Fusion CX
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Fusion CX Limited is a global provider of technology-enabled, omnichannel customer experience (CX) and business process management (BPM) solutions across healthcare, BFSI, telecom, and technology verticals.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Fusion CX Limited (formerly Fusion CX Private Limited and Xplore-Tech Services Private Limited) is an integrated customer experience (CX) solutions provider delivering voice, chat, email, social media, and digital field services globally. Operating over 40 delivery centers across 13 countries in North America, LATAM, EMEA, and APAC, the company serves clients across key verticals including Telecommunications and Technology (47.34% of FY26 revenue), BFSI (13.52%), Healthcare (13.14%), Consumer and Retail (12.12%), and others. The company integrates human agents with proprietary AI and generative AI platforms developed by its digital innovation subsidiary, Omind Technologies (including Arya, MindVoice, and Annotera.AI). Consolidated revenue from operations reached ₹ 1,818.14 crore (₹ 18,181.38 million) in Fiscal 2026 with a Restated Profit After Tax of ₹ 169.84 crore (₹ 1,698.40 million).
- Telecommunications and Technology — Omnichannel customer support, billing, subscriber management, and technical helpdesk solutions.
- Healthcare and Life Sciences — Patient engagement, telehealth support, revenue cycle management (RCM), and HIPAA-compliant digital workflows.
- BFSI — Customer onboarding, KYC compliance, collections, and fraud prevention solutions for banks and fintechs.
- Consumer and Retail — Omnichannel customer care, order management, seller support, and loyalty programs.
Global delivery footprint with 40+ delivery centers across 13 countries supporting 28 languages, deep domain specialization across regulated verticals, proprietary generative AI tools via subsidiary Omind, and long-standing client relationships averaging over 11 years with top customers.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding debt repayment, strategic acquisitions, and technology infrastructure expansion
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Filing Integrity. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 1818.14 | 1329.3 | 991.32 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 169.84 | 74.31 | 36.26 |
| PAT Margin | 9.34% | 5.59% | 3.66% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Telecommunications and technology: 47.34%
- BFSI: 13.52%
- Healthcare: 13.14%
- Consumer and retail: 12.12%
- Others: 13.88%
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 36.8% | Revenue from operations grew by 36.77% driven by organic account expansion across telecommunications, technology, and healthcare verticals, along with inorganic revenue contribution from acquisitions including S4 Communications LLC and Sequential Technology International (STI). | Structural |
| Employee benefits expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 36.3% | Employee benefit expenses increased primarily due to headcount addition following business expansion and acquisitions, salary increments, and leadership additions. | Structural |
| Finance costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 17.5% | Finance costs increased due to higher lease liability interest from newly recognized facility leases and interest on acquisition term loans. | Structural |
| Restated PAT (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 128.6% | Restated net profit expanded significantly due to top-line growth, operating leverage, higher gross margins, and integration synergies from acquisitions. | Structural |
| Operating cash flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 157.9% | Cash flow from operations increased to ₹ 264.22 crore in FY26 from ₹ 102.45 crore in FY25 due to higher profit before tax and efficient working capital collections. | Structural |
| Revenue from operations (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 34.1% | Revenue expanded due to organic client additions and inorganic expansion across nearshore delivery locations. | Structural |
Headwinds
- Employee Attrition and Global Wage Inflation Pressure company persistent
High voluntary attrition in CX roles and wage inflation across delivery locations in India, Philippines, and LATAM require ongoing recruitment and upskilling investments. - Client Adoption of In-House AI Self-Service and Automation Tools sector persistent
Emergence of client in-house AI tools and chatbots could reduce human agent interaction volumes, necessitating continuous development of proprietary Gen AI solutions.
