Jindal Supreme (India)
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Jindal Supreme (India) Limited is an India-based steel pipe and tube manufacturing company specializing in Mild Steel (MS) black pipes, galvanized pipes, metal beam crash barriers, and GI tubular poles. Operating from an integrated manufacturing facility in Hisar, Haryana, the company serves institutional buyers, EPC contractors, and a regional dealer network across infrastructure, water supply, and construction sectors.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Jindal Supreme (India) Limited is an established manufacturer of steel pipes, tubes, and infrastructure solutions. Originally founded in 1974 by Late Madan Lal Jindal, the company operates an integrated manufacturing facility spread over 16 acres in Hisar, Haryana, with an aggregate installed capacity of 1,71,000 MTPA as of Fiscal 2026. Its product portfolio comprises Mild Steel (MS) Black Pipes/Tubes (90,000 MTPA capacity), MS Galvanized Pipes/Tubes (45,000 MTPA capacity), Metal Beam Crash Barriers for highways (24,000 MTPA capacity, introduced in Fiscal 2025), and Galvanized Iron (GI) Tubular Poles for lighting and electrification (12,000 MTPA capacity, introduced in Fiscal 2026). The company serves infrastructure contractors, industrial clients, and public sector projects through direct sales (68.18% of Fiscal 2026 revenue) alongside an active network of 53 dealers across Northern and Western India (31.82% of Fiscal 2026 revenue). Geographically, revenue is concentrated in domestic markets, led by Haryana (28.55% of Fiscal 2026 revenue), Rajasthan (13.98%), Punjab (13.67%), and Uttar Pradesh (12.36%). The supply chain relies on mild steel coils and strips procured from top domestic steel suppliers, with the top 10 suppliers accounting for 76.23% of raw material purchases in Fiscal 2026. Manufacturing processes encompass slitting, cold forming, high-frequency ERW welding, hot-dip galvanizing, and automated testing. In Fiscal 2026, the company generated ₹ 675.39 crore (₹ 67,538.72 lakhs) in revenue from operations with total sales volume of 1,01,100 MT.
- MS Black Pipes & Tubes — Mild Steel non-galvanized pipes used in water supply, plumbing, infrastructure, and structural frameworks.
- MS Galvanized Pipes & Tubes — Zinc-coated corrosion-resistant pipes for water distribution, irrigation, and industrial conduits.
- Metal Beam Crash Barriers — W-beam and Thrie-beam road safety highway barriers introduced in Fiscal 2025.
- GI Tubular Poles — Galvanized iron poles for street lighting, power transmission, and electrification projects introduced in Fiscal 2026.
- Other Operating Revenue — Sale of steel scrap, zinc dross, strip scrap, and zinc ash generated during manufacturing.
Fully backward-integrated 16-acre manufacturing facility in Hisar, diversified infrastructure product portfolio (pipes, crash barriers, poles), established dealer network in Northern India, and a 50-year operating legacy under multi-generational promoter leadership.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment/pre-payment, in full or in part, of certain outstanding borrowings availed by our Company — ₹71.00 cr
- General Corporate Purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
100% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 675.39 | 586.4 | 645.44 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 22.53 | 24.27 | 12.87 |
| PAT Margin | 3.34% | 4.14% | 1.99% |
Revenue Breakdown
- MS Black Pipes & Tubes: 42.98%
- MS Galvanized Pipes & Tubes: 26.57%
- Metal Beam Crash Barriers: 17.43%
- Other Operating Revenue (Scrap, Zinc Dross & By-Products): 8.37%
- GI Tubular Poles: 4.66%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand and our read of the filing are broadly in the same territory.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 15.2% | Revenue increased due to strong sales volume growth across products, led by a sharp ramp-up in metal beam crash barrier sales and the introduction of GI tubular poles. | Structural |
| Other Income (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 97.0% | Other income dropped significantly because Fiscal 2025 included a non-recurring gain of ₹ 16.60 crore from the disposal of a building. | One-off |
| EBITDA (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 60.6% | EBITDA expanded due to higher revenue scale, improved operating efficiency, and a shift toward higher-margin value-added products like crash barriers and GI poles. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 43.3% | Other expenses rose due to higher power and fuel consumption, increased stores and spares usage, carriage inward, and freight and forwarding costs tied to higher production and sales volume. | Structural |
| Inventories (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 39.9% | Inventories increased due to higher raw material procurement and finished goods stocking to support expanded production capacity and new product lines. | Structural |
