Deepa Jewellers
FinMinutes Deep Business Model & Edge
Deepa Jewellers Limited is an organized business-to-business (B2B) gold jewellery designer, processor, and supplier in India, primarily operating across South Indian states. The company specializes in traditional wedding ornaments such as vaddanams (waist belts) and precision-engineered CNC machine-cut bangles, distributing to major organized retail chains and standalone boutiques.
What this company actually does — full breakdown ▾
Deepa Jewellers Limited, incorporated in 2016 and based in Hyderabad, Telangana, is a prominent organized business-to-business (B2B) designer, processor, and supplier of hallmarked gold jewellery in India. The company operates primarily across the southern states of Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala, which accounted for 94.37% (₹1,818.19 crore) of its consolidated revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026. Its product portfolio spans 16 plain and studded gold jewellery categories, with a strong specialization in traditional wedding vaddanams (waist belts) and high-precision CNC machine-cut bangles, which collectively contributed 72.72% (₹1,401.09 crore) of operational revenues in Fiscal 2026. Operating through a capital-efficient outsourced manufacturing model, the company provides raw gold bullion, alloys, and precious stones to a network of 41 skilled karigars in Telangana and Maharashtra who perform the physical fabrication in exchange for making charges. This asset-light model provides high scalability and operational flexibility without requiring heavy capital investments in manufacturing plants. The company serves a robust B2B customer network of 373 clients as of July 31, 2026, comprising 47 prominent national and regional retail chains (such as Joyalukkas, Kalyan Jewellers, Lalithaa, and GRT Jewellers) and 326 standalone stores, with its top 10 customers generating 64.67% (₹1,246.03 crore) of total sales. For the fiscal year ended March 31, 2026, the company reported ₹1,926.68 crore in operational revenues and a profit after tax of ₹104.79 crore.
- Vaddanam (Traditional Waist Belts) — Ornate, highly customized waist ornaments featuring traditional motifs (temple art, peacocks, lotuses), primarily worn during weddings and festive occasions. This key product line generated ₹806.24 crore (41.85% of total revenue from operations) in Fiscal 2026, compared to ₹483.06 crore in Fiscal 2025.
- CNC Machine Cut Bangles — High-precision, machine-made plain gold bangles popular for both bridal and daily wear. Sourced from the same pages, this segment contributed ₹594.85 crore (30.87% of total revenue from operations) in Fiscal 2026, compared to ₹584.22 crore in Fiscal 2025.
- Other Gold and Studded Jewellery Products — Includes plain gold and precious stone studded jewellery such as gents kada, vanky, kangan, earrings, rings, mangtika, and gold bullion trading. This category generated ₹525.58 crore (27.28% of total revenue from operations) in Fiscal 2026, compared to ₹329.73 crore in Fiscal 2025.
Deepa Jewellers' competitive moat lies in its position as a leading organized B2B aggregator and processor of specialized gold wedding ornaments (vaddanams and CNC cut bangles) in South India, which has the country's highest market share in gold consumption (~40%). By developing long-standing relationships with 47 of the largest national and regional jewellery retail chains (including Joyalukkas, Kalyan Jewellers, and GRT) and 326 standalone retailers, the company has built a highly defensible distribution network. This moat is further reinforced by its capital-efficient outsourced manufacturing model utilizing 41 skilled karigars, which allows it to scale production to meet seasonal wedding spikes without incurring high capital expenditure or inventory markdown risks. Additionally, its in-house design team of 15 designers continuously updates its catalog of 110 SKUs, while its proprietary mobile catalog application ('Deepa Jewellers Limited') facilitates digital discovery and real-time order tracking for its B2B customers, enhancing client lock-in and trust.
The Offer
Follow the Money — Use of Proceeds
- Funding long-term working capital requirements towards procurement, maintenance and scaling up of inventory by our Company — ₹215.00 cr
- General corporate purposes
Valuation at the Offer Price
The filing does not print a single headline multiple, so this one is ours: the upper band divided by the latest restated earnings per share — the same arithmetic the “Basis for the Offer Price” section performs. It is struck on pre-issue earnings; where the issue creates new shares, the post-issue multiple is computed in the workings below. The peer group is the one the filing itself names. A premium is not the same thing as expensive and a discount is not the same thing as cheap — the peer table and the reasons sit further down this page.
FinMinutes IPO Score — How It's Built
Transparent, deterministic, computed from the filing — not an opinion. Open any component below to see exactly what it measures and what it is worth. Components with no disclosed input are dropped from the weighting entirely rather than held at an invented neutral, because a constant inside a weighted average is not neutral — it quietly drags every score toward the middle. Weighted across 5 live components.
88% of the designed weighting had real data behind it on this issue. Not yet scored here: Anchor Quality. A lower coverage figure does not mean a worse company — it means we are standing behind less of the picture, and you should read the findings below rather than the headline number.
How this is measured12%
Whether fresh capital actually enters the business. A predominantly offer-for-sale issue is marked down ONLY when the financials are weak. A profitable, cash-rich company selling down is treated as neutral, not penalised, because it does not need the money.
How this is measured32%
Driven by the models battery run on the filing's own restated numbers: the Piotroski fundamental tests (scored out of those we could actually run), the Altman Z-double-prime solvency zone, and the direction of profit across the disclosed period. It is not a single yes/no on last year's profit.
How this is measured10%
The post-issue earnings multiple against the peer median disclosed in the filing. A discount to the median scores well and a premium scores badly. When the filing does not disclose comparable peer multiples, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than held at a made-up neutral.
How this is measured6%
A proxy for syndicate strength, based today only on how many lead managers are on the issue: 75 where three or more banks are involved, 60 otherwise. We have not built a bank-by-bank track record, so treat this as a rough signal. When the filing does not disclose the syndicate, this component is dropped from the weighting rather than guessed.
