Dhoot Transmission
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Dhoot Transmission Limited is a leading Indian electrical and electronics company that designs, engineers, manufactures, and supplies critical wiring harnesses and other E&E components. The company generates revenue by selling these integrated systems and components primarily to automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) in India and select international markets.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Dhoot Transmission Limited is a leading designer, engineer, and manufacturer of electrical and electronics (E&E) automotive components, primarily specializing in critical wiring harnesses. As of March 31, 2026, the company operates 23 manufacturing facilities and seven warehouses across India, the United Kingdom, Slovakia, Thailand, South Korea, and Vietnam, serving a diversified global customer base of marquee OEMs. Its core product portfolio includes integrated wiring harnesses (77.08% of FY26 revenue), EV battery packs, sensors, electronic controllers, and automotive switches. DTL maintains high customer concentration, with its top ten clients—including Bajaj Auto and TVS Motor—contributing 80.93% of FY26 revenue from operations. To enhance its RFQ competitiveness and optimize supply reliability, the company is backward integrated in critical parts such as terminals, connectors, and molded components. Backed by Bain Capital's controlling 55% pre-offer stake, DTL possesses a professional management team and a robust in-house R&D department of 237 full-time design and engineering professionals, enabling rapid prototyping, value engineering, and seamless co-development of advanced vehicle electronics.
- Wiring harnesses — Design, manufacture, and supply of integrated wiring systems for internal combustion engine (ICE) and electric vehicles (EV) that link sensors, controllers, switches, terminals, and connectors.
- Others — Includes EV battery packs, sensors (such as ABS and lean-angle sensors), electronic controllers (such as USB chargers and light control modules), automotive switches, autocomponents, moulds and dies, scrap, and other materials.
DTL's competitive edge is anchored in its established leadership as one of the top two players in India's 2W and 3W wiring harness market with a 41% market share in FY26, alongside a commanding ~70% market share in electric 2W and 3W harnesses. This positioning is supported by deep-seated, multi-year OEM integrations, in-house backward integration of critical components (terminals, connectors, cables) that lowers procurement overhead, and a customer-proximate global manufacturing network of 23 facilities facilitating rapid engineering changes.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Repayment/prepayment, in full or in part, of all or certain outstanding borrowings availed by our Company — ₹464.80 cr
- Investment in certain of our Subsidiaries, namely, Dhoot Autocomponents Private Limited, Dhoot Automotive Systems Private Limited and Dhoot Transmission UK Limited, for repayment/prepayment, in full or part, of all or certain of the outstanding borrowings availed by these Subsidiaries — ₹301.77 cr
- Setting up of a new wiring harness manufacturing plant of our Company at (i) Sector 11, Jhajjar, Haryana, India; and (ii) Shoolagiri, Hosur, Tamil Nadu, India — ₹150.00 cr
- Funding inorganic growth through unidentified acquisitions and general corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 4524.955 | 3444.863 | 2797.726 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 396.842 | 353.887 | 298.748 |
| PAT Margin | 8.77% | 10.27% | 10.68% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Wiring harnesses: 77.08%
- Others (including battery packs, sensors and electronic controllers, automotive switches, autocomponents, moulds and dies, scrap, and other materials): 22.92%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
The market is bidding this issue enthusiastically. The headline financials look strong, but our forensic read of the filing is not clean — the risk band is high and the footnotes carry material flags. That gap is the fact worth noticing. Strong demand is information about the market; the flags are information about the company, and the two are not saying the same thing here. Read the Forensic Findings below before the momentum decides it for you.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 4,524.96 | 3,444.86 | 2,797.73 |
| Other Income | 38.75 | 27.37 | 1.59 |
| Total Income | 4,563.70 | 3,472.24 | 2,799.32 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 3,068.98 | 2,256.74 | 1,828.92 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 373.40 | 295.30 | 252.15 |
| Finance Cost | 91.24 | 67.47 | 49.47 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 122.54 | 93.28 | 76.39 |
| Other Expenses | 445.11 | 319.13 | 228.52 |
| Total Expenses | 4,027.75 | 3,014.64 | 2,411.18 |
