Manipal Health Enterprises IPO — GMP, Subscription, Review & Score

Manipal Health Enterprises

MAINBOARD IPO · NSE, BSE · ✅ LISTED

FINMINUTES IPO SCORE 65/100

₹560–590

Price Band

Issue ₹9275 cr · Lot 25

FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge

Manipal Health Enterprises Limited operates a pan-India network of multispecialty hospitals providing comprehensive inpatient, outpatient, and diagnostic healthcare services. The company earns revenue primarily through hospital services, including complex tertiary and quaternary care procedures, diagnostic services, and the sale of pharmacy products.

What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾

Manipal Health Enterprises Limited is the largest multispecialty hospital network in India by bed capacity, operating 49 hospitals with 13,037 licensed beds across 14 states, including strong regional leadership in Karnataka, Maharashtra, Goa, and eastern India. The company delivers comprehensive clinical care spanning outpatient treatment, diagnostics, and advanced inpatient care. Its clinical focus is anchored in tertiary and quaternary care, specifically across its 'CONGO-R' specialties (cardiac sciences, oncology, neurosciences, gastro sciences, orthopedics, and renal sciences), which contribute over 64% of its gross inpatient revenue. Manipal serves a highly diversified patient base, supported by an omnichannel lead-management stack and an extensive network of 11,064 doctors. The company's geographic footprint balances presence across metro and non-metro cities, allowing it to capture urban demand while receiving complex referrals from adjacent rural districts. What sets Manipal apart is its repeatable playbook for integrating large transformative acquisitions—such as AMRI Hospitals, Medica Synergie, and Sahyadri Hospitals—enabling rapid scale, robust operational leverage, and industry-leading profitability margins in the Indian private healthcare delivery market.

Hospital services — Revenue from inpatient and outpatient clinical treatments, procedures, and consultations.
Pharmacy sales — Revenue from the sale of medical consumables and pharmacy items to patients.
Diagnostic services — Revenue generated from clinical laboratory and diagnostic imaging services.

Moat / Edge

India's largest multispecialty hospital network by bed capacity (13,037 beds) with a highly successful, repeatable playbook for integrating major acquisitions, yielding industry-leading revenue growth (29.41% CAGR) and superior ROCE.

The Offer

Open – Close2026-07-29 – 2026-07-31

Price Band₹560–590

Lot Size25

Min Investment—

Issue Size₹9,275 cr

Fresh Issue₹8,000 cr

Offer for Sale—

ListingNSE, BSE

Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds

Repayment/ prepayment, in full or in part, of certain outstanding borrowings and accrued interest thereon availed by one of our Material Subsidiaries, namely, Manipal Hospitals Private Limited
Acquisition of minority stake in our stepdown Subsidiary, Sahyadri Hospitals Private Limited
General corporate purposes

Valuation at the Offer Price

P/E at ₹590 upper band76.9xour arithmetic, on latest restated EPS

Peer median P/E73.2x

Against peers +5% premium to median

RoNW10.9%

The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.

FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built

Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.

Score coverage 88%

88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.

Issue Structure 70/100

How this is measured12%

Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.

Financial Quality 65/100

How this is measured32%

Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.

Valuation Vs Peers 40/100

How this is measured10%

The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.

Underwriter Quality 75/100

How this is measured6%

A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.

Governance Forensics 76/100

How this is measured28%

Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.

3-Year Financial & Growth Trend

Metric	FY26	FY25	FY24
Revenue (₹ Cr)	10335.751	8242.25	6171.632
Net Profit (₹ Cr)	916.519	1081.672	533.203
PAT Margin	8.87%	13.12%	8.64%

Revenue Breakdown

Hospital services: 94.71%
Pharmacy sales: 4.15%
Diagnostic services: 2.33%
Other operating revenue: 0.74%

Market Context

NOT part of the FinMinutes Score

The Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.

Momentum71/100from live subscription

Total6.24xsubscribed

QIB—xbids land late

Retail—x

GMP₹-5unofficial, grey market

The book and the filing agree.

Demand is strong and our read of the filing supports it. Agreement is not proof, but a disagreement would have been worth explaining, and there is not one.

Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.

Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment

Cut-off price₹590.00

Minimum retail application₹14,750

Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.

Deep Financials

Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.

Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.

Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.

Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr)	FY26	FY25	FY24
Revenue from Operations	10,335.75	8,242.25	6,171.63
Other Income	184.77	120.54	93.54
Total Income	10,520.52	8,362.79	6,265.17
Cost of Materials Consumed	2,116.16	1,680.04	1,251.21
Employee Benefit Expense	1,490.04	1,219.41	857.04
Finance Cost	864.29	511.87	454.93
Depreciation & Amortisation	679.55	506.84	397.02
Other Expenses	4,118.39	3,216.27	2,380.32
Total Expenses	9,268.42	7,134.43	5,340.51
Profit Before Tax	1,178.03	1,242.31	745.04
Tax Expense	261.51	160.64	211.83
Profit After Tax	916.52	1,081.67	533.20
EPS - Basic	7.71	9.25	5.27
EPS - Diluted	7.67	9.25	5.25

Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.

Balance Sheet (₹ Cr)	FY26	FY25	FY24
Share Capital	235.95	77.06	75.63
Reserves & Surplus	8,190.14	5,770.28	3,939.91
Net Worth	8,426.09	5,847.34	4,015.54
Long-term Borrowings	9,948.81	4,469.98	3,700.14
Short-term Borrowings	604.62	296.85	243.85
Total Borrowings	10,553.43	4,766.83	3,943.98
Trade Payables	1,464.54	1,126.59	1,130.52
Current Liabilities	3,362.37	1,794.80	1,656.74
Total Liabilities	16,065.74	8,071.90	6,731.32
Property, Plant & Equipment	5,840.79	4,224.73	3,750.24
Capital Work in Progress	795.30	614.03	41.59
Intangible Assets	2,406.39	502.67	424.49
Investments	2,675.19	1,775.67	1,121.09
Inventories	169.85	131.93	103.18
Trade Receivables	929.76	637.30	458.88
Cash & Equivalents	299.35	291.28	360.88
Current Assets	4,102.50	2,848.12	2,051.45
Total Assets	24,864.50	14,072.08	10,818.83

Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.

Cash Flow (₹ Cr)	FY26	FY25	FY24
Net Cash from Operating Activities	2,078.40	1,569.83	1,388.65
Capital Expenditure	1,316.19	1,054.31	331.94
Net Cash from Investing Activities	-7,036.74	-2,658.34	-870.50
Net Cash from Financing Activities	4,954.44	904.08	-250.21
Net Change in Cash	-3.90	-184.43	267.94

Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.

Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.

Ratio	FY26	FY25	FY24
Profitability
EBITDA Margin (%)	25.9	27	25.5
EBIT Margin (%)	19.4	21	19.2
PAT Margin (%)	8.9	13.1	8.6
Return on Equity (%)	10.9	18.5	13.3
Return on Capital Employed (%)	10.8	16.5	15.1
Return on Assets (%)	3.7	7.7	4.9
Leverage
Debt / Equity (x)	1.25	0.82	0.98
Net Debt / EBITDA (x)	3.77	1.98	2.24
Interest Coverage (x)	2.36	3.43	2.64
Liquidity
Current Ratio (x)	1.22	1.59	1.24
Quick Ratio (x)	1.17	1.51	1.18
Efficiency
Asset Turnover (x)	0.42	0.59	0.57
Receivable Days	33	28	27
Inventory Days	29	29	30
Payable Days	253	245	330
Cash Conversion Cycle (days)	-191	-188	-273
Quality of Earnings
Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x)	2.27	1.45	2.6
Accruals Ratio (%)	-4.7	-3.5	-7.9
Capex / Depreciation (x)	1.94	2.08	0.84
Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue.

DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.

A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.

Component	FY26	FY25	FY24
Net Margin (PAT / Revenue)	8.9%	13.1%	8.6%
Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets)	0.42x	0.59x	0.57x
Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth)	2.95x	2.41x	2.69x
= Return on Equity	10.9%	18.5%	13.3%
Tax Burden (PAT / PBT)	0.78x	0.87x	0.72x
Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT)	0.58x	0.71x	0.62x
Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue)	19.8%	21.3%	19.4%

Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.

Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.

What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.

Operating cash flow was 2.27x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.

Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.

Beneish M-Score

M = -2.3

An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.

Component	Value	What it captures
DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index `(Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1)`	1.163	Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
GMI Gross Margin Index `GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t`	1.001	Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate.
AQI Asset Quality Index `AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets`	1.207	Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here.
SGI Sales Growth Index `Sales_t / Sales_t-1`	1.254	Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going.
DEPI Depreciation Index `DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE)`	1.028	Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit.
SGAI SG&A Index `(SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses`	1.008	A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure.
LVGI Leverage Index `Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets`	1.203	Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers.
TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets `(PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets`	-0.0467	The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash.

