | Structural |
| Restated PAT (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 128.0% | Restated net profit expanded due to higher operating revenue, improved gross making charge yields, and operating leverage benefits. | Structural |
| Operating cash flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 46.6% | Operating cash outflow widened to ₹ -14.73 crore due to higher working capital lock-up in inventory build-up and trade receivables to support business expansion. | Structural |
| Revenue from operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 80.5% | Revenue grew by 80.50% driven by increasing acceptance of lab-grown diamond jewellery and B2B client network expansion. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Gold Bullion and Diamond Raw Material Price Volatility sector persistent
Fluctuations in gold and diamond prices impact gross margins and inventory holding values if cost variations cannot be immediately passed on to customers. - Supplier and Geographic Revenue Concentration company persistent
Top 5 states account for 85.03% of FY26 revenue, exposing business performance to regional consumer spending cycles in western and southern India.
Tailwinds
- Rapid Consumer Adoption of Lab Grown Diamonds (LGD) macro
60-80% price affordability of LGD relative to natural diamonds drives strong consumer demand among Gen Z and Millennials for daily-wear and bridal jewellery.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-07
- Pre Application Start2026-09-29
- Bidding Start2026-09-30
- Bidding End2026-10-05
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-06
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-07
- Listing Day2026-10-08
- Mandate End2026-11-16
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 202.89 | 96.85 | 53.66 |
| Other Income | 0.43 | 0.00 | 0.01 |
| Total Income | 203.33 | 96.85 | 53.66 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 167.49 | 87.67 | 45.67 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 6.53 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Changes in Inventories | -15.91 | -9.44 | -1.84 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 3.18 | 0.58 | 0.86 |
| Finance Cost | 1.46 | 0.47 | 0.18 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 2.59 | 0.54 | 0.37 |
| Other Expenses | 11.06 | 5.12 | 3.50 |
| Total Expenses | 176.40 | 84.95 | 48.73 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 26.93 | 11.89 | 4.93 |
| Exceptional Items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 26.92 | 11.89 | 4.93 |
| Tax Expense | 4.61 | 2.11 | 0.90 |
| Profit After Tax | 22.32 | 9.79 | 4.02 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | -0.07 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 22.25 | 9.82 | 4.04 |
| EPS - Basic | 5.52 | 4.37 | 1.83 |
| EPS - Diluted | 5.52 | 4.37 | 1.83 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 21.57 | 1.24 | 1.00 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 40.87 | 20.11 | 4.28 |
| Net Worth | 62.44 | 21.35 | 5.28 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.09 | 0.77 | 1.31 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 8.99 | 6.34 | 1.95 |
| Total Borrowings | 9.08 | 7.11 | 3.26 |
| Trade Payables | 8.39 | 2.76 | 1.81 |
| Current Liabilities | 23.95 | 16.14 | 4.72 |
| Total Liabilities | 36.99 | 17.29 | 6.42 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 4.03 | 1.67 | 1.63 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 8.18 | 0.01 | 0.00 |
| Investments | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Inventories | 63.59 | 26.22 | 5.27 |
| Trade Receivables | 21.46 | 10.61 | 4.06 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.54 | 0.30 | 0.05 |
| Current Assets | 88.95 | 37.69 | 9.68 |
| Total Assets | 116.42 | 39.87 | 11.75 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -14.73 | -10.05 | -1.05 |
| Capital Expenditure | 1.85 | 0.45 | 0.81 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -1.99 | -0.42 | -0.83 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 16.86 | 10.72 | 1.73 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.13 | 0.24 | -0.15 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 15.2 | 13.3 | 10.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 14 | 12.8 | 9.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 11 | 10.1 | 7.5 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 35.7 | 45.9 | 76.1 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 39.7 | 43.4 | 59.8 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 19.2 | 24.6 | 34.2 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.15 | 0.33 | 0.62 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.28 | 0.53 | 0.59 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 19.44 | 26.3 | 28.39 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 3.71 | 2.34 | 2.05 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.06 | 0.71 | 0.93 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.74 | 2.43 | 4.57 |
| Receivable Days | 39 | 40 | 28 |
| Inventory Days | 114 | 99 | 36 |
| Payable Days | 15 | 10 | 12 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 138 | 129 | 52 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.66 | -1.03 | -0.26 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 31.8 | 49.8 | 43.1 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.71 | 0.83 | 2.19 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 11% | 10.1% | 7.5% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.74x | 2.43x | 4.57x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.86x | 1.87x | 2.23x |
