Elevate Campuses
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Elevate Campuses Limited (formerly Good Host Spaces Limited) is an Indian education infrastructure company engaged in owning, operating, and managing on-campus student accommodation and K-12 school assets. As of March 31, 2026, its portfolio encompasses 20,368 Owned Beds, 55,487 Managed Beds, and 18 K-12 Assets across India and the UAE.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Elevate Campuses Limited is an education infrastructure and student accommodation platform operating across India and the GCC region. Its core offerings comprise Student Accommodation—divided into an Owned Portfolio (leasing student housing under long-term contracts with higher education institutions) and a Managed Portfolio (providing asset-light facility management, dining, laundry, and administrative services)—and K-12 Assets (owning school campus infrastructure leased to operators). The company serves academic institutions and students, catering to 17 HEIs and multiple K-12 schools, including prominent clients like Manipal University Jaipur, O.P. Jindal Global University, and Shoolini University. Geographically, operations span 22 cities in India—concentrated in northern states (Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Uttarakhand) and southern states (Karnataka, Tamil Nadu)—and internationally in Dubai, UAE (Hartland International School and North London Collegiate School). As of March 31, 2026, its scale includes 20,368 Owned Beds, 55,487 Managed Beds, and 18 K-12 Assets, generating ₹ 568.63 crore in restated consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026. Supply chain arrangements rely on long-term campus master leases, EPC agreements for greenfield and brownfield facility expansion, and vendor partnerships for third-party housekeeping, security, and catering services.
- Student Accommodation (Owned Portfolio) — On-campus student housing owned or leased under long-term contracts with minimum occupancy guarantees.
- Student Accommodation (Managed Portfolio) — Asset-light hostel management services providing administration, mess, laundry, and security under service agreements.
- K-12 Assets — Ownership and leasing of school campus infrastructure to K-12 school operators in India and the UAE.
Market leadership as India's largest Purpose-Built Student Accommodation (PMSA) operator, long-term contracts with HEIs featuring contractual inflation escalation and occupancy guarantees, integrated multi-asset education infrastructure presence across student housing and K-12 schools, and a derisked revenue model.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Payment of the purchase consideration for the acquisition of the K-12 Entities and Campuses from the fellow subsidiaries of our Promoters — ₹1,100.00 cr
- Repayment and/ or prepayment, in full or in part, of certain outstanding borrowings and prepayment penalties, as applicable of borrowings availed by our Company and certain of our wholly-owned Subsidiaries — ₹750.00 cr
- Funding inorganic growth through unidentified acquisitions, other strategic initiatives and general corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. This filing names no comparable listed peer, so there is no peer table and no relative multiple on this page. We would rather say that than assemble a peer set the issuer did not stand behind.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 4 live components.
90% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Valuation Vs Peers. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured12%
What changed between the draft prospectus and the final one. A period roll-forward or a refreshed industry report is expected and scores neutral. A statutory auditor replaced mid-process, a prior year restated, an offer-for-sale expanded late, new statutory dues disclosed, or a risk factor quietly removed all score against. Where only one of the two documents has been read, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 568.63 | 369.81 | 347 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 173.76 | 49.74 | 39.69 |
| PAT Margin | 30.56% | 13.45% | 11.44% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Student Accommodation (Owned Portfolio): 65.74%
- K-12 Assets: 29.34%
- Student Accommodation (Managed Portfolio): 4.92%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Our read of the filing is solid, but demand is thin so far. Books fill late — most retail and institutional bids land in the final hours — so this may simply be the clock. Or the market may know something the filing does not say.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Why the numbers moved, in management’s own words
Taken from the Management’s Discussion and Analysis section of the filing. A number tells you what happened; this is the company’s explanation of why, and whether it calls the cause temporary or structural.
