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Needs current assets and current liabilities.
KANOHAR · Electric Equipment · INE877D01025
Analyst mean 0.00 · 0 analysts · 0% bullishThis company listed within the last twelve months, so its prospectus is still the primary source. The figures below were extracted from the DRHP and RHP before listing and scored then, and they are shown here as they stand in the IPO record rather than restated.
Each flag is a fact read in the filing, shown with the context that makes it meaningful.
Stated objects, as worded in the offer document. Deployment against them is tracked separately.
Claims made in the offer document, to be read against what the company has reported since.
Kanohar Electricals Limited, established in 1972, is a prominent domestic player in India's power transmission infrastructure sector, specializing in the design, manufacture, and installation of power transformers. The company owns and operates two automated manufacturing facilities in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, consisting of the Rithani facility (operational since 1983, manufacturing distribution and small power transformers up to 25 MVA, 66 kV) and the Gangol facility (operational since 1997, manufacturing large power transformers up to 500 MVA, 400 kV) with an aggregate annual installed capacity of 19,200 MVA as of March 31, 2026. The company's product portfolio covers power, distribution, traction, and Scott-connected transformers, catering to high-growth strategic sectors such as state and central utilities (GETCO, Rajasthan Transco, PGCIL), Indian Railways, and private EPC contractors. The firm operates under a tender-driven, order-based model, with government entities accounting for 93.62% of its ₹ 1,818.32 crore order book as of Fiscal 2026. Kanohar is highly backward-integrated, producing critical components like transformer tanks and radiators indigenously, which reduces third-party dependencies, ensures quality control, and achieves faster delivery lead times compared to its peers.
Kanohar's competitive moat is driven by high technical barriers to entry and strict pre-qualification approvals. The company is one of only five players in India with short-circuit test certification for 500 MVA 400 kV transformers, and one of four certified by RDSO to manufacture 100 MVA 132 kV Scott-connected transformers. Additionally, its robust backward-integrated facilities for in-house manufacturing of transformer tanks and radiators act as key cost and lead-time advantages over competitors.
Kanohar Electricals Limited is a leading domestic manufacturer of power transmission transformers and a turnkey EPC solutions provider in India. Established in 1972, the company owns and operates two automated manufacturing facilities in Meerut, Uttar Pradesh, specializing in high-voltage power transformers up to 500 MVA, 400 kV.
Source: p. 244, p. 248
Where the revenue came from, as the document splits it.
| Name | Pct | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Transformer Manufacturing Business | 83.43 | p. 245 |
| EPC solutions for transmission lines | 9.69 | p. 245 |
| EPC solutions for substations | 6.75 | p. 245 |
| Other operating revenue | 0.13 | p. 245 |
The Indian power transmission and transformer manufacturing industry is experiencing steady expansion, driven by national grid upgrades, rural electrification programs, and renewable energy integration targets of 500 GW by 2030. The domestic transformer market has grown consistently, expanding from USD 3,691.40 million in CY19 to USD 4,944.90 million (₹ 46,803.48 crore) in CY25 at a CAGR of 5.0%, and is projected to accelerate to reach USD 6,854.20 million (₹ 64,874.96 crore) by CY30 at a CAGR of 6.7%. Growth is particularly robust in the extra-high voltage and ultra-high voltage segments, which are projected to grow at CAGRs of 9.3% and 8.9% respectively, creating sustained demand for certified local manufacturers like Kanohar.
Growth rate: 6.70%
Market size: ₹ 46,803.48 crore
Sector slug: power-transmission-transformers
Source: p. 167, p. 168
The comparable set the company chose, which is itself a disclosure.
| Name | Margin | Pb | Pe | Roe | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Hitachi Energy India Limited | EBITDA Margin: 15.37%, PAT Margin: 11.78% | 21.04 | p. 158 | ||
| Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited | EBITDA Margin: 6.93%, PAT Margin: 4.63% | 6.29 | p. 158 | ||
| Schneider Electric Infrastructure Limited | EBITDA Margin: 12.83%, PAT Margin: 7.31% | 31.81 | p. 158 | ||
| CG Power & Industrial Solutions Limited | EBITDA Margin: 13.09%, PAT Margin: 9.45% | 114.77 | 19.56 | p. 158 | |
| Transformers & Rectifiers (India) Limited | EBITDA Margin: 15.27%, PAT Margin: 10.59% | 32.19 | 19.33 | p. 158 | |
| GE Vernova T&D India Limited | EBITDA Margin: 27.13%, PAT Margin: 21.60% | 89.37 | 60.96 | p. 158 |
As presented in the offer document. Post-listing figures are in the statements above.
