Moneyview
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Moneyview Limited is a consumer-focused, digital-only, credit-led financial services platform in India providing Middle India customers access to a full suite of financial products through a network of 48 Financial Partners, including its regulated NBFC subsidiary, Whizdm Finance Private Limited. Operating primarily as a Lending Service Provider, the company facilitates paperless, AI/ML-driven personal loan origination and servicing alongside digital gold, earned wage access, home loans, credit cards, and payment solutions.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Moneyview Limited operates a credit-led digital financial platform offering personal loans, credit cards, home loans, loans against property, earned wage access, digital gold, fixed deposits, and UPI payments. Personal loans serve as its flagship product, available up to ₹ 0.10 crore with tenures up to 60 months. The company primarily targets Middle India—households earning ₹ 0.03 crore to ₹ 0.11 crore annually—with its monetized users averaging an age of 32 years and an average monthly income of ₹ 0.0047 crore. Geographically, Moneyview maintains a pan-India digital reach across 99.04% of Indian PIN codes, with 79.54% of monetized users residing in Tier 2+ cities and 36.64% of Managed AUM concentrated in Southern India as of Fiscal 2026. Operating a capital-light Lending Service Provider (LSP) model, its supply chain relies on deep technology integrations with 48 Financial Partners, including 22 regulated entities (banks and NBFCs) and its wholly-owned NBFC subsidiary, Whizdm Finance Private Limited. On scale, Moneyview facilitated ₹ 23,098.52 crore in personal loan disbursals in Fiscal 2026, reaching a Managed AUM of ₹ 21,380.14 crore (scaling to ₹ 22,520.17 crore as of June 30, 2026), with total consolidated revenue from operations standing at ₹ 3,351.16 crore and net profit of ₹ 242.71 crore in Fiscal 2026.
- Personal Loans (LSP & NBFC) — Flagship credit product facilitating digital personal loans up to ₹ 0.10 crore via partner REs and captive NBFC subsidiary WFPL.
- New Financial Products — Digital distribution of credit cards, earned wage access, home loans, loans against property, insurance, digital gold, FD marketplace, and UPI payments.
Proprietary AI/ML credit underwriting and risk-segmentation models trained on over 100,000 data variables, strong pan-India digital distribution covering 99.04% of PIN codes without physical branches, deep system integrations with 48 Financial Partners, and a self-reinforcing data flywheel powered by 140.28 million registered users.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Investment to drive growth in loan disbursals under default loss guarantee (DLG) arrangements — ₹325.00 cr
- Investment in WFPL, our Material Subsidiary, for the purpose of augmenting its capital base — ₹250.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
100% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 3351.16 | 2339.15 | 1342.37 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 242.71 | 240.28 | 171.15 |
| PAT Margin | 7.24% | 10.27% | 12.75% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Fees and commission income: 56.68%
- Interest income: 39.17%
- Gain on derecognition of financial assets: 2.9%
- Other operating income: 1.25%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Total Income (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 43.1% | Total income increased primarily due to an expansion in total revenue from operations driven by higher loan disbursals and AUM growth. | Structural |
| Interest Income (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 66.4% | Interest income expanded due to 59.19% growth in Average Gross Loans on the balance sheet of the NBFC subsidiary. | Structural |
| Gain on Derecognition of Financial Assets (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 239.9% | Gain on derecognition grew substantially as a result of increased direct assignment transactions of Portfolio Loans. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 70.8% | Finance costs increased due to a 67.32% rise in Average Total Borrowings undertaken to fund the growth of Portfolio Loans. | Structural |
| Impairment of Financial Instruments (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 47.3% | Impairment expense grew due to higher Average Gross Loans on book and an increase in default loss guarantee expenses from higher DLG disbursals. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 26.7% | Employee benefit expenses rose due to an increase in full-time headcount from 667 to 725, annual increments, and higher share-based compensation. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 21.9% | Other expenses increased due to higher outsource collection service costs from Managed AUM expansion and increased IT maintenance expenses. | Structural |
| Restated Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 67.3% | Pre-tax profit before exceptional items grew significantly due to operating leverage as revenue scaled faster than operating expenses. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 33.1% | Operating cash outflow reduced as operating profit before working capital changes grew, offsetting working capital deployments into portfolio loan disbursals. | Cyclical |
| Total Income (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 71.2% | Total income grew rapidly due to a 74.25% expansion in revenue from operations across fees, commissions, and interest income. | Structural |