Tailwinds
- Accelerating Enterprise Outsourcing to Digital Multilingual CX Platforms macro
Increasing enterprise shift toward outsourced digital CX, omnichannel voice/non-voice integration, and right-shoring nearshore delivery models drives multi-vertical demand.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-10-21
- Pre Application Start2026-10-12
- Bidding Start2026-10-14
- Bidding End2026-10-16
- Allotment Process Start2026-10-19
- Allotment Finalization2026-10-21
- Listing Day2026-10-22
- Mandate End2026-11-27
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 1,818.14 | 1,329.30 | 991.32 |
| Other Income | 33.69 | 22.73 | 30.21 |
| Total Income | 1,851.83 | 1,352.03 | 1,021.53 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 1,192.98 | 875.06 | 682.19 |
| Finance Cost | 45.47 | 38.69 | 18.96 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 95.10 | 81.34 | 48.98 |
| Other Expenses | 328.98 | 279.20 | 234.72 |
| Total Expenses | 1,662.53 | 1,274.29 | 984.84 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 189.30 | 77.74 | 36.68 |
| Exceptional Items | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Profit Before Tax | 189.30 | 77.74 | 36.68 |
| Tax Expense | 19.46 | 3.43 | 0.42 |
| Profit After Tax | 169.84 | 74.31 | 36.26 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 29.34 | 12.33 | -2.03 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 199.18 | 86.73 | 34.23 |
| EPS - Basic | 13.47 | 5.90 | 2.88 |
| EPS - Diluted | 13.41 | 5.88 | 2.88 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 12.63 | 12.60 | 12.60 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 547.97 | 345.76 | 257.55 |
| Net Worth | 552.46 | 354.58 | 270.15 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 79.77 | 73.78 | 70.88 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 187.10 | 232.95 | 139.73 |
| Total Borrowings | 266.86 | 306.73 | 210.61 |
| Trade Payables | 176.13 | 173.11 | 53.54 |
| Current Liabilities | 644.99 | 589.60 | 382.10 |
| Total Liabilities | 824.54 | 751.20 | 520.40 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 95.80 | 83.21 | 65.10 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 8.69 | 2.10 | 1.20 |
| Intangible Assets | 106.43 | 85.00 | 62.00 |
| Investments | 4.43 | 3.20 | 2.80 |
| Trade Receivables | 375.06 | 335.00 | 280.00 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 89.56 | 37.92 | 20.11 |
| Current Assets | 592.32 | 482.00 | 390.00 |
| Total Assets | 1,385.15 | 1,116.80 | 790.00 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 264.22 | 102.45 | 39.26 |
| Capital Expenditure | 19.73 | 31.51 | 28.44 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -83.10 | -63.63 | -61.89 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | -138.04 | -26.73 | 11.05 |
| Net Change in Cash | 42.68 | 17.81 | -11.58 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 17.8 | 14.6 | 10.2 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 12.7 | 8.6 | 5.4 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 9.3 | 5.6 | 3.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 30.7 | 21 | 13.4 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 28.7 | 17.6 | 11.6 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 12.3 | 6.7 | 4.6 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.48 | 0.87 | 0.78 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 0.54 | 1.36 | 1.82 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 5.16 | 3.01 | 2.93 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 0.92 | 0.82 | 1.02 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.31 | 1.19 | 1.25 |
| Receivable Days | 75 | 92 | 103 |
| Payable Days | 35 | 48 | 20 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.56 | 1.38 | 1.08 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -6.8 | -2.5 | -0.4 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 0.21 | 0.39 | 0.58 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against revenue. Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 9.3% | 5.6% | 3.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.31x | 1.19x | 1.25x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 2.51x | 3.15x | 2.92x |
| = Return on Equity | 30.7% | 21% | 13.4% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.9x | 0.96x | 0.99x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.81x | 0.67x | 0.66x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 12.9% | 8.8% | 5.6% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.56x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Receivable days fell from 103 to 75. Collections improved over the disclosed period.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 83% while profit grew 368%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- The current ratio was 0.92x in FY26 — current liabilities exceeded current assets. The company depends on continued access to short-term funding.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 0.819 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 1.019 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.368 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 0.992 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.964 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.881 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0681 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 6.13 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | -0.038 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.396 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.169 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.67 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 6.13 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
7 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✓Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
1 of 5 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly. Signs the filing gives no inputs for are shown as — and left out of the count.
