Lohia Corp
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Lohia Corp Limited is a global manufacturer of machinery and equipment for technical textiles, specializing in end-to-end solutions for producing PP and HDPE woven fabric and sacks (Raffia). The company earns revenue primarily through the sale of machines such as circular looms, tape extrusion lines, and tape winders, alongside the sale of spare parts and associated engineering services.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Lohia Corp Limited ranks among the top global players in the woven Raffia machinery market, commanding a 15.4% global market share by value in 2024. Headquartered in Kanpur, the company provides comprehensive end-to-end solutions across the entire woven fabric production lifecycle, from concept to commissioning. Its product portfolio spans tape extrusion lines, circular looms, coating and lamination lines, printing machines, and bag conversion machines. With four manufacturing facilities located in Kanpur and Bengaluru, Lohia Corp is highly backward integrated, designing and manufacturing critical components like inverters, customized machine controllers, and motors in-house. The company exhibits a massive global footprint, exporting to approximately 100 countries and generating over 42% of its Fiscal 2026 revenue from overseas markets. Its supply chain utilizes a mix of 'made to drawing' parts (55.72% of procured materials) and standard bought-out items. What distinctly sets Lohia Corp apart is its robust R&D infrastructure—holding 71 patents in India and 56 globally—and its dedicated Technical Training and Research Centre (TTRC), which offers industry training programs and cements deep customer loyalty in a high-barrier market.
- Sale of manufacturing goods — Includes sales of tape extrusion lines, circular looms, tape winders, bag conversion machines, and other machinery and equipment.
- Sale of spare parts — Provision of spare parts and accessories to global manufacturers of woven raffia.
- Sale of services — Revenue generated from engineering, process guidance, troubleshooting, operational, and technical training services.
Leading 15.4% global market share in the woven Raffia machinery market, comprehensive backward integration in machine manufacturing, robust in-house R&D with over 125 granted patents globally, and a proprietary Technical Training and Research Centre (TTRC) that deepens customer integration.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- To carry out the Offer for Sale by the Selling Shareholders and achieve the benefits of listing the Equity Shares on the Stock Exchanges
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 1716.995 | 1376.872 | — |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 193.452 | 117.841 | -0.009 |
| PAT Margin | 11.27% | 8.56% | — |
Revenue Breakdown
- Circular looms: 33.28%
- Tape extrusion lines: 20.3%
- Other machines and equipment: 17.03%
- Spare parts for machines: 11.34%
- Tape winders: 8.95%
- Others (incl. other sales, services, and operating revenue): 9.1%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand is strong and our read of the filing supports it. Agreement is not proof, but a disagreement would have been worth explaining, and there is not one.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 1,717.00 | 1,376.87 | — |
| Other Income | 20.88 | 9.60 | — |
| Total Income | 1,737.87 | 1,386.47 | — |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 914.01 | 658.27 | — |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 191.78 | 180.05 | — |
| Finance Cost | 12.63 | 15.34 | — |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 52.37 | 50.83 | — |
| Other Expenses | 240.45 | 211.45 | 0.01 |
| Total Expenses | 1,463.42 | 1,224.05 | 0.01 |
| Profit Before Tax | 265.04 | 162.43 | -0.01 |
| Tax Expense | 71.59 | 44.59 | — |
| Profit After Tax | 193.45 | 117.84 | -0.01 |
| EPS - Basic | 18.31 | 13.70 | -0.90 |
| EPS - Diluted | 18.31 | 13.70 | -0.90 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 10.57 | 10.57 | 0.01 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 510.99 | 357.41 | -0.01 |
| Net Worth | 525.73 | 371.59 | 0.00 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 48.17 | 86.29 | — |
| Short-term Borrowings | 104.61 | 125.87 | — |
| Total Borrowings | 152.78 | 212.16 | — |
| Trade Payables | 141.24 | 105.49 | 0.00 |
| Current Liabilities | 704.67 | 453.69 | 0.00 |
| Total Liabilities | 778.93 | 596.02 | 0.00 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 324.72 | 333.45 | — |
| Capital Work in Progress | 5.68 | 12.67 | — |
| Intangible Assets | 6.15 | 5.58 | — |
| Investments | 156.88 | — | — |
| Inventories | 396.48 | 296.21 | — |
| Trade Receivables | 138.41 | 119.97 | — |
| Cash & Equivalents | 29.25 | 37.13 | 0.00 |
| Current Assets | 903.45 | 551.42 | 0.00 |
| Total Assets | 1,304.66 | 967.60 | 0.00 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 325.16 | 141.28 | -0.01 |
| Capital Expenditure | 32.51 | 36.39 | — |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -239.13 | -31.29 | — |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -95.46 | -87.77 | 0.01 |
| Net Change in Cash | -9.43 | 22.22 | — |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 19 | 16.5 | — |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 16 | 12.8 | — |
| PAT Margin (%) | 11.3 | 8.6 | — |
| Return on Equity (%) | 36.8 | 31.7 | -900 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 40.9 | 30.5 | — |
| Return on Assets (%) | 14.8 | 12.2 | -450 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.29 | 0.57 | — |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.37 | 0.77 | — |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 21.99 | 11.59 | — |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.28 | 1.22 | 2 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.72 | 0.56 | — |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.32 | 1.42 | — |