| Metric | Move | Management's stated reason | Type |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 53.8% | Revenue from operations grew significantly due to inorganic expansion from acquiring Souk HIS UAE and Souk NLCS UAE in the K-12 segment, higher Managed Portfolio revenue from ScholarZ, and growth in Owned Portfolio properties. | Structural |
| Other Income (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 43.0% | Other income increased primarily due to higher gains on the sale of investments in mutual funds and fixed deposits alongside fair value gains on financial instruments at FVTPL. | One-off |
| Employee Benefits Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 66.0% | Employee benefit expenses increased primarily due to higher employee headcount following the acquisition of ScholarZ, annual salary increments, and strengthening operational teams. | Structural |
| Finance Costs (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 90.5% | Finance costs rose due to increased interest on bank borrowings drawn for asset acquisitions and interest expense on convertible debentures issued to related parties. | Structural |
| Depreciation and Amortisation Expense (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 99.4% | Depreciation and amortisation nearly doubled due to depreciation on newly acquired investment properties in Dubai and amortisation of intangible assets from acquisitions including ScholarZ and Data Ram Sons. | Structural |
| Other Expenses (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 18.8% | Other expenses grew due to higher legal and professional fees associated with business combinations, increased repairs and maintenance, rates and taxes, and utility charges across an expanded property portfolio. | Structural |
| EBITDA (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 112.6% | EBITDA expanded substantially driven by top-line revenue growth from inorganic K-12 asset and student housing acquisitions, supported by exceptional gains during the year. | Structural |
| Profit After Tax (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 249.4% | Restated net profit jumped due to an exceptional gain of ₹ 109.44 crore on the sale of a hostel undertaking, combined with revenue expansion across K-12 and student accommodation assets. | One-off |
| Trade Receivables (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 147.1% | Trade receivables expanded in line with overall business scale expansion and integration of newly acquired entities' billing cycles. | Structural |
| Total Borrowings (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 241.5% | Borrowings increased sharply due to new term loan drawdowns for funding inorganic asset acquisitions in Dubai and India and the issuance of ₹ 1,050.00 crore in convertible debentures. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY26 vs FY25) | ↑ 35.8% | Operating cash flows increased due to higher operating profitability before working capital changes, supported by expansion in rental income and facility management fees. | Structural |
| Other Income (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 55.8% | Other income grew due to higher gains realized on the sale of investments in mutual funds and fixed deposits. | One-off |
| Finance Costs (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 14.9% | Finance costs increased primarily due to higher interest on unwinding of financial liabilities from unamortized loan processing fees written off during debt refinancing and prepayment charges. | One-off |
| Profit After Tax (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 25.3% | Net profit expanded due to higher facility management fees, contractual fee escalations across HEIs, and full-year contribution of a hostel block in Sonipat acquired in August 2023. | Structural |
| Total Borrowings (FY25 vs FY24) | ↑ 22.5% | Borrowings increased as credit facilities were refinanced to increase available liquidity and fund asset acquisitions. | Structural |
| Operating Cash Flow (FY25 vs FY24) | ↓ 17.3% | Operating cash flows decreased due to working capital absorption from settling trade payables related to investment banking services availed in FY24. | Cyclical |
Headwinds
- Customer Concentration with Top HEIs company persistent
Deriving 61.46% of FY26 revenue from three largest HEI partners exposes operations to risks of contract termination, student enrollment drops, or university reputational issues. - Vacancy and Refurbishment at Woodstock and County Assets company temporary
Leases for Woodstock and County were terminated in FY26, resulting in temporary vacancy; while Woodstock recommenced operations in July 2026, occupancy remains below projected levels. - High Employee Attrition Rate company persistent
Employee attrition reached 56.43% in Fiscal 2026, creating operational risk in managing facility management and administrative teams across expanding campuses. - Higher Education Enrollment and Urban Migration Dynamics macro persistent
Macroeconomic slowdowns, policy changes in higher education, or geopolitical instability in international markets like Dubai can impact student mobility and housing demand.