| Trade Receivables (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 53.4% | Trade receivables grew in tandem with business expansion and increased sales through dealer channels and direct project buyers. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↓ 199.1% | Operating cash flow turned negative due to funds tied up in higher current assets, specifically working capital absorption in inventories and trade receivables. | Cyclical |
| Total Borrowings (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 25.1% | Borrowings increased due to higher utilization of short-term cash credit and working capital facilities to finance inventory and trade receivables. | Structural |
| Revenue from Operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 9.2% | Revenue fell due to a drop in steel prices and lower sales volumes caused by a temporary growth slowdown in the domestic infrastructure and construction sector. | Cyclical |
| Other Income (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 237.3% | Other income surged due to a one-time profit of ₹ 16.60 crore from the strategic sale of plant buildings to fund capital expenditure for crash barriers and GI poles. | One-off |
| Cost of Materials Consumed (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 11.4% | Material costs declined due to cooling steel prices and reduced raw material purchase volumes matching subdued production levels. | Cyclical |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 27.2% | Employee benefit costs decreased following workforce rationalization and reductions in overall salary and wage overheads. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 18.8% | Other expenses rose primarily due to higher consumption of stores and spare parts, power and fuel, and increased carriage and freight costs. | Structural |
| EBITDA (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 22.8% | EBITDA expanded due to lower raw material cost percentages and improved operational efficiencies despite lower top-line revenue. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 88.5% | Net profit jumped due to lower raw material input costs relative to revenue and a one-time gain of ₹ 16.60 crore from building disposal. | One-off |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 71.6% | Operating cash flows dropped due to working capital absorption from an increase in current assets, particularly inventory build-up. | Cyclical |
| Inventories (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 31.7% | Inventories expanded to support the commercial launch and stocking requirements of newly introduced metal beam crash barriers. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Single Location Geographic Concentration company persistent
Manufacturing operations are concentrated at a single 16-acre facility in Hisar, Haryana, exposing business continuity to local disruptions, regional policy changes, or weather events. - Raw Material Price Volatility macro persistent
Fluctuations in the prices of key raw materials (mild steel coils, HR coils, and zinc) directly affect production costs and operating margins. - Supplier and Customer Concentration company persistent
Top 10 suppliers account for 76.23% of raw material purchases and Haryana state alone accounts for 28.55% of revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026. - Overcapacity and Price Competition in Commoditized Pipes sector persistent
Rapid capacity additions by small and unorganized ERW pipe producers create supply overhangs and pricing pressure in lower-value commoditized product lines.
Tailwinds
- National Infrastructure and Water Supply Allocations macro
Large-scale government outlays under the National Infrastructure Pipeline and Jal Jeevan Mission (exceeding ₹ 3.6 lakh crore) generate sustained demand for MS black and galvanized pipes. - Highway Expansion and Road Safety Infrastructure sector
Accelerated development of expressways and national highways drives strong demand growth for metal beam crash barriers. - Rural Electrification and Smart City Infrastructure sector
Government focus on street lighting, urban infrastructure, and power distribution expands addressable markets for GI tubular poles.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| MS Black Pipe/Tube Line (Hisar Facility) | FY26 | 65.2% |
| MS Galvanized Pipe/Tube Line (Hisar Facility) | FY26 | 60.3% |
| Metal Beam Crash Barrier Line (Hisar Facility) | FY26 | 65.2% |
| GI Tubular Poles Line (Hisar Facility) | FY26 | 33.5% |
| Total Collective Manufacturing Facility (Hisar Facility) | FY26 | 61.7% |
Movements the filing does not explain
- Employee Benefits Expense FY25 vs FY24 — Employee benefit expenses fell 27.19% from ₹ 9.26 crore to ₹ 6.74 crore, but MD&A provides no operational driver or headcount explanation for the decline.