| Receivable Days | 29 | 32 | — |
| Inventory Days | 158 | 164 | — |
| Payable Days | 56 | 58 | — |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 131 | 138 | — |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.68 | 1.2 | 1.11 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -10.1 | -2.4 | 50 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.62 | 0.72 | — |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 11.3% | 8.6% | — |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.32x | 1.42x | — |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.48x | 2.6x | 2x |
| = Return on Equity | 36.8% | 31.7% | — |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.73x | 0.73x | 1x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.95x | 0.91x | — |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 16.2% | 12.9% | — |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.68x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Interest coverage was 21.99x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -2.86An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.925 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.116 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.686 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.247 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.952 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.885 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.034 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.101 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = -2.86, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 7.67 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.152 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.392 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.213 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.675 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 7.67 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
2 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹-23.4 cr in FY25, ₹-131.7 cr in FY26
- ○Receivable days rising · 32 days in FY25, 29 days in FY26
- ○Inventory days rising · 164 days in FY25, 158 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 7.1% of revenue in FY25, 19.8% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 15.2% of net block in FY25, 16.1% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 34.8% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 9.3%
Contingent liabilities of 48.74 cr against a net worth of 525.73 cr — 9.3% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 2%
2% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.28x
Short-term borrowings of 104.61 cr against cash of 29.25 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2.1%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 4.01 cr against a profit of 193.45 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹425.00, the market value is ₹4,488 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹449 cr | 2.3x | 6.0 | 3.8 |
| 12% a year | ₹539 cr | 2.8x | 7.3 | 4.6 |
| 14% a year | ₹628 cr | 3.2x | 8.4 | 5.3 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 4.31% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: 6.52% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, ₹293 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth193.45 ÷ 525.73What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)277.66 ÷ (525.73 + 152.78) = 277.66 ÷ 678.51Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue330.03 ÷ 1,717.00Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth152.78 ÷ 525.73How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost277.66 ÷ 12.63How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(138.41 ÷ 1,717.00) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days158 + 29 − 56How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT325.16 ÷ 193.45Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(193.45 − 325.16) ÷ 1,304.66 = -131.71 ÷ 1,304.66The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹425.00 × 105,600,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash4,488.00 + 152.78 − 29.25What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA4,611.53 ÷ 330.03The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT4,488.00 ÷ 193.45The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹193.45 cr ÷ ₹4,488.00 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹292.66 cr ÷ ₹4,488.00 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)23.2 ÷ 64.2%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The global woven Raffia machinery market is expanding steadily, driven by increasing infrastructure investments and the rising demand for bulk packaging across sectors such as cement, fertilizers, agriculture, and chemicals. As industries seek automation, energy-efficient production, and sustainable practices, machine manufacturers are transitioning from volume-based to value-added and export-oriented solutions. The Indian market is witnessing robust growth backed by government initiatives like the PLI scheme and National Technical Textiles Mission. High capital requirements, the need for deep technical expertise, and long training cycles create strong entry barriers, heavily favoring established global players with extensive R&D and integrated manufacturing capabilities.
Future Planning & Capital Allocation
The IPO is exclusively an Offer for Sale, meaning the company will receive no fresh capital. However, Lohia Corp generates exceptional free cash flow (Net cash from operations was ₹ 3,251.61 million in FY26) and maintains a low net debt-to-equity ratio of 0.23x, ensuring it can easily fund its own R&D, maintenance capex, and dividend payouts internally.