Tailwinds
- Growth in Indian Purpose-Built Student Accommodation Market sector
PMSA investible real estate opportunity is projected to reach 412 million sq ft with annual revenue potential of USD 4.36 billion (17% CAGR) by AY 2028-29, driven by rising private university enrollments. - Shift of HEIs and K-12 Operators to Asset-Light Models sector
Academic institutions increasingly prefer outsourcing student housing and school infrastructure management to specialized institutional operators.
| Facility | Period | Utilisation |
|---|---|---|
| Student Accommodation (Owned Portfolio) - Overall | Academic Year 2026 | 89.4% |
| Manipal University Jaipur (MUJ) Student Housing | Academic Year 2026 | 100.0% |
| O.P. Jindal Global University (Sonipat) Student Housing | Academic Year 2026 | 100.0% |
| UPES Dehradun Student Housing | Academic Year 2026 | 97.2% |
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-29
- Pre Application Start2026-09-21
- Bidding Start2026-09-23
- Bidding End2026-09-25
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-28
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-29
- Listing Day2026-09-30
- Mandate End2026-11-06
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 568.63 | 369.81 | 347.00 |
| Other Income | 34.76 | 24.32 | 15.61 |
| Total Income | 603.39 | 394.13 | 362.61 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 43.70 | 26.32 | 27.99 |
| Finance Cost | 239.10 | 125.54 | 109.23 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 102.14 | 51.24 | 48.76 |
| Other Expenses | 119.61 | 100.73 | 104.43 |
| Total Expenses | 504.55 | 303.83 | 290.41 |
| Profit Before Exceptional Items and Tax | 98.84 | 90.30 | 72.20 |
| Exceptional Items | 104.92 | -10.67 | -10.07 |
| Profit Before Tax | 203.76 | 79.63 | 62.13 |
| Tax Expense | 30.00 | 29.89 | 22.44 |
| Profit After Tax | 173.76 | 49.74 | 39.69 |
| Other Comprehensive Income | 60.35 | -0.01 | 52.18 |
| Total Comprehensive Income | 234.11 | 49.73 | 91.87 |
| EPS - Basic | 19.65 | 5.63 | 4.49 |
| EPS - Diluted | 17.81 | 5.63 | 4.48 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 2.21 | 2.21 | 2.21 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 954.08 | 697.57 | 653.56 |
| Net Worth | 956.29 | 699.78 | 655.77 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 4,003.23 | 1,183.73 | 885.20 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 117.31 | 22.87 | 99.51 |
| Total Borrowings | 4,120.53 | 1,206.60 | 984.71 |
| Trade Payables | 55.73 | 31.38 | 61.04 |
| Current Liabilities | 521.94 | 403.80 | 284.86 |
| Total Liabilities | 4,817.06 | 1,709.64 | 1,448.97 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 3,716.21 | 998.48 | 1,045.81 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 202.67 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 575.98 | 263.43 | 290.20 |
| Investments | 184.11 | 192.28 | 28.81 |
| Inventories | 0.91 | 1.00 | 1.80 |
| Trade Receivables | 5.86 | 2.37 | 1.97 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 245.57 | 306.73 | 77.40 |
| Current Assets | 484.23 | 522.30 | 259.75 |
| Total Assets | 5,773.35 | 2,421.20 | 2,104.74 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 297.08 | 218.72 | 264.45 |
| Capital Expenditure | 2,424.81 | 7.02 | 10.13 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -3,184.32 | -104.01 | -119.48 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 2,679.49 | 114.63 | -151.36 |
| Net Change in Cash | -207.75 | 229.34 | -6.39 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 72.9 | 67.8 | 63.5 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 56 | 54.8 | 50 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 30.6 | 13.5 | 11.4 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 18.2 | 7.1 | 6.1 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 6.7 | 11.3 | 11.1 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 3 | 2.1 | 1.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 4.31 | 1.72 | 1.5 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 8.81 | 3.37 | 3.94 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 1.41 | 1.72 | 1.66 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 0.93 | 1.29 | 0.91 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 0.93 | 1.29 | 0.91 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.1 | 0.15 | 0.16 |
| Receivable Days | 4 | 2 | 2 |
| Inventory Days | 1 | 1 | 2 |
| Payable Days | 36 | 31 | 64 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | -31 | -28 | -60 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 1.71 | 4.4 | 6.66 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | -2.1 | -7 | -10.7 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 23.74 | 0.14 | 0.21 |
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 30.6% | 13.5% | 11.4% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.1x | 0.15x | 0.16x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 6.04x | 3.46x | 3.21x |
| = Return on Equity | 18.2% | 7.1% | 6.1% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.85x | 0.62x | 0.64x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.6x | 0.37x | 0.34x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 59.4% | 58.4% | 52.3% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- Operating cash flow was 1.71x reported profit in FY26. Earnings are converting into cash, which is what you want to see and frequently is not the case.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 64% while profit grew 338%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 1.41x in FY26. A meaningful share of operating profit is going to service debt rather than fund the business.