| Profit Before Tax | 515.69 | 457.59 | 388.23 |
| Tax Expense | 118.85 | 103.71 | 89.48 |
| Profit After Tax | 396.84 | 353.89 | 298.75 |
| EPS - Basic | 24.40 | 24.31 | 20.83 |
| EPS - Diluted | 24.40 | 24.31 | 20.83 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 710.99 | 590.96 | 512.40 |
| EBIT | 627.19 | 525.06 | 437.60 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 37.69 | 17.59 | 17.21 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 2,396.65 | 975.98 | 731.05 |
| Net Worth | 2,397.15 | 978.18 | 741.01 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 246.29 | 266.49 | 204.75 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 595.11 | 509.57 | 350.15 |
| Total Borrowings | 841.39 | 776.06 | 554.90 |
| Trade Payables | 602.24 | 420.02 | 307.22 |
| Current Liabilities | 1,352.11 | 1,024.45 | 721.45 |
| Total Liabilities | 1,679.87 | 1,342.25 | 962.53 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 1,234.83 | 797.12 | 618.50 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 18.04 | 188.16 | 39.95 |
| Intangible Assets | 5.05 | 3.24 | 3.65 |
| Investments | 0.01 | 4.02 | 6.44 |
| Inventories | 639.22 | 425.24 | 333.94 |
| Trade Receivables | 793.67 | 600.34 | 420.81 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 1,084.28 | 46.45 | 30.40 |
| Current Assets | 2,619.90 | 1,140.62 | 880.39 |
| Total Assets | 4,114.83 | 2,336.23 | 1,711.70 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | 347.66 | 320.21 | 241.09 |
| Capital Expenditure | 349.97 | 406.88 | 287.87 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -1,261.69 | -442.84 | -310.86 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 1,912.33 | 137.98 | 63.43 |
| Net Change in Cash | 998.30 | 15.35 | -6.35 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 15.6 | 17 | 18.3 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 13.7 | 15.1 | 15.6 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 8.8 | 10.3 | 10.7 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 16.6 | 36.2 | 40.3 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 19.4 | 29.9 | 33.8 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 9.6 | 15.1 | 17.5 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.35 | 0.79 | 0.75 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | -0.34 | 1.23 | 1.02 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 6.87 | 7.78 | 8.85 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 1.94 | 1.11 | 1.22 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 1.46 | 0.7 | 0.76 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 1.1 | 1.47 | 1.63 |
| Receivable Days | 64 | 64 | 55 |
| Inventory Days | 76 | 69 | 67 |
| Payable Days | 72 | 68 | 61 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 68 | 65 | 61 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | 0.88 | 0.9 | 0.81 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 1.2 | 1.4 | 3.4 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 2.86 | 4.36 | 3.77 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 8.8% | 10.3% | 10.7% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 1.1x | 1.47x | 1.63x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.72x | 2.39x | 2.31x |
| = Return on Equity | 16.6% | 36.2% | 40.3% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.77x | 0.77x | 0.77x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.82x | 0.87x | 0.89x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 13.9% | 15.2% | 15.6% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
M = -2.24An eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.006 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.072 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | 0.371 | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.314 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.16 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 1.014 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.703 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.012 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
M = -2.24, below the −1.78 threshold. The model does not flag these accounts.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 9.69 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.308 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.582 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.152 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.427 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 9.69 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✓Positive operating cash flow
- ✗Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
6 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹33.7 cr in FY25, ₹49.2 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 64 days in FY25, 64 days in FY26
- ●Inventory days rising · 69 days in FY25, 76 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 2.0% of revenue in FY25, 2.3% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 11.7% of net block in FY25, 9.9% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 76.1% in FY26