| Interest Income (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 162.3% | Interest income rose steeply due to 147.91% growth in Average Gross Loans as on-book portfolio lending scaled up. | Structural |
| Gain on Derecognition of Financial Assets (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 396.5% | Gain on derecognition increased following the commencement of direct assignment transactions of Portfolio Loans in March 2024. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 194.6% | Finance costs nearly tripled due to a 159.29% increase in Average Total Borrowings to fund the growth of Portfolio Loans. | Structural |
| Impairment of Financial Instruments (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 164.2% | Impairment expense grew sharply due to rapid expansion in Average Gross Loans and higher DLG expenses on increased DLG disbursals. | Structural |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 41.6% | Employee benefit expenses increased due to headcount expanding from 471 to 667, particularly in technology teams to support new product launches. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 21.5% | Other expenses increased due to higher outsource collection costs driven by Managed AUM growth and higher transaction processing costs. | Structural |
| Restated Profit Before Tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 61.0% | Pre-tax profit expanded due to higher loan disbursals and improved scale efficiencies across operating expenses. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Regulatory Shifts around Digital Lending and Outsourcing sector persistent
Frequent regulatory interventions by the RBI regarding DLG caps, BNPL norms, and outsourcing restrictions pose ongoing operational compliance requirements. - Macroeconomic Inflation and Interest Rate Volatility macro persistent
Macroeconomic headwinds and sustained inflationary pressures can weaken borrower affordability, increase credit losses, and elevate borrowing costs. - Financial Partner and Debt Capital Concentration company persistent
Top 10 Financial Partners contributing 37.36% of revenue in FY26 exposes operations to potential non-renewal or adverse terms from key capital partners.
Tailwinds
- Structural Expansion of Digital Personal Loans in Middle India macro
Rapid digitization, high UPI adoption, and expanding credit demand among Middle India households drive long-term market growth in digital personal loan sanctions. - Data-Driven AI/ML Models and Capital-Light LSP Network company
Proprietary credit underwriting models trained on over 100,000 data variables combined with 48 Financial Partners drive lower acquisition costs and operating leverage.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-30
- Pre Application Start2026-09-23
- Bidding Start2026-09-24
- Bidding End2026-09-28
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-29
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-30
- Listing Day2026-10-01
- Mandate End2026-11-09
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 3,351.16 | 2,339.15 | 1,342.37 |
| Other Income | 53.12 | 39.38 | 46.87 |
| Total Income | 3,404.27 | 2,378.53 | 1,389.24 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 281.94 | 222.46 | 157.05 |
| Finance Cost | 631.69 | 369.82 | 125.54 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 9.88 | 8.95 | 4.86 |
| Other Expenses | 1,946.76 | 1,458.09 | 903.49 |
| Total Expenses | 2,870.27 | 2,059.32 | 1,190.94 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 534.01 | 319.21 | 198.30 |
| Exceptional Items | -206.65 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 327.35 | 319.21 | 198.30 |
| Tax Expense | 84.65 | 78.94 | 27.16 |
| Profit After Tax | 242.71 | 240.28 | 171.15 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 1.43 | 0.95 | 0.48 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 244.14 | 241.23 | 171.62 |
| EPS - Basic | 1.60 | 1.60 | 1.20 |
| EPS - Diluted | 1.57 | 1.58 | 1.19 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 38.22 | 38.22 | 35.29 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 2,185.06 | 1,878.10 | 1,569.21 |
| Net Worth | 2,225.42 | 1,918.66 | 1,606.64 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 2,019.64 | 1,201.12 | 422.38 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 3,137.40 | 2,212.24 | 1,286.54 |
| Total Borrowings | 5,157.04 | 3,413.37 | 1,708.92 |
| Trade Payables | 169.11 | 116.46 | 91.10 |
| Current Liabilities | 3,822.86 | 2,482.60 | 1,467.61 |
| Total Liabilities | 5,879.43 | 3,713.76 | 1,912.86 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 33.52 | 30.97 | 20.85 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 39.61 | 41.64 | 0.53 |
| Investments | 194.06 | 57.14 | 97.14 |
| Trade Receivables | 456.61 | 364.46 | 358.17 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1,027.09 | 561.05 | 457.41 |
| Current Assets | 6,382.39 | 4,197.41 | 2,623.10 |
| Total Assets | 8,104.85 | 5,632.42 | 3,519.50 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -950.90 | -1,420.71 | -1,632.74 |
| Capital Expenditure | 5.82 | 10.68 | 3.24 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -230.85 | -135.30 | 452.21 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 1,647.79 | 1,659.64 | 1,517.81 |