- Total Borrowings FY26 vs FY25 — Total borrowings expanded by 25.07% from ₹ 95.84 crore to ₹ 119.87 crore, but MD&A does not contain a narrative discussion explaining the underlying leverage expansion.
A material movement that management does not address is not a finding on its own. It is a question the filing leaves open, and it is recorded here as one.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-22
- Pre Application Start2026-09-15
- Bidding Start2026-09-16
- Bidding End2026-09-18
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-21
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-22
- Listing Day2026-09-23
- Mandate End2026-10-30
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 675.39 | 586.40 | 645.44 |
| Other Income | 0.55 | 18.34 | 5.44 |
| Total Income | 675.94 | 604.74 | 650.88 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 578.60 | 520.26 | 587.42 |
| Changes in Inventories | -3.76 | -2.74 | -2.83 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 7.03 | 6.74 | 9.26 |
| Finance Cost | 8.60 | 8.73 | 7.70 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 3.43 | 3.14 | 3.77 |
| Other Expenses | 51.88 | 36.21 | 30.47 |
| Total Expenses | 645.79 | 572.35 | 635.80 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 30.15 | 32.39 | 15.07 |
| Profit Before Tax | 30.15 | 32.39 | 15.07 |
| Tax Expense | 7.63 | 8.12 | 2.20 |
| Profit After Tax | 22.53 | 24.27 | 12.87 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 0.13 | 0.06 | 0.13 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 22.66 | 24.33 | 13.00 |
| EPS - Basic | 5.59 | 6.02 | 3.20 |
| EPS - Diluted | 5.59 | 6.02 | 3.20 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 40.28 | 1.92 | 1.92 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 56.54 | 72.72 | 48.39 |
| Net Worth | 96.82 | 74.64 | 50.31 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 20.41 | 30.07 | 29.08 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 99.45 | 65.77 | 75.84 |
| Total Borrowings | 119.87 | 95.84 | 104.92 |
| Trade Payables | 11.04 | 6.74 | 8.74 |
| Current Liabilities | 116.91 | 82.26 | 93.44 |
| Total Liabilities | 151.59 | 125.70 | 130.85 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 87.63 | 88.17 | 80.57 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 7.19 | 0.50 | 6.07 |
| Intangible Assets | 2.43 | 2.77 | 3.11 |
| Investments | — | 0.76 | 0.76 |
| Inventories | 100.31 | 71.72 | 54.47 |
| Trade Receivables | 33.24 | 21.67 | 22.25 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.01 | 0.01 | 0.04 |
| Current Assets | 148.94 | 107.51 | 90.03 |
| Total Assets | 248.41 | 200.33 | 181.16 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -5.69 | 5.74 | 20.20 |
| Capital Expenditure | 9.26 | 11.02 | 52.05 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -9.86 | 11.89 | -43.05 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 15.54 | -17.66 | 22.87 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.00 | -0.03 | 0.03 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 6.2 | 7.3 | 4.1 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 5.7 | 6.8 | 3.5 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 3.3 | 4.1 | 2 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 23.3 | 32.5 | 25.6 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 17.9 | 24.1 | 14.7 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 9.1 | 12.1 | 7.1 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 1.24 | 1.28 | 2.09 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 2.84 | 2.17 | 3.95 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 4.51 | 4.71 | 2.96 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.27 | 1.31 | 0.96 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.42 | 0.44 | 0.38 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 2.72 | 2.93 | 3.56 |
| Receivable Days | 18 | 13 | 13 |
| Inventory Days | 54 | 45 | 31 |
| Payable Days | 6 | 4 | 5 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 66 | 54 | 39 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.25 | 0.24 | 1.57 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 11.4 | 9.2 | -4 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.7 | 3.51 | 13.81 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 3.3% | 4.1% | 2% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 2.72x | 2.93x | 3.56x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.57x | 2.68x | 3.6x |
| = Return on Equity | 23.3% | 32.5% | 25.6% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.75x | 0.85x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.78x | 0.79x | 0.66x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 5.7% | 7% | 3.5% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 22.53 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -5.69 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 5% while profit grew 75%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.23An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.332 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.787 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 2.053 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.152 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.913 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.191 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.986 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.1136 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
This score is driven primarily by the sales-growth term (SGI). Growth is the one variable in this model that is not itself a manipulation signal — the model treats rapid growth as pressure to keep the streak going, not as evidence of anything. A company that grew revenue several-fold will read high here for that reason alone. The variable that speaks to manipulation directly is TATA (accruals — profit that did not become cash); read that one, and the receivables trend, rather than the headline M.