M = -2.3, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.

Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)

Z″ = 5.62 · Safe

A distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.

X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets	0.03
X2 — Reserves / Total Assets	0.329
X3 — EBIT / Total Assets	0.082
X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities	0.524
Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4	5.62

X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.

Piotroski F-Score (adapted)

3 / 8

Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.

✓Positive return on assets
✓Positive operating cash flow
✗Return on assets improving
✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
✗Long-term leverage decreasing
✗Current ratio improving
✗Gross margin improving
✗Asset turnover improving

Montier C-Score

5 of 6 signs

Six yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.

○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹-488.2 cr in FY25, ₹-1,161.9 cr in FY26
●Receivable days rising · 28 days in FY25, 33 days in FY26
●Inventory days rising · 29 days in FY25, 29 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
●Other current assets rising against revenue · 21.7% of revenue in FY25, 26.2% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 12.0% of net block in FY25, 11.6% in FY26
●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 76.7% in FY26

The Final-Year Check

ours

Not from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.

Profit moved backwards in FY26: net profit fell 15.3% to ₹917 cr even as revenue grew 25.4% to ₹10,336 cr. Net margin compressed from 13.1% to 8.9%. A premium multiple asked on a year when earnings moved backwards is worth understanding: the profit the price is measured against is not the peak the company has shown.

Ratios Nobody Prints

Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 1.7%
Contingent liabilities of 146.31 cr against a net worth of 8,426.09 cr — 1.7% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which.
Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.6%
0.6% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market.
Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.5x
Short-term borrowings of 604.62 cr against cash of 299.35 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable.
Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3.5%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 32.46 cr against a profit of 916.52 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.

What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.

At the upper band of ₹590.00, the market value is ₹77,606 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.

Hurdle rate	Profit the price needs	× FY26 profit	Years at 15% growth	Years at 25% growth
10% a year	₹7,761 cr	8.5x	15.3	9.6
12% a year	₹9,313 cr	10.2x	16.6	10.4
14% a year	₹10,865 cr	11.9x	17.7	11.1

Earnings yield at the upper band: 1.18% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
Free cash flow yield: 0.98% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, ₹762 cr, ÷ market value).

The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.

Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.

Profitability

Return on Equity (ROE)10.9%

FormulaPAT ÷ Net Worth

Worked916.52 ÷ 8,426.09

What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.

Return on Capital Employed (ROCE)10.8%

FormulaEBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)

Worked2,042.32 ÷ (8,426.09 + 10,553.43) = 2,042.32 ÷ 18,979.53

Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.

EBITDA Margin25.9%

FormulaEBITDA ÷ Revenue

Worked2,721.87 ÷ 10,335.75

Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.

Leverage

Debt to Equity1.25x

FormulaTotal Borrowings ÷ Net Worth

Worked10,553.43 ÷ 8,426.09

How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.

Interest Coverage2.36x

FormulaEBIT ÷ Finance Cost

Worked2,042.32 ÷ 864.29

How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.

Efficiency

Receivable Days33 days

Formula(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365

Worked(929.76 ÷ 10,335.75) × 365

How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.

Cash Conversion Cycle-191 days

FormulaInventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days

Worked29 + 33 − 253

How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.

Quality of Earnings

Operating Cash Flow to Profit2.27x

FormulaCash from Operations ÷ PAT

Worked2,078.40 ÷ 916.52

Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.

Accruals Ratio-4.7%

Formula(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets

Worked(916.52 − 2,078.40) ÷ 24,864.50 = -1,161.88 ÷ 24,864.50

The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.

Valuation at the Offer Price

Market Capitalisation (at the top of the band)₹77,605.68 cr

FormulaPrice × Post-issue Shares

Worked₹590.00 × 1,315,350,541 shares

What the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.

Enterprise Value (EV)₹87,859.76 cr

FormulaMarket Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash

Worked77,605.68 + 10,553.43 − 299.35

What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.

EV / EBITDA32.28x

FormulaEnterprise Value ÷ EBITDA

Worked87,859.76 ÷ 2,721.87

The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.

Price / Earnings (P/E)84.67x

FormulaMarket Cap ÷ PAT

Worked77,605.68 ÷ 916.52

The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.