| = Return on Equity | 35.7% | 45.9% | 76.1% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.83x | 0.82x | 0.82x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.96x | 0.96x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 14% | 12.8% | 9.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 22.32 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -14.73 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Interest coverage was 19.44x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.966 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.543 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 2.095 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.625 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.193 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.487 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.3182 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 11.47 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.558 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.351 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.244 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.688 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 11.47 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.66x profit in FY26, against -1.03x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 4.6%
Contingent liabilities of 2.88 cr against a net worth of 62.44 cr — 4.6% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 33.4%
33.4% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.06x
Short-term borrowings of 8.99 cr against cash of 0.54 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 0.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.10 cr against a profit of 22.32 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth22.32 ÷ 62.44What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)28.38 ÷ (62.44 + 9.08) = 28.38 ÷ 71.52Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue30.97 ÷ 202.89Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth9.08 ÷ 62.44How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost28.38 ÷ 1.46How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(21.46 ÷ 202.89) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days114 + 39 − 15How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-14.73 ÷ 22.32Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(22.32 − -14.73) ÷ 116.42 = 37.05 ÷ 116.42The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹75.00 × 57,593,248 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash431.95 + 9.08 − 0.54What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA440.49 ÷ 30.97The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT431.95 ÷ 22.32The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹75.00 ÷ ₹11.45Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)19.35 ÷ 128%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the CareEdge Report, the Indian gems and jewellery industry is one of the largest in the world, contributing significantly to GDP and exports. Driven by rising disposable income, urbanisation, cultural demand, and the emergence of Lab Grown Diamonds (LGDs) as a cost-effective alternative to natural diamonds, the sector is transitioning toward organized retail and branded jewellery platforms.
100% Primary Equity Capital Inflow for Working Capital De-risking
The IPO is structured 100% as a Fresh Issue of 1,44,56,000 Equity Shares, allocating ₹ 70.00 crore directly to working capital procurement of fine gold and lab-grown diamonds. This influx strengthens liquidity and reduces reliance on short-term bank credit.
Source: p.1, p.139, p.140Vertical Integration into D2C Retail via Ayaani Acquisition
Nityas Gems expanded its margin profile by acquiring a 50.04% stake in Ayaani Diamonds, establishing an omnichannel D2C store presence to complement its core B2B wholesale manufacturing base.
Source: p.206, p.252, p.360Rapid Scalability in High-Margin Lab Grown Diamond Segment
Capitalizing on the 15.8% CAGR projected for the Indian LGD industry, Nityas achieved a 94.46% revenue CAGR between FY24 and FY26, with PAT margin expanding from 7.50% to 11.00%.
Source: p.101, p.150, p.170Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Rajnikant Lallubhai Chanchad
Litigation: ₹ 2.95 crore in direct tax proceedings pending against the Company.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None; Statutory auditor examination reports contain unmodified opinions for FY24-FY26.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Goldiam International Limited | 34.2 | — | 22.1 | 14.5 |
| DP Abhushan Limited | 28.5 | — | 28.4 | 6.2 |
At the ₹75 upper band, the issue is priced at 13.6x earnings — a 57% discount to the peer median of 31.4x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Jewellery & Retail Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Omnichannel retail store footprint | 12 stores | operating retail outlets under Ayaani Diamonds and Ratna LGD subsidiaries as of March 31, 2026 |
| B2B vs D2C revenue mix | 95.58% B2B / 4.42% D2C | share of Fiscal 2026 revenue from operations |
| Lab Grown Diamond (LGD) product share | 68.50% | share of total jewellery sales in Fiscal 2026 |
| Inventory turnover ratio | 3.70 times | Fiscal 2026 inventory turnover (5.25 times in FY25) |
| Domestic vs export revenue mix | 97.44% Domestic / 2.56% Overseas | geographical revenue breakdown for Fiscal 2026 |
Source: p.170, p.206, p.252, p.436
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Nityas Gems and Jewellery Limited incurred negative cash flows from operating activities of ₹ -14.73 crore in FY26, ₹ -10.05 crore in FY25, and ₹ -10.51 crore in FY24 due to heavy working capital lock-up in inventory and receivables.