Written before listing, answered from the document itself.
Why is the company allocating ₹ 155.00 Crore for incremental working capital and only ₹ 64.18 Crore for capital expenditure when its capacity utilization at Rithani is below 1% and overall total utilization is only 45.99%?
The company's transformer manufacturing is custom-engineered and tender-driven, requiring extended design, test, and manufacturing cycles (six months to two years) which bloat net working capital days (107 days in FY26). The Rithani facility's low utilization (0.25%) is intentional as the company has repurposed Rithani for prototype developments and over 200 short-circuit test certifications. The ₹ 155.00 Crore funding is crucial to execute its rapidly expanding ₹ 1,818.32 Crore order book.
p. 63, p. 131, p. 174, p. 175
How severe is the customer concentration risk, and what are the implications of the temporary debarment by BSPTCL in early 2026?
The customer concentration risk is extreme: the top 10 clients contributed 93.16% of FY26 revenue, and government utilities generated 85.37% of revenue. The BSPTCL debarment in February 2026 (for delays and defects in its JV project) was conditionally withdrawn on May 14, 2026, after completing balance punch-point tasks. Any future blacklisting or failure to meet pre-qualification criteria would cut off its primary order pipelines.
p. 14, p. 212
What is the primary driver of the company's EBITDA margin expansion from 11.23% in FY24 to 27.59% in FY26, and is this level of profitability sustainable?
Profitability expansion is driven by a structural shift in product mix toward certified EHV (500 MVA 400 kV) power transformers and advanced Scott traction transformers which carry high margins and technical barriers. Gross margins expanded from 28.80% (FY24) to 38.88% (FY26). However, because revenues are tender-driven and raw material input costs are highly volatile (copper, steel), margins remain susceptible to competitive bidding pressures and commodity inflation.
p. 63, p. 125, p. 212
What are the key governance risks arising from the missing corporate records, erroneous committee structures, and the massive ~4x spike in promoter remuneration?
The company has serious historic corporate governance and administrative weaknesses: historical capital files are untraceable, and the Board has run with improperly constituted CSR, Audit, and NRC committees (regularized post-facto via RoC applications on Dec 6, 2025). Furthermore, promoter remuneration was increased by ~288% in FY26 to ₹ 1.593 Crore (representing 39.2% of entire employee benefits), indicating aggressive pre-IPO cash extraction that harms public shareholder value.
p. 37, p. 42, p. 123, p. 237
What the issue priced at, on the figures in the document.
Based on weighted average EPS of ₹ 12.03 and basic/diluted EPS of ₹ 17.43 for the financial year ended March 31, 2026. Cap vs Floor to be finalized.
Consists of domestic listed peers in the transformer and power infrastructure sector: Hitachi Energy, BHEL, Schneider Electric, CG Power, TRIL, and GE Vernova.
Source: p. 150-153
How the book filled. A category that bid far above the rest is a different signal from a uniformly covered issue.
| Date | Name | Shares | Price per share | Category | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1989-08-25 | Bonus Issue (7:8) | 0 | Bonus Issue | p. 111 | |
| 1992-07-01 | Bonus Issue (1:4) | 0 | Bonus Issue | p. 111 | |
| 2025-08-27 | Sub-division (1:5) | 18047500 | Split | p. 111 | |
| 2025-09-19 | Bonus Issue (3:1) | 54142500 | 0 | Bonus Issue | p. 111 |
Ceo: Dinesh Singhal
Outstanding litigation by the Company includes 5 tax proceedings and 1 material civil litigation (aggregate involved ₹ 6.153 Crore). Outstanding litigation against the Company includes 2 tax proceedings and 2 material civil litigations (aggregate involved ₹ 16.224 Crore). Outstanding litigations against Directors and Promoters are Nil.
Auditor name: S S Kothari Mehta & Company, Chartered Accountants
As of the date of the RHP, K Sons Family Trust holds 72,203,991 Equity Shares constituting 97.00% of the pre-Offer Equity Share capital, and Promoter Group member Kanohar International Private Limited holds 2,028,000 Equity Shares (2.72%). Collectively, the Promoters and Promoter Group hold 74,231,991 Equity Shares constituting 99.72% of the pre-Offer paid-up Equity Share capital.