What this price requires5% a year for three years (or 2.9% for five)

FormulaGrowth needed to reach the peer multiple on earnings alone

Worked84.67x against a peer median of 73.23x

This is not a forecast and not a target. It is the price restated as a question: at this multiple, with the price unchanged, earnings would have to compound at this rate to arrive at what the filing’s own peer group trades on. Whether the business can do that is the argument — we are only stating what the argument is about.

Return on Invested Capital (ROIC)8.5%

FormulaEBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)

WorkedNOPAT ÷ Invested Capital

What the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.

Earnings yield at the upper band1.18%

FormulaLatest full-year PAT ÷ market value

Worked₹916.52 cr ÷ ₹77,605.68 cr

The P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.

Free cash flow yield at the upper band0.98%

Formula(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value

Worked₹762.21 cr ÷ ₹77,605.68 cr

Cash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.

FinMinutes IPO HubEvery live and upcoming issue, scored the same way, on one page.All IPOs →

Workspace

The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.

Price per share (₹)

Revenue growth, per year (%)

EBITDA margin held at (%)

Discount rate for the reverse DCF (%)

Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.

Market capitalisation—

Enterprise value—

P / E—

EV / EBITDA—

EV / Sales—

On your assumptions, two years out

Revenue—

EBITDA—

Implied forward EV / EBITDA—

What the price is assuming

Free-cash growth priced in, 10 yrs—

Years to earn back the market cap—

Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.

Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive

Industry Overview (RHP Industry Overview p. 188)

The Indian healthcare delivery market is experiencing robust expansion, driven by rising life expectancy, increasing incidence of non-communicable and lifestyle diseases, expanding health insurance coverage, and rising medical tourism. The market is predominantly skewed toward private healthcare providers, who are expanding infrastructure to meet the demand for high-quality, specialized treatments. Cardiac sciences and oncology represent the largest specialty segments. For leading pan-India chains like Manipal, growth is propelled by the growing need for complex tertiary and quaternary care, digital healthcare integration, and ongoing industry consolidation, where large networks acquire regional players to deepen micro-market penetration and leverage economies of scale.

Market Size₹7.6-7.8 trillion (FY26) Growth11.5-13.5% CAGR (FY25-30, private hospitals)

Future Planning & Capital Allocation

The company is executing a massive ₹80,000 million Fresh Issue primarily designed to deleverage the balance sheet. Specifically, ₹55,527.60 million will be used to prepay/repay outstanding borrowings of its material subsidiary, MHPL, and ₹5,740.00 million will fund the acquisition of the remaining minority stake in the recently acquired Sahyadri Hospitals. This aggressive debt reduction will significantly cut the group's finance costs (which stood at ₹8,642.89 million in FY26) and further expand net profit margins.

Source: RHP p. 32, 146, 192, 399

Competitive Position

Manipal has cemented its position as the apex consolidator in the Indian private hospital space, completing major acquisitions including Columbia Asia, AMRI, Medica Synergie, and Sahyadri. By focusing its clinical mix heavily on complex tertiary and quaternary care (CONGO-R specialties), it commands pricing power and longer-term patient stickiness, differentiating itself from regional secondary-care providers.

Source: RHP p. 228, 261, 298

Execution / Track Record

The company's execution of its M&A strategy is demonstrably successful. Consolidated revenue expanded from ₹61,716 million in FY24 to ₹103,357 million in FY26 while maintaining a robust Adjusted EBITDA margin of 25.58%. Management has proven its ability to extract synergies and implement stringent working capital discipline, operating with a negative 13-day working capital cycle in FY26 despite incorporating multiple distinct hospital chains into its network.

Source: RHP p. 300, 301, 588

Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership

Promoter Pre → Post81.43% → —%

Pledged Shares6.59%

Free Float—%

Anchor—

Merchant Bankers (BRLMs)Kotak Mahindra Capital Company Limited, Axis Capital Limited, Goldman Sachs (India) Securities Private Limited, Jefferies India Private Limited, J.P. Morgan India Private Limited, UBS Securities India Private Limited, DBS Bank India Limited

RegistrarKFin Technologies Limited

Leadership & Skin in the Game

Leadership: Dilip Jose (Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer)

Litigation: Against Company: 1 criminal, 40 tax, and 4 statutory/regulatory proceedings aggregating to ₹2,963.36 million. Against Subsidiaries: 9 criminal, 180 tax, 30 statutory/regulatory, and 3 civil proceedings aggregating to ₹5,041.54 million.