Source: RHP p. 68, 132, 433Competitive Position
Lohia operates in a high-barrier-to-entry, capital goods niche where it has secured a 15.4% global market share. Its proprietary Technical Training and Research Centre (TTRC) helps solve the global shortage of skilled machine operators, cementing deep, sticky relationships with manufacturers worldwide who rely on Lohia for end-to-end setups.
Source: RHP p. 193, 204Execution / Track Record
Despite a complex recent demerger to isolate the core technical textiles machinery business, execution has been flawless. Consolidated revenue grew to ₹ 17,169.95 million in FY26. More importantly, operating leverage kicked in, expanding EBITDA margins from 16.49% in FY25 to 19.53% in FY26, yielding a massive 36.80% Return on Equity.
Source: RHP p. 132, 396Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Raj Kumar Lohia (Chairman & Managing Director)
Litigation: Against Company: 3 Indirect Tax proceedings (₹ 29.14 million). Against Promoters: 1 Direct Tax proceeding (₹ 1.34 million).
Auditor / RPT Flags: Emphasis of Matter regarding the Scheme of Arrangement for the demerger. Additionally, a CARO qualification/Other Matter notes that the third-party accounting software lacks an independent assurance report confirming the existence of audit trails (edit logs) for direct changes at the database level.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Rajoo Engineers Limited | 18.27 | — | 14.16 | — |
| LMW Limited | 134.25 | — | 4.56 | — |
| Mamata Machinery Limited | 62.07 | — | 8.13 | — |
| Jyoti CNC Automation Limited | 54.6 | — | 16.79 | — |
| Windsor Machines Limited | — | — | 0.13 | — |
At the ₹425 upper band, the issue is priced at 23.2x earnings — a 66% discount to the peer median of 67.3x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The statutory auditors issued a remark under Rule 11(g) stating that the company's third-party accounting software lacks an 'Independent Service Auditor's Assurance Report' confirming the existence and operation of audit trails (edit logs) for direct changes made at the database level.
RHP p. 436-438, Auditor's ReportThe core 'Technical Textile Machinery Business' was demerged from LTS Holdings Private Limited into the newly incorporated Lohia Corp Limited (formed June 2023) via a Scheme of Arrangement effective May 1, 2024 (Appointed Date: April 1, 2024). Consequently, FY24 financials are Special Purpose Combined & Carve-Outs.
RHP p. 24, 396The CBI issued a notice to the Demerged Company in July 2025 to produce transaction documents from FY2016 onwards regarding an investigation against M/s High Ground Enterprises Limited.
RHP p. 439The IPO is a 100% Offer for Sale. The company is highly profitable, generating strong positive operating cash flows (₹ 3,251.61 million in FY26) with negligible net debt.
RHP p. 68, The OfferAgainst Company: 3 Indirect Tax proceedings (₹ 29.14 million). Against Promoters: 1 Direct Tax proceeding (₹ 1.34 million).
RHP p. 102, 261, 325, 436-440Emphasis of Matter regarding the Scheme of Arrangement for the demerger. Additionally, a CARO qualification/Other Matter notes that the third-party accounting software lacks an independent assurance report confirming the existence of audit trails (edit logs) for direct changes at the database level.
RHP p. 102, 261, 325, 436-440Short-term borrowings of ₹104.61 cr against cash of ₹29.25 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Does the independent industry report validate this market leadership position?
RHP p. 193, 206 (F&S Report confirms a 15.4% global market share in 2024)Do the operational metrics reflect this lack of concentration?
RHP p. 387, 391 (Top 10 customers accounted for only 12.63% of revenue in FY26; Top 10 suppliers accounted for 25.76% of purchases in FY26)Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Dominant global market leadership with a 15.4% share in woven raffia machinery, supported by deep backward integration and 71 registered Indian patents.
- Extremely diversified revenue base with exports to roughly 100 countries (overseas revenue constituted 42.18% of operations in FY26) and minimal reliance on any single customer.
Weaknesses
- Heavy product concentration risk, with 88.16% of FY26 revenue derived entirely from the sale of woven raffia machines and their specific components.