| Net Change in Cash | 466.04 | 103.64 | 337.29 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 34.5 | 29.3 | 23.7 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 34.2 | 29 | 23.3 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 7.2 | 10.3 | 12.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 10.9 | 12.5 | 10.7 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 15.8 | 12.9 | 9.8 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 3 | 4.3 | 4.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 2.32 | 1.78 | 1.06 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 3.51 | 4.09 | 3.81 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 1.85 | 1.86 | 2.58 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.67 | 1.69 | 1.79 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.41 | 0.42 | 0.38 |
| Receivable Days | 50 | 57 | 97 |
| Payable Days | 18 | 18 | 25 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -3.92 | -5.91 | -9.54 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 14.7 | 29.5 | 51.3 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.59 | 1.19 | 0.67 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 7.2% | 10.3% | 12.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.41x | 0.42x | 0.38x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 3.64x | 2.94x | 2.19x |
| = Return on Equity | 10.9% | 12.5% | 10.7% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.74x | 0.75x | 0.86x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.28x | 0.46x | 0.61x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 34.8% | 29.5% | 24.1% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 242.71 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -950.90 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days fell from 97 to 50. Collections improved over the disclosed period.
- Interest coverage was 1.85x in FY26. A meaningful share of operating profit is going to service debt rather than fund the business.
- Debt to equity stood at 2.32x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.874 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.836 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.433 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.985 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.926 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.102 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1473 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.56 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.316 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.27 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.144 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.379 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.56 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
1 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -3.92x profit in FY26, against -5.91x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 41.4%
Contingent liabilities of 920.35 cr against a net worth of 2,225.42 cr — 41.4% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 5.4%
5.4% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.33x
Short-term borrowings of 3,137.40 cr against cash of 1,027.09 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.7%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 8.87 cr against a profit of 242.71 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth242.71 ÷ 2,225.42What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)1,165.69 ÷ (2,225.42 + 5,157.04) = 1,165.69 ÷ 7,382.46Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue1,175.57 ÷ 3,351.16Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth5,157.04 ÷ 2,225.42How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost1,165.69 ÷ 631.69How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(456.61 ÷ 3,351.16) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-950.90 ÷ 242.71Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(242.71 − -950.90) ÷ 8,104.85 = 1,193.61 ÷ 8,104.85The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹34.00 × 1,545,923,567 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash5,256.14 + 5,157.04 − 1,027.09What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA9,386.09 ÷ 1,175.57The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT5,256.14 ÷ 242.71The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Market Cap ÷ (PAT − exceptional items, tax-effected)5,256.14 ÷ (242.71 − -206.65 at 25.9% tax)The latest year carries an exceptional item of ₹-206.65 cr, which depressed reported profit. Both multiples are shown because both are true: one is what the year printed, the other is what the business did. Which one belongs in your judgement is your call, not ours.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹34.00 ÷ ₹0.55Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)21.66 ÷ 1%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the Redseer Report, India's personal loan sanctions grew at a CAGR of ~43% between FY2021 and FY2026, reaching ₹ 1,480,000.00 crore (~US$ 0.16 trillion), and are projected to expand to ₹ 3,300,000.00–₹ 3,600,000.00 crore by FY2031P at an 18-20% CAGR. Digital personal loans represent the fastest-growing segment, accounting for ~15% of personal loan sanctions in FY2026 (₹ 220,000.00 crore) and projected to grow at a 26-27% CAGR to reach ₹ 710,000.00–₹ 730,000.00 crore by FY2031P. Moneyview Limited is the largest full-stack digital lending platform among its peers in India based on AUM as of FY2025, accounting for approximately 10.5% of total digital unsecured personal loan sanctions and 1.6% of overall unsecured personal loan sanctions in FY2026.