- The current ratio was 0.93x in FY26 — current liabilities exceeded current assets. The company depends on continued access to short-term funding.
- Debt to equity stood at 4.31x in FY26.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman and Piotroski — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.608 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | — | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.733 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.538 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.825 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.836 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 1.195 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | -0.0214 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 4.35 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | -0.007 |
| X2 — Retained Earnings / Total Assets | 0.165 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.059 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 0.199 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 4.35 |
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 7Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it. A further 1 test is shown as — below: the filing does not disclose what it needs, so it is dropped from the denominator rather than counted as a failure.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✓Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✗Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✗Current ratio improving
- —Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- Revenue grew 54% in FY26, against 7% the year before. The final year before a filing is, for obvious reasons, the year a company most wants to look its best. Genuine acceleration does exactly this too — the filing is where you find out which it was.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 3.9%
Contingent liabilities of 37.34 cr against a net worth of 956.29 cr — 3.9% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0.9%
0.9% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 2.09x
Short-term borrowings of 117.31 cr against cash of 245.57 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 5.26 cr against a profit of 173.76 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth173.76 ÷ 956.29What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)337.94 ÷ (956.29 + 4,120.53) = 337.94 ÷ 5,076.82Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue440.08 ÷ 568.63Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth4,120.53 ÷ 956.29How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost337.94 ÷ 239.10How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(5.86 ÷ 568.63) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days1 + 4 − 36How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT297.08 ÷ 173.76Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(173.76 − 297.08) ÷ 5,773.35 = -123.32 ÷ 5,773.35The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Workspace
The interactive workspace is withheld on this issue. Every output in it — market capitalisation, enterprise value, every multiple, the reverse discounted cash flow — rests on the share count, and on this filing that count does not agree with itself. Below is each route we compute it by and what each one produces. A workspace built on the wrong one would be wrong in a way that looks entirely plausible, so we publish the disagreement instead.
| How the count is reached | Shares | Against the others |
|---|---|---|
| paid-up share capital divided by face value | 2.21 cr | agrees |
| profit after tax divided by basic EPS | 8.84 cr | does not agree |
| net worth divided by net asset value per share | 2.21 cr | agrees |
The profit after tax divided by basic EPS route sits at almost exactly 4 times the others, which is the signature of a bonus issue or a split between the financial year end and the offer rather than an error. Check whether the filing restated earnings per share for it.
The share count does not reconcile across independent routes. Every figure derived from it is withheld until the filing is re-read.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian Purpose-Built Student Accommodation (PMSA) and K-12 education infrastructure sectors are expanding rapidly, driven by rising higher education enrollments, urban migration, and institutional adoption of asset-light school operating models. According to the CBRE Report, the Indian PMSA market is projected to reach an investible real estate opportunity of 412 million square feet with an annual revenue potential of USD 4.36 billion (CAGR of 17%) by Academic Year 2028-29. Concurrently, the Target Addressable Market for K-12 private unaided school tuition fee revenue is expected to grow at a CAGR of 18.6% to USD 28.4 billion by Academic Year 2028-29. As the largest PMSA operator in India with a growing international K-12 footprint, Elevate Campuses Limited is positioned to capture demand across student lifecycles.