Opportunities
- Global shift towards sustainable packaging and circular economies opens new markets for the company's planned plastic waste recycling and post-consumer non-food grade recycling machines.
- Increasing automation demands in the global technical textiles sector drives a replacement cycle for older, less energy-efficient looms and extrusion lines.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Order book deferrals, truncations, or cancellations. risk_section
Why it matters: The company boasts an order book of ₹ 13,585.17 million. If macroeconomic shocks cause customers to delay or cancel these capital expenditure orders, projected revenues will fall short, directly impacting cash flows. - Volatility in the cost and supply of raw materials and electronic components. risk_section
Why it matters: Raw materials constitute over 53% of the company's operating revenue. Because machine supply contracts can be long-dated, sudden spikes in steel or imported electronic component prices may severely compress material margins.
Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (07 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Where is the money going?
The entire Offer is an Offer for Sale of up to 25,931,407 Equity Shares by the Promoter and Promoter Group Selling Shareholders. The company will not receive any proceeds from the IPO.
RHP p. 68, 127How concentrated is the customer and supplier base?
Concentration is extremely low. In FY26, the top 10 customers accounted for only 12.63% of total revenue from operations, while the top 10 suppliers accounted for just 25.76% of total purchases.
RHP p. 387, 391Is it profitable and growing?
Yes, highly profitable. Revenue from operations reached ₹ 17,169.95 million in FY26. The company generated a Profit After Tax of ₹ 1,934.52 million with a robust EBITDA margin of 19.53% and a Return on Equity (RoE) of 36.80% in FY26.
RHP p. 132, 450What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
The company carries ₹ 487.35 million in contingent liabilities as of FY26, heavily dominated by a ₹ 413.00 million corporate guarantee given for a credit facility of its US subsidiary, Leesona Corp. Additionally, the auditor's CARO report flags that the company's third-party accounting software lacks database-level audit trails.
RHP p. 231, 436-438What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Raj Kumar Lohia | ₹195.00 | 2026-03-30 | 2.2x |
| This round priced within the last year, yet the offer is at roughly 2.2x that price. A step-up this steep in this little time is worth understanding: what changed in the business to justify it? | |||
| RKL Holdings Private Limited | ₹210.00 | 2025-02-11 | 2.0x |
| Sarjna Capfin Private Limited | ₹210.00 | 2025-02-11 | 2.0x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 30 Jan 2028Minimum promoters’ contribution18 months
- 30 Jan 2027Promoter's shareholding in excess of 20%six months
- 30 Jan 2027Entire pre-Offer Equity Share capitalsix months
- 28 Oct 2026Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
- 29 Aug 2026Anchor Investors (50%)30 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Total issue size (Offer for Sale) The total issue size (consisting entirely of an Offer for Sale) was reduced by approximately 38.6%, or 16,328,563 shares. Most participating promoters and selling shareholders scaled down their offered shares. | Up to 42,259,970 Equity Shares | Up to 25,931,407 Equity Shares |
| Selling Shareholders Promoter Group Selling Shareholder Neela Lohia completely withdrew her participation in the Offer for Sale pursuant to a withdrawal letter dated June 26, 2026. | Includes Neela Lohia offering up to 512,000 Equity Shares | Neela Lohia is no longer a selling shareholder |
| Financial Information Period The restated financial statements were rolled forward by one full fiscal year to include the newly completed FY26, dropping FY23 from the special purpose combined statements. | Restated financial statements for the years ended March 31, 2025 and March 31, 2024 | Restated financial statements for the years ended March 31, 2026, March 31, 2025 and March 31, 2024 |
| Employee Reservation Portion The size of the Employee Reservation Portion was specifically quantified at 200,000 Equity Shares in the RHP. | Up to [●] Equity Shares | Up to 200,000 Equity Shares |
| Pre-IPO Share Transfers (Promoter Holding) Between the DRHP and RHP filings, Promoter Gaurav Lohia transferred 2,100,000 shares as a contribution to the Rishab Kumar Lohia Memorial Trust on June 29, 2026. Additionally, Promoter Raj Kumar Lohia acquired 265,000 shares via a secondary transfer on March 30, 2026. | Gaurav Lohia held 13,145,000 Equity Shares (12.44% pre-offer) | Gaurav Lohia holds 11,045,000 Equity Shares (10.45% pre-offer) |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