Scalable LSP Framework Powered by Hybrid Captive NBFC Architecture
Moneyview operates a hybrid digital lending model where it acts as a Lending Service Provider (LSP) for 22 partner REs while maintaining its wholly-owned NBFC subsidiary (Whizdm Finance Private Limited). This structure allows Moneyview to capture fee and commission income on partner-disbursed loans while selectively retaining high-margin loans on its own balance sheet, driving a 56.54% revenue CAGR between FY24 and FY26.
Source: p.168, p.207, p.214Primary Proceeds Deployment Targeted at DLG Collateral and NBFC Capital Base
Out of ₹ 750.00 crore fresh issue proceeds, Moneyview is allocating ₹ 325.00 crore toward lien-marked bank fixed deposits to back 5% Default Loss Guarantee (DLG) arrangements with partner banks and NBFCs, and ₹ 250.00 crore to augment the CRAR capital base of its subsidiary WFPL. This capital deployment directly unlocks multi-year loan disbursal expansion across its 48 Financial Partners.
Source: p.101, p.134, p.208Underwriting Outperformance in Middle India Credit Segment
By leveraging AI/ML models trained on over 100,000 data variables (including alternative mobile and cash-flow metadata alongside credit bureau signals), Moneyview consistently outperformed broader industry asset quality, reducing its annualised loss rate to 6.95% in FY26 compared to an industry average loss rate of 8.29%.
Source: p.168, p.202, p.208Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Puneet Agarwal
Litigation: 1 direct tax proceeding involving Director Alpana Parida (unquantified demand before Principal CCIT Mumbai); 1 criminal proceeding by subsidiary WFPL (₹ 1.97 crore recovery involving cyber fraud API unauthorized withdrawals); 1 ED show-cause notice under FEMA against nominee director Subrata Mitra.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Statutory Auditors disclosed modifications/qualifications in their CARO reports for FY26, FY25, and FY24 regarding daily backup of electronic accounting books on Indian physical servers and database-level audit trail features, alongside a CARO 2020 reporting of a cyber fraud incident involving unauthorized bank withdrawals of ₹ 48.32 crore in FY26.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| OnEMI Technology Solutions Limited | 16.62 | — | 20.96 | — |
| PB Fintech Limited | 120.33 | — | 9.17 | — |
| One97 Communications Limited | 213.45 | — | 4.61 | — |
| Bajaj Finance Limited | 33.66 | — | 17.19 | — |
| SBI Cards and Payment Services Limited | 27.98 | — | 13.72 | — |
At the ₹34 upper band, the issue is priced at 21.7x earnings — a 36% discount to the peer median of 33.7x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Lending Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Managed AUM | ₹21,380.14 crore | as of FY26 (₹22,520.17 crore as of June 30, 2026) |
| AUM growth | 27.91% | FY26 vs FY25 Managed AUM growth |
| GNPA % (Gross Stage 3) | 2.74% | as of March 31, 2026 (2.72% as of June 30, 2026) |
| NNPA % (Net Stage 3) | 0.65% | as of March 31, 2026 (0.59% as of June 30, 2026) |
| PCR % (Provision Coverage) | 76.65% | as of March 31, 2026 (78.93% as of June 30, 2026) |
| CAR % (CRAR) | 24.00% | subsidiary WFPL CRAR as of March 31, 2026 (24.32% as of June 30, 2026) |
| Annualised loss rate | 6.95% | FY26 platform loss rate (6.90% as of June 30, 2026) |
| Loan disbursals | ₹23,098.52 crore | FY26 total personal loan disbursals |
| Loan margin | 8.55% | FY26 Net Loan Revenue / Disbursals |
| Cost-to-income (OpEx / Total Income) | 34.84% | FY26 operating expenses as % of total income |
Source: p.147, p.216, p.228, p.238 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
In August 2025 (FY26), subsidiary Whizdm Finance Private Limited (WFPL) suffered a cyber incident where external threat actors exploited API integrations with partner banks to initiate unauthorized bank account withdrawals of ₹ 48.32 crore, resulting in a net cash loss of ₹ 46.65 crore recognized as an exceptional item.