p.39, p.103, p.441Absolute sum of related party transactions represented 33.37% of revenue from operations in FY26 (38.88% in FY25 and 17.59% in FY24), primarily involving unsecured loans, raw material trading, and entity acquisitions.
p.39, p.360In September 2025, an FIR was registered regarding the theft of 16 gold items valued at ₹ 0.13 crore at the Jodhpur store, where genuine inventory was replaced with imitation items.
p.40, p.448The offer consists 100% of a Fresh Issue of 1,44,56,000 Equity Shares with zero Offer for Sale by Promoters or existing shareholders.
p.1, p.96, p.139₹ 2.95 crore in direct tax proceedings pending against the Company.
p.4, p.66, p.113, p.273, p.282Operating cash flow was negative ₹14.73 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹22.32 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>033.4% of FY26 revenue (₹67.70 cr) came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue sold to yourself is not revenue won in the market.
rule: RPT revenue > 15%Short-term borrowings of ₹8.99 cr against cash of ₹0.54 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Restated consolidated financial statements confirm revenue from operations grew from ₹ 53.66 crore in FY24 to ₹ 202.89 crore in FY26 (CAGR of 94.46%), with PAT increasing from ₹ 4.02 crore to ₹ 22.32 crore.
p.101, p.206Operating cash flows were negative across FY24 (₹ -10.51 crore), FY25 (₹ -100.52 crore), and FY26 (₹ -147.32 crore) due to working capital expansion.
p.39, p.103, p.441Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Integrated business model covering natural diamonds, gold, silver, and high-growth Laboratory Grown Diamonds (LGDs).
- Multi-channel distribution strategy across B2B wholesale networks and expanding D2C retail footprint via Ayaani and Ratna LGD.
Weaknesses
- Sustained negative operating cash flows driven by working capital lock-up in jewellery inventory and trade receivables.
- High concentration of sales to top 10 customers accounting for 55.49% of FY26 revenue.
Opportunities
- Rapid consumer adoption of Laboratory Grown Diamonds (LGD) providing higher margin retail expansion opportunities.
- Expansion of D2C retail store network across Tier-1 and Tier-2 Indian cities.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Gold and diamond raw material price fluctuations and foreign exchange volatility. risk_section
Why it matters: Fluctuations in gold or diamond prices impact gross margins and inventory valuation if cost increases cannot be passed on immediately.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (16 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the net fresh issue proceeds be deployed?
The net proceeds from the fresh issue will be utilized entirely for funding incremental working capital requirements to support business scaling and inventory build-up, alongside general corporate purposes.
p.139, p.140What is the customer concentration profile of the business?
Top 1 customer accounted for 12.98% of FY26 consolidated revenue, while the top 10 customers collectively represented 55.49% of revenue from operations.
p.446What drove revenue growth and profit expansion in Fiscal 2026?
Consolidated revenue from operations expanded by 109.51% to ₹ 202.89 crore in FY26, driven by higher B2B sales volumes, addition of D2C retail store operations via Ayaani acquisition, and higher making charge yields.
p.101, p.436What is the reason for negative cash flow from operations despite strong reported profits?
Operating cash flow was negative at ₹ -14.73 crore in FY26 due to substantial capital deployment into inventory (up ₹ 21.48 crore) and trade receivables (up ₹ 11.87 crore) to support revenue expansion.
p.39, p.103, p.441What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Rajnikant Lallubhai Chanchad / Nilesh Ghanshyambhai Panchani | ₹10.00 | 2022-04-26 | 7.5x |
| An early round from roughly 5 years ago, at roughly 7.5x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Sub-division of shares (1:2) | — | 2026-03-13 | — |
| Bonus Issue (1:10) | — | 2026-03-16 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 1 entries | |||
| MG 369 Finventure (Aditya Vinod Kanodia) | ₹260.00 | 2025-03-04 | as disclosed |
The 1 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Apr 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 08 Apr 2027Promoters' Shareholding in Excess of Minimum Contribution6 months
- 08 Apr 2027Entire Pre-Issue Equity Share Capital6 months
- 07 Nov 2026Anchor Investor Portion (50%)30 days
- 06 Jan 2027Anchor Investor Portion (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
