HD Fire Protect
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
HD Fire Protect Limited is an Indian manufacturer and exporter of fire protection equipment and systems, offering comprehensive deluge, foam, water spray, and gas suppression solutions globally.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
HD Fire Protect Limited (formerly HD Fire Protect Private Limited) is an established manufacturer and exporter of engineered fire protection equipment and systems. The company designs, manufactures, and supplies a wide product suite including deluge valves, foam systems, water spray nozzles, fire monitors, and gas suppression systems across oil & gas, power, chemical, industrial, and commercial infrastructure sectors in over 90 countries. Operating from manufacturing facilities in Jalgaon and Thane, Maharashtra, the company generated revenue from operations of ₹ 489.28 crore in Fiscal 2026, with export markets contributing 34.69% of top-line sales.
- Manufacturing and Trading of Fire Fighting Equipment — Design, manufacturing, and trading of engineered fire protection and fire fighting equipment.
Global market presence with international product certifications (UL Listed, FM Approved, CE Marked), stringent empanelment driven high entry barriers, long-standing relationships with global EPC contractors, and integrated manufacturing and testing infrastructure.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Carry out the Offer for Sale by the Promoter Selling Shareholders and achieve the benefits of listing
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 489.281 | 432.799 | 372.953 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 116.787 | 109.718 | 87.92 |
| PAT Margin | 23.87% | 25.35% | 23.57% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Domestic Sales: 65.31%
- Export Sales: 34.69%
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 13.1% | Revenue from operations increased primarily due to higher domestic sales volume and expanding export demand across industrial, oil & gas, and infrastructure sectors. | Structural |
| Cost of materials consumed (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 3.1% | Cost of materials consumed increased in line with higher manufacturing scale and raw material procurement. | Structural |
| Purchases of stock-in-trade (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 31.8% | Purchases of contract manufactured goods rose due to higher trading sales of off-the-shelf white-labeled fire safety products. | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 8.8% | Employee expenses increased due to headcount growth, annual increments, and higher staff welfare expenses. | Structural |
| Restated PAT (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 6.4% | Net profit expanded due to higher operating top-line revenue, improved production efficiencies at Jalgaon, and disciplined cost control. | Structural |
| Revenue from operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 16.1% | Revenue grew by 16.05% due to volume growth in deluge valves, sprinkler systems, and foam suppression equipment. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Raw Material Price Volatility in Metals (Brass, Stainless Steel, Copper, Ductile Iron) sector persistent
Fluctuations in raw metal prices impact manufacturing cost structures under fixed-price delivery contracts if cost increases cannot be passed on immediately. - Centralized Manufacturing Location Concentration company persistent
All manufacturing operations are centralized in Jalgaon and Thane, exposing business performance to localized regional disruptions or shutdowns.
Tailwinds
- Mandatory Fire Safety Regulatory Mandates and Data Centre Infrastructure Expansion macro
Tightening NBC/BIS compliance codes, Viksit Bharat 2047 industrial infrastructure investments, and data centre expansion drive sustained structural demand for certified fire suppression systems.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Jalgaon Facility - Deluge Valves, Skids & Pre-Action Systems | FY26 | 80.9% |
| Jalgaon Facility - Foam Equipment & Suppression Systems | FY26 | 63.4% |
| Jalgaon Facility - Sprinklers, Alarm Valves & Accessories | FY26 | 70.4% |
| Jalgaon Facility - Monitors & Monitor Nozzles | FY26 | 78.9% |
| Thane Facility - Water Spray Nozzles | FY26 | 94.1% |
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-19
- Pre Application Start2026-10-09
- Bidding Start2026-10-13
- Bidding End2026-10-15
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-16
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-19
- Listing Day2026-10-21
- Mandate End2026-11-26
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 489.28 | 432.80 | 372.95 |
| Other Income | 15.83 | 17.88 | 19.07 |
| Total Income | 505.12 | 450.68 | 392.02 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 123.08 | 119.37 | 111.90 |
| Purchases of Stock-in-Trade | 132.20 | 100.30 | 80.84 |
| Changes in Inventories | -5.39 | -8.51 | 3.95 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 45.68 | 42.00 | 35.42 |
| Finance Cost | 0.17 | 0.03 | 0.01 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 10.14 | 9.14 | 9.34 |
| Other Expenses | 43.26 | 41.63 | 34.22 |
| Total Expenses | 349.14 | 303.96 | 275.67 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 155.98 | 146.71 | 116.35 |
| Exceptional Items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 155.98 | 146.71 | 116.35 |
| Tax Expense | 39.19 | 37.00 | 28.43 |
| Profit After Tax | 116.79 | 109.72 | 87.92 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 3.31 | 0.25 | 8.88 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 120.10 | 109.97 | 96.80 |
| EPS - Basic | 6.66 | 6.26 | 5.01 |
| EPS - Diluted | 6.66 | 6.26 | 5.01 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 87.62 | 87.62 | 2.66 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 289.53 | 309.62 | 340.76 |