Statutory Auditor under CARO 2020 Clause 3(ii)(b) issued negative comments regarding discrepancies in quarterly bank statements on working capital against books of accounts for FY26 and FY25. Predecessor Auditor in FY24 issued a negative comment under Clause 3(iv) regarding non-charging of interest on a loan, and Note 40 records excess managerial remuneration of ₹ 0.828 Crore in FY24 under Section 197.
Auditor changed last 3y: No
Source: p. 37, p. 41, p. 123, p. 148, p. 185
Transactions with promoters, directors and their entities, as disclosed.
| Counterparty | Amount cr | Nature | Relationship | Core function | Source |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Dinesh Singhal | 3.85 | Remuneration (salary) | Managing Director and Promoter | Executive Management | p. 123 |
| Adesh Singhal | 3.6 | Remuneration (salary) | Whole-time Director and Promoter | Executive Management | p. 123 |
| Vivek Singhal | 3.35 | Remuneration (salary) | Whole-time Director and Promoter | Executive Management | p. 123 |
| Abhishek Singhal | 3.35 | Remuneration (salary) | Whole-time Director and Promoter | Executive Management | p. 123 |
| Brijesh Singhal | 1.779 | Remuneration (salary) | Promoter Group member | Senior Management | p. 123 |
| Aditya Singhal & Associates | 0.687 | Professional charges | Enterprise over which Key Management Personnel has significant influence | Legal and professional consultancy (FY25 transaction; Nil in FY26) | p. 123 |
| Kanohar International Private Limited | 0.73 | Loan repaid including interest | Enterprise over which Key Management Personnel has significant influence | Inter-corporate deposit repayment (FY25 transaction; Nil in FY26) | p. 123 |
| Kanohar International Private Limited | 0.18 | Lease Rent | Enterprise over which Key Management Personnel has significant influence | Manufacturing and office space rental (FY25 transaction; Nil in FY26) | p. 123 |
Under CARO 2020 Clause 3(vii)(a), the auditor disclosed delays in depositing undisputed statutory dues (GST and TDS). In FY26, there was 1 instance of GST delay (₹ 0.07 Crore, 30 days of delay) and 5 instances of TDS delays (₹ 0.169 Crore, up to 243 days of delay). All delayed amounts have been fully discharged as of the RHP date. Trade payables include ₹ 12.719 Crore due to micro, small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) and ₹ 87.323 Crore due to other creditors as of March 31, 2026.
Defaults disclosed: Yes
Source: p. 23, p. 85, p. 99
A change between the two filings is a disclosure in itself.
Numbered markers are corporate actions and, once the filings are read, capital and governance events. Prices are split-adjusted so the series is continuous.
What the numbers mean when read together — computed from the filings, not a score.
Operating cash is only 20% of profit, and operating cash has been negative in 5 of the last 12 years — this is a pattern, not a one-off timing gap.
Why this reading: Flagged because the shortfall is persistent (5 weak years), material, and unexplained by a single year of working-capital movement.
Latest operating cash ₹26 cr vs trailing profit ₹130 cr. A repeated gap between profit and cash points to structural earnings quality issues rather than benign timing.
Debt rose over 3 years, and most of it (100%) has turned into fixed assets and projects under construction — the borrowing is building the business.
Why this reading: A positive signal: leverage taken on is visibly becoming productive capacity, not disappearing.
New borrowing ₹19 cr largely matched by an asset build of ₹19 cr. Debt that funds capacity is a different thing from debt that funds nothing.
Net margin improved from 7.1% to 19.9% year-on-year — the business is keeping more of each rupee.
Why this reading: A positive signal in the numbers, shown for balance alongside the concerns.
Quarter net margin 19.9% vs 7.1% four quarters earlier. Expansion from operating leverage is healthy; verify it is not a one-off gain.
Free cash flow swings between positive and negative across the cycle.
Why this reading: Surfaced for context, not as a concern — it only becomes meaningful if it persists or pairs with other signals.
Latest ₹23 cr, negative in 5 of 12 years.
Every score below is calculated here from the reported numbers — none of it is asserted. Open the notebook at the foot of the section to see each formula with this company's figures in it.
Needs current assets and current liabilities.
Piotroski F-Score — fundamental momentum — Joseph Piotroski, University of Chicago, 2000, in a study of whether accounting signals could improve returns among cheap stocks.
Nine yes-or-no tests across profitability, leverage and operating efficiency. Each pass scores one. It asks a narrow question: is this business getting better or worse on its own terms, year over year?