Inorganic Consolidation Strategy via Related-Party K-12 Acquisitions
Elevate Campuses is executing a major structural transition by utilizing ₹ 1,100.00 crore of fresh IPO proceeds to buy 14 K-12 Entities and Campuses from promoter-controlled entities. This expands pro forma FY26 revenue to ₹ 806.93 crore and shifts the business from a pure student housing operator into an integrated education real estate owner.
Source: p.28, p.133, p.570De-leveraging Capital Structure & Prepayment of High-Cost Debt
With total borrowings standing at ₹ 4,120.53 crore (including ₹ 1,050.00 crore in promoter debentures), the allocation of ₹ 750.00 crore from Fresh Issue proceeds toward debt prepayment will immediately reduce annual finance costs (₹ 239.10 crore in FY26) and improve Net Debt to EBITDA from 4.98x.
Source: p.58, p.133, p.580Contractual Cash Flow Protections & Valuation Distortion from Asset Sales
The core student housing business operates under 30-to-60 year university master leases backed by minimum occupancy guarantees and inflation escalations. However, reported net profit in FY26 (₹ 173.76 crore) was significantly boosted by a ₹ 109.44 crore exceptional gain on the sale of TAPMI hostel assets, meaning core recurring net margins are lower than headline numbers suggest.
Source: p.64, p.159, p.571Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Jayakumar Narasimha Raghavan
Litigation: 1 indirect tax proceeding against Company (₹ 9.68 crore GST demand); 1 criminal FIR against Directors Joseph Raymond Gagnon and Siddhartha Gupta regarding Tablespace; 16 tax proceedings against K-12 Entities (₹ 10.32 crore); 1 indirect tax proceeding against Subsidiary (₹ 31.46 crore GST demand, partially resolved).
Auditor / RPT Flags: None; unmodified audit examination opinion on Restated Consolidated Summary Statements, though CARO Annexure noted audit trail log preservation issues in FY24.
Capacity Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Operational beds (Owned) | 20,368 beds | AY2026 across 17 HEIs (plus 55,487 managed beds) |
| Occupancy rate | 89.37% | AY2026 average occupancy rate for Owned Portfolio |
| Average revenue per bed | ₹2,79,183 | annualized revenue per operational owned bed in FY26 |
| Weighted-average contract tenor | 30-60 years | master lease agreement duration with university partners |
| K-12 assets count | 18 assets | school infrastructure assets owned/operated across India and UAE |
| Customer concentration | 61.46% | Top 3 HEIs share of FY26 revenue from operations |
| Net debt to EBITDA | 4.98x | FY26 net debt of ₹ 2,712.90 crore against EBITDA of ₹ 545.00 crore |
Source: p.26, p.33, p.165, p.580 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company proposes to allocate ₹ 1,100.00 crore (52.38% of gross IPO proceeds) to acquire 14 K-12 Entities and Campuses from K-12 HoldCos, which are fellow subsidiaries of Promoters Genius Bidco and Genius Rajkot.
p.28, p.133FY26 Restated Net Profit of ₹ 173.76 crore includes an exceptional gain of ₹ 109.44 crore from the sale of a hostel undertaking at TAPMI, without which net profit before tax would be substantially lower.
p.64, p.571Total consolidated borrowings reached ₹ 4,120.53 crore as of March 31, 2026 (Net Debt of ₹ 2,712.90 crore), resulting in a Net Debt to EBITDA ratio of 4.98x and annual finance costs of ₹ 239.10 crore.
p.58, p.580The ₹ 2,100.00 crore offer consists entirely of a Fresh Issue with zero Offer for Sale, directing proceeds toward K-12 asset acquisitions (₹ 1,100.00 crore) and debt prepayment (₹ 750.00 crore).
p.1, p.133The company filed an adjudication application before RoC Mumbai under Section 454 for temporary reduction of shareholders below the statutory minimum of two between April 2024 and July 2025.