| Net Worth | 377.15 | 397.23 | 343.41 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Total Borrowings | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Trade Payables | 29.78 | 24.78 | 20.90 |
| Current Liabilities | 52.91 | 49.20 | 45.90 |
| Total Liabilities | 54.88 | 52.85 | 49.22 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 80.91 | 86.82 | 75.14 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 17.64 | 4.07 | 0.99 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.03 | 0.07 | 0.07 |
| Investments | 78.88 | 127.37 | 90.53 |
| Inventories | 87.36 | 69.88 | 55.14 |
| Trade Receivables | 93.71 | 57.78 | 47.96 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 14.87 | 17.47 | 20.91 |
| Current Assets | 249.28 | 222.08 | 210.84 |
| Total Assets | 432.03 | 450.08 | 392.63 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 92.49 | 98.32 | 63.77 |
| Capital Expenditure | 17.89 | 20.81 | 12.35 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | 40.97 | -52.56 | -32.98 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -136.06 | -49.20 | -22.90 |
| Net Change in Cash | -2.59 | -3.45 | 7.90 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 32.9 | 34.6 | 32.1 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 30.9 | 32.6 | 29.7 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 23.9 | 25.4 | 23.6 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 31 | 27.6 | 25.6 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 41.4 | 36.9 | 33.9 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 27 | 24.4 | 22.4 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | -0.09 | -0.11 | -0.17 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 907.85 | 5643.85 | 16622.86 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 4.71 | 4.51 | 4.59 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 3.06 | 3.09 | 3.39 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.13 | 0.96 | 0.95 |
| Receivable Days | 70 | 49 | 47 |
| Inventory Days | 65 | 59 | 54 |
| Payable Days | 22 | 21 | 20 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 113 | 87 | 81 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.79 | 0.9 | 0.73 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 5.6 | 2.5 | 6.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 1.76 | 2.28 | 1.32 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 23.9% | 25.4% | 23.6% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.13x | 0.96x | 0.95x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.15x | 1.13x | 1.14x |
| = Return on Equity | 31% | 27.6% | 25.6% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.75x | 0.76x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 1x | 1x | 1x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 31.9% | 33.9% | 31.2% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Receivable days rose from 47 in FY24 to 70 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Interest coverage was 907.85x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -1.86An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.435 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 0.968 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.752 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.131 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.855 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.941 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.12 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.0562 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = -1.86, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 18.06 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.455 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.67 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.361 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 6.872 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 18.06 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
6 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✓Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 1.5%
Contingent liabilities of 5.54 cr against a net worth of 377.15 cr — 1.5% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 17.1%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 20.02 cr against a profit of 116.79 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth116.79 ÷ 377.15What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)156.15 ÷ (377.15 + 0.00) = 156.15 ÷ 377.15Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue166.29 ÷ 489.28Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth0.00 ÷ 377.15How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost156.15 ÷ 0.17How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(93.71 ÷ 489.28) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days65 + 70 − 22How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT92.49 ÷ 116.79Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(116.79 − 92.49) ÷ 432.03 = 24.30 ÷ 432.03The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹271.00 × 175,230,000 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash4,748.73 + 0.00 − 14.87What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA4,733.86 ÷ 166.29The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT4,748.73 ÷ 116.79The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisitionAcquired at nil or near-nil considerationEvery offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Here the entry price is nil, which means a bonus issue or a transfer for no consideration. A multiple cannot be computed against zero, and that is the fact worth noticing rather than a number to print. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)40.66 ÷ 6.4%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the CRISIL Report, the Indian and global fire protection equipment market is driven by expanding industrial infrastructure, oil & gas investments, power generation expansion, and tightening fire safety regulatory compliance mandates. Operating EBITDA margins for leading capital goods and equipment players range between 12% and 23%.