How this is measured28%
Starts at 100 and loses points for every material finding: 12 for a flagged finding, 4 for a noted one. Two kinds feed it. DERIVED findings are computed from the filed numbers against stated thresholds — operating cash negative while profit is positive, related-party revenue above 15% of total, revenue rising while profit falls, goodwill above 30% of net worth, receivables growing more than 1.3x faster than sales, cash below half of short-term debt. Those are reproducible: the same filing gives the same answer every time, and the rule is printed beside the finding. READ findings come from the forensic sweep of the notes. Contingent liabilities, related-party intensity, customer concentration, litigation, auditor qualifications, statutory dues, promoter funding. Findings that record the ABSENCE of a problem — no litigation pending, an unmodified audit opinion — deduct nothing. This is the component our forensic read drives directly, and it moves most between companies.
3-Year Financial & Growth Trend
| Metric | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue (₹ Cr) | 192.668 | 139.701 | 102.457 |
| Net Profit (₹ Cr) | 104.788 | 40.58 | 24.347 |
| PAT Margin | 54.39% | 29.05% | 23.76% |
Revenue Breakdown
- Sale of products - processing: 99%
- Sale of services - job work: 0.89%
- Sale of products - trade: 0.11%
Market Context
NOT part of the FinMinutes ScoreThe Score above is what the filing says. Everything in this box is what the crowd says. We keep them apart on purpose — every other site blends the two and calls the result a rating. Demand is real information, but it is information about the market, not about the company, and it changes by the hour while the company does not.
Demand is strong and our read of the filing supports it. Agreement is not proof, but a disagreement would have been worth explaining, and there is not one.
Subscription is low early in a book and high at the end, because most bids arrive in the final hours. A number read on day one says more about the clock than the company — which is precisely why it is not in the Score. GMP is unofficial, unregulated, and easily moved. Neither is a recommendation.
Issue Timeline
Dates as carried by the exchange feed. Allotment, refund and credit dates move more often than the open and close dates do.
- Refunds initiated2026-09-07
- Pre Application Start2026-08-31
- Bidding Start2026-09-01
- Bidding End2026-09-03
- Allotment Process Start2026-09-04
- Allotment Finalization2026-09-07
- Listing Day2026-09-08
- Mandate End2026-10-15
Applying, and Who Handles the Allotment
Check allotment status on the registrar’s own portal → We link the registrar directly rather than mirroring the form.
Deep Financials
Revenue, EBITDA and profit are what every listing site prints. Below are the full restated statements as disclosed, the ratios we compute from them, and a DuPont decomposition of the return on equity. A prospectus carries three years, not ten — that is the document’s ceiling, and within it we go as deep as it allows.
Income StatementThe profit and loss as filed, then what we derive from it — kept apart.
Statutory order, exactly as restated in the filing. Finance cost and depreciation sit inside Total Expenses under Ind AS, which is why they are listed among the expense lines here rather than below the total. The expense rows sum to the total. Rows the filing does not disclose separately are omitted rather than left blank.
| Income Statement — as filed (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from Operations | 192.67 | 139.70 | 102.46 |
| Other Income | 1.05 | 3.09 | 1.16 |
| Total Income | 192.77 | 140.01 | 102.57 |
| Cost of Materials Consumed | 177.77 | 125.06 | 100.94 |
| Employee Benefit Expense | 4.09 | 1.86 | 2.07 |
| Finance Cost | 6.31 | 4.36 | 3.96 |
| Depreciation & Amortisation | 0.74 | 0.26 | 0.29 |
| Other Expenses | -1.43 | 8.86 | -2.27 |
| Total Expenses | 178.74 | 134.56 | 99.31 |
| Profit Before Tax | 140.33 | 54.47 | 32.68 |
| Tax Expense | 35.55 | 13.89 | 8.34 |
| Profit After Tax | 104.79 | 40.58 | 24.35 |
| EPS - Basic | 12.78 | 4.95 | 2.97 |
| EPS - Diluted | 12.78 | 4.95 | 2.97 |
Below this line the figures are ours, not the filing's. Ind AS has no EBITDA or EBIT line. We reconstruct them from disclosed items — EBIT as profit before tax plus finance cost, less any exceptional item and share of associate profit sitting below the operating line; EBITDA as EBIT plus depreciation. The working is in the Formula Notebook.
| Derived by us (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| EBITDA | 14.63 | 5.60 | 3.58 |
| EBIT | 146.65 | 58.83 | 36.64 |
Balance SheetWhat the company owns, owes, and is worth on paper.
| Balance Sheet (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Share Capital | 16.40 | 4.10 | 4.10 |
| Reserves & Surplus | 221.67 | 129.11 | 88.45 |
| Net Worth | 238.07 | 133.21 | 92.55 |
| Long-term Borrowings | 43.65 | 38.22 | 41.09 |
| Short-term Borrowings | 67.46 | 42.57 | 36.84 |
| Total Borrowings | 111.12 | 80.79 | 77.93 |
| Trade Payables | 0.09 | 0.60 | 0.03 |
| Current Liabilities | 70.17 | 45.92 | 40.64 |
| Total Liabilities | 119.11 | 84.47 | 82.08 |
| Property, Plant & Equipment | 2.26 | 0.62 | 0.78 |
| Capital Work in Progress | 2.21 | 0.00 | 0.00 |
| Intangible Assets | 0.09 | 0.01 | 0.02 |
| Inventories | 87.36 | 82.79 | 72.26 |
| Trade Receivables | 252.36 | 131.73 | 88.45 |
| Cash & Equivalents | 0.10 | 0.10 | 1.20 |
| Current Assets | 346.81 | 216.83 | 173.64 |
| Total Assets | 357.18 | 217.67 | 174.64 |
Cash FlowWhere the cash actually went. Often the most honest statement of the three.
| Cash Flow (₹ Cr) | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Cash from Operating Activities | -14.73 | -9.86 | 4.85 |
| Capital Expenditure | 4.37 | 0.10 | 0.28 |
| Net Cash from Investing Activities | -4.37 | 10.26 | 5.81 |
| Net Cash from Financing Activities | 19.11 | -1.50 | -9.48 |
| Net Change in Cash | 0.01 | -1.11 | 1.17 |
Ratio AnalysisProfitability, leverage, liquidity, efficiency and earnings quality — computed by us.