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 2.5%
Contingent liabilities of 60.05 cr against a net worth of 2,397.15 cr — 2.5% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 1.1%
1.1% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 1.82x
Short-term borrowings of 595.11 cr against cash of 1,084.28 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 2%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 7.98 cr against a profit of 396.84 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹871.00, the market value is ₹14,166 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹1,417 cr | 3.6x | 9.1 | 5.7 |
| 12% a year | ₹1,700 cr | 4.3x | 10.4 | 6.5 |
| 14% a year | ₹1,983 cr | 5.0x | 11.5 | 7.2 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 2.80% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -0.02% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹2.3 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth396.84 ÷ 2,397.15What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)627.19 ÷ (2,397.15 + 841.39) = 627.19 ÷ 3,238.54Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue710.99 ÷ 4,524.96Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth841.39 ÷ 2,397.15How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost627.19 ÷ 91.24How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(793.67 ÷ 4,524.96) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days76 + 64 − 72How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT347.66 ÷ 396.84Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(396.84 − 347.66) ÷ 4,114.83 = 49.19 ÷ 4,114.83The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹871.00 × 162,640,164 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash14,165.96 + 841.39 − 1,084.28What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA13,923.07 ÷ 710.99The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT14,165.96 ÷ 396.84The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹396.84 cr ÷ ₹14,165.96 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-2.31 cr ÷ ₹14,165.96 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)35.7 ÷ 12.1%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
The Indian automotive wiring harness and E&E component industry is undergoing a structural transformation driven by the accelerating transition to electric vehicles (EVs) and premiumization. According to the CRISIL Report, EV penetration in the 2W segment is projected to rise from 6.6% in FY26 to 25-30% by FY31, while 3W electrification is projected to jump from 31.6% to 53-58%. Electrification significantly expands the addressable market, as BEVs and plug-in hybrids increase the wiring harness kit value per vehicle by 2 to 3 times compared to conventional ICE models. Concurrently, premiumization and safety upgrades (such as ABS and advanced sensors) are driving higher wiring and controller complexity, favoring scaled Tier-1 suppliers.
Future Planning & Capital Allocation
The company's primary allocation strategy for the ₹14,000.00 million Fresh Issue focuses on debt reduction, earmarking ₹4,648.02 million for prepayment of parent debt and ₹3,017.73 million for subsidiary debt. It allocates ₹1,500.00 million to Greenfield plants in Jhajjar and Hosur to meet localized OEM commitments.
Source: RHP p. 118, 316, 366Competitive Position
DTL has leveraged its backward integration in terminals, connectors, and cables to optimize costs and RFQ conversion rates, while its ~70% EV harness share creates high switching barriers for OEMs transitioning away from ICE architectures.
Source: RHP p. 271, 276, 518Execution / Track Record
The company has scaled its operating revenues at a CAGR of ~27.2% from ₹27,977.26 million in FY24 to ₹45,249.55 million in FY26, while expanding its underlying asset base and manufacturing footprint in India and internationally.
Source: RHP p. 25, 275, 412Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Rahul Radhavallabh Dhoot (Managing Director)
Litigation: Against the company: 1 criminal proceeding, 30 tax proceedings, and 1 statutory/regulatory proceeding, with an aggregate of ₹236.93 million involved. Against subsidiaries: 5 tax proceedings and 1 statutory/regulatory proceeding involving ₹2.81 million in total. Against directors: 4 criminal proceedings and 1 statutory/regulatory proceeding.
Auditor / RPT Flags: Statutory auditors Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants LLP noted recurring exceptions regarding unenabled database-level audit trails and disabled edit logs in multiple accounting systems, as well as failures to maintain daily backups of books of account on servers physically located in India. Significant related party transactions exist with promoters, including ₹9,547.07 million spent to buy out promoter stakes in Dhoot Holdings Private Limited (DHPL).