Completely Debt-Free Issuer Executing 100% Secondary Offer for Sale
HD Fire Protect Limited operates with zero debt on its balance sheet (pre and post issue borrowings of ₹ 0.00 crore) and high return ratios (FY26 RoE of 30.17% and RoCE of 40.33%). The IPO is structured 100% as an Offer for Sale of 26,284,500 Equity Shares, providing secondary liquidity to promoters without diluting capital or requiring primary capital injection.
Source: p.1, p.76, p.105, p.205Global Export Leadership Backed by Extensive International Safety Certifications
HD Fire Protect is India's largest exporter of fire protection equipment by value, with export sales across 90+ countries accounting for 34.69% of FY26 revenue from operations (₹ 168.41 crore). The company holds 21 UL Listed and 87 FM Approved certifications alongside CE, VdS, ASME-U Stamp, and Lloyd's Register accreditations, creating significant technical entry barriers.
Source: p.200, p.202, p.212Vertical Integration in Manufacturing and R&D Infrastructure
Operating two manufacturing facilities in Jalgaon and Thane spanning 8.50 acres, HD Fire maintains in-house non-ferrous foundry, 5-axis machining, automated testing, and 745 kWp rooftop solar power generation, alongside a newly completed 2.50-acre Jalgaon R&D and fire test lab expansion.
Source: p.212, p.218, p.235Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Harish Narshi Dharamshi
Litigation: ₹ 0.04 crore (₹ 0.40 million) in indirect tax proceedings against the Company; no criminal proceedings or material civil claims outstanding against Company or Promoters.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Resignation of joint statutory auditor Hitesh Dedhia & Co in March 2025, who was later appointed as CFO in May 2025, disclosed as a risk factor.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| KSB Limited | — | — | 9.14 | 20.59 |
| Kirloskar Pneumatic Company Limited | — | — | 41.8 | 18.91 |
| Elgi Equipments Limited | — | — | 23.87 | 10.57 |
At the ₹271 upper band, the issue is priced at 40.7x earnings — a 35% discount to the peer median of 63.0x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Plant & Fire Safety Equipment Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Installed Capacity (Jalgaon & Thane) | Jalgaon: 126,738 EPU / Thane: 800,000 EPU | annual installed capacity across Jalgaon and Thane plants in FY26 |
| Jalgaon Capacity Utilisation % (FY26) | Deluge 80.90%, Foam 63.40%, Sprinklers 70.40%, Monitors 78.90% | FY26 capacity utilisation rates at Jalgaon manufacturing facility |
| Thane Water Spray Nozzles Utilisation % | 94.10% | FY26 capacity utilisation rate for water spray nozzles at Thane facility |
| Export Sales Revenue Share | 34.69% | share of FY26 revenue from operations from exports across 90+ countries |
| Manufacturing Facilities Footprint | 8.50 acres | combined area across Jalgaon MIDC and Thane MIDC facilities |
Source: p.210, p.212, p.235, p.238
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Hitesh Dedhia & Co, Chartered Accountants, resigned as joint statutory auditor on March 27, 2025. Subsequently, Hitesh Dedhia was appointed as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) of HD Fire Protect Limited on May 2, 2025.
p.16, p.52, p.118, p.275HD Fire Protect Limited paid regulatory compounding fines of ₹ 0.075 crore (₹ 0.75 million) in Feb 2026 for buyback procedural lapses under Section 68 and ₹ 0.025 crore (₹ 0.25 million) in Dec 2025 for delayed cost auditor appointment.
p.66, p.67M/s. Dharamshi Capital Services, a proprietary firm of Promoter Group member Hiren Narshi Dharamshi, was prohibited by SEBI from accessing capital markets for 5 years in September 2004 for market manipulation and artificial volume creation.
p.59, p.60The entire IPO of 2,62,84,500 Equity Shares is an Offer for Sale by Promoters Harish Narshi Dharamshi and Kusum Harish Dharamshi, with zero fresh issue proceeds flowing to the Company.