Every ratio below is computed by us from the line items the company disclosed — not copied from anywhere. The arithmetic is standard; the point is that somebody actually did it. Blank cells mean the filing did not disclose the inputs, and we would rather show a gap than invent a number.
| Ratio | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Profitability | |||
| EBITDA Margin (%) | 7.6 | 4 | 3.5 |
| EBIT Margin (%) | 76.1 | 42 | 35.7 |
| PAT Margin (%) | 54.4 | 29 | 23.8 |
| Return on Equity (%) | 44 | 30.5 | 26.3 |
| Return on Capital Employed (%) | 42 | 27.5 | 21.5 |
| Return on Assets (%) | 29.3 | 18.6 | 13.9 |
| Leverage | |||
| Debt / Equity (x) | 0.47 | 0.61 | 0.84 |
| Net Debt / EBITDA (x) | 7.59 | 14.41 | 21.45 |
| Interest Coverage (x) | 23.23 | 13.49 | 9.25 |
| Liquidity | |||
| Current Ratio (x) | 4.94 | 4.72 | 4.27 |
| Quick Ratio (x) | 3.7 | 2.92 | 2.49 |
| Efficiency | |||
| Asset Turnover (x) | 0.54 | 0.64 | 0.59 |
| Receivable Days | 478 | 344 | 315 |
| Inventory Days | 179 | 242 | 261 |
| Payable Days | 0 | 2 | 0 |
| Cash Conversion Cycle (days) | 657 | 584 | 576 |
| Quality of Earnings | |||
| Operating Cash Flow / PAT (x) | -0.14 | -0.24 | 0.2 |
| Accruals Ratio (%) | 33.5 | 23.2 | 11.2 |
| Capex / Depreciation (x) | 5.93 | 0.36 | 0.97 |
| Inventory and payable days are measured against cost of goods (materials consumed + purchases of stock-in-trade + change in inventories). Receivable days against revenue. | |||
DuPont DecompositionWhy the return on equity is what it is: margin, efficiency, or leverage.
A headline return on equity tells you what. The DuPont decomposition tells you why — whether the return is earned through margin, through asset efficiency, or simply through leverage. Two companies can post an identical ROE for opposite reasons, and only one of them is safe.
| Component | FY26 | FY25 | FY24 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Net Margin (PAT / Revenue) | 54.4% | 29% | 23.8% |
| Asset Turnover (Revenue / Assets) | 0.54x | 0.64x | 0.59x |
| Equity Multiplier (Assets / Net Worth) | 1.5x | 1.63x | 1.89x |
| = Return on Equity | 44% | 30.5% | 26.3% |
| Tax Burden (PAT / PBT) | 0.75x | 0.74x | 0.74x |
| Interest Burden (PBT / EBIT) | 0.96x | 0.93x | 0.89x |
| Operating Margin (EBIT / Revenue) | 76.1% | 42.1% | 35.8% |
Computed from the disclosed statements. Where the filing omits an input, the row is left blank rather than estimated.
Quality of EarningsWhat the statements say when you read them against each other.
What the statements say once you read them against each other. These are observations, not verdicts — every one is arithmetic on the numbers the company itself disclosed, and each is stated so you can go and check it in the filing.
- In FY26 the company reported a profit of 104.79 cr while operating cash flow was NEGATIVE at -14.73 cr. Reported earnings did not convert into cash. This is the single divergence most worth understanding in any set of accounts, and the filing is the place to look for why.
- Receivable days rose from 315 in FY24 to 478 in FY26. The company is booking revenue faster than it is collecting it, which ties up cash and raises the question of who is not paying.
- Between FY24 and FY26 revenue grew 88% while profit grew 330%. Profit expanding at several times the rate of revenue is not automatically a concern — operating leverage does exactly this — but it is worth confirming from the filing whether the gap comes from genuine margin expansion or from one-off items.
- Interest coverage was 23.23x in FY26. Debt servicing is comfortably covered by operating profit.
Forensic ModelsBeneish, Altman, Piotroski and the Montier C-score — plus our own final-year check.
Beneish M-Score
7 of 8 inputsAn eight-variable model built to detect earnings manipulation, and built to run on exactly two consecutive years — which is what a prospectus gives us. It belongs here more than anywhere: a company about to list has the maximum possible incentive to have dressed up the very years it is about to show you. A score above −1.78 is the threshold at which the model says the accounts merit a closer look. It is a screening signal, not an accusation, and it was calibrated on listed companies elsewhere. Read the eight components, not just the total.
| Component | Value | What it captures |
|---|---|---|
| DSRI Days Sales in Receivables Index (Receivables_t / Sales_t) / (Receivables_t-1 / Sales_t-1) | 1.389 | Above 1 means receivables grew faster than sales. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection. |
| GMI Gross Margin Index GrossMargin_t-1 / GrossMargin_t | 1.355 | Above 1 means margins deteriorated. A firm with worsening prospects has more incentive to manipulate. |
| AQI Asset Quality Index AQ_t / AQ_t-1, where AQ = 1 - (CurrentAssets + PPE) / TotalAssets | — | Above 1 means a rising share of assets is soft (neither current nor fixed) — capitalised costs can hide here. |
| SGI Sales Growth Index Sales_t / Sales_t-1 | 1.379 | Growth is not manipulation. But high-growth firms face more pressure to keep the streak going. |
| DEPI Depreciation Index DepRate_t-1 / DepRate_t, where DepRate = Dep / (Dep + PPE) | 1.207 | Above 1 means assets are being depreciated more slowly — a quiet way to lift reported profit. |
| SGAI SG&A Index (SGA_t / Sales_t) / (SGA_t-1 / Sales_t-1), SGA proxied as employee cost + other expenses | 0.18 | A proxy, because filings rarely break out SG&A cleanly. Read it as a direction, not a precise figure. |
| LVGI Leverage Index Leverage_t / Leverage_t-1, where Leverage = (CurrentLiab + LongTermDebt) / TotalAssets | 0.824 | Above 1 means leverage rose. Debt covenants create pressure to hit numbers. |
| TATA Total Accruals to Total Assets (PAT - CashFromOperations) / TotalAssets | 0.3346 | The gap between reported profit and cash generated. The single heaviest term in the model — and the one that catches profit that never became cash. |
The filing does not disclose every input the model needs, so we withhold the composite score rather than substitute a guess. The components we could compute are above.