Auditor / RPT Flags: CARO/Other Matter qualifications: The audit trail (edit log) facility was not enabled at the database level to log direct data changes in the accounting software used by the Company and several Subsidiaries. Further, CARO observations noted undisputed delays in statutory dues (bonus and provident fund) and significant loans (₹4,539 million) granted to a subsidiary that were settled via extension of further loans.

Peers & Valuation

Company	P/E	P/B	RoE	Margin
Apollo Hospitals Enterprise Ltd	73.23	—	17.61	—
Fortis Healthcare Ltd	80.12	—	8.68	—
Max Healthcare Institute Ltd	87.63	—	11.47	—
Aster DM Healthcare Limited	85.94	—	4.39	—
Global Health Limited	63.85	—	15.68	—
Krishna Institute of Medical Sciences Limited	54.34	—	15.55	—
Narayana Hrudayalaya Limited	57.06	—	27.88	—

Where this sits

At the ₹590 upper band, the issue is priced at 76.9x earnings — a 5% premium to the peer median of 73.2x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.

Hospital Vitals

The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.

Metric	Value	Detail
Operational beds	6,227	Actuals as of FY26 across 49 hospitals (6,878 operational beds on a pro forma basis)
Occupancy rate	64.47%	Actuals for FY26; down from 67.09% in FY25
ARPOB	₹68,937.61	Average revenue per occupied bed per day in FY26 (actuals); up from ₹63,312.23 in FY25
ALOS	2.78 days	Average length of stay in FY26 (actuals); decreased from 2.88 days in FY25
Bed additions planned	2,426 beds	Planned capacity expansion through FY30 and beyond
Payor mix	Cash 30.33%, Insurance/TPA 49.68%, Govt 13.80%, Others 6.19%	Gross inpatient revenue split for FY26 (actuals)
Doctor count	11,064 doctors	As of March 31, 2026 across the network
Patient volume	527,227 IP / 5,483,403 OP	Inpatient vs Outpatient footfalls for FY26 (actuals)

Source: RHP p. 550-554 — Management's Discussion and Analysis / Business

🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say

Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.

Deficient Accounting Software Controls (Audit Trail) where: auditor_rpt_flags flagged

The statutory auditors issued adverse remarks under Other Legal and Regulatory Requirements stating that the company and its subsidiaries used accounting software where the audit trail (edit log) facility was not enabled at the database level to log direct data changes, and at the application level it was only implemented in a phased manner or not enabled throughout the year.

RHP p. 134-138

Material Impairment of Goodwill and Investments where: footnotes flagged

The company recognized significant impairment charges on recent investments, including a ₹1,140.65 million goodwill impairment for HealthMap Diagnostics Private Limited in FY24 and a ₹222.32 million full impairment of its investment in associate Medica TS Hospital Private Limited in FY25.

RHP p. 83, 95

Missing Historical Corporate Records where: risk_section noted

Certain historical corporate records are untraceable, potentially exposing the company to regulatory proceedings, actions, or penalties by competent regulatory authorities.

RHP p. 87, 639

Evergreening of Subsidiary Loans where: auditor_rpt_flags noted

CARO 2024 observations noted that loans aggregating to ₹4,539.00 million granted by the Company to Manipal Hospitals (Dwarka) Private Limited fell due during FY24 and were settled by the extension of fresh loans to the same party.

RHP p. 138, 475

Material Litigation where: litigation flagged

Against Company: 1 criminal, 40 tax, and 4 statutory/regulatory proceedings aggregating to ₹2,963.36 million. Against Subsidiaries: 9 criminal, 180 tax, 30 statutory/regulatory, and 3 civil proceedings aggregating to ₹5,041.54 million.

RHP p. 104, 134-138, 146, 386, 448, 613

Auditor / RPT Notes where: rpt noted

CARO/Other Matter qualifications: The audit trail (edit log) facility was not enabled at the database level to log direct data changes in the accounting software used by the Company and several Subsidiaries. Further, CARO observations noted undisputed delays in statutory dues (bonus and provident fund) and significant loans (₹4,539 million) granted to a subsidiary that were settled via extension of further loans.