p.1, p.76, p.88, p.119₹ 0.04 crore (₹ 0.40 million) in indirect tax proceedings against the Company; no criminal proceedings or material civil claims outstanding against Company or Promoters.
p.16, p.21, p.52, p.100, p.118, p.275, p.356Resignation of joint statutory auditor Hitesh Dedhia & Co in March 2025, who was later appointed as CFO in May 2025, disclosed as a risk factor.
p.16, p.21, p.52, p.100, p.118, p.275, p.356Trade receivables grew 62.2% against revenue growth of 13.1% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Restated financial statements confirm export revenue of ₹ 168.41 crore in FY26 (34.69% of top-line sales) with active sales across 90+ countries including Middle East, US, and Europe.
p.204, p.211, p.212Filing discloses resignation of joint statutory auditor who became CFO, past compounding fines for buyback and cost audit lapses, and unrectified errors in annual MGT-7 filings.
p.52, p.66, p.68Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Global footprints across 90+ countries backed by international product certifications including UL Listed, FM Approved, and CE Marked.
- Completely debt-free balance sheet with high return ratios (FY26 RoE of 30.17% and RoCE of 40.33%).
Weaknesses
- Working capital lock-up in inventory (85 days in FY26) and trade receivables (57 days in FY26).
- High concentration of management control among family promoters.
Opportunities
- Growing global and domestic demand for automated fire suppression systems across expanding data centres, industrial plants, and EV infrastructure.
- Expansion of international distribution footprint across untapped overseas markets.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Raw material price volatility in metals (brass, stainless steel, ductile iron) and polymer compounds. risk_section
Why it matters: Fluctuations in copper, zinc, or iron prices impact manufacturing margins if price increases cannot be passed on immediately. - Regulatory changes or loss of international product safety accreditations. risk_section
Why it matters: Revocation or delay in renewing UL/FM certifications would halt sales to major global EPC contractors.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: MUFG Intime India
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (26 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Will HD Fire Protect Limited receive any proceeds from the public offer?
No. The offer is 100% an Offer for Sale of 26,284,500 Equity Shares by Promoter Selling Shareholders Harish Narshi Dharamshi and Kusum Harish Dharamshi. All net proceeds will go to the selling shareholders.
p.76, p.119What drove revenue and net profit growth in Fiscal 2026?
Revenue from operations grew by 13.05% to ₹ 489.28 crore in FY26, while Restated PAT increased by 6.44% to ₹ 116.79 crore, supported by sustained domestic market demand and expanding export sales.
p.204, p.258, p.373Why did one of the joint statutory auditors resign and join the company as CFO?
Hitesh Dedhia & Co. resigned as joint auditor on March 27, 2025, and Hitesh Dedhia was appointed CFO on May 2, 2025 to manage expanded finance operations. The company states this was done to support operational scale, though it is flagged as a risk factor.
p.16, p.52, p.118Reading the Offer Structure
100% offer for sale — and the company does not appear to need the cash.
A high offer-for-sale share is not automatically a concern. On the disclosed numbers this company is profitable and not heavily borrowed, so the listing reads as an exit route for existing shareholders and a route to a public market rather than a funding exercise. Large, cash-generative companies routinely list this way.
What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Harish Narshi Dharamshi / Kusum Harish Dharamshi | ₹100.00 | 2005-04-01 | 2.7x |
| An early round from roughly 22 years ago, at roughly 2.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Harish Narshi Dharamshi / Kusum Harish Dharamshi | ₹100.00 | 2007-09-05 | 2.7x |
| An early round from roughly 19 years ago, at roughly 2.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Bonus Issue (1:100) | — | 2023-11-04 | — |
| Sub-division of shares (1:20) | — | 2025-03-18 | — |
| Bonus Issue (1:10) | — | 2025-03-18 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 21 Apr 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 21 Apr 2027Promoters' Shareholding in Excess of Minimum Contribution6 months
- 21 Apr 2027Entire Pre-Offer Equity Share Capital6 months
- 20 Nov 2026Anchor Investor Portion (50%)30 days
- 19 Jan 2027Anchor Investor Portion (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