- ○Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹-28.1 cr in FY25, ₹-94.4 cr in FY26
- ○Receivable days rising · 92 days in FY25, 75 days in FY26
- —Inventory days rising · — days in FY25, — days in FY26 (on revenue)
- ○Other current assets rising against revenue · 8.2% of revenue in FY25, 7.0% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ○Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 97.8% of net block in FY25, 99.3% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 24.0% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 552.46 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 3.5%
3.5% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0.48x
Short-term borrowings of 187.10 cr against cash of 89.56 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 1.2%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 2.00 cr against a profit of 169.84 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹289.00, the market value is ₹3,672 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹367 cr | 2.2x | 5.5 | 3.5 |
| 12% a year | ₹441 cr | 2.6x | 6.8 | 4.3 |
| 14% a year | ₹514 cr | 3.0x | 7.9 | 5.0 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 4.63% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: 6.66% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, ₹244 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth169.84 ÷ 552.46What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)234.77 ÷ (552.46 + 266.86) = 234.77 ÷ 819.32Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue329.87 ÷ 1,818.14Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth266.86 ÷ 552.46How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost234.77 ÷ 45.47How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(375.06 ÷ 1,818.14) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT264.22 ÷ 169.84Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(169.84 − 264.22) ÷ 1,385.15 = -94.38 ÷ 1,385.15The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹289.00 × 127,059,295 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash3,672.01 + 266.86 − 89.56What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA3,849.31 ÷ 329.87The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT3,672.01 ÷ 169.84The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
Offer price ÷ weighted average cost of acquisition₹289.00 ÷ ₹72.20Every offer document must disclose the weighted average cost of acquisition for shares issued or transferred over the preceding one, eighteen and thirty-six months. Early capital takes real risk and a large multiple built over years is ordinary. A steep step-up inside a short window is the one that deserves a second look. What it means is yours to decide; the arithmetic is the filing’s own.
Growth needed to reach the peer multiple on earnings alone21.62x against a peer median of 20.96xThis is not a forecast and not a target. It is the price restated as a question: at this multiple, with the price unchanged, earnings would have to compound at this rate to arrive at what the filing’s own peer group trades on. Whether the business can do that is the argument — we are only stating what the argument is about.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹169.84 cr ÷ ₹3,672.01 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹244.49 cr ÷ ₹3,672.01 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)21.62 ÷ 128.6%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the Everest Report, the global customer experience (CX) industry addressable market is expected to reach ₹ 3,503,000.00 crore (INR 35.03 trillion) by 2027. Outsourced CX represents a growing segment driving adoption of AI, generative AI, and multilingual omnichannel delivery.
Inorganic M&A Integration Driving Global CX Footprint Expansion
Fusion CX has executed eight strategic acquisitions across North America, LATAM, EMEA, and APAC since 2019 (including S4 Communications, STI, and VA Platinum), building a global delivery network of 40+ centers across 13+ countries supporting 28 languages.
Source: p.131, p.188, p.246Proprietary Gen AI Suite Integration via Subsidiary Omind
Through its digital innovation subsidiary Omind, Fusion CX deploys proprietary AI platforms (Arya, MindVoice, Annotera.AI) to automate quality management, agent co-pilots, and multilingual voice harmonization across enterprise client accounts.
Source: p.131, p.163, p.174Fresh Issue Proceeds Targeted for Debt Reduction and Strategic Acquisitions
Out of ₹ 500.00 crore in net fresh issue proceeds, Fusion CX allocates funds toward prepayment/repayment of outstanding debt facilities and funding strategic M&A opportunities, de-risking the balance sheet and supporting global expansion.
Source: p.97, p.116Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Pankaj Dhanuka
Litigation: ₹ 3.49 crore in income tax proceedings against the Company, alongside criminal complaints under IPC/BNS where CMD Pankaj Dhanuka and CFO Amit Soni obtained anticipatory bail and filed settlement petitions.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Auditor noted CARO reporting observations across FY24-FY26 regarding discrepancies between quarterly trade receivable statements filed with working capital banks and financial books of accounts.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Firstsource Solutions Limited | 22.27 | — | 15 | 7.1 |
| eClerx Services Limited | 19.65 | — | 53 | 17.2 |
At the ₹289 upper band, the issue is priced at 21.6x earnings — a 3% premium to the peer median of 21.0x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
CX & BPM Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Delivery Centers Count | 40+ centers | across 13+ countries globally in North America, LATAM, EMEA, and APAC as of March 31, 2026 |
| Language Support Capability | 28 languages | multilingual delivery capabilities supporting global enterprise client operations |
| CX Workforce Headcount | 13,357 employees | CX employees engaged in operations as of March 31, 2026 (13,735 as of June 30, 2026) |
| Voluntary Employee Attrition % | 26.50% | voluntary attrition rate in Fiscal 2026 (down from 30.56% in FY25) |
| Telecommunications & Technology Revenue Share | 47.34% | largest revenue contributing vertical in Fiscal 2026 |
Source: p.121, p.132, p.188, p.217
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Statutory auditor CARO reports noted material variances between quarterly trade receivable statements submitted to lending banks for working capital limits exceeding ₹ 5.00 crore and internal financial books of accounts across FY24, FY25, and FY26.