Altman Z″-Score (emerging markets)
Z″ = 15.21 · SafeA distress-prediction model. We use the Z″ variant deliberately: the original Z was calibrated on American manufacturers and misleads badly on Indian services companies. Above 2.6 is the safe zone, 1.1 to 2.6 is grey, below 1.1 is the distress zone. Like every model of its kind it is a screen, not a prophecy.
| X1 — Working Capital / Total Assets | 0.775 |
| X2 — Reserves / Total Assets | 0.621 |
| X3 — EBIT / Total Assets | 0.411 |
| X4 — Net Worth / Total Liabilities | 1.999 |
| Z″ = 3.25 + 6.56·X1 + 3.26·X2 + 6.72·X3 + 1.05·X4 | 15.21 |
X2 is meant to read retained earnings. The filing reports Other Equity, which also holds securities premium paid in by investors, so X2 here runs on reserves and reads higher than true retained earnings would. The more premium the company has raised before listing, the more Z″ is flattered.
Piotroski F-Score (adapted)
4 / 8Nine yes-or-no tests of fundamental strength — except we run eight. One of the original nine asks whether the company issued new shares, which is plainly absurd to ask of a company whose entire purpose at this moment is to issue shares. We drop that test, and we would rather tell you that than quietly fudge it.
- ✓Positive return on assets
- ✗Positive operating cash flow
- ✓Return on assets improving
- ✗Cash flow exceeds profit (quality of earnings)
- ✓Long-term leverage decreasing
- ✓Current ratio improving
- ✗Gross margin improving
- ✗Asset turnover improving
Montier C-Score
5 of 6 signsSix yes-or-no signs that reported profit may be running ahead of the business, from James Montier’s 2008 screen, read here for FY26 against FY25. Each is a direction in the statements, not a judgement. Several together are a reason to read the accounting policies and notes closely; none on its own means anything is wrong, and growing companies trip some of them honestly.
- ●Gap between profit and operating cash flow widening · PAT − CFO: ₹50.4 cr in FY25, ₹119.5 cr in FY26
- ●Receivable days rising · 344 days in FY25, 478 days in FY26
- ○Inventory days rising · 242 days in FY25, 179 days in FY26 (on cost of goods)
- ●Other current assets rising against revenue · 1.6% of revenue in FY25, 3.6% in FY26 (current assets less cash, receivables and inventory)
- ●Depreciation falling against fixed assets · 42.3% of net block in FY25, 32.7% in FY26
- ●Total assets growing more than 10% a year · 64.1% in FY26
The Final-Year Check
oursNot from any textbook. The hockey stick in the last year before a filing is the oldest pattern in this business, and nobody publishes it. So we measure it: how the final disclosed year compares with the years behind it. Real acceleration looks exactly the same on the page as a flattering one — which is precisely why it is worth naming rather than assuming either way.
- The EBITDA margin expanded by 3.6 percentage points in FY26, having moved 0.5 points the year before. Margin expansion concentrated into the final disclosed year is worth understanding: operating leverage produces it honestly, and so does a change in what gets capitalised.
Ratios Nobody Prints
- Contingent liabilities / Net worth: 0%
Contingent liabilities of 0.00 cr against a net worth of 238.07 cr — 0% of what the company is worth on paper. These are obligations that sit off the balance sheet but could land on it. What they consist of matters as much as the size: a corporate guarantee to a subsidiary is a different animal from a disputed tax demand, and the filing says which. - Related-party revenue / Total revenue: 0%
0% of revenue in FY26 came from entities connected to the promoters. Revenue you sell to yourself is not the same as revenue you won in the market. - Cash / Short-term borrowings: 0x
Short-term borrowings of 67.46 cr against cash of 0.10 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is only comfortable while lenders stay comfortable. - Promoter remuneration / PAT: 1.3%
Managerial remuneration to the promoter group was 1.33 cr against a profit of 104.79 cr. This is a legitimate cost — but it is also a route by which value leaves a company before it ever reaches a minority shareholder.
What the Price RequiresThe profit the offer price needs, at three hurdle rates. A restatement of the price, not a view on it.
At the upper band of ₹177.00, the market value is ₹1,451 cr. A buyer who wants a given return each year from a business that never grows needs annual profit of market value × that return. The three rates are round hurdle rates, not this company’s cost of capital, so pick the one that is yours. The years columns assume profit compounds from the FY26 figure and the price stands still. None of this is a forecast, a fair value or a target.
| Hurdle rate | Profit the price needs | × FY26 profit | Years at 15% growth | Years at 25% growth |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 10% a year | ₹145 cr | 1.4x | 2.3 | 1.5 |
| 12% a year | ₹174 cr | 1.7x | 3.6 | 2.3 |
| 14% a year | ₹203 cr | 1.9x | 4.7 | 3.0 |
- Earnings yield at the upper band: 7.22% (FY26 profit ÷ market value).
- Free cash flow yield: -1.32% (operating cash flow less capital expenditure, −₹19.1 cr, ÷ market value).
The Formula NotebookEvery number above, with the working shown. Check us.
Every number we publish, with the working shown. The formula, the same formula with this company’s actual figures put into it, the answer, and what it is for. Check us. That is the point.
PAT ÷ Net Worth104.79 ÷ 238.07What the company earned on the money shareholders have in it. The headline measure of return — and the one the DuPont section takes apart.
EBIT ÷ (Net Worth + Total Borrowings)146.65 ÷ (238.07 + 111.12) = 146.65 ÷ 349.19Return on ALL the capital in the business, borrowed as well as owned. Unlike ROE, it cannot be flattered by taking on debt.
EBITDA ÷ Revenue14.63 ÷ 192.67Operating profitability before the effects of debt, tax and depreciation. What the business earns from the act of trading.