p.50, p.356, p.427Moneyview maintains default loss guarantee (DLG) commitments of up to 5% on facilitated personal loan portfolios to Regulated Entities, resulting in outstanding contingent liabilities of ₹ 1,060.78 crore as of June 30, 2026 (₹ 920.35 crore as of March 31, 2026), representing 43.92% of consolidated Net Worth.
p.31, p.62, p.373Moneyview incurred negative operating cash flows of ₹ -950.90 crore in Fiscal 2026 (₹ -1,420.71 crore in FY25 and ₹ -1,632.74 crore in FY24) as cash was absorbed into funding on-book Portfolio Loans disbursed by its captive NBFC subsidiary WFPL.
p.38, p.85, p.312Restated consolidated net profit for Fiscal 2026 was impacted by a one-time performance-based incentive of ₹ 160.00 crore paid to Managing Director and CEO Puneet Agarwal.
p.40, p.95, p.381Subsidiary WFPL filed a suo moto settlement application dated February 19, 2026 with SEBI regarding private placement NCDs down-sold by allottees, causing the number of debenture holders to exceed the limit prescribed under Sections 42 and 25 of Companies Act 2013.
p.40, p.428, p.430The public offer consists of a Fresh Issue of ₹ 750.00 crore alongside an Offer for Sale of up to 10,04,94,200 Equity Shares by Promoters and investor selling shareholders (Accel, Internet Fund III, Crimson Winter, Ribbit Capital, etc.).
p.1, p.2, p.871 direct tax proceeding involving Director Alpana Parida (unquantified demand before Principal CCIT Mumbai); 1 criminal proceeding by subsidiary WFPL (₹ 1.97 crore recovery involving cyber fraud API unauthorized withdrawals); 1 ED show-cause notice under FEMA against nominee director Subrata Mitra.
p.2, p.50, p.98, p.101, p.122Statutory Auditors disclosed modifications/qualifications in their CARO reports for FY26, FY25, and FY24 regarding daily backup of electronic accounting books on Indian physical servers and database-level audit trail features, alongside a CARO 2020 reporting of a cyber fraud incident involving unauthorized bank withdrawals of ₹ 48.32 crore in FY26.
p.2, p.50, p.98, p.101, p.122Operating cash flow was negative ₹950.90 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹242.71 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>05.4% of FY26 revenue came from connected entities.
rule: RPT revenue 5-15%Short-term borrowings of ₹3,137.40 cr against cash of ₹1,027.09 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Redseer Report confirms Moneyview's Managed AUM reached ₹ 21,380.14 crore in FY2026 (scaling to ₹ 22,520.17 crore as of June 30, 2026), making it the largest full-stack digital lending platform in India ahead of Kreditbee, Kissht, Fibe, and Navi.