How to read it7 or more suggests improving fundamentals; 3 or fewer suggests deterioration. It measures direction, not quality — a weak company improving can score higher than a strong one holding steady.
Where it failsA single year of comparison, so one unusual year distorts it. Says nothing about valuation, competitive position or management. Piotroski designed it to rank already-cheap stocks, not to judge a company in isolation.
Needs trade receivables, current assets, other expenses.
Accruals are 19.9% of assets. Free cash flow negative in 5 of 12 years.
DuPont decomposition — Devised inside the DuPont Corporation in the 1920s and still the standard way to read a return on equity.
Splits return on equity into its three sources, so the same headline number can be traced to very different businesses.
How to read itA 20% ROE built on margin and turnover is a different proposition from a 20% ROE built on 3× leverage. The first survives a downturn; the second amplifies it.
Where it failsA single year. Negative equity makes it meaningless. Leverage is structural for lenders, so the third term carries no signal there.
Revenue grew faster than the capital behind it, which is what operating leverage looks like: the existing asset base is working harder.
cumulative operating cash flow ÷ cumulative net profit
₹176 cr ÷ ₹304 cr, over 12 years
0.58×
Below 1.0 and persistent means profit is being recognised before the cash arrives.(net profit − operating cash flow) ÷ average total assets
(₹130 − ₹26) cr ÷ average assets
19.9%
The share of profit that is accounting entries rather than cash. Above ~10% is where accruals start to dominate.net margin × asset turnover × leverage
19.9% × 1.07 × 1.65
34.9%
Splits ROE into whether returns come from operations or from borrowing.EBIT ÷ finance cost
₹187 cr ÷ ₹13 cr
14.38×
How many times operating profit covers the interest bill.borrowings ÷ net worth
₹39 cr ÷ ₹373 cr
0.10×
Read against the sector — infrastructure carries more than software.growth in fixed assets + CWIP, against growth in revenue
capital +73% vs revenue +110%, FY2023 to FY2026
-37pp gap
Money going in far faster than revenue coming out. For an incubator this is expected — the test is whether it eventually converts.Needs more balance-sheet detail (only 3 of 6 flags testable).
NOPAT over equity plus debt less cash, at a notional 25% tax. Incremental ROIC is the return on money put in since then — the number that decides whether growth creates value or consumes it.
Return on invested capital, and incremental ROIC — Standard in corporate finance; the incremental form was popularised by Michael Mauboussin as the test of whether growth creates value.
ROIC measures what the business earns on all the capital it employs — equity plus debt, less cash. Incremental ROIC asks a sharper question: what has it earned on the money put in since a chosen year?
How to read itROIC comfortably above the cost of capital — call it 11–13% in India — means growth compounds. Below it, growth consumes. Incremental below headline means recent investment is earning less than the legacy business.
Where it failsDistorted in the year of a large acquisition. Understated for companies mid-build, where capital is deployed but capacity has not yet been commissioned — an incubator will look poor until it does not.
Read downward. Cash can cover EBITDA and still not survive capex — the third rung is where a capital-hungry business shows itself.
The earnings quality ladder — Not a named model — the standard sequence an analyst walks when testing whether reported profit is real.
Three ratios read in order, each stricter than the last.
How to read itRead downward. Each rung failing where the one above passed tells you exactly where the cash is going.
Where it failsA single year of heavy capex depresses the third rung legitimately. Judge it across a cycle.
The growth rate that makes today's market value equal the discounted cash flows, at a 11.5% discount rate and 4.0% terminal growth. Not a forecast — the arithmetic of what is already in the price. Compare it with what the business has actually delivered.
Reverse DCF — the growth already in the price — A standard inversion of discounted cash flow, used to avoid the forecasting problem entirely.
Instead of forecasting cash flows and deriving a value, it takes today's market value as given and solves for the growth rate that would justify it. The output is not a view — it is the arithmetic of what the market is currently assuming.
How to read itCompare it with what the business has actually delivered. A price implying 30% a year against a decade of 15% is a demanding assumption; the reverse is a modest one.
Where it failsUseless when free cash flow is negative or unusually depressed, which is common mid-capex. Highly sensitive to the discount rate — a point either way moves the answer materially.
Models that need these lines are withheld rather than estimated: net worth, current assets, current liabilities, trade receivables, inventory, net block. Nothing on this page is back-solved from a figure the company did not publish.
Each framework below is a set of stated, mechanical criteria from published work, run against this company's own filed numbers. Passing or failing a screen is not a verdict — different frameworks disagree by design, and that disagreement is itself informative.