Total Borrowings ÷ Net Worth111.12 ÷ 238.07How much the company has borrowed against what it owns. High is not automatically bad — ask whether the borrowing is being serviced comfortably.
EBIT ÷ Finance Cost146.65 ÷ 6.31How many times over operating profit covers the interest bill. Below about 2x, a meaningful share of what the business earns is going to lenders rather than owners.
(Trade Receivables ÷ Revenue) × 365(252.36 ÷ 192.67) × 365How long the company waits to be paid. Rising receivable days mean revenue is being booked faster than it is collected — which is where a great many accounting problems begin.
Inventory Days + Receivable Days − Payable Days179 + 478 − 0How long cash is tied up in the operating cycle before it comes back. The longer it is, the more working capital the business must fund.
Cash from Operations ÷ PAT-14.73 ÷ 104.79Did the profit turn into cash? Profit is an opinion; cash is a fact. When this sits well below 1x for long, the two are drifting apart, and the filing is where you find out why.
(PAT − Cash from Operations) ÷ Total Assets(104.79 − -14.73) ÷ 357.18 = 119.52 ÷ 357.18The share of reported profit that exists on paper rather than in the bank. It is also the heaviest single term in the Beneish model, for good reason.
Price × Post-issue Shares₹177.00 × 81,993,740 sharesWhat the whole company is being valued at, if the issue prices at the top of the band.
Market Cap + Total Borrowings − Cash1,451.29 + 111.12 − 0.10What it would actually cost to buy the whole business: you take on its debt and you get its cash. This is the number a buyer cares about, and it is the reason a P/E on its own can mislead.
Enterprise Value ÷ EBITDA1,562.30 ÷ 14.63The multiple that includes debt. Two companies on the same P/E — one debt-free, one heavily borrowed — are not the same investment, and only this number tells you so.
Market Cap ÷ PAT1,451.29 ÷ 104.79The familiar multiple. Useful, but blind to debt — read it alongside EV/EBITDA, never instead of it.
EBIT × (1 − tax rate) ÷ (Net Worth + Debt − Cash)NOPAT ÷ Invested CapitalWhat the business earns on the capital actually at work in it. We do not compare this to a cost of capital: that would need a beta, an unlisted company has none, and inventing one would be theatre.
Latest full-year PAT ÷ market value₹104.79 cr ÷ ₹1,451.29 crThe P/E turned upside down: what each rupee of market value earns today. Set it against what you could earn elsewhere; the gap is what growth has to make up.
(Operating cash flow − capital expenditure) ÷ market value₹-19.10 cr ÷ ₹1,451.29 crCash left after the company pays for its own investment, against the price of the whole company. Profit can be shaped by accounting choices; this is harder to shape.
P/E ÷ trailing PAT growth (%)13.85 ÷ 158.2%PEG was designed for FORWARD growth. This one uses TRAILING growth, because that is all a prospectus gives us — and the final year before an IPO is very often the best year the company will have for a while. A low PEG here may say more about the timing of the filing than about the price. We show it because it was asked for; we show the growth denominator beside it so it cannot mislead you quietly.
Workspace
The post-issue share count is stated as “[•]” in this filing until final pricing, so we derive it: profit after tax divided by earnings per share gives the pre-issue count, and the fresh issue divided by the offer price gives the new shares. Everything below rests on that derivation. It is close, not exact.
The numbers are already loaded. Move the offer price and watch every multiple move with it. Set your own growth and margin and see what they imply two years out. These are your assumptions, not our forecast — we have no view on what this company will earn, and the moment we published one we would be doing something we are not registered to do. What we can do is put the arithmetic in front of you and get out of the way.
Price defaults to the top of the band. Margin defaults to what the company actually reported in FY26.
Projections are arithmetic on the inputs you typed. They are not a forecast, not a recommendation, and not a view on whether this offer is worth taking. Educational only.
Institutional Alpha: DRHP Deep Dive
According to the CRISIL Report, the B2B gems and jewellery industry in India, comprising manufacturers and wholesalers, has shown strong growth, with market size increasing at a CAGR of 24.60% from ₹3,03,000.00 crore (₹3,030.00 billion) in Fiscal 2022 to ₹7,30,100.00 crore (₹7,301.00 billion) in Fiscal 2026. Retail jewellery consumption is heavily concentrated in South India, which commands the highest regional share of 38% to 43%. The South Indian gems and jewellery retail market, valued at ₹5,02,600.00 crore (₹5,026.00 billion) in Fiscal 2026, is projected to grow at a CAGR of 6.00% to 7.00% to reach ₹6,20,000.00 crore to ₹6,60,000.00 crore by Fiscal 2030, driven by deep-rooted cultural affinity, festive demand cycles, and increasing organized retail penetration.
Future Planning
Deepa Jewellers is transitioning toward a hybrid model by establishing a 6,696 square feet in-house manufacturing facility in Hyderabad, Telangana. The facility will be equipped with advanced gold machinery such as a real wax 3-D printer and induction melting machine. Additionally, the company is opening a new sales office in Bengaluru in Fiscal 2027 to deepen its presence in Karnataka, following its November 2025 Vijayawada rollout.
Source: p. 192, 193Competitive Position
The company holds a strong competitive position as an organized wholesaler specializing in large wedding ornaments (vaddanams) and CNC cut bangles, capturing a substantial share of B2B demand from national jewellery retail chains in South India. Its inventory holding period of 18 days in FY26 is significantly lower than listed peers like RBZ Jewellers (235 days) and Khazanchi Jewellers (63 days), enabling superior asset turn.
Source: p. 114, 115Execution Track Record
The company has demonstrated an exceptional growth trajectory under its founders. Consolidated revenues from operations scaled from ₹102.46 crore in Fiscal 2024 to ₹192.67 crore in Fiscal 2026, exhibiting a CAGR of 37.10%. Over the same period, profit after tax (PAT) rose from ₹24.35 crore to ₹104.79 crore, representing an extraordinary CAGR of 107.46%, driven by substantial volume growth and expansion of processing margins.