p.39, p.5831 indirect tax proceeding against Company (₹ 9.68 crore GST demand); 1 criminal FIR against Directors Joseph Raymond Gagnon and Siddhartha Gupta regarding Tablespace; 16 tax proceedings against K-12 Entities (₹ 10.32 crore); 1 indirect tax proceeding against Subsidiary (₹ 31.46 crore GST demand, partially resolved).
p.2, p.111, p.412, p.583None; unmodified audit examination opinion on Restated Consolidated Summary Statements, though CARO Annexure noted audit trail log preservation issues in FY24.
p.2, p.111, p.412, p.583Goodwill and intangibles of ₹575.98 cr are 60.2% of net worth. An impairment would fall straight through to reported profit.
rule: intangibles > 30% of net worthTrade receivables grew 147.3% against revenue growth of 53.8% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
CBRE Report confirms Elevate Campuses operates 78,542 beds (20,368 Owned and 55,487 Managed), representing 2.1x the capacity of the second-largest PMSA operator in India.
p.158, p.313Filing disclosures confirm Owned Portfolio occupancy of 89.37% in AY 2026, exceeding the estimated national average of 85-90% reported by CBRE.
p.158, p.165Consolidated restated EBITDA reached ₹ 545.00 crore in FY26 on Revenue from Operations of ₹ 568.63 crore (EBITDA margin of 90.32% on total income), supported by high gross margins in owned real estate assets.
p.160, p.164Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Market-leading scale as India's largest Purpose-Built Student Accommodation operator with 78,542 beds and 18 K-12 Assets.
- Long-term institutional contracts with minimum occupancy guarantees and inflation-linked rental escalations.
- Integrated presence across student housing and school infrastructure in India and international GCC expansion in Dubai.
Weaknesses
- High customer concentration, with top 3 HEIs (O.P. Jindal, MUJ, Shoolini) contributing 61.46% of FY26 revenue from operations.
- Elevated consolidated leverage with total borrowings of ₹ 4,120.53 crore and Net Debt to EBITDA of 4.98x in FY26.
Opportunities
- Rapid expansion of Indian PMSA market projected to reach USD 4.36 billion revenue potential (17% CAGR) by AY 2028-29.
- Institutional shift of universities and school operators toward asset-light infrastructure leasing models.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Early contract termination, non-renewal, or rent renegotiation by partner universities or K-12 operators. risk_section
Why it matters: Directly threatens occupancy levels, long-term revenue visibility, and asset cash flow protection. - Geopolitical instability or regulatory policy changes in international expansion markets like Dubai, UAE. risk_section
Why it matters: Disrupts school operations and tuition collection across international K-12 assets.
Live Subscription Status
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (06 Nov 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Why is over 52% of the fresh issue proceeds being paid to promoter-affiliated entities for acquiring K-12 assets?
The ₹ 1,100.00 crore payment consolidates 14 school properties previously acquired by promoter entities in 2023 under the listed parent company, establishing a single integrated education real estate platform based on independent valuation reports.
p.28, p.133, p.135How does management plan to reduce revenue concentration among top partner universities?
While top 3 HEIs contributed 61.46% of FY26 revenue, the acquisition of 18 K-12 Assets and expansion of the Managed Portfolio through ScholarZ will reduce top-3 HEI concentration to ~43% on a pro forma basis.
p.27, p.29, p.165What is the sustainable recurring net profit level after excluding one-off asset sale gains?
Excluding the ₹ 109.44 crore exceptional gain on the TAPMI hostel sale, FY26 profit before tax from core operations was ₹ 98.84 crore, which generates a normalized net profit of ~₹ 68.84 crore after tax.
p.84, p.571What is the status and impact of ongoing lease rental delays from certain K-12 school operators?