RHP p. 104, 134-138, 146, 386, 448, 613

Material intangible balance where: derived noted

Goodwill and intangibles are 28.6% of net worth.

rule: intangibles 15-30% of net worth

Earnings moved backwards as revenue grew where: derived flagged

Revenue rose to ₹10,335.75 cr in FY26 while profit fell to ₹916.52 cr. Net margin went from 13.1% to 8.9%. The profit the offer price is measured against is not the best the company has shown.

rule: revenue↑ & PAT↓ in offer year

Short-term debt exceeds cash on hand where: derived flagged

Short-term borrowings of ₹604.62 cr against cash of ₹299.35 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.

rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debt

Company's Claims vs Reality

We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.

India's largest multispecialty hospital group by bed capacity with pan-India presence and leadership in key markets. Supported

Does the independent industry report validate this market leadership position?

RHP p. 200, 228 (Confirmed by CRISIL Report; 13,037 licensed beds across 49 hospitals)

Repeatable playbook for integrating and scaling transformative acquisitions. Supported

Do the financials reflect successful integration and margin expansion?

RHP p. 201, 588 (Revenue grew at 29.41% CAGR and Adjusted EBITDA Margin remained robust at 25.58% in FY26 despite integrating multiple large acquisitions like AMRI and Sahyadri)

Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific

Strengths

Market leader as India's largest multispecialty hospital network by bed capacity (13,037 beds) with a highly successful, repeatable playbook for integrating major acquisitions.
Industry-leading growth with strong profitability; Revenue from operations grew at 29.41% CAGR (FY24-FY26), backed by highly efficient working capital management resulting in a negative working capital cycle of 13 days in FY26.

Weaknesses

High geographic concentration risk, with 46.40% of restated consolidated revenue in FY26 derived from hospitals located in a single state, Karnataka.

Opportunities

Significant growth potential in high-acuity 'CONGO-R' specialties (cardiac, oncology, neurosciences, gastro, orthopedics, renal) which already account for over 64% of gross inpatient revenue and drive higher Average Revenue Per Occupied Bed (ARPOB).
Consolidation of the fragmented Indian private healthcare delivery market, allowing the company to further deploy its M&A playbook in underserved Tier-2 and Tier-3 micro-markets.

Threats (material, not boilerplate)

High dependence on insurance and Third-Party Administrators (TPAs). risk_section
Why it matters: 49.68% of gross inpatient revenue in FY26 was derived from insurance and TPAs. Delays, non-renewals, or disputes over billing with these entities could severely impact the company's negative working capital cycle and liquidity.
Contingent liabilities and ongoing tax litigation. footnotes
Why it matters: The group faces ₹1,463.09 million in contingent liabilities, including substantial direct and indirect tax demands (₹1,041.43 million). Adverse rulings could strain cash flows.

Live Subscription Status

Total6.24x

Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.

Allotment Status

Bidding closed31 Jul 2026

Allotment04 Aug 2026

Refunds begin04 Aug 2026

Listing05 Aug 2026

Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies

Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (11 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.

Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions

Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.

USE OF PROCEEDS

Where is the money going?

The Offer includes a Fresh Issue of ₹80,000 million. The proceeds are heavily weighted toward deleveraging: ₹55,527.60 million will be used to repay/prepay outstanding borrowings of subsidiary Manipal Hospitals Private Limited, and ₹5,740.00 million will be used to acquire a minority stake in step-down subsidiary Sahyadri Hospitals Private Limited.

RHP p. 146

CONCENTRATION

How concentrated is the geographic and payor base?

Geographically, the company relies heavily on Karnataka, which generated 46.40% of its operating revenue in FY26. From a payor perspective, 49.68% of gross inpatient revenue in FY26 came from Insurance/TPAs, followed by Cash/Self-pay at 30.33%, and Government Schemes at 13.78%.

RHP p. 79, 305

PROFITABILITY

Is it profitable and growing?

Yes. Revenue from operations grew rapidly from ₹61,716.32 million in FY24 to ₹103,357.51 million in FY26. Concurrently, Profit After Tax increased from ₹5,332.03 million to ₹9,165.19 million, yielding an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 25.58% and a Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) of 21.88% in FY26.

RHP p. 399, 588

HIDDEN RISKS

What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?

The company reported ₹1,463.09 million in contingent liabilities as of FY26, primarily consisting of disputed direct/indirect tax demands (₹1,041.43 million) and patient compensation claims (₹180.54 million). Footnotes also disclose auditor CARO qualifications regarding the company's accounting software lacking required database-level audit trails, and ₹1,362.97 million in historical impairment write-offs related to goodwill and associate investments.