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Minda Corporation Limited | 46.49 | — | 13.63 | — |
| Uno Minda Limited | 56.87 | — | 17.53 | — |
| Motherson Sumi Wiring India Limited | 43.24 | — | 28.92 | — |
| Sona BLW Precision Forgings Limited | 74.64 | — | 10.7 | — |
At the ₹871 upper band, the issue is priced at 35.7x earnings — a 31% discount to the peer median of 51.7x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Shareholding & Capital Structure
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| Total number of shares (Post-Listing) | 20,45,48,057 | approx. 20.45 Crore equity shares post-issue |
| Free float (Public shareholding) | 17.23% | approx. 3.52 Crore equity shares available to public post-issue |
Source: RHP — Capital Structure / Shareholding Structure
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
Statutory auditors reported that the audit trail (edit log) feature in the core accounting software did not operate throughout the year, some subsidiary software completely lacked edit log capabilities, and prior year audit logs were not preserved. Additionally, the company did not maintain daily electronic backups of its books of account on servers physically located in India.
RHP p. 51, 454-455The company entered into a management fee agreement under which it is obligated to pay a lump sum of ₹600.00 million (minus fees already paid) upon the completion of an IPO or a Qualified Sale event within 5 years. This resulted in a ₹480.41 million contingent liability as of March 31, 2026.
RHP p. 24, 79, 423As of March 31, 2025, the company was in breach of its working capital loan's current ratio covenant, which fell to 0.97 against a required minimum of 1.10. Consequently, loans of ₹164.00 million were reclassified as current because the lender held the right to accelerate repayment.
RHP p. 60, 429Under its restructuring, DTL acquired a 100% stake in DHPL, which involved discharging ₹7,675.10 million in cash to Rahul Radhavallabh Dhoot and ₹1,871.97 million in cash to Anupama Rahul Dhoot.
RHP p. 81, 83, 431, 445The company exhibits significant customer concentration, with the top 10 customers accounting for 80.93% of revenue from operations in FY26 (top 5 accounted for 71.56%). Revenue from 3 major customers in India alone contributed 61.45% of total revenue.
RHP p. 24, 25, 424Against the company: 1 criminal proceeding, 30 tax proceedings, and 1 statutory/regulatory proceeding, with an aggregate of ₹236.93 million involved. Against subsidiaries: 5 tax proceedings and 1 statutory/regulatory proceeding involving ₹2.81 million in total. Against directors: 4 criminal proceedings and 1 statutory/regulatory proceeding.
RHP p. 51, 81, 83, 96, 105, 347, 430, 454-455, 483-484Statutory auditors Price Waterhouse Chartered Accountants LLP noted recurring exceptions regarding unenabled database-level audit trails and disabled edit logs in multiple accounting systems, as well as failures to maintain daily backups of books of account on servers physically located in India. Significant related party transactions exist with promoters, including ₹9,547.07 million spent to buy out promoter stakes in Dhoot Holdings Private Limited (DHPL).
RHP p. 51, 81, 83, 96, 105, 347, 430, 454-455, 483-484Company's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
Does independent industry research confirm this leadership position?
RHP p. 271, 276Do restated consolidated metrics confirm substantial EV segment exposure and growth?
RHP p. 275, 277Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Dominant market position with 41% overall share in India's 2W/3W wiring harness segment and a leading ~70% share in EV harnesses.
- Widespread, customer-proximate manufacturing presence with 23 facilities across multiple countries (India, UK, Slovakia, Thailand, South Korea, Vietnam).
Weaknesses
- Extreme reliance on a single product class, with wiring harnesses generating 77.08% of FY26 revenue.
- Highly concentrated customer base with the top 10 clients contributing 80.93% of FY26 operating revenue.
Opportunities
- Substantial kit-value expansion from vehicle electrification, as EV harnesses carry 2 to 3 times the value of traditional ICE harnesses.
- Planned Greenfield expansions in Jhajjar and Hosur, backed by pre-negotiated customer nominations to capture immediate local demand.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Susceptibility to volatile commodity costs (specifically copper), which can squeeze margins under fixed-price supply contracts. risk_section
Why it matters: Unhedged or delayed pass-through of critical raw material price hikes directly impacts gross profitability. - Pricing pressure and competitive bidding on new vehicle platforms by dominant OEMs. risk_section
Why it matters: OEM buyers exercise immense negotiating leverage, which can result in margin contraction if bids are underpriced.
Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: KFin Technologies
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (23 Sep 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
Where is the money going?
The Net Proceeds from the Fresh Issue are primarily being deployed toward debt repayment (₹4,648.02 million at the company level and ₹3,017.73 million across subsidiaries Dhoot Autocomponents, Dhoot Automotive Systems, and Dhoot UK) and ₹1,500.00 million for constructing new manufacturing plants in Haryana and Tamil Nadu.
RHP p. 118, 316How concentrated is the customer base?
The customer base is highly concentrated. DTL's top 10 customers contributed 80.93% of total revenue from operations in FY26, while the top 5 customers accounted for 71.56%. Further, the top 3 customers alone represented 61.45% of total revenue.
RHP p. 24, 25, 424Is it profitable and growing?
Yes. Revenue from operations increased from ₹27,977.26 million in FY24 to ₹45,249.55 million in FY26. PAT grew from ₹2,987.48 million in FY24 to ₹3,968.42 million in FY26, maintaining a stable EBITDA margin of 15.71% in FY26.
RHP p. 25, 275, 412What sits in the footnotes / contingent liabilities?
Contingent liabilities total ₹600.51 million, dominated by a ₹480.41 million disputed performance/consultancy fee (triggered up to ₹600.00 million on an IPO or sale event) and ₹120.10 million in disputed tax demands. Footnotes also reveal a FY25 loan covenant breach reclassifying ₹164.00 million as current, and recurring auditor exceptions regarding unenabled database-level audit trails and daily server backup gaps.
RHP p. 24, 79, 423, 429, 454-455What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| BC Asia Investments XV Limited | ₹483.68 | 2025-04-02 | 1.8x |
| BC Asia Investments XV Limited | ₹461.22 | 2026-03-20 | 1.9x |
| Nitinkumar Dagdulal Kalani | ₹468.00 | 2026-05-07 | 1.9x |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 17 Feb 2028Minimum Promoter's Contribution18 months
- 17 Feb 2027Promoter's shareholding in excess of Minimum Promoter's Contribution6 months
- 17 Feb 2027Entire pre-Offer equity share capital6 months
- 15 Nov 2026Anchor Investors (50%)90 days
- 16 Sep 2026Anchor Investors (50%)30 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Financial Information Period The restated consolidated financial information was rolled forward to cover full Fiscal 2026, dropping the oldest reporting period (Fiscal 2023) and the 9M interim period. | Restated consolidated financial statements for the nine months period ended December 31, 2025 and Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023 | Restated consolidated financial information for Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 |
| Offer for Sale (OFS) Share Volume The Offer for Sale component was increased by 2,826,869 Equity Shares (an expansion of approximately 17.33%). | Up to 16,310,733 Equity Shares | Up to 19,137,602 Equity Shares |
| Designated Stock Exchange NSE (National Stock Exchange of India Limited) was formally designated as the Designated Stock Exchange for the Offer. | [●] | NSE |
| M/s Multilink slump sale base consideration The agreed base consideration for the slump sale from M/s Multilink to DASPL was reduced by ₹370.00 million, with the actual finalized paid consideration set at ₹4,211.55 million in the RHP. | ₹4,720.00 million | ₹4,350.00 million |
| Use of Proceeds (Outstanding Borrowings Repayment for Company) The estimated deployment of Fresh Issue proceeds allocated for repayment or prepayment of certain borrowings of the Company was reduced by ₹291.88 million. | ₹4,939.90 million | ₹4,648.02 million |
| Declaration Signatories (Executive Director) Dhiren Vinodrai Sheth did not sign the RHP declaration, indicating a change in the directorship or signing authority prior to the final filing. | Signed by Dhiren Vinodrai Sheth (Executive Director) | Not signed by Dhiren Vinodrai Sheth |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