Certain K-12 operators have experienced payment delays and raised operational demands (STPs, structural repairs, flooding controls). The company holds security deposits and contractual escalation mechanisms to enforce collections.
p.28, p.29What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Genius Bidco Holdings Pte. Ltd. | — | 2023-10-14 | — |
| Genius Bidco Holdings Pte. Ltd. | — | 2025-09-19 | — |
| Genius Rajkot Investment Holdings Pte. Ltd. | ₹200.00 | 2025-09-24 | 1.8x |
| Genius Bidco Holdings Pte. Ltd. | — | 2026-09-08 | — |
| Allotted below the band — 1 entries | |||
| Genius Rajkot Investment Holdings Pte. Ltd. | ₹475.06 | 2026-09-07 | as disclosed |
The 1 allotments listed under “allotted below the band” are shown at their as-disclosed per-share price. They are not adjusted for any later bonus issue or share split, so where a company has issued bonus shares the raw multiple understates the true return and can even read as a loss when none was made. We show them as filed and decline to compute a misleading multiple.
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 30 Sep 2029Minimum Promoters' Contribution3 years
- 30 Sep 2027Promoters Excess Shareholding1 year
- 30 Mar 2027Pre-Offer Capital6 months
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Use of Proceeds Total Fresh Issue size was reduced by ₹ 450.00 crore from ₹ 2,550.00 crore in DRHP to ₹ 2,100.00 crore in RHP. Allocations for K-12 acquisitions (₹ 1,100.00 crore) and debt prepayment (₹ 750.00 crore) were maintained, while the unallocated general corporate purposes component was reduced. | ₹ 2,550.00 crore total Fresh Issue (₹ 1,100.00 crore K-12 acquisitions, ₹ 750.00 crore debt repayment, ₹ 700.00 crore unallocated GCP) | ₹ 2,100.00 crore total Fresh Issue (₹ 1,100.00 crore K-12 acquisitions, ₹ 750.00 crore debt repayment, ₹ 250.00 crore unallocated GCP) |
| Reporting Period Restated Consolidated Summary Statements were updated in RHP to include full Fiscal 2026 audited financials, dropping Fiscal 2023. | Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023 (as of March 31, 2025, 2024, and 2023) | Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 (as of March 31, 2026, 2025, and 2024) |
| Restated Financials Restated financial tables were updated to reflect Fiscal 2026 performance, showing top-line revenue growth to ₹ 568.63 crore and PAT expansion to ₹ 173.76 crore (inclusive of ₹ 109.44 crore exceptional gain). | FY25 Revenue from operations of ₹ 369.81 crore, Restated PAT of ₹ 52.65 crore | FY26 Revenue from operations of ₹ 568.63 crore, Restated PAT of ₹ 173.76 crore |
| Risk Factors Total risk factor count expanded from 45 in DRHP to 60 in RHP, adding disclosures regarding lease terminations (Woodstock and County), ScholarZ contract impairments, geopolitical risks in Dubai, and sustainability/green building upgrade costs. | 45 risk factors | 60 risk factors |
| Contingent Liabilities Disclosed contingent liabilities increased from nil as of March 31, 2025 in DRHP to ₹ 37.34 crore as of March 31, 2026 in RHP due to pending GST and income tax proceedings. | ₹ 0.00 crore (as of March 31, 2025) | ₹ 37.34 crore (as of March 31, 2026) |
| Litigation Materiality threshold for disclosing civil and tax litigation was revised upward from ₹ 2.63 crore in DRHP to ₹ 4.39 crore in RHP based on updated average profit calculations across Fiscals 2024-2026. | Materiality threshold of ₹ 2.63 crore (5% of average profit after tax) | Materiality threshold of ₹ 4.39 crore (5% of average profit after tax) |
| Statutory Dues CARO disclosures updated in RHP to reflect minor delays in depositing statutory dues during Fiscal 2026, all of which were subsequently paid. | Disclosed short delays in deposit of statutory dues (PF ₹ 0.08 crore, Income Tax ₹ 0.42 crore) in FY25 | Disclosed short delays in deposit of statutory dues (PF ₹ 0.12 crore, Income Tax ₹ 0.85 crore, GST ₹ 0.17 crore) in FY26 |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.