Benjamin Graham's stated criteria for a defensive stock, applied to the filed numbers. A company failing several is not disqualified — Graham designed these to be deliberately strict.
Two ratios only: what the business earns on its capital, and what you pay for those earnings. Designed to be ranked across a universe rather than read in isolation.
The fundamental half of William O'Neil's framework. The market and leadership components are judgement calls and are not scored here.
The characteristics long-term holders commonly look for: cash-backed earnings, high returns on capital, and debt that never forces a decision.
Bars are revenue; the line is net margin. Revenue rising while the line falls is the shape worth noticing.
Operating cash first, then what the business spent and raised.
One year is a snapshot. These are the two lines that matter across a cycle.
Rising debtor or inventory days against flat sales is the earliest visible sign of stress.
Set your own assumptions and watch the numbers move. A scenario calculator — the outputs are the arithmetic of your inputs.
One canonical set of figures — the same numbers used everywhere else on this page and on the screener.
How the register has moved over recent quarters — the direction matters more than the level.
Promoter held steady from 74.65% to 74.65% across these quarters.
FII held steady from 2.19% to 2.19% across these quarters.
MF held steady from 3.94% to 3.94% across these quarters.
Other held steady from 19.22% to 19.22% across these quarters.
Where cash gets stuck. A rising inventory or debtor line against flat sales is the earliest sign of trouble in the numbers.
| Measure | FY2013 | FY2014 | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Debtor days
How long customers take to pay | 188 | 272 | 109 | 69 | 104 | 115 | 158 | 118 |
| Inventory days
How long stock sits before it sells | 109 | 153 | 151 | 88 | 85 | 155 | 52 | 104 |
| Payable days
How long the company takes to pay suppliers | 23 | 58 | 181 | 97 | 111 | 110 | 87 | 91 |
| Cash conversion cycle
Debtor + inventory − payable days | 274 | 367 | 79 | 61 | 77 | 160 | 123 | 131 |
| Working capital days | 258 | 324 | 34 | 38 | 67 | 89 | 96 | 127 |
| ROCE %
Return on capital employed | 5.0% | 5.0% | — | 18.0% | 20.0% | 16.0% | 39.0% | 54.0% |
The shape of the business over time (annual) — read the direction, not the single print.
| Line | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Revenue from operations | 168 | 236 | 311 | 277 | 451 | 654 |
| Other income | 4 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 7 | 9 |
| Depreciation | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 | 3 |
| Finance cost | 5 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 9 | 13 |
| Profit before tax | 11 | 25 | 30 | 26 | 88 | 174 |
| Net profit (owners) | 8 | 18 | 22 | 18 | 65 | 130 |
| EPS (₹) | 20.82 | 49.62 | 59.91 | 47.72 | 174.96 | 17.43 |
Exceptional items, total income and EBITDA are read from the filed statements.
| Metric | Sep 2025 |
|---|---|
| Revenue | 166 |
| Other Income | 5 |
| Expenses | 123 |
| Depreciation | 1 |
| Finance cost | 5 |
| Profit before tax | 42 |
| Net Profit | 31 |
| EPS | 4.12 |
| Item | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Equity Capital | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 4 | 15 |
| Reserves | 127 | 145 | 168 | 174 | 239 | 358 |
| Borrowings | 27 | 12 | 20 | 43 | 33 | 39 |
| Net block | 29 | 26 | 26 | 26 | 31 | 31 |
| CWIP | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 14 |
| Investments | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Total Assets | 241 | 237 | 293 | 323 | 432 | 614 |
| Line | FY2021 | FY2022 | FY2023 | FY2024 | FY2025 | FY2026 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Cash from operations | 20 | 24 | -23 | -16 | 79 | 26 |
| Cash from investing | 0 | -1 | -3 | -13 | -62 | -22 |
| Cash from financing | 10 | -16 | 7 | 12 | -18 | -4 |
| Free cash flow | 20 | 24 | -25 | -18 | 71 | 23 |
| Net change in cash | 30 | 8 | -18 | -17 | 0 | 0 |
Cash from operations is the number profit has to answer to. Free cash flow is what remains after the business pays for its own growth.
These are coverage counts, not ratings. Each one asks a fixed set of questions of the filings and reports how many the company answered. A company that discloses nothing counts nothing here — that is a statement about the disclosure, not about the business.
The same read, applied to the companies this one competes with.