M = -1.23, above the −1.78 threshold. On this model the accounts merit closer reading. That is a prompt to go to the filing, not a conclusion about it.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.56 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.129 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.228 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.156 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.639 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.56 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
3 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Profit moved backwards in FY26: net profit fell 7.2% to ₹23 cr even as revenue grew 15.2% to ₹675 cr. Net margin compressed from 4.1% to 3.3%. A premium multiple asked on a year when earnings moved backwards is worth understanding: the profit the price is measured against is not the peak the company has shown.
- Cash conversion fell sharply in the final year: operating cash flow was -0.25x profit in FY26, against 0.24x in FY25. Profit rose; the cash behind it did not follow at the same rate.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 96.82 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0x
Short-term borrowings of 99.45 cr against cash of 0.01 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2.4%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 0.54 cr against a profit of 22.53 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth22.53 ÷ 96.82What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)38.75 ÷ (96.82 + 119.87) = 38.75 ÷ 216.69Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue42.18 ÷ 675.39Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth119.87 ÷ 96.82How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost38.75 ÷ 8.60How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(33.24 ÷ 675.39) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days54 + 18 − 6How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-5.69 ÷ 22.53Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(22.53 − -5.69) ÷ 248.41 = 28.22 ÷ 248.41The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹93.00 × 51,023,769 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash474.52 + 119.87 − 0.01What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA594.38 ÷ 42.18The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT474.52 ÷ 22.53The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisitionAcquired at nil or near-nil considerationEvery offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Here the entry price is nil, which means a bonus issue or a transfer for no consideration. A multiple cannot be computed against zero, and that is the fact worth noticing rather than a number to print. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The global steel pipes and tubes market is estimated at USD 245,999.02 million in 2026 and is projected to reach USD 395,563.29 million by 2036 at a CAGR of 4.86%, while the Indian market is estimated at USD 14,415.83 million in 2026 and is projected to reach USD 23,932.99 million by 2036 at a CAGR of 5.20%. Growth in India is driven by the National Infrastructure Pipeline, Jal Jeevan Mission water supply programs, urban development, and energy network expansion. As a mid-sized domestic manufacturer of ERW black pipes, galvanized tubes, crash barriers, and GI poles, Jindal Supreme (India) Limited is positioned to benefit from sustained government infrastructure spending and rising demand for value-added steel products.
Product Diversification into High-Margin Highway Infrastructure
Jindal Supreme has strategically expanded beyond commoditized MS black and galvanized pipes by launching metal beam crash barriers in FY25 (24,000 MTPA capacity) and GI tubular poles in FY26 (12,000 MTPA capacity). Crash barriers already contributed 17.43% of FY26 revenue, boosting overall EBITDA margins to 6.16%.
Source: p.29, p.161, p.164Working Capital Intensity & De-leveraging via IPO
Business expansion has increased working capital requirements, pushing total borrowings to ₹ 119.87 crore in FY26 and causing negative operating cash flow (-₹ 5.69 crore). Allocating ₹ 71.00 crore from Fresh Issue proceeds to debt prepayment will significantly reduce finance costs (₹ 8.60 crore in FY26) and improve leverage metrics.
Source: p.61, p.92, p.307Geographic & Supplier Concentration Dynamics
Manufacturing is concentrated at a single facility in Hisar, Haryana, with 28.55% of FY26 revenue generated from Haryana alone and 76.23% of raw material purchases sourced from top 10 suppliers. Expanding the dealer network beyond Northern India is critical to mitigating regional market risks.