p.30, p.34, p.174A retaliatory FIR was registered against CMD Pankaj Dhanuka and CFO Amit Soni alleging criminal breach of trust and falsification of records, wherein Calcutta High Court granted anticipatory bail on August 18, 2026, followed by a joint settlement petition to withdraw FIRs.
p.250Chairman and CEO Pankaj Dhanuka was previously disqualified under Section 164(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 from being appointed as a director.
p.35The offer consists of a Fresh Issue of ₹ 500.00 crore alongside an Offer for Sale of ₹ 202.00 crore by Promoter Selling Shareholders P N S Business Private Limited and Rasish Consultants Private Limited.
p.2, p.10₹ 3.49 crore in income tax proceedings against the Company, alongside criminal complaints under IPC/BNS where CMD Pankaj Dhanuka and CFO Amit Soni obtained anticipatory bail and filed settlement petitions.
p.1, p.2, p.30, p.34, p.157, p.250Auditor noted CARO reporting observations across FY24-FY26 regarding discrepancies between quarterly trade receivable statements filed with working capital banks and financial books of accounts.
p.1, p.2, p.30, p.34, p.157, p.250Goodwill and intangibles are 19.3% of net worth.
rule: intangibles 15-30% of net worthShort-term borrowings of ₹187.10 cr against cash of ₹89.56 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Restated consolidated financial statements confirm FY26 revenue of ₹ 1,818.14 crore across 40+ delivery centers in 13+ countries with 13,700+ CX employees.
p.131, p.188Statutory auditor CARO reports noted discrepancies between quarterly trade receivable statements filed with working capital banks and internal books of accounts across FY24-FY26.
p.30, p.174Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Global delivery network with 40+ delivery centers across 13 countries supporting 28 languages.
- Proven inorganic growth track record with 8 strategic acquisitions integrated since 2019.
- Proprietary generative AI and automation platforms (Arya, MindVoice, Annotera.AI) developed by subsidiary Omind.
Weaknesses
- High revenue concentration in Telecommunications and Technology vertical accounting for 47.34% of FY26 revenue.
- Auditor CARO observations regarding discrepancies in quarterly bank trade receivable statements.
Opportunities
- Expanding addressable market for outsourced CX projected to reach ₹ 3,503,000.00 crore globally by 2027.
- Upselling AI-driven analytics, automation, and digital field services to existing Fortune 1000 client base.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Accelerating client shift toward automated self-service and in-house AI tools. risk_section
Why it matters: Rapid adoption of client in-house AI tools or chatbots could reduce human agent call volume and squeeze outsourcing contract values. - Employee attrition and wage pressure across global delivery centers. risk_section
Why it matters: High employee turnover in CX roles forces higher recruitment costs and wage inflation in key delivery hubs like India and Philippines.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (27 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How will the ₹ 500.00 crore fresh issue proceeds be deployed?
Fusion CX will allocate net fresh issue proceeds toward repayment/prepayment of borrowings, funding strategic acquisitions, technology infrastructure expansion, and general corporate purposes.
p.97, p.116What is Fusion CX's customer and vertical concentration profile?
Top 5 clients contributed 39.6% and top 10 clients contributed 49.7% of FY26 revenue from operations. Vertically, Telecommunications and Technology accounts for 47.34% of FY26 revenue.
p.132, p.181What drove top-line growth and EBITDA expansion in Fiscal 2026?
Consolidated revenue from operations grew 36.77% to ₹ 1,818.14 crore in FY26, while EBITDA increased 66.79% to ₹ 329.87 crore, supported by inorganic integration synergies (S4 and STI acquisitions) and higher demand for digital CX solutions.
p.125, p.188What are the key audit and legal risk flags disclosed in the filing?
Statutory auditors flagged CARO observations regarding discrepancies between quarterly bank trade receivable filings and internal accounting books for FY24-FY26. Additionally, key promoters face tax demand proceedings of ₹ 3.49 crore and a settled criminal proceeding.
p.30, p.250What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hemant Dogra / Oindrila Banerjee Das / Amit Soni / Atul Khemka | ₹72.20 | 2025-01-20 | 4.0x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 22 Apr 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 22 Apr 2027Promoters' Shareholding in Excess of Minimum Contribution6 months
- 22 Apr 2027Entire Pre-Offer Equity Share Capital6 months
- 21 Nov 2026Anchor Investor Portion (50%)30 days
- 20 Jan 2027Anchor Investor Portion (50%)90 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