Source: p. 68, 77, 104Shareholding, Syndicate & Leadership
Leadership & Skin in the Game
Leadership: Ashish Agarwal (Chairman and Managing Director)
Litigation: As of the date of the Red Herring Prospectus, there are no outstanding criminal, material civil, or tax litigations (direct or indirect tax demand is Nil) pending against the Company, its Promoters, or Directors.
Auditor / RPT Flags: None. The statutory auditors' examination report on the Restated Financial Information for Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024 is unmodified and contains no reservations, qualifications, adverse remarks, or emphasis of matter.
Peers & Valuation
| Company | P/E | P/B | RoE | Margin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sky Gold and Diamonds Limited | 57.56 | 11.17 | 23.88 | 6.86 |
| Shanti Gold International Limited | 12.72 | 3.25 | 37.34 | 9.86 |
| Shringar House of Mangalsutra Limited | 17.02 | 3.3 | 26.29 | 7.07 |
| RBZ Jewellers Limited | 10.08 | 1.86 | 20.11 | 14.43 |
| Khazanchi Jewellers Limited | 22.22 | 6.21 | 32.45 | 6.11 |
At the ₹177 upper band, the issue is priced at 13.8x earnings — a 19% discount to the peer median of 17.0x. This is the arithmetic of the price band against the peers the filing itself lists; it is not a view on whether the offer is worth taking.
Retail Vitals
The operating metrics that actually price this business — the ones a generic IPO page skips. Straight from the filing.
| Metric | Value | Detail |
|---|---|---|
| B2B client network | 373 customers | As of July 31, 2026, comprising 47 organized jewellery retail chains and 326 standalone stores, up from 315 customers (43 chains and 272 standalone stores) as of November 30, 2025. |
| Product SKU count | 110 SKUs | Across 16 gold jewellery categories as of July 31, 2026, up from 76 SKUs across 14 categories as of November 30, 2025. |
| In-house design team | 15 designers | As of July 31, 2026, expanded from 5 designers as of November 30, 2025. |
| Average inventory days | 18 days | For Fiscal 2026, down from 21 days in Fiscal 2025 and 22 days in Fiscal 2024, demonstrating improved stock turns. |
| Average receivable days | 36 days | For Fiscal 2026, up from 29 days in Fiscal 2025, but down from 42 days in the half-year ended September 30, 2025. |
| Net operating cycle | 53 days | For Fiscal 2026, compared to 49 days in Fiscal 2025 and 53 days in Fiscal 2024. |
| Total gold volume sold | 1,644 kg | In Fiscal 2026, compared to 1,889 kg in Fiscal 2025 and 1,739 kg in Fiscal 2024. |
| Job work volume processed | 757 kg | In Fiscal 2026, up from 485 kg in Fiscal 2025 and 387 kg in Fiscal 2024. |
| Average revenue per customer | ₹9.00 crore | ₹90.03 million in Fiscal 2026, up from ₹6.78 crore (₹67.82 million) in Fiscal 2025 and ₹5.25 crore (₹52.54 million) in Fiscal 2024. |
| Unsold gold jewellery returns | 93.84 kg | In Fiscal 2026, compared to 107.64 kg in Fiscal 2025 and 81.26 kg in Fiscal 2024, accepted as a customer retention measure. |
| Geographic sales coverage | 10 states / UTs | In Fiscal 2026, compared to 9 states and union territories in Fiscal 2025 and Fiscal 2024. |
| Operating sales offices | 1 office | Located in Vijayawada, Andhra Pradesh (commenced in November 2025). A new Bengaluru sales office is planned for Fiscal 2027. |
| In-house manufacturing planned | 6,696 sq. ft. proposed facility | Under construction in Hyderabad, Telangana (expected to be operational in FY27) to transition from a 100% outsourced karigar model. |
Source: p. 17, 30, 184, 186, 217, 218 — Business / MD&A
🔍 Forensic Findings — What the Footnotes Say
Findings from across the filing — the notes, MD&A, related-party disclosures, contingent liabilities, CARO and litigation, alongside the risk section itself. Each carries where it was found, so you can see which were buried and which were disclosed. Findings marked derived are computed from the filed numbers against a stated rule, shown beside them.
The company has availed unsecured loans from its promoters. As of July 31, 2026, these borrowings aggregated to ₹44.43 crore (₹444.28 million), representing a significant share of its total borrowings of ₹127.41 crore (₹1,274.07 million) (or ₹111.12 crore as of March 31, 2026). These loans are repayable on demand (subject to Yes Bank's consent), exposing the company to liquidity and refinancing risks if recalled on short notice.
p. 28, 103, 339, 341Two partnership firms forming part of the Promoter Group, namely M/s Deepa Jewellers (discontinued in FY17) and M/s Deepa Gold (discontinued in FY21), were dissolved pursuant to dissolution deeds dated November 27, 2025 and December 6, 2025, respectively, shortly before filing the DRHP. Any residual unassessed tax liabilities, past non-compliance, or regulatory penalties arising from these dissolved entities could expose the Promoters (who were partners in these firms) to personal liabilities, indirectly impacting the Company.
p. 49, 220The company currently processes 100.00% of its jewellery through an outsourced model utilizing a pool of 41 skilled karigars. However, formal written agreements have been executed with only 29 of these karigars, while the remaining 12 operate under informal working relationships. Because these arrangements are non-exclusive, competitors can offer higher making charges to prioritize their orders, exposing the company to production delays, design leaks, or making charge fluctuations.
p. 34, 185, 186As a customer retention measure, the company accepts returns of unsold gold jewellery from its B2B retail chain and standalone customers, adjusting the value against future purchases instead of offering cash refunds. The returned jewellery quantities were substantial, standing at 93.84 kgs in Fiscal 2026, 107.64 kgs in Fiscal 2025, and 81.26 kgs in Fiscal 2024, exposing the company to redesigning, remanufacturing, and refining costs and delays if designs become outdated.