Source: p.24, p.27, p.29Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Abhishek Jindal
Litigation: 1 direct tax proceeding against Company (₹ 0.05 crore); 1 statutory demand/notice against Promoters; Personal guarantees provided by Abhishek Jindal for Company credit facilities.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None; unmodified audit opinion with no reservations, qualifications, or adverse remarks.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vibhor Steel Tubes Limited | 23.06 | — | 4.57 | 0.76 |
| Sambhv Steel Tubes Limited | 65.55 | — | 18.35 | 5.87 |
| Hi-Tech Pipes Limited | 22.31 | — | 6.07 | 1.81 |
At the ₹93 upper band, the issue is priced at 16.6x earnings — a 28% discount to the peer median of 23.1x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Plant Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Installed capacity | 1,71,000 MTPA | aggregate capacity across MS Black (90,000 MTPA), MS Galv (45,000 MTPA), Crash Barriers (24,000 MTPA), GI Poles (12,000 MTPA) in FY26 |
| Capacity utilisation | 61.66% | overall FY26 capacity utilisation across Hisar manufacturing plant (65.18% Black, 60.25% Galv) |
| Order book / book-to-bill | — | order book and book-to-bill ratio not disclosed in filing |
| Customer concentration | 20.32% | Top 10 customers share of FY26 revenue from operations (Top 1 accounts for 5.82%) |
| Value addition / Gross margin | 14.33% | FY26 gross profit margin over raw material consumed (EBITDA margin 6.16%) |
Source: p.25, p.26, p.31, p.106 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Cash flow from operations turned negative at -₹ 5.69 crore in FY26 despite reporting a net profit of ₹ 22.53 crore, due to working capital absorption in inventories (₹ 100.31 crore) and trade receivables (₹ 33.24 crore).
p.63, p.306Fiscal 2025 Other Income included a non-recurring gain of ₹ 16.60 crore on the disposal of plant buildings, which accounted for over 51% of profit before tax (₹ 32.39 crore) in FY25.
p.300, p.302The Offer comprises a Fresh Issue of 1,07,41,149 shares and an Offer for Sale of 26,86,851 shares. Out of the Net Fresh Issue proceeds, ₹ 71.00 crore is allocated to repayment/prepayment of outstanding borrowings.
p.57, p.92The company has 13 pending applications before regulatory authorities (including HSPCB and BIS) for updating the company name from 'Jindal Supreme (India) Private Limited' to 'Jindal Supreme (India) Limited' and renewing consents to operate.
p.324, p.3251 direct tax proceeding against Company (₹ 0.05 crore); 1 statutory demand/notice against Promoters; Personal guarantees provided by Abhishek Jindal for Company credit facilities.
p.73, p.203, p.215, p.324Operating cash flow was negative ₹5.69 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹22.53 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Revenue rose to ₹675.39 cr in FY26 while profit fell to ₹22.53 cr. Net margin went from 4.1% to 3.3%. The profit the offer price is measured against is not the best the company has shown.
rule: revenue↑ & PAT↓ in offer yearTrade receivables grew 53.4% against revenue growth of 15.2% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthShort-term borrowings of ₹99.45 cr against cash of ₹0.01 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Filing disclosures confirm corporate origin dating back to 1974 under founder Late Madan Lal Jindal, operating a 1,71,000 MTPA integrated plant in Hisar, Haryana.
p.161, p.174Auditor-restated financial tables confirm FY26 Net Profit of ₹ 22.53 crore on Net Worth of ₹ 96.82 crore, yielding an RoE of 26.28%, outperforming listed peers Vibhor Steel (4.57%) and Hi-Tech Pipes (6.07%).
p.103, p.105Single 16-acre integrated facility in Hisar houses slitting, tube forming, ERW welding, hot-dip galvanizing, and barrier profiling lines under one roof.
p.161, p.164Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Fully integrated 16-acre manufacturing setup in Hisar, Haryana with 1,71,000 MTPA total installed capacity.
- Diversified product mix spanning MS black pipes, galvanized tubes, metal beam crash barriers, and GI tubular poles.
- Established regional presence with 53 active dealers across Northern and Western India.
Weaknesses
- Single-location manufacturing operational risk at Hisar, Haryana.
- Negative operating cash flow in FY26 (-₹ 5.69 crore) due to working capital absorption in inventories and receivables.
Opportunities
- Sustained government infrastructure spending under Jal Jeevan Mission and National Infrastructure Pipeline driving steel pipe demand.