p.168, p.199, p.208Redseer data shows Moneyview reduced annualised loss rate from 7.93% in FY24 to 7.07% in FY25 and 6.95% in FY26, while the broader industry annualised loss rate rose from 7.80% in FY24 to 8.29% in FY26.
p.168, p.202, p.224Statutory auditor CARO reports noted modifications regarding electronic books backup on Indian physical servers and database audit trail features across FY24-FY26, alongside a ₹ 48.32 crore cyber fraud API incident in August 2025.
p.50, p.356, p.427Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Largest full-stack digital lending platform in India by AUM with Managed AUM reaching ₹ 22,520.17 crore as of June 30, 2026.
- Capital-light LSP business model supported by deep technology integrations with 48 Financial Partners and 22 Regulated Entities.
- Proprietary AI/ML credit underwriting models utilizing over 100,000 data variables and achieving lower annualised loss rates (6.95% in FY26) than the industry average (8.29%).
Weaknesses
- Negative operating cash flows (₹ -950.90 crore in FY26) due to working capital deployments into balance-sheet Portfolio Loans.
- High off-balance sheet Default Loss Guarantee (DLG) exposure standing at ₹ 1,060.78 crore as of June 30, 2026 (43.92% of Net Worth).
Opportunities
- Rapid growth of digital personal loans in Middle India, projected by Redseer to reach ₹ 7,10,000.00–₹ 7,30,000.00 crore by FY2031P at a 26-27% CAGR.
- Product diversification into home loans, credit cards, earned wage access, and UPI payments to expand user lifetime monetization.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Frequent regulatory changes by RBI regarding digital lending norms, DLG caps, co-lending rules, and credit risk weights. risk_section
Why it matters: Regulatory interventions can increase compliance costs, restrict LSP fee structures, or cap loan growth. - Macroeconomic credit stress or interest rate spikes increasing borrower defaults across unsecured personal loan portfolios. risk_section
Why it matters: Higher delinquencies trigger DLG payouts and portfolio loan impairment provisions, directly eroding profitability.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (09 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the ₹ 750.00 crore fresh issue proceeds be deployed to drive business growth?
Moneyview is allocating ₹ 325.00 crore to fund lien-marked fixed deposits for Default Loss Guarantee (DLG) collateral with partner lenders, ₹ 250.00 crore as equity infusion into Whizdm Finance Private Limited to boost its capital adequacy ratio, and the remaining balance for general corporate purposes.
p.101, p.134What is Moneyview's dependence on its top Financial Partners for revenue?
Moneyview derived 37.36% of its FY26 total revenue from operations from its top 10 Financial Partners, demonstrating significant partner diversification across 22 regulated lending entities and 26 other financial product partners.
p.27, p.50, p.442What caused the one-time impact on net profit in Fiscal 2026 despite strong operating profit growth?
While pre-tax profit before exceptional items grew 67.29% to ₹ 53.40 crore in FY26, net profit was impacted by a one-time performance-based incentive of ₹ 160.00 crore paid to Managing Director & CEO Puneet Agarwal, alongside a net exceptional cyber loss of ₹ 34.91 crore (after tax).
p.40, p.95, p.356What was the nature and financial impact of the cyber fraud incident reported in FY26?
In August 2025, external threat actors exploited bank API integrations to make unauthorized bank withdrawals of ₹ 48.32 crore from WFPL's accounts. Law enforcement recovered ₹ 2.11 crore, leaving a net cash loss of ₹ 46.65 crore recognized as an exceptional item in FY26.