p. 30The company experienced delays in filing several statutory and regulatory forms with the Registrar of Companies (ROC) in the past, including Form CHG-1 (creation/modification of charges for FY17, FY18, FY19, and FY22), Form ADT-1 and ADT-3 (statutory auditor appointments and resignations), Form DIR-12 (KMP appointments), Form MGT-14 (bonus allotments and CFO appointment), and Form DPT-3 (return of deposits for FY19 and FY25).
p. 36The company disclosed that it was unable to obtain official records of educational qualifications for one of its Directors (Whole-Time Director Dev Agarwal, who holds a provisional BBA degree from Amity University), its Key Managerial Personnel (CFO Srinivas Kamoji Gunupudi, who holds a provisional degree), and three of its Senior Management personnel, relying on provisional degrees or certificates for their profiles.
p. 42Operating cash flow was negative ₹14.73 cr in FY26 while the company reported a profit after tax of ₹104.79 cr. Profit that does not arrive as cash has to be funded from somewhere else.
rule: CFO<0 & PAT>0Trade receivables grew 91.6% against revenue growth of 37.9% in FY26. Revenue may be being recognised ahead of collection.
rule: receivables growth > 1.3x sales growthShort-term borrowings of ₹67.46 cr against cash of ₹0.10 cr. Debt that must be refinanced within a year is comfortable only while lenders stay comfortable.
rule: cash < 0.5x short-term debtCompany's Claims vs Reality
We stress-test each claim against the filing's own data.
How does the working capital cycle react to the rapid expansion of trade receivables and receivables days?
p. 29, 30, Note 48Proprietary SWOT — Company-Specific
Strengths
- Established market position as an organized B2B supplier of specialized gold wedding ornaments (vaddanams and CNC cut bangles) in South India, which has the country's highest gold consumption (~40%).
- Long-standing relationships with 47 prominent national and regional retail chains (such as Joyalukkas, Kalyan Jewellers, GRT Jewellers) and 326 standalone stores.
- Capital-efficient outsourced manufacturing model utilizing 41 skilled karigars, enabling rapid scalability without heavy fixed asset investments.
Weaknesses
- Negative cash flows from operating activities (-₹14.73 crore in FY26 and -₹9.86 crore in FY25) due to high trade receivables and inventory expansion.
- High geographical concentration, with 94.37% of revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026 generated from the South Indian states of Telangana, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala.
- Customer concentration, with the top 10 B2B customers contributing 64.67% of total sales in Fiscal 2026.
Opportunities
- Establishment of a new 6,696 square feet in-house manufacturing facility in Hyderabad to centralize production, enhance design confidentiality, and lower making charges.
- Product portfolio expansion by adding high-margin kundan nakshi and paper casting jewellery categories and adding 5 more designers by FY27.
- Under the India-UAE CEPA, importing gold bullion at a 1% concessional customs duty rate under Tariff Rate Quotas (TRQ) to improve margins.
Threats (material, not boilerplate)
- Extreme volatility in raw gold prices driven by central bank purchases and global geopolitical tensions, which raises inventory costs and can delay retail purchases.
- Intense competition from organized B2B suppliers and unorganized family-owned local wholesalers who operate on high trust and lower pricing.
- Risks of design duplication or leakage as the company does not register its jewellery designs under the Designs Act, 2000.
Live Subscription Status
Total subscription is fed live from the exchange data feed. The category split (QIB, NII, retail) is not carried by that feed and is added by hand where it is material — so it is shown only when we have actually verified it, rather than left as blanks.
Allotment Status
Check your allotment on the registrar's portal → Registrar: Bigshare Services
Allotment is decided by the registrar, not by us and not by the exchange. In an oversubscribed retail book, allotment is by lottery, so a large application does not improve your odds beyond one lot. If money stays blocked after the refund date, the mandate expiry (15 Oct 2026) is the date to raise with your bank.
Analyst Q&A: Burning Questions
Facts from the filing. No recommendation — that layer arrives once our Research Analyst registration is live.
How does the proposed deployment of ₹215.00 crore for working capital requirements align with the company's historical financial performance?
The company is directing 86.00% of its Fresh Issue proceeds (₹215.00 crore out of ₹250.00 crore) to fund incremental working capital, to be deployed as ₹125.00 crore in FY27 and ₹90.00 crore in FY28. This is highly aligned with its business model, which requires maintaining extensive inventories of finished gold ornaments (surged to ₹87.36 crore in FY26) to showcase collections at national B2B exhibitions and support a massive increase in trade receivables, which scaled to ₹252.36 crore in FY26.
p. 12, 101, 102, 104What are the material customer and geographic concentrations of Deepa Jewellers' B2B business?
The company exhibits significant customer and geographic concentration. Geographically, South Indian states (Telangana, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, Kerala) generated 94.37% (₹181.82 crore) of total Fiscal 2026 revenues. Client-wise, its top 10 customers (consisting of prominent retail chains like Kalyan and Joyalukkas) contributed 64.67% (₹124.60 crore) of total revenue from operations in Fiscal 2026, making it highly dependent on the credit health and purchase volumes of these major retail accounts.
p. 185, 186, 188What factors drove the exceptional net profit surge to ₹104.79 crore in Fiscal 2026, and is this growth sustainable?
The consolidated PAT scaled from ₹24.35 crore in FY24 to ₹104.79 crore in FY26. This was driven by a 36.35% increase in processing revenues, but primarily by exceptional operating leverage. Operating EBITDA margins expanded from 3.49% in FY24 to 7.60% in FY26 as average inventory days fell to 18 days and gold prices elevated. However, sustainability is a concern given that cash flows from operations (CFO) turned negative at -₹14.73 crore in FY26 due to credit extension (trade receivables doubled to ₹252.36 crore).
p. 52, 70, 104What are the key hidden promoter-related and regulatory risks that prospective public investors must evaluate?