- Rapid expansion of national highways and expressways driving demand for metal beam crash barriers.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Raw material price volatility in hot-rolled coils, mild steel strips, and zinc. risk_section
Why it matters: Input price swings directly impact gross margins and inventory valuation. - High customer and supplier concentration, with top 10 suppliers providing 76.23% of raw material purchases. risk_section
Why it matters: Supply chain disruptions or supplier credit term changes could interrupt manufacturing.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (30 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is the entire net fresh issue debt allocation directed toward debt prepayment rather than new capital expenditure?
Prepaying ₹ 71.00 crore of high-cost working capital and term borrowings directly reduces annual finance costs (₹ 8.60 crore in FY26), strengthens net worth (₹ 96.82 crore in FY26), and creates debt capacity to support future working capital needs as plant utilization expands.
p.61, p.92, p.114How does the company address single-location risk and regional sales concentration in Haryana?
While all manufacturing is housed at the 16-acre Hisar plant, sales are geographically diversifying through 53 dealers across Rajasthan (13.98%), Punjab (13.67%), and Uttar Pradesh (12.36%), alongside direct institutional sales to EPC highway contractors across India.
p.24, p.29, p.174What caused the jump in PAT margin from 1.99% in FY24 to 3.33% in FY26?
Margin expansion was driven by a product mix shift toward higher-value crash barriers (17.43% of sales) and GI poles, higher capacity utilization across pipe mills (over 60%), and improved operating leverage over fixed factory overheads.
p.25, p.29, p.103Why did operating cash flow turn negative (-₹ 5.69 crore) in FY26 despite reporting ₹ 22.53 crore in net profit?
Operating cash flow was impacted by a temporary working capital lock-up, as inventory expanded to ₹ 100.31 crore to support crash barrier production and trade receivables increased to ₹ 33.24 crore due to revenue growth.
p.63, p.300, p.306What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2025-08-30 | — |
| Existing Shareholders | — | 2025-11-12 | — |
| Janak Raj Jindal to Abhishek Jindal | — | 2025-12-05 | — |
| Janak Raj Jindal to Abhishek Jindal | — | 2026-03-26 | — |
| Jayshree Jindal to Abhishek Jindal | — | 2026-03-26 | — |
| Janak Raj Jindal & Sons HUF to Abhishek Jindal | — | 2026-03-26 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 2 entries | |||
| Abhishek Jindal | ₹100.00 | 2023-09-29 | as disclosed |
| Abhishek Jindal | ₹100.00 | 2023-09-29 | as disclosed |
The 2 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 23 Mar 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 23 Mar 2027Promoters Excess Shareholding6 months
- 23 Mar 2027Pre-Offer Capital (Non-Promoters)6 months
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period Restated financial statements were updated in the RHP to include full Fiscal 2026 audited financials and the three-month period ended June 30, 2026, replacing Fiscal 2023. | Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023 (and period ended December 31, 2025) | Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 (and period ended June 30, 2026) |
| Restated Financials Financial tables updated to reflect full Fiscal 2026 restated performance, showing revenue growth to ₹ 675.39 crore. | FY25 Revenue from operations of ₹ 586.40 crore, PAT of ₹ 24.27 crore, Basic EPS of ₹ 6.02 | FY26 Revenue from operations of ₹ 675.39 crore, PAT of ₹ 22.53 crore, Basic EPS of ₹ 5.59 |
| Litigation Outstanding dues to material creditors updated in RHP disclosures. | Material creditors outstanding stood at ₹ 5.25 crore across 4 material creditors as at October 13, 2025 | Material creditors outstanding revised to ₹ 4.97 crore across 4 material creditors as at October 11, 2025 |
| Risk Factors Added explicit disclosures regarding independent operation and brand usage relative to other listed/unlisted entities carrying the 'Jindal' name. | Standard risk disclosures regarding ERW pipe manufacturing, raw material price volatility, and single-location risk | Expanded risk disclosures explicitly clarifying independent corporate governance and operation from other 'Jindal' group entities |
| Statutory Dues Disclosures updated regarding ongoing procedural follow-ups for statutory license name changes post conversion to public company. | 13 pending applications before regulatory authorities for updating company name on consents and licenses | 13 pending applications updated with disclosures of proactive follow-up communications sent to HSPCB and BIS |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.