p.50, p.356, p.427What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Puneet Agarwal and Sanjay Aggarwal | ₹10.00 | 2014-08-11 | 3.4x |
| An early round from roughly 12 years ago, at roughly 3.4x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Moneyview Employees Trust | ₹1.00 | 2026-02-24 | 34.0x |
| This round priced within the last year, yet the offer is at roughly 34.0x that price. A step-up this steep in this little time is worth understanding: what changed in the business to justify it? | |||
| Allotted below the band — 6 entries | |||
| Accel Growth IV Holdings (Mauritius) Ltd. and NLI Strategic Investment Limited | ₹2,634.06 | 2018-10-03 | as disclosed |
| DMI Alternative Investment Fund – The Sparkle Fund | ₹2,897.47 | 2021-09-23 | as disclosed |
| Crimson Winter Limited | ₹17,196.65 | 2022-03-16 | as disclosed |
| Nexus Ventures VI Holdings, LLC | ₹64.15 | 2024-03-30 | as disclosed |
| Trifecta Venture Debt Fund - III | ₹64.15 | 2025-03-11 | as disclosed |
| Accel India VI (Mauritius) Limited and Accel India VII (Mauritius) Limited | ₹64.15 | 2024-09-17 | as disclosed |
The 6 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 01 Apr 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 01 Apr 2027Pre-Offer Equity Capital6 months
- 31 Oct 2026Anchor Investor Portion (50%)30 days
- 30 Dec 2026Anchor Investor Portion (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period Restated consolidated financial statements were updated in the RHP to incorporate full Fiscal 2026 audited performance and the three-month period ended June 30, 2026, dropping Fiscal 2023. | Nine months period ended December 31, 2025, and Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023 | Three month periods ended June 30, 2026 and June 30, 2025, and Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 |
| Use of Proceeds Fresh issue size reduced by ₹ 750.00 crore from up to ₹ 1500.00 crore in DRHP to ₹ 750.00 crore in RHP, with corresponding reductions in allocations for DLG growth investment and WFPL capital augmentation. | Fresh Issue up to ₹ 1500.00 crore (₹ 650.00 crore for DLG growth, ₹ 450.00 crore for WFPL capital base, balance for GCP) | Fresh Issue up to ₹ 750.00 crore (₹ 325.00 crore for DLG growth, ₹ 250.00 crore for WFPL capital base, balance for GCP) |
| Offer for Sale Offer for sale share count reduced by 3,56,01,700 Equity Shares from 13,60,95,900 shares in DRHP to 10,04,94,200 shares in RHP. | Up to 13,60,95,900 Equity Shares | Up to 10,04,94,200 Equity Shares |
| Restated Financials Restated financial statements were updated to reflect full Fiscal 2026 performance, showing Total Income expanding to ₹ 3404.27 crore and Restated PAT reaching ₹ 242.71 crore. | FY25 Total Income of ₹ 237.85 crore, Restated PAT of ₹ 24.03 crore | FY26 Total Income of ₹ 3404.27 crore, Restated PAT of ₹ 242.71 crore |
| Contingent Liabilities Outstanding DLG contingent liabilities expanded from ₹ 847.07 crore as of December 31, 2025 in DRHP to ₹ 920.35 crore as of March 31, 2026 (and ₹ 1060.78 crore as of June 30, 2026) in RHP. | ₹ 847.07 crore Default Loss Guarantee (DLG) liabilities (as of December 31, 2025) | ₹ 920.35 crore DLG liabilities (as of March 31, 2026) and ₹ 1060.78 crore (as of June 30, 2026) |
| Litigation Materiality threshold updated to ₹ 10.90 crore based on revised 3-year average PAT, and disclosures added for post-DRHP investor complaints and the net exceptional loss from the cyber fraud incident. | Materiality threshold of ₹ 9.57 crore; 1 cyber fraud incident disclosure and unquantified SEBI settlement application | Materiality threshold of ₹ 10.90 crore; updated cyber fraud API net cash loss disclosure (₹ 46.65 crore) and post-DRHP investor complaints disclosed |
| Risk Factors Risk factors expanded in RHP to 82 total risk factors, adding disclosures on post-DRHP complaints, audit report modifications regarding physical server backups, and increased DLG commitments. | 75 total risk factors (53 internal, 22 offer/external) | 82 total risk factors (68 internal, 14 offer/external) |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.