The primary hidden risks include: (i) Promoter-linked funding dependency, with ₹43.65 crore outstanding in unsecured loans from Ashish, Seema, and Dev Agarwal as of March 31, 2026, which are repayable on demand; (ii) retrospective tax or compliance exposures of dissolved partnership firms M/s Deepa Jewellers and M/s Deepa Gold, which were wound up shortly before filing the DRHP; and (iii) the lack of trademark registration for the company's main logos and brand taglines (all applications are currently pending formalities check).
p. 28, 49, 103, 220What Earlier Investors Paid
Early capital takes real risk and is fairly rewarded for it — a large multiple built over many years is normal. What deserves a closer look is a steep step-up in a short window: a round priced cheaply only months before the offer.
| Shareholder | Priced at | When | vs IPO price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ashish Agarwal and Seema Agarwal (Initial Subscription to the Memorandum of Association) | ₹10.00 | 2016-05-05 | 17.7x |
| An early round from roughly 11 years ago, at roughly 17.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Ashish Agarwal, Seema Agarwal, and Chandrakala Agarwal (Rights Issue) | ₹10.00 | 2016-09-17 | 17.7x |
| An early round from roughly 10 years ago, at roughly 17.7x the offer price. A multiple of that size built over that long reflects the risk taken and the time elapsed. That is the normal reward for early capital, not a red flag. | |||
| Stock Split (Face Value sub-division from ₹10 each to ₹2 each) | — | 2025-11-10 | — |
| Bonus Issue (Ratio of 3 Equity Shares for every 1 existing Equity Share held) | — | 2025-11-28 | — |
Prices are as stated in the filing’s allotment history and are not adjusted for later bonus issues or share splits. Where a company has issued bonus shares, the multiples above understate the true return and can even read as losses. Adjusting for that is on our list; until it is done we would rather show the raw disclosure and tell you its limits than publish a confident number that is wrong.
Lock-in Expiry Calendar
Shares held before the IPO cannot be sold immediately; they unlock in tranches. When a tranche unlocks, more shares become eligible to trade. Retail investors are frequently caught unaware by these dates. The schedule below follows from the listing date; quantities are shown only where the filing discloses them.
- 08 Mar 2028Minimum Promoters' Contribution18 months
- 08 Mar 2027Promoters' shareholding in excess of 20%6 months
- 08 Mar 2027Entire pre-Offer Equity Share capital of our Company (other than the Minimum Promoters' Contribution and shares sold in OFS)6 months
- 07 Dec 2026Anchor Investors (50% of allotment)90 days
- 08 Oct 2026Anchor Investors (remaining 50% of allotment)30 days
An unlock means more shares may be sold — not that they will be, and not that the price will move. We state the dates; what you do with them is your call.
What Changed Between the DRHP and the RHP
Companies file a draft prospectus, then a final one. The changes in between are rarely reported, and they can be revealing.
| Item | In the DRHP | In the RHP / Addendum |
|---|---|---|
| Reporting Period (Restated Financials Roll-Forward) The reporting periods were rolled forward by one full financial year for the RHP. Fiscal 2023 and the six-month stub period ended September 30, 2025 were dropped, while Fiscal 2026 was added with audited figures. | Restated Consolidated Financial Statements covering Fiscals 2025, 2024, and 2023, and the six-month period ended September 30, 2025. | Restated Consolidated Financial Statements covering Fiscals 2026, 2025, and 2024. |
| Assessment of Gems and Jewellery Industry Report (CRISIL Report Date) The commissioned industry research report from CRISIL was updated from the December 2025 version to the August 2026 version to provide the most recent industry metrics and peer benchmarks. | CRISIL Report titled 'Assessment of gems and jewellery industry in India with focus on the B2B segment' dated December 2025. | CRISIL Report titled 'Assessment of gems and jewellery industry in India with focus on the B2B segment' dated August 2026 (incorporating an addendum to the engagement letter dated May 29, 2026). |
| Outstanding Trade Payables to Creditors Outstanding trade payables were significantly reduced from ₹3.26 crore to ₹0.09 crore between the two reporting dates. This reduction lowered the 5% materiality threshold for individual creditor disclosure from ₹1.63 million to ₹0.05 million. | Outstanding trade payables of ₹3.26 crore (₹32.57 million) across 25 creditors (comprising 6 material creditors with ₹20.88 million and 19 other creditors with ₹11.68 million) as of September 30, 2025. Materiality threshold for individual disclosure was ₹1.63 million. | Outstanding trade payables of ₹0.09 crore (₹0.90 million) across 12 creditors (comprising 7 material creditors with ₹0.84 million and 5 other creditors with ₹0.06 million) as of March 31, 2026. Materiality threshold for individual disclosure fell to ₹0.05 million. |
| In-house Design Team and SKU Portfolio Size The company expanded its design team from 5 to 15 designers and increased its product catalog size from 76 to 110 SKUs to support B2B retail client demands. | In-house team of 5 designers and a product portfolio of 76 SKUs across 14 gold jewellery categories as of November 30, 2025. | In-house team of 15 designers and a product portfolio of 110 SKUs as of July 31, 2026. |
| Customer Network / B2B Retail Clients The customer base expanded by 58 clients, with retail chains increasing from 43 to 47 and standalone stores increasing from 272 to 326. | Customer network of 315 B2B clients (comprising 43 jewellery retail chains and 272 standalone stores) across 13 states and 1 union territory in India as of November 30, 2025. | Customer network of 373 B2B clients (comprising 47 jewellery retail chains and 326 standalone stores) as of July 31, 2026. |
| Undisputed Statutory Dues Filings While Fiscals 2025 and 2024 remained delay-free, the newly added Fiscal 2026 results disclosed minor procedural delays in EPF and GST filings. | No instances of delay or non-payment in undisputed statutory dues/liabilities recorded during Fiscals 2025, 2024, 2023, and the six-month period ended September 30, 2025. | Disclosed minor procedural delays in Fiscal 2026, comprising 1 instance of delay in depositing Employees' Provident Fund (EPF) of ₹0.005 crore (₹0.05 million) for 25 days, and 1 instance of delay in Central Goods and Services Tax (GST) filing for 16 days (with nil amount delayed). |
Educational, grounded entirely in the company's filings (DRHP/RHP). Not investment advice. FinMinutes does not provide buy/sell recommendations.