RHP p. 83, 134-138, 437

GMP: ₹-5 — unofficial grey-market chatter, shown for information only. Never part of the FinMinutes Score.

What Earlier Investors Paid

Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.

Shareholder	Priced at	When	vs IPO price
Manipal Research & Management Services International	₹58.45	2026-07-14	10.1x
This round priced within the last year, yet the offer is at roughly 10.1x that price. A step-up this steep in this little time is worth understanding: what changed in the business to justify it?
Allotted below the band — 1 entries
MEMG International India Private Limited	₹692.68	2026-03-12	as disclosed

The 1 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.

Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.

Lock-in Expiry Calendar

Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.

05 Aug 2029
Minimum Promoters' Contributionthree years
05 Aug 2027
Promoters' shareholding in excess of 20%one year
05 Feb 2027
Balance pre-Offer Equity Share capitalsix months
03 Nov 2026
Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
04 Sep 2026
Anchor Investors (50%)30 days

An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.

What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP

Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.

Item	In the DRHP	In the RHP / Addendum
Offer for Sale (OFS) Size The Investor Selling Shareholders (Ammar Sdn Bhd, Novo Holdings, and Phoenix Bear) reduced the number of shares offered in the OFS by exactly 50% between the draft and final filings.	Included up to 811,582 shares by Ammar Sdn Bhd, 529,111 shares by Novo Holdings Invest Asia A/S, and 440,926 shares by Phoenix Bear Investments, LLC.	OFS of up to 21,613,834 Equity Shares. The specific offerings were reduced to 405,791 shares by Ammar Sdn Bhd, 264,556 shares by Novo Holdings, and 220,463 shares by Phoenix Bear.
Financial Information Period The restated financial statements were rolled forward to include the full FY26, dropping the six-month interim period and FY23.	Restated financial statements for the six months ended September 30, 2025, and the financial years ended March 31, 2025, 2024, and 2023.	Restated financial statements for the financial years ended March 31, 2026, 2025, and 2024.
Pre-IPO Share Transfers (Promoter Group) The upside sharing agreement transfer was executed between the DRHP and RHP filings, resulting in a 5.12 million share secondary transfer from an investor to the promoter group.	TPG SG Magazine Pte. Ltd. agreed to transfer up to 6,000,000 Equity Shares to Manipal Research & Management Services International (MRMSI) prior to filing the RHP.	On July 14, 2026, exactly 5,123,543 Equity Shares were transferred from TPG SG Magazine Pte. Ltd. to MRMSI at ₹58.45 per share.
Contingent Liabilities Total contingent liabilities decreased by roughly 20%, primarily due to a reduction in indirect tax demands.	₹1,838.59 million (as of September 30, 2025)	₹1,463.09 million (as of March 31, 2026)
Regulatory Litigation / RBI Compounding The RHP includes material updates on pending RBI FEMA/compounding issues that arose or advanced after the DRHP was filed.	MHSPL filed a compounding application on March 4, 2026, with the RBI regarding downstream investments.	The RBI directed the Company on June 18, 2026, to re-submit the compounding application. MHSPL was also advised in late April 2026 to file an additional compounding application for FC-TRS filings.

Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.

Written and verified by

Gaureesh Vats Shukla

Founder and Head of Research, FinMinutes

Gaureesh Vats Shukla reads Indian offer documents as an engineer. He has read several hundred of them alongside annual reports, most of them by hand before he built the structured extraction engine that now does the work at scale, and every figure on this page carries a citation back to the page of the filing it came from. To restated numbers he applies a standard forensic battery: Beneish M-score, Altman Z-double-prime, Piotroski F-score, DuPont decomposition and cash-conversion analysis. Coverage runs the full cap spectrum alongside macro, mutual funds and unlisted companies, with particular depth in the segment institutional research does not reach. The sectors closest to the work are defence and aerospace, semiconductors and electronics, technology, engineering and EPC, solar and capital goods. He holds a B.Tech in Aerospace Engineering and completed the Post Graduate Programme in Securities Markets at NISM with a research analysis specialisation.

The same research method is available as commissioned work: company diligence, industry and market-entry studies, and financial modelling. See what that covers →

Figures on this page were last recomputed from the filing on 2026-10-21.

Manipal Health Enterprises IPO GMP Today and Forensic Analysis